DEFENSE WHITE PAPER

2000



The Ministry of National Defense
The Republic of Korea

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This English version of *Defense White Paper 2000* has been translated by the Translating Team of the Department of English, Korea Military Academy (KMA) on behalf of the ROK Ministry of National Defense. For comments or questions, please contact KMA English Department or MND Defense Policy Division at:

English Department KMA
Phone: 82-2-2197-2538/2531/2544
Website: www.kma.ac.kr
E-mail: jslee@kma.ac.kr

Defense Policy Division MND
Phone: 82-2-748-6227
Website: www.mnd.go.kr
E-mail: basicpol@mnd.go.kr

Message from the Minister of National Defense

The year 2000 was a very meaningful year for us in Korea. We celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Korean War, in which many brave native and foreign soldiers sacrificed their lives to safeguard democracy and freedom on Korean soil. Also, for the first time in 55 years, South and North Korea held a summit and issued the "June 15 Joint Declaration," which will serve as the framework for reconciliation, cooperation, and the removal of the Cold War structure from the Korean peninsula.

Since the "June 15 Joint Declaration," many changes have taken place on the Korean peninsula. First of all, talks at the ministerial level initiated the process to bring separated families together. Second, South and North Korean athletes walked together in the opening procession at the Sydney Olympics and impressed the entire world that was viewing the event. Moreover, detailed plans are underway to foster additional exchanges and active cooperation between the two countries. Finally, South and North Korea are currently rebuilding the once-connected Seoul-Sinuiju Railway and Highway.

Furthermore, during the "First Inter-Korea Defense Ministers' Talks" on "Cheju" Island, both sides agreed to uphold the spirit of the "June 15 Joint Declaration" and work towards reducing military tension and establishing lasting peace. In the future, we plan to engage in dialogues at the defense ministerial level on a regular basis and pursue military confidence building measures. Our ultimate goal is to bring an end to the Cold War regime on the peninsula.

I believe that such exciting developments in South-North relations were

made possible because of our military's firm readiness posture. As the two countries continue to improve their relationship, a support structure built on strong security will become more important. In other words, whatever changes may come in South-North relations and the security environment, we will not lose sight of our primary task of "protecting the lives and property of our people by repelling and retaliating against external aggression on our land, air, and sea." In short, we will always hold fast to what is the most basic and fundamental duty and mission of the military.

Highly significant in shaping a defense policy is the need to recognize the "actual capability" of our counterparts rather than just their "stated intention." Hence, even with the recent positive changes in South-North relations, it must be noted that the reality of North Korea's threat, with its powerful military, still exists. We will make our utmost effort to ensure military readiness at all times.

For the past year, the ROK Armed Forces have been pushing ahead with three key missions in order to foster advanced combat mission-oriented elite forces. The three key missions include "establishing a robust defense posture," "fostering advanced, elite forces," and "nurturing armed forces that are loved and trusted by the people."

The ROK Armed Forces will work tirelessly to safeguard the nation's interests and the invaluable lives of its citizens, foster a technology- and information-oriented professional military for the new security threats in the future, and expand military cooperation with neighboring countries on the basis of a strong ROK-US alliance. Also, the ROK Forces will strive to initiate and implement defense reforms in order to increase efficiency and ensure openness in military management and operation. Recognizing that the wellspring of a nation's defense capability are the citizens themselves, the ROK military seeks to become an "Armed Forces of the People" that are loved and trusted by the public.

This year's *Defense White Paper* illustrates the ROK Armed Forces' policies and visions of 2000. To acquire an enriched understanding and support of the people, the Ministry of National Defense enormously expanded the scale of public information on defense policies. This book contains a

detailed analysis of the changes and challenges in the international security environment, defense policy and posture for peacekeeping, the current status and tasks of national defense, military reform for the 21st century, and national defense with the people. Furthermore, a wide range of materials and data have been collected and organized into an Appendix to enhance the readers' understanding and provide assistance in conducting research in security-related fields.

I sincerely hope that *Defense White Paper 2000* will play an important role in sharpening people' s understanding of our military and in forming a broad consensus on our defense policy. I eagerly hope that this book will provide an opportunity for the ROK Armed Forces to receive international recognition for their many notable contributions to world peace.

December 1, 2000



Cho, Seong-Tae
ROK Minister of National Defense

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Part One
Security Environment: Changes and Challenges

Chapter One
Global Security Situation

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Security Situation in Northeast Asia

Chapter Three
North Korean Situation and Military Threat

Chapter One
Global Security Situation

Security Situation Overview

Since the end of the Cold War, the global security situation has shown two opposing trends. One is toward peace, sustained by an increase in cooperation and reconciliation, and the other toward insecurity caused by ongoing regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

On December 3, 1989, the United States and the former Soviet Union made a joint declaration, calling for "an official end to the Cold War between the eastern and the western blocs and for a start of a new age of cooperation for lasting peace." Positive results ensued. The eastern Europeans and the Third World adopted democracy and opted for a free market system. Further, an increasing number of countries began to resort to non-violent means to resolve inter-state disputes.

However, the problems that lay dormant during the Cold War have resurfaced and, along with many new ones, are emerging as the latest threats to global security. Foremost are the frequent communal disputes, be they racial, religious, ethnic, or territorial. The countries labeled "States of Concern" are a constant threat, as they refuse to cease production of WMDs such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition, problems on a transnational level, including environmental pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, and refugee issues are also on the rise.

As the world's sole superpower, the United States is dealing with the security issues by way of bilateral alliances and collective security establishments like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US is expected to remain the primary stabilizing force around the globe in the new millennium, despite challenges from Russia and China, who frequently express opposing views on some of the most controversial issues facing

the international community.

The new millennium will also witness the United Nations enlarge its sphere of activity, as it pushes for a speedy conclusion to several important negotiations to reduce strategic and conventional weapons. A strict enforcement of the terms of these negotiations is another key concern of the organization. At the grassroots level, the UN works for stability *via* peacekeeping operations, sending trained men and women to areas of conflict.

New Threats and Challenges

A. Diversified Security Concepts and Increased Transnational Threats

Since the Cold War, the world's attention has turned to a new set of issues. First, the sources of contention around the globe have multiplied, with diminishing natural resources and a worsening environment added to the old problems of territorial, ethnic, and religious conflicts. Additionally, many countries now feverishly pursue self-interest and competitiveness, because they recognize that only such a course of action will ensure economic progress in an age of free commerce and rapid technological advancement. Accordingly, the traditional ideas of security revolving around politics and the military have become obsolete; governments must now seek to embrace non-military measures to ensure an active economy. In other words, politics and military affairs are no longer exclusively critical to national defense as trade, finance, information, welfare, technology, resources, environment, and culture have increased in importance.

And as a logical consequence, problems in the economic sector, like recession and financial crises as well as the factors that weaken the economy, such as natural disasters, organized crime, drug-trafficking, environmental pollution, and illegal cyber activities pose as serious a threat as military tension. Affected in this process are not only the individuals but also nations as a whole, and ultimately the entire global community.

B. Progress in Military Science and Expansion of New Threats

Technology has already become the determining factor in future warfare, and most countries are investing heavily in high-tech weaponry and the necessary operational systems.

The traditional military powers predict cyber warfare and high-level C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) warfare as the new forms of fighting in the future. They are, furthermore, making every effort to enhance their information warfare capability by increasing their own intelligence activity of producing, gathering, and transporting information in cyberspace while neutralizing their enemy's ability to do the same. Receiving yet greater attention are long-range precision missile capability, C4ISR capability that allows commanding officers to evaluate battle situations on a real time basis, and eventually space warfare capability, all of which are critical to achieving military superiority.

The same countries have involved themselves in another task; they are working to limit the uncontrolled production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, in addition to the WMDs and the missiles built to deliver these deadly weapons.

Successful in their resistance, however, a few countries persist in the development and production of WMDs, making many worry about the future of global security. India and Pakistan, for example, competed with each other in conducting nuclear tests and mid- and long-range missile launches in May of 1998 and again in April of the following year. Moreover, the relentless pursuit of strengthened nuclear and mid- and long-range ballistic missile capability by North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other so-called "States of Concern" has heightened tension in the international community.

It is now obvious that many countries have the technology to develop missiles and nuclear weapons, and to make matters worse, the parts for these weapons are readily available on the black market. Chemical and biological weapons (CB) are another serious threat; they have the advantage of low production cost and can be easily made. At present, even criminal and terrorist organizations are suspected of having them.

C. Regional Disputes and Conflicts

Conflicts in different parts of the world today have no easy solutions, because a complex web of problems is intricately woven together. Consequently, the international community faces a difficult challenge, as it struggles to resolve these conflicts and prevent any new ones.

Records for the last several months of 1999 show 83 regions under conflict (see Appendix 1), out of which 18 produced more than 1,000 casualties each. The year 2000 experienced some reduction, with 45 regions affected by blood-shedding strife, including the civil wars in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Europe suffered through 13 conflicts in 1999, and two involved armed clashes. Most arose in areas where the displacement of communism is underway. The former Yugoslavia is a case in point. Hostility among the numerous ethnic groups in the region, with their own religion and political antagonism manipulated behind the scenes by the international powerhouses, will continue with no clear end in sight.

With NATO's armed intervention, the conflict in Kosovo grew to an international crisis. Russia, China, and the former Eastern blocs voiced their displeasure over the course of action taken by the United States and the western European countries. The tension began to subside, when the Serbians agreed to the "Kosovo Peace Plan" on June 10, 1999. In the following month, the western countries launched the "Stability Pact for Southeast Europe" yet another move toward long-term peace in the region. Ethnic issues are highly sensitive, however, and lasting solutions will require more than just a few signatures on a paper.

Similarly, the former Soviet Union is struggling with a number of persistent ethnic problems. Besides the well-known Russia–Chechnya conflict, frequent local wars between Georgia and Abkhazia and the civil war in Tajikistan give ample evidence to the latent, yet powerful, hostility among the different ethnic groups.

Asia's ethnic conflicts are somewhat distinctive in that they are closely related to colonialism, religious plurality, and independence movements. The civil wars in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan are prime examples. The success of East Timor had a profound effect on other separatist movements in

the region, particularly the Philippines, where a rebel army is taking advantage of widespread internal anxiety. Moving northwest to India and Pakistan, conflict on a national scale can be observed, with the Kargil crisis of 1999 adding fuel to the fire. Although the two countries, in an effort to prevent armed provocation and to build trust, signed the "Lahore Declaration" a few months prior to the crisis, it proved to be short-lived. India's neighbor to the south, Sri Lanka has a problem of its own with the Tamil separatists calling for independence. Apparently, neither country is close to a permanent solution. In addition, the Middle East currently has the world's attention, with Israel and Palestine unable to achieve a satisfactory settlement. Here, progress via diplomacy is offset by radical groups and their terrorism. Further, Iraq continues to hold a grudge against the West for the UN sanctions and the forced inspection of their military facilities, and the international community is unsettled over Iran's recent test-fire of long range ballistic missiles.

Africa does not fare any better. At present, 1/3 of the world's local wars (27 total) are being fought on this continent, and half of the 53 African countries are affected. The departure of Europeans in the 1960s left a power vacuum. Disputes ensued among the native political factions, as well as rival ethnic and tribal groups, and these eventually grew into full-scale conflicts, as each vied for political power. Africa has the unenviable record for the highest number of local wars. The civil strife in Sierra Leone and the Republic of Congo provide good examples.

Over on the American continents, the dominant atmosphere is one of harmony and stability, though three disputes are still to be settled. Mexico has not experienced armed violence for quite some time, and Peru's dramatically weakened rebel armies and few instances of riots or terrorism have proved inconsequential. An exception is Colombia, where drug lords with ties to the leftists are at a violent standoff with the conservatives. Regrettably, the conflict has produced many casualties and is deemed to be the most serious case on the two continents.

International Efforts for Peace

A. Expansion of UN Roles and Functions

For almost half a century since its inception in 1945, the United Nations (UN) was constrained in its activity by the debilitating ideological standoff among its member countries. With the end of the Cold War, however, came consensus and cooperation. This strengthened the UN's position, which then began to exert greater influence on global politics, particularly in the area of security.

The number and the scope of the UN's peacekeeping operations are increasing steadily. Some of the more notable of these operations include preventing disputes, creating an atmosphere conducive for peace negotiations, overseeing the execution of comprehensive agreements, ensuring the distribution of humanitarian aid, and enforcing the terms of the armistice agreements.

The UN takes leadership in arms reduction, an issue of utmost concern in the international community. The primary concern at present is the unhindered production of WMDs and their sale across national boundaries. First of all, the UN was the key player in concluding such international treaties as the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) and in strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These treaties were designed to limit the production of WMDs. Moreover, in order to monitor international transfers of these weapons, the organization took the critical step of putting several highly effective control mechanisms in place. The Wassenaar Agreement, the MTCR, and many others impose severe restrictions on all traffic involving parts, technology, and information directly or indirectly related to the production of WMDs.

However, recent UN activities, have been halted due to major complications in the reform of the Security Council and severe financial constraints. The US and other developed nations, on the one hand, are attempting to alleviate their burden of the UN payments *via* financial reform. On the other hand, Japan and Germany are seeking recognition commensurate

with their monetary contribution to the organization by demanding a permanent seat on the Security Council. Support from other members is not entirely absent, as many have voiced a similar opinion on the need to reorganize and expand the Security Council. However, the thorny issue of veto rights and the size of the Council remains, with little hope of being settled any time soon.

B. Reduction of Strategic and Conventional Weaponry

The United States and Russia concluded two treatises, START I and START II, to reduce strategic and conventional armaments. NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) signed a treaty, known as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), for the same purpose.

Concluded in July 1991, START I became effective in 1994. The terms of this agreement have been successfully carried out thus far. Both the United States and Russia are optimistic in their push to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missiles to 1,600 and nuclear warheads to 6,000. The second treaty, START II, was ratified by the Russian Duma on April 19, 2000, and the two countries are well on their way to their target numbers: nuclear warheads down to the 3,000-3,500 range and the complete destruction of the entire stock of the multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles. Currently, aiming at the reduction range of 1,500-2,500 for nuclear warheads, the two superpowers are hammering out a third agreement, appropriately called START III.

Since the sixteen members of NATO and the fourteen of the former WTO agreed to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (effective July 1992), a steady reduction in conventional arms followed in Europe. In November of 1999, a summit meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was held, at which time the members decided that the right of retention of the conventional arms will be transferred from NATO and WTO to individual countries. Further, progress has come in Central Europe, where the military is reducing by 10% their inventory of tanks, fighter planes, artillery, and other conventional weapons and is now planning to close down two of the four Russian bases, with plans to send the troops and their weaponry back home by the middle of 2001.

C. Vitalizing Security Dialogues and Regional Security Cooperation Mechanisms

Regional cooperation systems and regular dialogues among countries with mutual interest in security will produce positive results in building confidence in diplomatic and military relations and in regional stability. Russia and the US are setting good examples with their frequent talks and the hotline connecting their two defense ministries. As a result, trust between them has strengthened, reducing much global tension.

In the Asia-Pacific region, where the interests of the major global powers intersect, bilateral security talks play an especially important role. A present pressing need is to pursue these talks with greater fervor, since China's expansionist tendency on the one hand and US-Japan's new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation on the other are raising the level of anxiety of all those affected. Moreover, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, and Japan are in the process of setting up the "Northeast Asia Multilateral Security Consultative Body" that can foster stability in the region. Though North Korea's lukewarm response has delayed this process thus far, its highly symbolic gesture of joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July of 2000 renewed hopes of the member countries. The ARF can now move forward with what it has been doing so successfully–building confidence and encouraging preventative diplomacy–as the unique government-level security mechanism since its inception in 1994. Many more systems are operating around the world to solve the problems distinctive to their region.

Chapter Two

Security Situation in Northeast Asia

Cooperation and Conflict in Northeast Asia

All Northeast Asian countries share a common understanding: indispensable for sustained economic growth is the prevention of regional conflict and destabilization, both of which require a prior alleviation of political and military tension. Hence, the same countries are looking to establish new patterns of relations derived from cooperation and competition, ultimately maximizing their own economy safeguarded by national security.

The United States presently exercises a leading influence in Northeast Asia, and its ties with Korea and Japan will only serve to fortify the cooperative spirit among the three. To check this combined monopoly, however, China and Russia recently agreed to retain their strategic partnership. Significant in this is President Vladimir Putin's unflinching determination to revive Russia's past glories *via* new military diplomacy, with a special eye on Northeast Asia as the new playing field.

The announcement of a revision of the "Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation" and a joint research agreement on the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system placed new strains between these two countries and China, because they involve Taiwan. In the event of contingencies in the area, China is wary of two things. First, the US and Japan may intervene to help Taiwan retain control over the Taiwan Strait, thereby increasing Japan's share of responsibility for stability in the region. Second, and more serious, is the possible inclusion of Taiwan in the US-led TMD project in Northeast Asia, which Beijing views as an infringement on China's sovereignty. Russia expressed its unilateral support for China in this regard.

In light of the US-Japan joint ventures, it was well anticipated that the four major powers in the above paragraph would be divided into two opposing sides. What demands our attention is their influence in the security development of Northeast Asia. The fluctuating relationship between the

US and China now especially emerges as the key variable in the Northeast Asian affairs. Problems in the past, such as the bombing of the Chinese embassy by NATO fighter planes and the US House Representative's Cox Report, which raised suspicions of China's direct involvement in the stolen plans of highly confidential nuclear bombs and missiles, have aggravated their relationship. Furthermore, the US is pushing through the Congress a bill called the "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act," over which China has expressed extreme displeasure. However, positive efforts have not been neglected as the bilateral agreement to secure China's eventual entrance into the World Trade Organization was recently signed and as renewed military exchanges began to reduce the built-up tension.

China also found some common ground with Japan. Both recognize the priority of economic progress and regional security and the symbolic significance of China's membership in the WTO. Progress, however, is offset by a serious territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and by the highly intense tug-of-war for political influence in the region. Russia generally maintains an agreeable relationship with China, as both sides concur on the need for force reduction and to build confidence in their border region, contributing much to stability in Northeast Asia.

On the other hand, Russia's relations with Japan since the end of the Cold War has evolved into one of a strategically mapped out *quid pro quo* cooperative system. A good example is the way both are approaching the problem of the Kurile Islands (Japan's "Northern Territories"). A schematic design of economic exchanges, based on the Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, is in place, along with a diplomatic agreement, to ensure a peaceful resolution.

As is obvious from the previous discussions, the mood in Northeast Asia is upbeat, with clear signs of open cooperation for regional progress. But also as noted above, numerous elements of conflict remain to threaten this progress. Just one example is the latest revelation that, despite signs of reform, open policy, and all-around diplomacy, North Korea remains a threat because of the unresolved problems of nuclear and ballistic missiles. Fortunately, the Inter-Korea summit in June of 2000, the first of its kind in 55 years, produced much hoped-for results, with increased exchanges and cooperation. The world community promises to keep a watchful eye on this development between the two nations.

The Four Major Powers' Policies Toward Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

The United States, Japan, China, and Russia constitute the four nations with special interest in and powerful influence over Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula. Common to all is the desire to ensure that their global policies are faithfully reflected in this part of the world, while simultaneously expanding their political and economic influence with due consideration given to internal and external circumstances.

To begin with, the US adopted the idea of national security, world economy, and global democracy backed up by the military and diplomacy as the cornerstones of its foreign policy, otherwise known as the "Engagement & Leadership Abroad Policy." The US government will fight to prevent any unbalanced exercise of power and regional conflicts in Northeast Asia using an improved set of multilateral security cooperation systems, built on past bilateral alliances.

Recognizing the tension on the Korean peninsula as the prime threat to peace in Northeast Asia, the US is determined to maintain the present level of forces in Korea to ensure stability in this region. It is also pursuing relentlessly another program of prevention, by way of dialogues with North Korea with assistance from Korea and Japan, to deal with the production of nuclear weapons and missiles.

Japan operates under the existing perception outside of Japan that due to its historical offenses and large-scale military development it is a latent threat. It is attempting to deal with this through the US-Japan security system and by advancing international and multilateral dialogue and exchanges.

Agreeing with the US that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are central to Northeast Asian peace, Japan extends unreserved support for South Korea's policy toward North Korea and seeks to strengthen the partnership for cooperative security in the region, with the assistance of Korea and the US. Not surprising then is Japan's enthusiasm for talks to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea that can improve their relationship.

China, however, is wary of Japan's joint endeavors with the US because of their threat to the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Thus, following on

the heels of its recent economic progress, China is investing heavily to modernize the military, expecting to further raise its status as a global superpower.

Moreover, China acknowledges the geopolitical significance of the Korean peninsula and hence considers the two Koreas as objects of key foreign policies. Most significant here is China's implementation of an "equidistant policy." To elaborate, China strives to strike a balance between South and North Korea, maintaining strong economic ties and improving political and military relations with the South on the one hand and giving monetary aid and holding onto the traditional alliance with the North on the other. On the issue of unification, China is a firm supporter of a peaceful resolution through direct dialogues and negotiations between the two governments on the peninsula.

Not to be ignored in this discussion is Russia, who has correctly estimated the strategic significance of the Asia-Pacific by giving it greater attention than before. Russia now works diligently to defuse tension and to strengthen its strategic partnership with China, while improving relations with the countries in this part of the globe. Moreover, as countermeasures to the United States' National Missile Defense (NMD) plan and the potential monopoly of influence over the international and regional disputes, Russia has set up a reliable system of mutual cooperation with China and is pushing to hold six-party talks by adding itself and Japan to the existing 4-party conference on the security issue on the peninsula.

In terms of the Korean peninsula, Russia's basic position is that, though it is not unwilling to lend support when necessary, South and North Korea should work out the details for a peaceful unification on their own.

Defense Policies and Military Trends of Neighboring Major Powers

A. The United States

1. Defense Policy

The four cornerstones of the US defense policy are maintaining global peace, creating an environment of international security favorable to its

national interests, responding to various threats, and preparing for the uncertainties of the future.

Northeast Asia is the region where the global superpowers, including the US, have concentrated the greatest amount of their military forces, forces that work closely together and keep a certain distance at the same time. The region also experiences continual uneasiness due to North Korea's nuclear missiles and the troubles between Taiwan and China.

The United States' defense policy underscores the reduction of tension and deterrence of war on the Korean peninsula on the basis of bilateral alliances with Korea and Japan. It is particularly concerned about the North's ballistic missile capability and considers it as the single greatest threat to security in Northeast Asia. The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan had already begun to be drawn up with Japan in 1999 as an antidote to protect the US forces in the area and their allies from this threat. Judging from the fact that Pyongyang will increase the range of its ballistic missiles as far as the American continent, the US is beginning to build an NMD system to defend its territory. However, the pace was slowed down by President Clinton's announcement on September 1, 2000, postponing the deployment of the NMD weaponry until the completion of all the necessary tests. He, in effect, handed the responsibility for NMD over to his successor. Russia, China, and the European Union welcomed Clinton's decision, and experts agree that it will help induce North Korea to give up production of the missiles.

2. Military Trend

The United States forces in Northeast Asia are committed to the defense of its two allies, Korea and Japan and to securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Pacific Ocean.



▲ USS *Kittyhawk* aircraft carrier battle group

Convinced of the importance of Northeast

Asian security, the United States government selected the US Pacific Command to take the lead in developing new operational concepts based on rapid reaction forces and deployed the USS *Kittyhawk* aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) from the Seventh Fleet to the region.

Figure 1-1 US Military Capabilities in Northeast Asia



Source: *The Military Balance 1999–2000* (London: IISS, October 1999)

The transfer of the *Kittyhawk* CVBG to the Persian Gulf in support of the airstrikes in Serbia in early 1999 raised serious doubts as to feasibility of the "Win-Win Strategy." The US responded quickly by ordering a readiness alert of all the forces on the mainland US and by deploying additional forces to the Korean peninsula to fill the vacancy left by the departure of the *Kittyhawk*. Clearly, the US was determined to show its commitment to the strategy that was designed to ensure victories in these two major theaters.

In addition, rapid developments in the international security environment are expected in the near future. To prepare, the US overhauled its inventory of strategies and tactics. First of all, with the lessons learned in such small-scale contingencies (SSC) as in Bosnia and Kosovo, the military will seek to speed up troop transport. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unveiled its new long-term plan for force enhancement called, "Joint Vision 2020." It seeks to secure an absolute superiority in military and all other areas by applying the following four concepts of battlefield management: dominant maneuver, precision-guided warfare, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. The same plan recognizes the necessity of constant innovations in military intelligence and makes provisions for enhanced information operations and sustained combined operations with allies for

more efficient implementation of the strategies.

B. Japan

1. Defense Policy

Japan outlines the main points of its defense policy as adherence to the US-Japan security system, maintenance of sufficient forces for national defense, and continuance of diplomacy for global peace and security.

Plans for augmentation of forces to attain these primary aims have been laid out in what is known as the "New National Defense Program Outline," drawn up in November, 1995. In April of the following year, the two countries issued the "US-Japan Security Joint Declaration" that redefined the terms of their alliance and confirmed this alliance as the basis of Japan's national security for the 21st century.

Revised in September, 1997, the "New Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation" was followed up by the enactment of a series of laws, brought together under the "Emergency Law on Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan," drawn up in May of 1999. This delineates the steps Japan will take in the event of armed attack or visible threats to its peace and security. Japan also revised many other related laws, showing its willingness to follow through on the US-Japan' s security agreements.

Moreover, aware that its new security plans with the US and consolidation of national forces increase anxiety in Northeast Asia, particularly from Russia, China, and Korea, Japan saw the need to continue the policy of conciliation and confidence-building through sustained military diplomacy. Japan backed off from its hard-line stance against North Korea's August 1998 test-fire of long-range missiles. At the time, Japan responded with a suspension of food aid and charter air transportation. In 1999, after the successful US-North Korea Missile Conference, Japan lifted most of its sanctions against North Korea, and further steps to normalize diplomatic relations with the North have been taken since the South-North Korea summit in 2000.

2. Military Trend

Japan's basic plan for national defense hinges on the US-Japan security guarantee system. In peacetime, Japan will work closely with the United States to help the peacekeeping efforts of the UN and to build trust with the surrounding countries *via* security dialogue and other forms of exchange. However, in time of crisis, Japan will rely on the US-Japan combined strategy and mutual cooperative plan to manage the situation. To prepare for such a course of action, Japan is in the process of revising and refining its laws governing military action.

▲ Japan's *Aegis* Destroyer

Since the first release of the "National Defense Program Outline" in 1976, Japan has followed a five-year cycle of drawing up a "Mid-term Defense Program" and implementing it to strengthen military power. The "2001-2005 Mid-term Defense Program" will seek to activate the Airborne Warning and Control

Figure 1-2 Japan's Current SDF Capabilities



Source: *The Military Balance 1999– 2000* (London: IISS, October 1999).

System (AWACS), introduce aerial refueling tankers, and construct long-range jumbo cargo transport planes and cargo transport ships. This bold new program is drawing much attention from neighboring countries.

Searching for ways to raise the quality of the three branches of its military, Japan's Self-Defense Force (SDF) began to reorganize the units of the Ground SDF, enhance the mobility of the Maritime SDF, and supply new fighters for the Air SDF. The SDF then moved on to streamlining its administration, increasing the efficiency of its personnel, and eliminating bureaucracy. In short, the SDF strove to maintain the present structure in top shape while keeping up with the changes of the times. Also, since the test-fire of missiles from North Korea and the appearance of a suspicious fishing boat (March 1999), Japan has acquired several missile-carrier vessels, followed by formations of new patrol helicopter units and a special patrol unit to boost defense readiness against North Korea. Still in the works is the creation of a counter-insurgency unit, the acquisition of four reconnaissance satellites by 2002, and the enhancement of defense capabilities against biological and nuclear attack. These are a part of a larger effort to secure an autonomous intelligence activity and operational defense posture.

Wanting to gain a status commensurate to its economic achievements in the global community, Japan sent several medical teams from the Ground SDF to participate in the rescue operations in Honduras when it was devastated by a hurricane in 1998. In 1999, Japan sent cargo transport planes for the refugees in East Timor. Japan has no plans to withdraw its endorsement of the UN-sponsored missions for peacekeeping and will encourage the Ground SDF to seek new outlets of service.

C. China

1. Defense Policy

With a defense-oriented policy, the Chinese military promises not to initiate war on another nation. However, when provoked, it will not hesitate to retaliate, a sign that the policy is an aggressive one. Moreover, China is seeking a policy of "conversion from quantity to quality" in order to modernize its military and to ensure readiness for local conflicts, which are to be fought by high-tech weapons. A substantial amount of the defense budget

is now set aside for the Navy, Air Force, and the development of strategic missiles. When Japan and the US planned to include Taiwan in the TMD program, Beijing voiced strong opposition because it saw the move as a threat to China's sovereignty and to its unification efforts with Taiwan.

2. Military Trend

In March 2000, the third plenary session of the Ninth National People's Congress passed the year's defense budget of approximately US $14.6 billion. This marks a 12.7% increase from the previous year. For 12 consecutive years since 1989, the military has benefited from an annual increase of 10%, or more.

With the new budget, the defense ministry plans to initiate new programs to modernize the Army, Navy, and Air Force. First, the Army will improve maneuverability and firepower by increasing the number of multiple rocket launchers (MRL), purchasing the latest-model tanks, and creating new division-level units of attack helicopters. To better handle the SSCs, it is experimenting with a new rapid-reaction unit and a rapid-deployment unit. The Navy is not too far behind with the addition of a 7000-ton

Figure 1-3 China's Current Military Capabilities



Source: *The Military Balance 1999–2000* (London: IISS, October 1999).

Souvremenny-class destroyer and *Kilo*-class submarines, boosting its combat capabilities on and under the sea. The introduction of SU-27/30 aircraft from Russia, along with technology transfer and licensed production, has sharpened the Air Force's ability to fight, and it is now pursuing the introduction of an early warning system.

▲ China's DF-31 ICBM

In its overall plan, China wants to improve its nuclear and missile technology and invests heavily in the research on electronics warfare. This shows that the Chinese military is very interested in strategic weapons and cyber warfare.

Moreover, the military succeeded in reducing its forces by 500,000 at the end of 1999 and reorganized the present strength of 2.5 million soldiers. On October 1, 1999, a military parade to mark the 50th anniversary of the government showed off China's own DF-31 ICBMs, T-90 II tanks, FBC-1 fighter-bombers for sea operations, and aerial refuelers rebuilt from H-6 bombers.

D. The Russian Federation

1. Defense Policy

Russia's key concern in security policy is the stability of the countries that belong to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

According to the "New Concepts in National Security" unveiled in January of 2000, the possibility of a large-scale war is said to be small while the frequency of local conflicts is on the rise. Further, the "New Policy in Diplomacy" of July, 2000 noted that Russia is taking the United States' drive to construct a new world order in its own way as a serious threat and challenge. Several months earlier on April 21, 2000, the Russian government

issued the "New Military Doctrine" to underscore its willingness to resort to nuclear weapons when the security of it and its allied nations is in jeopardy. It also advocates strong measures to resolve any local wars. In other words, the doctrine promotes an offensive strategy and was issued as a presidential order.

During the Kosovo war, Russia opposed the NATO air strikes on Serbia. After the war, the Russian government participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, resolving to intervene where its national interests are at stake.

When NATO proceeded eastward even after three eastern European countries joined the organization as members, Russia put up a strong resistance. A similar reaction was shown to the development of NMD that is spearheaded by the US. To check the growth of the United States' unrivaled influence on the effort to build a viable world order, Russia reconfirmed its partnership with China and signed the "Military and Technology Cooperation Agreement" with India. Clearly, Russia is taking pains to reestablish itself as a superpower and regain the respect it once commanded.

2. Military Trend

Russia will build its military strength and reorganize the three branches and their administrative hierarchy, according to the reforms mandated in the "Concepts for National Policy on Military Reform by 2005" (August 1998) and the "Reform Code of the Russian Military" (December 1998), put forward by the NSC in November, 2000. To be more specific, a move to downsize the forces to 850,000 by 2005 will be sustained, along with a reduction of the current seven military districts to six. Russia will, in addition, convert the four service system (Army, Strategic, Navy, and Air Force) into a three service system (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Finally, the reform includes plans for maintaining and further developing nuclear deter-



▲ Russia's TU-160 Bomber

Figure 1-4 Russia's Current Military Capabilities in the Far East



Source: *The Military Balance 1999–2000* (London: IISS, October 1999).

rence.

Despite severe financial constraints, Russia shows no reservation in investing in the costly development of high-tech weaponry. With plans to increase the export of these weapons, Russia created a new position of deputy prime minister for military commerce and a "Committee for Transnational Cooperation on Military Technology." This government-level support brought much needed relief to the defense budget, with an estimated increase from US $3.5 billion in 1999 to US $4.3 billion in 2000. The most eager customers are China, the Middle East, and many countries in Asia.

To prepare for the loss of the buffer zone due to an expanding NATO as well as against such threats as the airstrikes on Serbia, in 1999 Russia conducted the largest military exercise in its history, called "West-99," intended to shore up readiness against a potential "Invasion from the West."

The same year saw President Putin, then a Prime Minister, pay a visit to the Pacific Fleet Command to reiterate the significance of the Far East Fleet. The deputy prime minister at that time was Ilya Klebanov, and he drew up

a plan to improve the Navy. As a direct result, massive efforts to modernize the Navy are under way to reverse the trend of deterioration over the past ten years.

Improvements in strategic weapons can also be witnessed, notably in their quality. Even though their total number have decreased, such developments as the TOPOL-M missile, touted as a next generation armament, has increased the effectiveness of the military. It was deployed for use in combat in December of 1998. Another valuable addition was the TU-95/160, a strategic bomber brought in from the Ukraine.

Chapter Three

North Korean Situation and Military Threat

Refurbishing its legal systems and institutions through a constitutional revision completed in September 1998, North Korea formed a committee of core members around National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il and other key military figures. This group is responsible for both domestic and foreign policies.

On January 1, 2000, a joint editorial of the party, military, and youth newspapers (title: "Let us brighten this year that marks the 55th anniversary of our party with victories like a prime stallion running through a flame.") emphasized the principles of ideology, the military, and science and technology as the three pillars of a great and powerful state. Thus, the government will seek to construct socialism around the Korean People's Army, with a heightened focus on economic recovery. North Korea recognizes the current economic crisis as the greatest obstacle to its vision of a socialist state and national security and is prepared to concentrate all national energies on the economy.

Moreover, the ROK's policy of reconciliation and cooperation had proved successful as its counterpart in the North agreed to a summit in Pyongyang held from June 13-15, 2000. Recently, North Korea began pushing itself onto the international stage by a multidirectional and pragmatic form of diplomacy with the Western world.

Despite the newly emerging atmosphere of reconciliation on the peninsula and positive diplomatic movements, it is too early to conclude that the North Korean military has given up on its longstanding strategy of communizing the South nor has fully given over to an open-door policy with the outside world. The best assessment is that this is only the beginning phase.

North Korea, in comparison, boasts a military strength twice that of ours and is reported to have increased the level of military exercises since the

clash off the shores of Yonpyong Islands in June of 1999. It continues to improve its forces with new productions of long-distance artillery, import of fighters and helicopters, and construction of small submarines. In addition, the army is building underground sites for missiles and consistently raising its level of combat readiness, all the while intensifying ideological indoctrination. Therefore, even after the South-North summit, no substantial changes to internal military activity are visible except for the cessation of the disparaging broadcasts at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and other minor concessions.

Reality of North Korean Situation

A. Domestic Situation

North Korea held the third session of the tenth Supreme People's Assembly from April 4 to 6, 2000 and passed the budget and important bills, reviving the legislative functions in the process. The role of the party was emphasized through the joint editorial of the new millennium and other outlets of the media on the occasion of the party's 55th anniversary. Pyongyang is at the same time searching for ways to normalize the government's administrative system and party functions.

The 60th birthday of the National Defense Committee Chairman, Kim Jong-il, will be celebrated in 2002 as the "Year of Economic Normalization," and through "The Second Chonlima All-Out Rushing Campaign" and others like it, the government will seek economic recovery. By increasing on-site visits to areas related to the economy, solidifying the laws on the economy, restructuring factories and companies, clarifying land distribution on a national level, and building new mid to small scale electric powerhouses, Chairman Kim Jong-il is seeking to break out of the economic crisis.

Although these national efforts, supported by the international community and joint economic ventures with the South, are helping North Korea rise from the lowest point of its economic decline in 1999, limited resources, obsolete social facilities, and other problems desperately call for continuous

foreign support for its economic growth.

With the boost of its national image in the global community since the South-North Korea summit, Pyongyang is sprinting toward securing economic support and actively extending itself to draw foreign investment by coalescing the basic industry with the light industry and by other forms of improvement.

However, since a bold open policy and economic reform of the market is needed for the normal development of North Korea's economy, without sweeping changes at a fundamental level, hope for economic recovery in North Korea is dim. Additionally, the factors causing widespread anxiety follow on the heels of economic depression and will remain for the time being.

In order to strengthen its grip on the people to overcome their unrealistic expectations for unification and fantasies about capitalism following the South-North Korea summit, Pyongyang conducted a nationwide propaganda campaign to magnify the role of Kim Jong-il in the unification process and his leadership as the Chairman of the National Defense Committee. The government put its citizens through a more rigorous ideological indoctrination than before and is frantically searching for measures to mitigate their internal shock.

B. North Korean Foreign Policy

The current direction of North Korean foreign policy can be summarized into regime survival and external economic support. Pyongyang is conducting multifaceted diplomacy with the international community to stay on this course.

To find solutions to its economic problems and maintain the communist order in the post Cold War era, Pyongyang is using brinkmanship tactics in various negotiations by taking advantage of its accumulated nuclear weapons, missiles, and WMD development. The diplomatic efforts thus far can be summarized as a policy to protect the present political system and secure economic aid *via* direct negotiations with the United States. In other words, North Korea used creation-of-crisis tactics to safeguard its political structure and ensure economic aid and in turn tried to bring about a pack-

age settlement to the numerous pending problems by means of negotiations designed to solve these very crisis of its own creation.

Although successful in securing the US-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework, economic aid, and other forms of diplomatic gains, Pyongyang, it appears, is acutely aware that such tactics have failed miserably in solving its main economic problem–structural inefficiency. Consequently, accepting the limited influence such brinkmanship tactics have on overcoming economic challenges, the government has recently shown signs of altering its foreign diplomatic policies. It is beginning to realize that the restoration of confidence by improving its international image and the expansion of diplomatic relations are more advantageous to securing solid economic cooperation and support than the brinkmanship tactics.

Pyongyang held working-level talks with the United States in Berlin in September, 1999. As a result, the US offered a partial lifting of its economic sanctions against North Korea, who in return agreed to a moratorium on the test firing of its missiles. Up until November, 2000, the two countries engaged in six more working-level talks and two missile conferences, discussing issues of WMDs, lifting of economic sanctions, improving relations, and other comprehensive and pending problems. On June 19, 2000, the US announced that it would ease economic restrictions against North Korea. Two days later, Pyongyang responded with a communique by the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it would continue the suspension of missile test-fires. The First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Cho Myung-rok, reconfirmed the announcement on October 12. Six days earlier, the two sides issued a joint statement revealing that both are working to remove North Korea's designation as a terrorist nation. From October 9-12, the First Vice Chairman visited the United States for top-level talks to resolve longstanding issues between the two countries.

Pyongyang-Tokyo relations took a quick turn for the worse after the North Korean test-fire of *Daepodong-1* missile on August 31, 1998, but unofficial, civilian-level exchanges continued. By April, 2000 and after two preparatory meetings, the two countries resumed regular talks to normalize diplomatic relations. Additionally, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2000, the two sides held the first ever meeting at the foreign ministers' level and agreed to continue friendly negotiations in the future. As a result, the

following months, August and October, saw two conferences aimed at normalizing diplomatic relations.

Since the normalization of ROK-China relations in 1992, North Korea's relationship with China has cooled somewhat. The two countries are, however, exerting concerted efforts, in the form of active diplomatic exchanges, to restore their traditional friendship. For example, the Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Kim Jong-il, made an unprecedented visit to the Chinese Embassy in North Korea in March, 2000. A couple of months later, the Chairman made a sudden visit to *China* to discuss the then upcoming summit with South Korea and the issue of economic support. To return the favor, China's minister of defense, Chi Haotian came to North Korea for the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of China's participation in the Korean War. At present, both sides are increasing the number of reciprocal visits by top-level officials.

As a follow-up to the "New Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" with

North Korea-Russia Fraternity, Amity, and Cooperation Treaty

North Korea-Russia Fraternity, Amity, and Cooperation Treaty following the denunciation of the "Treaty of DPRK-Soviet Fraternal Relations, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" (July, 1961), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia visited North Korea and officially concluded a new treaty between the two countries on February 9, 2000.

The main points of the new treaty are as follows:

- "Treaty of DPRK-Soviet Fraternity, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" is renamed, "North Korea-Russia Treaty of Fraternity, Amity, and Cooperation." This change signifies that the relationship between the two countries is one of bilateral cooperation; one side is no longer the provider of assistance and the other, the recipient.
- The clause, "immediate military intervention and provision of assistance and resources in case of armed attack on any side of the treaty powers" is changed to "immediate mutual intervention in case of armed attack on any side of the treaty powers."
- The treaty specifies the terms of cooperation between the two countries by expanding the articles of the treaty from six to twelve.

Russia in February, 2000, Pyongyang received President Putin for a summit meeting in July. It is evident that North Korea is serious about restoring their former relationship of friendly cooperation.

In addition, North Korea is searching for ways to expand friendly relations with the Western countries while maintaining goodwill relations of cooperation with the Third World and non-allied nations. Moreover, North Korea applied for membership in ARF in July, 2000 and began bolstering its diplomatic activities with numerous multilateral security consultative organizations and other international organizations.

C. Policy Toward South Korea

In line with the terms of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" issued at the historic meeting between South and North Korea in June, 2000, Pyongyang showed some changes in its attitude toward South Korea. However, its prime agenda, including the hard-line policy of communizing the South, has not been abandoned.

Even with a marked increase in the joint commercial ventures at the civilian level–the Mt. Kumgang Project for example–the North Korean military continued to create a tense atmosphere by its Northern Limit Line (NLL) Nullification Declaration (September 1999) and the Declaration of Order of Navigation around Five South Korean Islands on the West Sea (March 2000). But over time, the North gained a favorable view of the ROK government's consistent policy of reconciliation and cooperation. In the early months of 2000, its desperate need to revive the economy and improve international relations had pushed Pyongyang to abandon hostility to future dialogues with the South.

Since the June summit, North Korea has taken visible steps to improve the South-North Korea relations, ceasing its derogatory broadcasts at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and sending the fishing boat that drifted past the NLL back safely across the line. Other concessions included the exchange of visits by separated families, inter-ministerial talks, along with the defense ministers' talks, and invitations to Seoul's media executives.

However, North Korea continues to promote its plans to draw up a united front strategy and insists that the ROK government abolish its National

Security Law and dissolve the United Nations Command (UNC) on the peninsula. Hence, a major turning point in the relationship between the two cannot be reached until Pyongyang takes strong measures to ensure the success of the South-North Joint Military Committee and to reduce military tension. Another indispensable item is for Pyongyang's policymakers to renounce their goal of communizing the entire peninsula, a policy enunciated in the preamble of the North Korean Worker's Party Regulations.

North Korean Military Policy and Strategy

North Korea failed to meet the expectations of the ROK government when it refused to overhaul its military philosophy following the summit in June. The essence of the party regulations– "the communization of the entire Korean peninsula" –has been kept intact, as the following excerpt will show:

> **Excerpt from the Chosun Rodongdang (North Korean Workers' Party) Regulations**: The immediate goal of the Chosun Rodongdang is achieving the complete victory of socialism in the northern half of the republic, thereby successfully accomplishing its nation-wide revolutionary mission of liberating the Korean people and establishing people's democracy. The ultimate goal of the party is to spread "Juche Thought" and construct a communist society.

After decades of thorough preparation based on the "Four-Point Military Guideline," adopted in 1962, Pyongyang has publicly stated on numerous occasions that the country is ready for another war.

The constitution, revised in September 1998, makes special mention of the Guideline, which advocates the idea that every citizen is a soldier and every place is a fortress. The North Korean government wants to uphold these ideas, considering it as a task for the nation.

Until it decides to give up on the idea of communizing the peninsula, North Korea will stay with the current defense policy, because it understands that the military is the ultimate support structure for Chairman

North Korean Constitution Article 60: Self-reliant national defense can only be achieved by first arming the military and the people with political ideology, and on this foundation, instilling cadre potential in every soldier, modernizing the entire military, arming the entire population, and turning the whole nation into a fortress.

Kim's political system. Pyongyang will thus maximize the use of its military power at the bargaining table with South Korea and the international community, until it feels it is the right moment for an armed revolution on the peninsula.

North Korea's military strategy toward the South is "an early surprise attack" aimed at taking the initiative in the war. It will depend primarily on the mechanized and self-propelled artillery units producing rapid results for a successful *blitzkrieg*. At the same time, the military will deploy combined forces of the regular and guerrilla army simultaneously so that the entire peninsula can be occupied before the arrival of American reinforcements. In short, Pyongyang will fiercely implement the now famous "short-term blitzkrieg strategy.

North Korea recognizes the priority of the military in their political scheme of maintaining stability and expanding influence. Therefore, despite the worsening economic situation, sufficient funds are set aside each year for force improvement. Further, the mechanized and long-range artillery units, along with 55% of other key units, are deployed near the frontline.

During the third session of the Tenth Supreme People's Assembly held in April, 2000, Pyongyang detailed the military spending for that fiscal year (FY): 14.5% of the total national budget, or US $1.36 billion. Taking into account the past budgets and constant force improvement efforts, however, the actual military expenditures are estimated to exceed 30% of the total national budget. Still, there is another source of income: the defense industry, otherwise known as the 2nd economy of North Korea. Here, independent military accounts are kept to record income from the export of arms, autonomously developed weapons, and businesses set up within the military to bring in foreign currency. Furthermore, the defense department can benefit immensely from the relatively inexpensive cost of importing

weapon systems and their low overhead, made possible by cheap or even free labor, land, and public utilities. Thus, larger investments can be made to enhance force capability than is indicated by the official figures. In terms of real purchasing power, the North would be able to achieve more than triple the force improvement of the South with the same investment.

North Korean Military Threat

A. War and Military Command Organizations

As shown in Figure 1-5, the highest-ranking governmental body in North Korea, called the National Defense Committee (NDC), is fully in charge of war and military command. The NDC decides on national defense-related issues and defense projects. The Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) is under the direct control of the NDC.

Through the revision of the North Korean constitution on September 5, 1998, the status of the NDC was solidified as the state's supreme body of military command and national defense management. In addition, the chairman of the NDC was designated as the country's supreme leader who

Figure 1-5 North Korea's Military Command System



controls all political, military, and economic systems in North Korea.

Kim Jong-il, Chairman of the NDC and supreme commander of the KPA, is in direct control of the entire North Korean military, making decisions on war and other important military operations.

As a matter of formality, the MPAF is responsible for managing and implementing overall activities of the Regular Corps through the General Political Bureau, the General Staff Department, and other organizations under the MPAF (Figure 1-5). However, in actuality, the General Staff Department has the command authority for all military operations.

B. Organization, Weaponry and Deployment of KPA

1. Ground Forces

North Korean ground forces are composed of 20 corps including four corps in the forward area, four mechanized, one tank, and two artillery corps, as well as the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (LITGB) supervising the Special Operations Forces (SOF). A total of 170 divisions and brigades make up the major combat units, including 80 infantry divisions/brigades, 30 artillery brigades, 15 tank brigades, 24 mechanized brigades, and 25 SOF brigades. Figure 1-6 shows the composition of North Korean ground force combat units.

The main weaponry of the North Korean ground forces is as shown in Table 1-1. The old-model T-54/55/59 tanks still comprise the majority of its tanks. Recently, however, the North has domestically produced T-62 *Chonmaho* tanks that feature larger caliber munitions. These tanks have been deployed extensively in forward areas and around Pyongyang. The *Chonmaho* tanks are equipped with snorkels that enable them to

Figure 1-6 Composition of Major Ground Force Combat Units



Table 1-1 North Korean Ground Force Weaponry

※ Figures approximate

Tanks	Armored Vehicles	Artillery (MRLs included)	Air Defense Weapons	River-crossing Equipment K-61s/S-shape pontoon bridge
3,800	2,300	12,500	13,800	760 / 2,200

cross rivers up to 5.5 meters deep.

North Korea possesses BTR-series and type M-1973 armored vehicles, although recently it has added to its collection the BMP series vehicles with the capabilities of a light tank. North Korean ground forces also possess artillery of various calibers and ranges, and more than half of these guns are self-propelled. Most of all, the North has a large number of multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) ranging from 107 mm to 240 mm, which could shower thousands of artillery rounds over the Seoul area in a short time.

▲ North Korea's 240mm MRLs

For air defense weapons, North Korea possesses diverse anti-aircraft artillery ranging from 14.5 mm to 100 mm, as well as SA-7 anti-air missiles.

Forward area forces corps and the Engineering Forces Bureau, in particular, possess river-crossing equipment such as K-61 amphibious vehicles and S-type pontoon bridges, thus enabling the military to rapidly cross most rivers.

North Korea has deployed approximately 10 corps and some 60 divisions and brigades in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and is prepared to launch a surprise attack and invade the South without a further deployment of its units. Deployments are as follows: four corps in the forward; eight corps in the central and Pyongyang areas; and eight in the rear area. A total of five mobile corps–one tank, two mechanized infantry

corps, and two artillery corps are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.

Mechanized infantry and tank units, organized from corps to brigade, are positioned in depth along the major axes of attack. It is estimated that these would be employed as the units for maneuver operations in depth in order to exploit a breakthrough and to penetrate into the heart of the ROK military' s rear area.

Artillery units are capable of providing in-depth fire support from hardened underground sites. Additionally, these self-propelled units possess mobile fire support capability. The MRLs will be able to launch massive concentrated strikes on various targets.

By operating amphibious vehicles and pontoon bridges, river-crossing engineer forces can support rapid river-crossing operations for units with troops and weapons.

It is estimated that North Korea will infiltrate approximately 100,000 SOF troops into the forward and rear areas of the ROK in contingency. They may then attempt to destroy command and communication facilities, cut off lines of communication, assassinate important personnel, demolish or cripple major facilities such as airfields to reduce Seoul's war sustainability, and harass our forces in the rear area–turning virtually all of South Korea into a battlefield.

In addition, the North is estimated to have built underground tunnels along the front line. It can covertly insert massive units into the South through these tunnels avoiding the obstacles positioned along the DMZ before launching an all-out surprise attack against the South. Some twenty tunnels are suspected to have been built under the DMZ by the North Koreans; the four that have been discovered thus far are all situated under the major avenues of approach into South Korea's forward area.

2. Navy

The East and the West Sea Fleets operate under the Navy Command. These two fleets boast 16 battle groups and two seaborne sniper brigades. The following diagram provides important facts.

Most North Korean combat vessels, such as light destroyers, patrol ships, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, and fire support boats, are small. At

Table 1-2 North Korean Vessels

※ Figures approximate

Combat Vessels		Support Vessels	
Surface Combatants	Submarines	Amphibious Vessels	Other
430	90	270	200
	Midget Submarines included	Air Cushion Landing Craft included	Surface Patrol Boats included

present, over 60% of North Korean combat vessels are deployed in forward bases. From these, approximately 40 guided missile boats pose a substantial threat; they have the capability of launching missile attacks against our large vessels and are equipped with two to four 46-km-range *Styx* anti-ship missiles.



▲ North Korea's guided missile carrier

The 50-some *Romeo* and *Shark*-class submarines are capable of blocking sea lanes and attacking the ROK's surface vessels, emplacing mines anywhere within the ROK maritime territory, or secretly infiltrating commandos into the South.

Support vessels are composed of amphibious vessels including personnel landing craft, landing craft personnel aircushion (LCPA), surface patrol boats and mine countermeasure vessels. These support vessels, however, have a limited role in long-distance operations.

Also operated by the Navy are two seaborne sniper brigades and some 140 LCPAs. One of these domestically produced LCPAs can land armed troops equivalent to the size of a platoon on a specific target. Because these LCPAs can be operated on tidal flats, they can land in most parts of the East and West coasts. With high-speed mobility of 50 knots or more, these ves-

sels are effective in the simultaneous launch of multi-dimensional surprise attacks in the early phase of a war.

The Navy has deployed the 95-km-range ground-to-ship *Silkworm* missiles on both the east and west coasts. *Silkworm* missiles, deployed in the forward area, are able to launch anti-ship attacks as far as Tokjok-do in the Yellow Sea and Sokcho and Yangyang on the East Coast.

3. Air Force

There are six air divisions under the direct control of the Air Command, one per military district: three fighter and bomber divisions, two support aircraft divisions, and one training division. One helicopter brigade also takes orders from the Air Command. The following diagram shows the current air power in North Korea.

Over 45% of North Korean aircraft consist of old models such as MIG-15s and 17s and IL-28s. MIG-19s and 21s make up the core and are quantitatively greater. The North is also equipped with many highly advanced fighters such as MIG-23s and 29s as well as SU-25s. In 1999, the Air Force purchased 40 MIG-21s from Kazakhstan and a number of MI-8 helicopters from Russia. According to the Pyongyang government's policy of fostering the aircraft industry, some fighter spare parts are domestically produced. In the early 1990s, North Korea assembled modern MIG-29s domestically with Russian technological support.

Two Air Force sniper brigades are organized under the air force, and they have approximately 300 AN-2s capable of flying slowly at low altitudes.

Table 1-3 North Korean Aircraft

※ Figures approximate



AN-2s can easily infiltrate SOF troops deep into the South's rear areas in contingency.

▲ North Korea's MIG-29 fighter

40 % of all fighter planes are deployed in forward bases where they can launch surprise attacks throughout South Korea in a short period of time. Taking into account wartime sustainability, approximately 70 air bases, including reserve and emergency runways, are built throughout the various areas of the North. These bases are in addition to the 20 strategic bases already in operation.

A strong air defense network has been built and is maintained over the Pyongyang area and around major facilities throughout the country, including early-warning systems, air defense surveillance radar, low-altitude anti-aircraft artillery, and mid- and high-altitude surface-to-air missiles.

4. Reserve Forces

As one gigantic "garrison society," North Korea began to strenuously pursue the Four-Point Military Guidelines in the early 1960s and has succeeded in arming the entire population. Therefore, its massive reserve force can be mobilized immediately.

Civilians between the ages of 14 and 60, or approximately 30% of the entire population, are subject to mobilization. Currently, the reserve troops number some 7.48 million, and each reservist is subject to 15-30 days of training a year.

A closer look at the composition of reserve troops will show the following. Approximately 1.73 million reserves make up the RMTU (men between 17 and 45, women between 17 and 30). 4.14 million personnel are in the Worker/Peasant Red Guards (mostly men between the ages of 46 and 60), which resemble civil defense forces. 1.18 million belong to the Red Youth

Guards, a military organization of high/middle school students (ages 14 to 16). And some 430,000 personnel are in such para-military troops as the Civilian Security and Protection Agency, the General Bureau of Logistics Mobilization Department, Speed Battle Youth Shock Troops, and the Guard Command.

In case of mobilization, the RMTU, under direct control of the MPAF, can be mobilized and committed immediately for every unit. In addition, the Red Youth Guards and the Worker/Peasant Red Guards, commanded by the KWP Civil Defense Department, are organized to facilitate mobilization in a short period. The key point is that North Korean reserve forces can be mobilized immediately due to the government' s control over citizens' work, travel, and place of residence.

C. Level of Strategic Weapons Development

1. Nuclear Development

Pyongyang has exerted full efforts in nuclear development since the 1950s, receiving technological support from the former Soviet Union. North Korea has mines containing four million tons of uranium ore. In the 1960s, it established a large nuclear research complex in Yongbyon, imported an atomic reactor for research purposes from the Soviet Union, and has since been accumulating nuclear weapons technology and training nuclear specialists.

In the 1970s Pyongyang concentrated its nuclear research on the nuclear fuel cycle–refining, conversion, and processing technologies. It successfully enlarged the power generation capacity of its research atomic reactor through its own technology, and in 1980 started the construction of a 5MW-level research reactor, the so-called "second reactor."

In the 1980s the North focused on the practical uses of atomic energy and completed the nuclear research and development infrastructure by 1986. Thus, it began to operate uranium refining and conversion facilities. In 1989 Pyongyang embarked upon the construction of a 200MW-atomic energy power plant and large reprocessing facilities, in Taechon and Yongbyon, respectively. Additionally, the North conducted detonations to test triggering devices with high explosives.

It is estimated that by the 1990s, North Korea completed the entire nuclear fuel cycle from the acquisition of nuclear fuel to its reprocessing. Nevertheless, due to difficulties in developing detonation devices and delivery systems that require advanced, precision technologies, it is doubtful whether Pyongyang has actually finished producing or now possesses usable nuclear weaponry. However, considering its capability to extract plutonium from used nuclear fuel, North Korea is estimated to be capable of assembling and producing one or two crude nuclear weapons.

To freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons development program, the United States and North Korea signed the Geneva Agreed Framework in October 1994. The US, in return for the North freezing its nuclear development program, agreed to build two light-water reactors for the North, and provide it with 500,000 tons of heavy oil each year until the completion of the first reactor. Under the agreement on the "Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization" (KEDO), North Korea went on to sign the Light-Water Reactor Supply Agreement in December 1995. The construction of the reactor is currently underway. In January 1992, North Korea officially announced it would allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make regular and *ad hoc* inspections. However, it still prohibits IAEA inspection of undeclared facilities, refuses to submit records of its 5MW atomic reactor to be examined, and does not allow the IAEA inspection team to collect samples of materials for examination or examine spent fuel rods. North Korea finished the sealing process of spent nuclear fuel rods from its 5MW atomic reactor in April, 2000.

The world has kept wary eyes on the Kumchang-ri area since mid-1998, but the US on-site inspections in May of 1999 and 2000 showed that the area did not have any nuclear underground facilities.

2. Chemical and Biological Weapons

North Korea recognized the importance of the chemical warfare and issued the Kim Il-sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" at the end of 1961. The defense ministry has since begun to build research and production facilities, exerting its utmost efforts to produce chemical weapons. In the 1980s, the military turned to the development of biological weapons according to Kim Il-sung' s directive that "poisonous gas and bacteria can

be used effectively in war."

Eight different factories in North Korea have produced lethal chemicals, such as nerve, blister, blood, vomiting agents, as well as tear gas, and at present they are stored in six different facilities. Their quantity is estimated to be somewhere between 2,500-5,000 tons. The North is also suspected of maintaining numerous facilities for cultivating and producing the bacteria of anthrax and other forms of biological weapons.

In addition, the North also possesses various vehicles and equipment for launching chemical munitions. Forwardly deployed are mortars, field artillery, MRLs, and FROG rockets of over 100mm caliber. In the rear, Scud and *Rodong* missiles, fighters, bombers, and AN-2s are in place. This allows the North to launch chemical munitions into the ROK' s forward and rear areas simultaneously. The North may also dare to launch a secret attack in the rear through its SOF troops armed with biological weapons.

To enhance its nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, the North Korean military has organized chemical platoons down to the regiment level. Furthermore, North Korea has provided protective masks to the entire population. Not only military personnel, but para-military personnel and civilians must participate in regular NBC defense drills.

North Korea will attempt to maintain its CB production capabilities despite its serious economic difficulties and the global movement to ban CB weapons. North Korea will continue this policy because these weapons can be produced at a low cost, they are effective, and it is relatively easy to destroy the evidence of such programs.

3. Mid- and Long-range Guided Weapons

Since the early 1980s, North Korea has embarked on the development of ballistic missiles. It has already domestically produced and deployed 500-km-range *Scud-Cs* by upgrading Soviet *Scud-Bs*. In 1993 it succeeded in test-firing a 1,300-km-range *Rodong-1* missile. *Rodong-1* missiles have been deployed for operational purposes since 1997. In August 1998 Pyongyang attempted to launch a small satellite into orbit using the transformed launch system of a *Daepodong-1* missile. Although the attempt failed, the missile's engine combustion, body separation, and guidance systems functioned without problems. From the test, it can be inferred that North Korea

does have the capability to develop mid- and long-range missiles. The maximum ranges of *Daepodong-1* and *Daepodong-2*, which North Korea is feverishly developing at the moment, are estimated to reach 2,000-2,500 km and 6,700 km respectively. Such a capability poses a great threat not only to South Korea but also to neighboring countries in Northeast Asia. Pyongyang is currently under scathing criticism from the international community for exporting the missiles to the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

Since 1996, the US and North Korea have proceeded with missile talks concerning North Korean participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). During the talks, the US has pressured the North to suspend its production and export of missiles. The talks, however, still have not produced any significant results. After the *Daepodong* missile incident in August, 1998, the two renewed efforts to seek comprehensive compromises. During the top-level talks with the United States on September 24, 1999, North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to a moratorium on all its missile test firing. A year later, the First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Committee, Cho Myung-rok, reconfirmed the announcement in the "US-North Korea Joint Communiqué" issued at the end of the talks held on October 12, 2000 in Washington D.C.

The reasons for producing and possessing mid- and long-range missiles with CB weapons are simple. They provide the means for North Korea to respond to the expanding military influence of the US and Japan and use them as a bargaining chip at negotiations for regime survival, while posing threats to the neighboring countries. These weapons can also conduct decisive tactical and operational roles in contingency. In using these weapons to simultaneously attack major cities and strategic targets in the South, the North will attempt to realize its military *blitzkrieg* strategy.

Assessment of Recent Military Trends and Threats

Despite a steady decline in the economy, efforts to develop *Daepodong* missiles continue, and the numbers of long-range artillery systems (including the 170mm SP guns and 240mm MRLs) deployed near the frontline, along with the production of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, have increased.

Since the clash off the shores of Yonpyong Islands (June 1999), North Korea has stepped up its military's combat capability. During the summer of 1999, the ground forces concentrated on artillery exercises and mobility training for the mechanized units. The navy focused on seashore and warship gunnery exercises, warship-to-warship guided missile firing, and sea mobility training. Regular sea and underwater infiltration exercises made up the summer schedule for the SOFs.

From September to December of 1999, the Ministry of People's Armed Forces conducted a military-wide inspection and overhauled the entire weapons inventories to heighten combat readiness of all forces. The winter of December 1999 to April 2000 saw intensive training of all forces. The army stepped up live artillery fire exercises and the field mobility exercises of mechanized units. The navy felt a special need to reemphasize its overall combat readiness, while the air force conducted several combined air defense and unit deployment exercises. However, for two consecutive years, 1999 and 2000, the government passed on the defense command exercises due to its monetary constraints as well as the already intensified training of all branches after the battle off the shores of Yonpyong.

Although North Korea reduced live fire and other exercises following the June summit, by August it resumed their normal pace, comparable to that of the previous year.

With the lessons learned from the Gulf War and the Kosovo Crisis, Pyongyang continues to maintain a heightened combat readiness. In the forward and rear areas, the army is constructing hardened missile sites and setting up reinforcements for the existing obstacles and combat facilities on the coastlines and in forward areas. The air force strategically deployed the recently acquired MIG-21s to enhance the air defense capability of the

northeastern region. Not satisfied, the air force brought in additional 240 fighters and deployed them to 10 different bases in the forward and rear areas. These augmentation measures were capped off with the installation of numerous air artillery systems in airports and air bases throughout North Korea.

To boost the morale in the military, Kim Jong-il promised sufficient financial support and personally visited different bases to lift the fighting spirit of the soldiers. He also called for a meeting of company commanders in February 1999 and exactly a year later, held a large-scale convention of central political and military figures at the Pyongyang Gymnasium and awarded them with national medals of honor to secure their continued loyalty. Moreover, Kim Jong-il expressed the importance of company-level combat capability via sharpened instruction on military regulations and intensified indoctrination; he also underscored military-civilian integrated operational training. The ultimate purpose behind these measures is for Kim Jong-il to successfully construct a hierarchical system that places him at the top as the undisputed commander-in-chief.

North Korea constructed and deployed additional midget submarines for infiltration purposes and developed an underwater supply vessel (SBS-2), which is now in operation. With no reduction in the infiltration-related exercises, North Korea continues to provide the South with ample reasons to be concerned for unprovoked infiltration. Further, despite the agreement on the NLL after the cease-fire, Pyongyang unilaterally declared a western "Military Demarcation Line at the West Sea of Korea" in September 1999. In March of the following year, the North Korean news reported that the navy command headquarters issued the so-called "Declaration of Order of Navigation around Five South Korean Islands on the West Sea," fostering yet more uneasiness on the peninsula.

Following the summit, Pyongyang began to exhibit restraint in its critical broadcasts concerning the South, use refined language in reference to the political system in Seoul (no longer used are words like "puppet," "enemy," etc.), and bring down the billboards at the DMZ (messages such as "welcome to North Korea," "sold out to America," etc.). The North Korean Navy started to crack down on the fishing boats drifting south past the

NLL. These and other changes were designed to prevent any unnecessary tension between the two countries. However, the North has not, in reality, let down its long-term force augmentation, combat readiness reinforcements, and infiltration-related training that continue to threaten peace on the peninsula.

Part Two
Defense Policy and Posture for Peacekeeping

Chapter One
Basic Directions of Defense Policy

Chapter Two
Military Preparedness for War Deterrence

Chapter Three
Efforts to Ease Tensions and Build a Peace Regime on the Peninsula

Chapter Four
Stability on the Peninsula and the Contribution of External Military Policy for Global Peace

Chapter One

Basic Directions of Defense Policy

National Goals and Security Policy

The ROK government considers its national goals and security policies as the guiding principles in setting up its defense policy. The national goals reflect the basic values of the Korean citizens as they work toward lasting existence and prosperity as a nation. Korea is ready to pursue these goals under any set of circumstances. The goals are as follows. First, Korea will uphold its nationhood, seek peaceful unification, and ensure lasting independence under the ideologies of free democracy. Second, Korea will protect the freedom and rights of its citizens and create a social welfare system that achieves equality in their standard of living. Third, Korea will work to improve its status in the international community in order to put forth dignity as a nation and contribute to world peace.

The national security policies are the foundation for the national goals. President Kim Dae-jung has set the removal of the cold war system on the peninsula for "a peaceful settlement in the first year of the millennium" as the primary security objective for 2000. The President then proposed three basic directions in security policy.

First, the ROK government will maintain a firm security posture. The government will not attempt to achieve unification by absorption or military threat. It is, however, prepared to respond strongly to the North's armed provocation. Important in this regard will be the ROK's ability to increase its crisis-management readiness that includes a civilian-government-military combined defense system. Further, the ROK must establish a firm security posture, which will deter the North's armed invasion and stimulate reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries.

Second, South and North Korea must create a "South-North Combined

Economic System." Under the principle of separation of politics and economy, the two must improve their cooperative relationship by increasing joint economic ventures and diversifying commercial exchanges at the civilian level. The ROK government needs to make another important change of developing a mutually beneficial and reciprocal relationship of cooperation that brings together its technology and capital with the North's land and labor.

Third, Korea will increase its diplomatic efforts to end the cold war on the peninsula. In order to realize a substantial reduction in mutual threat, including the removal of the threat of North Korea's WMDs, Seoul must ensure that the US and Pyongyang keep the terms of their agreement. Additionally, the international community will have to encourage North Korea to subscribe to globally recognized laws and regulations as well as to join international society and function as a responsible member.

North Korea Policy

The threat of war on the peninsula will remain as long as South and North Korea stand opposed to each other and the border is divided. Thus, the South's plans to deter war and pursue reconciliation and cooperation will, in reality, become the highest priority of its defense policy.

The ROK government's policy toward North Korea aims for "peace, reconciliation, and cooperation" in order to improve relations and is known as the "Reconciliation & Cooperation Policy." It seeks to maintain peace through a firm security posture and to simultaneouly pursue a course of reconciliation and cooperation. This will help create an environment in which North Korea can take the path of self-transformation and self-reform without outside coercion.

The ROK government has explicitly expressed three major principles and six keynotes by which to accomplish its policy objectives toward North Korea. "No armed provocation, no absorption of the North, and reconciliation and cooperation" encapsulate the three principles.

First, the government will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind that would destroy peace. In other words, the government will maintain a

firm security posture to deter war on the peninsula based on solid and close ROK-US security cooperation, while taking strong countermeasures against any armed provocation.

Second, the government has no intention whatsoever of unifying the peninsula by absorbing the North; the ROK has demonstrated time and again that it does not intend to harm North Korea in the least and under any circumstances. This expresses the government's will to construct a peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas and to concentrate on restoring national identity through exchanges and cooperation.

Third, the government will actively promote reconciliation and cooperation. This means that it will make efforts to convert the confrontational relationship into a reconciliatory and cooperative one by first increasing economic exchanges, which could have far-reaching ramifications. South-North reconciliation and cooperation will promote mutual interests and national benefits as well as help establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

The six keynotes are: "pursuit of national security in parallel with South-North cooperation;" "realization of peaceful coexistence and exchanges first;" "creation of a positive environment for the North to change through reconciliation and cooperation;" "promotion of South-North mutual benefits;" "securing of international support under the principle of the resolution of the problems by the two Koreas themselves;" and "pursuit of a policy toward North Korea rooted in a national consensus."

South Korea consistently maintained its policy of reconciliation and cooperation, and the North began to gain confidence in the policy. As a result, the most historic meeting between the two countries in 55 years was held in Pyongyang on June 13-15, 2000. The two leaders issued the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration," marking a turning point in their relationship. It showed that the two countries were willing to clear up the past problems of distrust and antagonism and inaugurate in full force a new era of reconciliation and cooperation.

Moreover, many changes swept across the peninsula following the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration." Both sides agreed to allow reunions for separated families, to begin a project to restore the Seoul-Shineju Railroad, and to initiate ministerial-level talks, among others. Particularly notable is the first defense ministers' talks, in which the two sides reconfirmed their

desire to avoid armed conflict on the peninsula and to firmly support the vision of the "Joint Declaration of June 15."

However, these achievements do not affect the ROK's defense policy in any significant way, because the substance of North Korea's military and its strength, which has a direct bearing on ROK security, remains unchanged.

National Defense Objectives and Policy Keynotes

The ROK military drew up key defense objectives in order to ensure national security, and to achieve these objectives, it decided on several basic concepts. These concepts take into consideration the duty and role of the military, the defense environment, and others, and they serve as the basis of the key points of the defense policy that pursues a consistent and productive form of mid- and long-term administration.

A. Defense Objectives

> **Defense Objective:** The ROK military will defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification, and contribute to regional stability and world peace.

First, "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion" means protecting it from any possible external military threat as well as those immediate threats from North Korea, which, as the nation's main enemy, could endanger our survival.

Second, "upholding peaceful unification" means that the nation helps to unify the divided Korea by deterring war on the peninsula, defusing military tension, and maintaining peace and stability.

Third, "contributing to regional stability and world peace" demonstrates our willingness to contribute to and enhance a cooperative military relationship with neighboring countries based on our national status and security capabilities. Furthermore, this objective reflects our desire to enthusiastically join the UN in its efforts to maintain world peace. We are living up to

our responsibilities and obligations as a member of the world organization.

B. Basic Concepts for Defense Improvement

While developing policies to achieve defense objectives, the military has established the basic concepts of our defense policy as follows.

First, the current defense policy, centered on preparing for North Korean threats, will be transformed into one that prepares for other future threats as well.

Moreover, the military can no longer delay preparation for the challenges of new forms of warfare in the future and of the changing security environment, because increasing weapon systems capabilities, improving unit organization, and training personnel will require 10 to 20 years. This amount of time is necessary because of the unique nature of the military. Korea's national defense is built on this new concept and is well prepared to deter the North's provocation and respond effectively to other outside threats.

Second, the military will seek to improve its defense in order to protect national interests with a strong defense capability that is in proportion to Korea's overall national strength.

The pursuit of enhanced defense capabilities based on uncertain and unclear threat scenarios could limit the military's ability to respond to unpredicted events. This is why the ROK Armed Forces are making efforts to formulate well-defined and clear threat scenarios and maximize defense capabilities. In particular, the military intends to develop defense policy in consideration of the nation's budget, as the funds for building and maintaining military strength can only be increased in an amount proportionate to the limits of the nation's economic capacity.

Third, the ROK military will strengthen its external military ties to establish bilateral or multilateral strategic cooperative relations with neighboring countries. A perfect and independent defense requires a huge defense budget, but this is practically impossible to realize. Korea will therefore increase its military capability through a strengthened alliance with the United States. Korea will also engage in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations, designed strategically within the framework of its alliance

with the US. Seoul is confident that these approaches to military diplomacy with other countries will bring peace and stability not only to the peninsula but also to Northeast Asia at large.

The mid- and long-term objectives for improving Korea's national defense are shown in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1 Defense Development Objectives



C. Keynotes of Defense Policy

To achieve the national defense development objectives outlined above, the military has advanced defense policies according to the following five key points.

1. Establishment of a Firm Defense Posture

A firm defense posture means that the military is ready to deter the enemy's armed provocation and ensure total victory in war. This will require a thorough preparation, enabling our forces to respond immediately to any military threat or invasion at any given time. With this in mind, the ROK military is consolidating its crisis-management system, preparing for a possible limited or all-out war, and establishing a robust civilian-government-military integrated strategic defense posture. It is also creating an atmosphere conducive to enhancing combat-readiness and training for field units of the ground forces as well as combat units under the operational command of the navy and air force, respectively. Institutions responsible

for troop education are laying the foundation for an educational system that ensures initial and sustained victory by instructing soldiers to fight with a prior grasp of the enemy situation. The same institutions are particularly concerned with raising the level of security consciousness among the troops even with the current changes in the relationship between South and North Korea. In addition, the ROK military is continually pursuing policies for boosting morale and promoting the welfare of those on active duty and in the reserve so that they can dedicate themselves fully to their country in a contingency.

2. Aiming for Advanced, High-Quality National Defense

Another key point in the ROK's military policy is to aim for an advanced, high-quality national defense structure able to protect Korea's national interests and maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This is an important policy considering that the security environment in this region will undergo major transformations after the unification of the peninsula because of the dynamic relations among the neighboring military superpowers. From another perspective, this keynote policy shows the vision or the blueprint for the military's plan for the 21st century and points the way to the successful accomplishment of given tasks and to achieving the overall defense objectives. It is significant to note, however, that without a continuous reform, the ROK military cannot realize the vision of an independent defense posture, high-quality manpower, advanced weapon systems, streamlined management system, and defense digitization. Such a future-oriented military will demand more resources than before and require internal reforms such as reducing administrative overhead, increasing the efficiency of defense-related industries, and others. However, the defense ministry is aware of the limits of reforms in meeting these needs. It must therefore search for all possible ways to secure sufficient funds at the government level.

3. Devising Military Policy Toward the North and Defusing Tension on the Korean Peninsula

The military has been focusing on efficiently minimizing the North's aggression and ultimately inducing the North to rid itself of the use of

provocation in favor of peaceful reunification. The recently concluded "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" helped create a new framework for a peaceful settlement on the peninsula and speed up the process of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries. The success of the June summit is the fruit of the "Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation" built on a firm foundation of national security. Important to note here is that the relationship between the two countries will remain on this positive trend only when the ROK military does not let up on its present state of full readiness. In other words, it must recognize the indispensability of "national security for prevention of war and national security for reconciliation and cooperation." Thus, the military will seek to defuse tension in a military way by building military confidence between the South and North through such things as joint observation of large-scale military exercises and a military hotline, all the while maintaining a firm security posture.

4. Improving the ROK-US Alliance and Strengthening Security Cooperation with Neighboring Major Powers

The alliance between the ROK and the US contributed in significant ways to the deterrence of war on the peninsula, improvement of the economy in the region, and creation of the framework for the ROK's independent defense. Both agree that their cooperative military relationship must continue in order to maintain peace and stability not only on the peninsula but also in the surrounding region during the process of the unification as well as afterwards.

With the basic framework of the ROK-US alliance intact, efforts for multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation with the neighboring countries will be made. In addition, the military also plans to participate in regional multilateral security cooperation and at the same time play a leading role in forming a multilateral organization dedicated to security in Northeast Asia.

5. Cultivating an "Armed Forces of the People" That Works Harmoniously with the People

The need to efficiently respond to various security threats in the twenty-first century makes indispensable the military's construction of a "comprehensive security system" in which all the security factors in both military

and non-military fields are balanced; cultivating an "armed forces of the people" supports this system. In other words, an all-out national defense system should be established so that civilian and military can work together as one, including the employment of civilian resources for military purposes. The military will actively cope with non-military security threats such as environmental hazards, terrorism, and drug trafficking, in addition to improving technology and national education. As a "well-prepared organization" fully armed with all the necessary equipment, our armed forces will systematically carry out projects in support of the general populace during national crises and disasters. In addition, the military will restore public confidence and promote national identity by enhancing its own economic efficiency through employing a rational management system.

Chapter Two

Military Preparedness for War Deterrence

Military Capabilities of the Three Services

A. Army

The ROK Army makes up the core of our national defense. Its mission in peacetime is deterring war with the help of the Navy and the Air Force; its wartime mission is to bring all ground combat to victory.

Organized into the ROK Army Headquarters, three Field Army Commands, the Aviation Operations Command, the Special Warfare Command, and units to support these commands, the ROK Army consists of 11 corps, 49 divisions, and 19 brigades.

Figure 2-2 Organization of the ROK Army



Approximately five hundred sixty thousand troops make up the army, and its core equipment includes some 2,360 tanks, 5,180 pieces of field artillery, and 2,400 armored vehicles. Table 2-1 shows the main components of the army.

Table 2-1 Manpower/Equipment of the Army

※ Figures approximate



※ Field Artillery: MRLs included; Missiles: ATACMS included

The First and Third Field Army Commands have the mission to defend the region that ranges from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the Seoul area. Each army command consists of several corps commands, divisions, and brigades. The troops under these two commands, in response to the threat of surprise attacks or high-speed mobile warfare launched by North Korea, have deployed key ground forces along the major avenues of approach that connect Seoul to North Korea.

The mission of the Second Field Army Command is to defend the entire rear area, including the coastline, that starts from the rear line of responsibility of the two aforementioned forward-area army commands. Several corps commands, divisions, and brigades make up this command. The core tasks of this army are designed to repel North Korean infiltration by land, sea, and air and should the North successfully conduct an infiltration, annihilate the infiltrated force. These tasks include guarding the coastline, defending major facilities and sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and managing reserve forces and materiel for wartime mobilization.

Organized into one aviation brigade and several battalions, the Aviation Operations Command possesses various types of helicopters. The command provides maneuver forces with fire support, airlift and reconnaissance support, and if necessary, moves into the enemy's rear area to conduct timely fire support and air strikes.

The Special Warfare Command consists of several brigades. Its main tasks include collecting intelligence, locating enemy targets, and carrying out other designated tasks.

The Capital Defense Command consists of several divisions and focuses on the mission of maintaining the security of Seoul as well as protecting the infrastructure of the city.

One reconnaissance and one decontamination battalion, and the Chemical Defense Research Institute make up the CBR (chemical, biological, and radiological) Defense Command. The command supports CBR operations, conducts research, and evaluates issues related to chemical warfare agents.

Each field army, corps command, and division has its own artillery unit that provides effective fire support for the maneuver forces under it. These artillery units possess various sorts of artillery, targeting equipment, fire-control systems, and high-tech weapons that make them capable of timely and sustained fire support.

B. Navy

Aside from war deterrence in peacetime, the ROK Navy's missions include upholding national sovereignty, protecting maritime rights, supporting government foreign policies, and enhancing national prestige. During war, the navy exercises control over the sea and the sea lines of communication that will ensure the safety of our maritime activities, prevent the enemy from exercising its own maritime operations, and carry out surprise landing operations on the enemy's flanks and in rear areas.

The ROK Navy Headquarters, Operations Command, Marine Corps Headquarters, and support units make up the ROK Navy. It has 67,000 troops, including marines and operates approximately 190 vessels including submarines and 70 aircraft.

Under the ROK Navy Operations Command, three fleets are based in the

Figure 2-3 Organization of the ROK Navy



East Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the Korea Straits, respectively. To guard its operational zone of responsibility, each fleet possesses combatant or combat vessels, e.g., destroyers, escorts, patrol battleships, high-speed boats, etc. The Operations Command also has its own vessels and aircraft to conduct major naval component operations such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine operations, landing, salvage, and special operations.

The Marine Corps Headquarters is organized into two divisions and one brigade. For amphibious landing operations, the marines possess a wide range of landing equipment, including amphibious tanks and their own fire support.

Table 2-2 ROK Navy Manpower and Equipment

※ Figures approximate

Troops	Submarines/ Submersibles	Combat Vessels (boats)	Support Vessels (boats)	Aircraft
67,000	10	160	20	70

C. Air Force

The Air Force constantly keeps a watchful eye on the enemy and maintains a firm combat readiness posture for immediate retaliation should the enemy launch any provocation. The mission of the Air Force during war is to achieve air superiority so as to prevent the enemy from gaining access to our air space, to neutralize the enemy's will by destroying its principal and potential warfighting capability, and finally, to give full support to ground and naval operations.

The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, and Support Commands constitute the ROK Air Force. Two wings are directly subordinate to the headquarters; the Air Defense Artillery Command, Aircraft Control & Warning Wing, and nine tactical fighter wings come under the

Operations Command. Additionally, the Training Command currently operates one training wing as well.

Figure 2-4 Organization of the ROK Air Force



Air force personnel number 63,000 and the air force possesses more than 800 aircraft including KF-16 fighters.

Air operations are under the direct control of the Theater Air Control Center (TACC). At present, the air force operates aircraft that can carry precision-guided munitions and long-range air-to-air missiles. It can also provide support to ground and naval forces with close air support as part of joint air-ground-sea operations.

Table 2-3 Air Force Manpower and Equipment

※ Figures approximate



D. Reserve Forces

The ROK government enacted the "Local Reserve Forces Establishment Law" in 1961. Seven years later in April 1968, after armed infiltrators from

North Korea attempted an assault on the Blue House in January of the same year, it created the first Reserve forces. Since the end of the Korean War through the Vietnam War era, and up until now, the reserve forces have played a pivotal role in deterring North Korea's war provocation.

During peacetime, reservists receive regular education and training, which allow them to maintain the ability to defend their homeland. Aside from homeland defense during wartime, however, the reserves are expected to carry out the same combat tasks as active duty forces; they will become supplementary manpower for creating new units, reinforcing existing units, and serving as replacements for combat losses.

According to the law, those who have finished their military service must serve in the reserves for eight years. Reservists currently number 3.04 million.

Individual and crew-served equipment including firearms, munitions, and tanks are stockpiled at all times in areas where reserves are expected to prepare for commitment by reinforcing units or organizing new ones.

Military Strength and Augmentation Capabilities of Allied Forces

A. United States Forces Korea

Since its arrival in Korea after the establishment of the "ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" in October, 1953, US Forces Korea (USFK) has remained a symbol of the ROK-US alliance and continues to contribute to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia including the Korean peninsula.

Figure 2-5 Organization of USFK



The commander of the United Nations Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) also commands USFK. Eighth US Army (EUSA), US Naval Forces Korea, US Air Force Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and the Special Operations Command Korea make up USFK. In case of a contingency on the Korean peninsula, the USFK Commander is in full control of the operations of the Seventh US Air Force Command.

The number of USFK troops currently authorized is shown in Figure 2-6.

Figure 2-6 Number of USFK Troops Authorized

Unit: persons



Principal equipment in EUSA includes 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, e.g., Patriot, and 70 AH-64 helicopters. EUSA has the capability to perform required tasks under various circumstances using this equipment.

US Air Forces Korea possesses approximately 100 aircraft: advanced fighters, e.g., 70 F-16s, 20 A-10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligence-collecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. With this highly modern equipment, US Air Forces Korea has sufficient capability to launch all-weather attacks and to conduct air support operations under all circumstances. In the event the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command augment them, the capability of USFK will substantially increase both quantitatively and quali-

▲ The Patriot Missile

tatively.

Limited manpower and equipment are allocated to US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea in peacetime. However, the US Pacific Command will augment these forces and commands should a crisis or war erupt, thus providing them with a higher combat capability.

B. Augmentation Forces

US augmentation forces, including the army, navy, air force, and the marine corps, are composed of approximately 690,000 troops. The augmented forces comprise army divisions, carrier battle groups with highly advanced fighters, tactical fighter wings, and marine expeditionary forces in Okinawa and on the US mainland.

The US augmentation forces have contingency plans for the Korean peninsula to execute the Win-Win Strategy in support of United Nations Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) operation plans.

There are three types of augmentation capability: Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages (FMPs), and the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD). These are executed through a unit integration process, when the commander of CFC requests them and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff orders them in case of a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into political, economic, diplomatic, and military options. Approximately 150 deterrence options are ready to be employed.

FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as strong carrier battle groups.

Under TPFDD, in which FDO and FMP are included, the key forces are planned ahead of time to be deployed in case of an outbreak of war. There are three types of forces under TPFDD: in-place forces, or forces currently deployed to the peninsula; pre-planned forces, or forces of time-phased deployment in a contingency; and on-call forces, which could be deployed if needed.

● Augmentation Forces Status

In an almost simultaneous two major theater wars (2MTW: the Middle East and Korean Peninsula), the United States adopted the Win-Win Strategy as its basic strategy to resist/repulse the North Korean attack before it achieves its objectives. The augmentation forces are designed with this strategy in a view to achieve an early victory on the peninsula. As the main augmentation forces on the peninsula, the TPFDD's capability has the following history. In the early part of the 1990s, its troops numbered 480,000 and in the second half of the same decade, it planned to increase the number to 630,000. Recently, it maintains a deployment plan of 690,000 troops, 160 vessels, and 1,600 aircraft. These figures are proof that despite a plan to reduce the overall size of the forces, the US is determined to establish a firm defense of the Korean peninsula. The present forces planned for deployment have a strike capability to attack densely grouped enemy artillery, carrier battle groups with multi-dimensional battle capability, an air capability to secure air superiority, air defense, and air strikes, and a capability to respond to the weapons of mass destruction. In order to ensure smooth deployment of the augmentation forces to the peninsula in the beginning phase of a war, the ROK and US troops, under the supervision of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command, conduct the RSOI exercise annually and inspect the deployment execution system and the administration of transport devices.

Response Posture of the ROK Armed Forces

North Korea reduced its disparaging broadcasts at the DMZ and initiated other minor changes since the historic June 15 South-North Korea Summit. However, it is still pushing forward with plans to increase military training and improve combat capability and combat readiness, showing little signs of fundamental changes.

ROK forces are maintaining a robust defense readiness posture that is able to respond immediately to any kind of provocation from the North. They are serious about building a dependable system of combined defense to prevent further deterioration of the situation on the peninsula and minimize tension and instability in the region. Not neglected in this process is the attempt to extend the scope of its military diplomatic efforts.

A. Maintaining Early-Warning and Crisis-Management Systems

Operating ROK-US joint surveillance equipment, the ROK Armed Forces keep track of the movements of North Korean troops. In the forward area, the ROK soldiers use their own eyes in addition to radar, thermal equipment, and electronic combat supplies to keep the ground troops in the North under close surveillance. Along the sea lines, the Navy utilizes automatic surveillance equipments such as maritime surveillance radar and the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) to track the movements of the North's Navy on a real time basis. The ROK Air Force operates the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) 24 hours a day to watch aircraft activities in the North. If necessary, the center receives support from US intelligence satellites. The defense ministry also maintains a ROK-US combined crisis management and cooperation system for a more efficient management of indicators that might be detected through such a thorough surveillance.

South Korea and the US signed an agreement in 1994 on ROK-US combined crisis management and in 1995, followed it up by a memorandum of agreement that contained implementing guidelines. Again in 1998 a memorandum of agreement on more detailed procedures for combined crisis management was signed between the two countries. In the following year, the two sides, from a mutually identical perspective, established a crisis management system that can provide consistent emergency management measures. Through four ROK-US crisis management exercises and other series of exercises, followed up by active intelligence exchanges and a series of procedural training, the two countries guarantee systematic crisis management supported by the combined ROK-US forces.

The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a set of procedures based on its crisis management regulations. The Staff then recruited the number of personnel it needed on the crisis management team and imposed regular and no-notice training in order to develop practical skills to deal with crisis events. For immediate recognition and management of a crisis, the Staff implemented a system of automated command centers and a quick voice command dissemination system, and for emergencies it will work with the entire operations command to ensure high-speed transmission of informa-

tion for the purpose of immediately putting the crisis management system in operation.

B. Peacetime Military Posture

The ROK military maintains a superior defense readiness posture by establishing a firm army-navy-air force joint operations posture in order to defend the country's territory under any circumstances, protect the life and possessions of ROK citizens, and contribute to international peace.

On the ground, the ROK Army maintains a close lookout along the barbed wire and guard posts built across the 250-km-long MDL, where the two Koreas confront each other, as well as along the coastline.

In addition, within the areas of Korea's maritime jurisdiction over the east, west, and south seas, the five islands located in the Northwest and Mara-do, Ullung-do, and Tok-do, the ROK Navy patrols the coastal and adjacent seas with vessels, submarines, and aircraft. The ROK air force patrols the air 24 hours a day with high performance aircraft and uses radar and high-tech equipment to watch and control all aircraft activities within the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ).

With a civilian-government-military integrated defense system in the inland preparing for the numerous types of provocation from the North such as infiltration and terrorism, the ROK Defense Ministry is building an integrated operational execution system, which can handle all possible inputs ranging from civilian reports to military bases, police, coastguard, reserve, national guard, fishery radio stations, and local self-governments. At the 21st ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM), both governments reconfirmed their willingness to respond to North Korea's infiltration and local provocations and activate ROK-US



▲ Patrol around the Tok-do Islets

standing Military Committee meetings. Both participants also established a military operation posture, through the ROK-US Ministers' Joint Communiqué of March 2000, which can deter North Korea's armed provocation and, if provocation arises, bring an early end to it with a strong response.

C. Military Readiness Posture for War

In the event of a war on the Korean peninsula, the first few days will be crucial as to whether the ROK wins or loses due to North Korea's 1,500-km range missiles, various chemical weapons, artillery and mechanized units.

Thus, the ROK military is increasing joint exercises and combined training as well as improving and revitalizing the plans of various cooperative systems, while maintaining a strong supreme command and national defense crisis response system designed to deter armed provocation and break, in advance, the North's will to initiate war.

First, in order to continually revitalize the cooperative systems, South Korea annually holds the MCM and the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on the one hand and improves the ROK-US alliance system on the other hand by discussing important issues at the standing committee meetings held whenever a need arises.

In terms of making improvements to the systems, the ROK and US are working closely together to develop diverse plans, including Operation Plan (OPLAN) 5027. They seek to improve and reinforce OPLAN 5027 on a regular basis with such joint and combined exercises and training as Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI), and Foal Eagle (FE).

In order to protect ROK citizens and troops from the North's weapons of mass destruction, the ROK military completed in 1998 and is at present implementing a comprehensive readiness plan for missile and CB attacks. Moreover, it is reorganizing and reinforcing the CB policy department and chemical units and supplementing them with increased protective CB equipment and other supplies. In November 1999, the SCM and MCM agreed to step up ROK-US combined readiness for CB warfare with plans for early deployment of CB units in the event of a war.

● ROK Military's Chemical & Biological Defense System

North Korea currently holds 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical weaponry, and if war breaks out, it is anticipated that they will concentrate their attack on the South's metropolitan areas with aircraft, SCUD missiles, and long-range artillery. Therefore, using ROK-US Combined Forces assets, we have maintained a 24-hour surveillance of North Korea's chemical and biological weapons production and its storage facilities. Also, we have established a solid plan to render them ineffective before an emergency situation occurs. In addition, the NBC defense command, which is in charge of preparing for chemical and biological warfare threats from North Korea, is supporting civilian-government-military integrated training for CB defense drills including quarterly civil defense CB training. We have also formed an emergency dispatch unit for every metropolitan area to respond immediately should there be an outbreak of poisonous gas.

D. Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense Operation Posture

In order to establish a firm civilian-government-military operation posture, the Combined Defense Headquarters held a Central Meeting for Integrated Defense in January, 2000, presided by the President. The meeting established a practical operational posture based on the revised Presidential Directive number 28, and detailed the tasks and roles of respective operational departments following two working-level meetings.

Local autonomous governments held local meetings to reexamine the response posture, supported reinforcement efforts to rectify the structural vulnerability of guard post facilities along the sea lines and at harbors and ports, and engaged in long-term public relations efforts to inform the people of the civilian alert networks and methods of using these networks. Further, the ROK government improved the protection posture of the nation's key facilities by conducting a military-police-government integrated protection examination and rectifying the vulnerable areas and supplemented the protection posture by refurbishing the surveillance equipment and guard facilities and by securing enough protection personnel. In another effort, the government is devising a master plan to strengthen the protection posture and watch condition of the infrastructure of the nation's

metropolitan cities. With ground combined arms training, Hwarang training, comprehensive counter-infiltration training, and other forms of integrated defense training by as many civilian, government, and military operation personnel as possible, the ROK Defense Ministry is bearing much fruit toward helping each participant acquire mastery over the integrated defense operations and procedures and is improving the protective posture of the cities' infrastructure such as the subway and buildings.

● Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense System

The Civilian-Government-Military Integrated Defense System is a pan-national, all-out war execution system, which defends the nation by integrating the elements of national defense, such as civilian-government-military-police-reserves-national defense corps, in preparation for infiltration or provocation by the enemy during both peace and war time. The Integrated Defense Headquarters adjusted and regulated the framing of the policy of the Integrated Defense and its operations. They set up detailed preparations of integrated defense in the Defense Council, which is a part of the central and regional Integrated Defense Organization. Every ROK citizen has become the nation's eyes and ears against the enemies, an essential element of successful national defense. The Regional Autonomous Party is the core administrative body of the Integrated Defense. It brings together the civilian and military sector. Through the Integrated Defense Conferences and the operation of the Defense Support Headquarters, the local autonomous governments announce situations of Integrated Defense emergencies and an end solution to the situation, support the nurturing of reserve units that are the core element of local defense, and establish systems for the local residents in vulnerable areas to report any provocation. With a near flawless coastal defense, the military maintains a system in which the enemy is spotted and destroyed before reaching the shore. Meanwhile, the police are setting up checkpoints, operating investigative searches, and managing vulnerable areas and their given areas of duty for a successful execution of integrated defense operations. The coastal police, fishery radio stations, and alert centers for fishing boats are running vessel inspections and preparing for possible infiltration of the enemy from the sea by controlling arriving and departing vessels

E. Strengthening Mental Fighting Ability of Officers and Men

The ROK military's mental education emphasizes a realistic and practical education based on three themes: "war threats," "defense posture," and "our pledge." The military exerts efforts to sow strong conviction in the minds of all officers and men by giving them constant, repetitive mental education from the time they enter the service and after they are assigned to a unit. Mental education is regarded as an essential part of combat readiness posture, and commanders play the central role in these education programs.

At this turning point in the relations between South and North Korea following the historic June 15th Summit, the mental education of the troops is as follows.

First, despite changes in the security situation and the South-North relations, the ROK military's basic task of "defending the nation's territory on land, sea, and air from all outside threats by repulsing them as well as retaliating, and of protecting the ROK citizens' lives and property" remains absolutely unchanged.

Second, when formulating defense policy or strategy, the military must not, under any circumstances, consider only the opposition's proposed plans. Rather, it must carefully evaluate the changes in military strength and force capability and respond accordingly. To elaborate, even if the other side declares that it has no intention of starting a war, the response posture should not change as long as there is no visible proof such as a reduction of military capabilities or redeployment of units to substantiate the declaration. This means that as long as North Korea's forces remain as they are at the present level, the ROK military should maintain an even firmer response posture than before.

Third, the military must bear in mind the communists' past reconciliation-war strategy and tactics. When the opposition was strong, they pursued a policy of peace. However, they showed no hesitation to use force when their opposition became weak. Seoul should not forget this lesson from history that has revealed the communists' true intentions.

The ROK military considers the above three assertions as the underlying principles for all troop education. Furthermore, it realizes that only when

its response posture is invincible can the terms of the South-North Joint Declaration be carried out and a peaceful unification based on reconciliation and cooperation ultimately be possible. Finally, the military will improve the mental education of the troops, including the concept of a main enemy, in order to prevent the troops' security consciousness from growing weak.

Enhancement of Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises

A. Combined & Joint Training and Exercises

In order to deter war on the Korean peninsula and enhance combined operational readiness, a number of ROK-US combined exercises and training events are carried out according to integrated operation plans, whose roots can be found in the ROK-US combined defense system. The plans include the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI) exercise, the Foal Eagle (FE) exercise, the Team Spirit (TS) exercise, and others.

1. Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise

The Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise is a comprehensive command post exercise (CPX), designed to enhance the conduct of war and specific warfare capabilities as well as to ensure a mastery of the procedures for specific warfare fighting capabilities. The exercise has been performed annually since its inception in 1976. It is the combination of the Focus Lens Exercise, which has been conducted under the control of the United Nations Command since 1954, and the Ulchi Exercise that has been held by the ROK since the attempted

▲ The UFL Exercise

raid on the Blue House on January 21, 1968.

During the Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise, the ROK government's crisis management and ROK-US combined crisis management processes during the early stages of war are depicted through various situations from each operational phase.

2. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI) Exercise

The RSOI Exercise is a command post exercise conducted under the control of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). Contents of this computer-simulated exercise include the processes of reception, staging, movement to the forward area, and integration of US augmentation forces that would be deployed to the peninsula during war. Also included in these exercise are wartime support, mutual logistics support, mobilization, combined rear area coordination (CRAC) tasks and processes on the part of the ROK Armed Forces.

The RSOI Exercise has been conducted annually since 1994. The ROK Defense Ministry, Joint Chiefs of Staff, component commands of each branch of service, and operational commands participate in the exercise. The US has CFC, USFK, and augmentation forces taking part in the exercise.

3. Foal Eagle Exercise

The Foal Eagle Exercise is an annual ROK-US combined field maneuver conducted since 1961. Its purposes are to demonstrate ROK-US military resolve to deter war on the Korean peninsula and to improve the combined and joint operational posture. Participants in the 1999 Foal Eagle Exercise included ROK-US forces already stationed on the Korean peninsula, to-be-deployed augmentation forces from the US mainland, and administrative offices and

▲ The Foal Eagle Exercise

reserve forces from the area where the exercise took place. The scenario for the 1999 exercise was an infiltration by North Korean Special Operation Forces into the rear area. It focused on ROK-US brigade-level force-on-force field training and combined amphibious landing operation.

4. Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)

Conducted biennially (every even year) under the leadership of the US Third Fleet, RIMPAC is a multinational, combined sea mobility exercise in which the ROK, the US, Australia, Canada, Chile, England, and Japan have participated since 1971.

▲ The Harpoon missile fired at the RIMPAC Exercise (July 2000)

The exercise is held with the objective to increase mutual cooperation and enhance the combined operations capabilities among the countries around the rim of the Pacific Ocean so that they can ensure the safety of major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and improve their combined response capabilities in the event of conflict on the sea. In 2000, the ROK Navy participated in this exercise for the 6th time since its inception in 1990.

5. Team Spirit Exercise

Team Spirit is an annual field maneuver exercise initiated in 1976 in order to deter North Korean war provocations and fortify ROK-US security cooperation.

Purely defensive in nature, Team Spirit is basically a combined exercise and is regularly held between the two allies. This is, then, quite different from what the North criticized the exercise as being–offensive training–and we have even invited the North to observe the training.

Team Spirit is a mandatory exercise needed to evaluate the ROK-US alliance and to foster combined operations and military capabilities for defending South Korea. With an eye on improving inter-Korean relations, however, it has been suspended from 1994 to the present.

6. Amrok River Exercise

As the ROK military's CPX under the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1996, the Amrok River Exercise is conducted in May of every year, with the JCS and the operational commands as key sponsors. The CPX is used to master the war execution procedures and enhance the operational command capabilities of the ROK military.

During the Amrok River Exercise, the JCS and operational commands participate as the supervisory body while other units and organizations are grouped into either a response team or an execution team and conduct the exercise based on the war game model in their respective command posts and mock combat headquarters.

With the Amrok exercises, the JCS has improved wartime combat capability restoration procedures and the wartime support requirement production and support system by mastering the operational command and staff activity procedures and wartime conversion procedures and implementing unit by unit operation plans. In particular, beginning in 1999, JCS increased the productivity of these exercises by operating C4I functions in an interlocking manner.

7. Hoguk ("Guarding the Nation") Exercise

Conducted under the command of the ROK JCS since 1996, Hokuk training is a large-scale joint exercise in which all services gather to jointly execute operation plans along coastal and inland axes of attack.

▲ The Hoguk Exercise

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps participated in the 2000 Hokuk Exercise along the eastern coast and inland areas in the center of the ROK. Through the exercise, combat development requirements were derived and supplemented according to various functions. In this exercise, the domestically developed Joint Battle Evaluation model was applied. This model helped make timely and objective battle assessments.

B. Major Exercises of the Three Services

In a bid to maximize individual capabilities to perform combat missions, exercises and training on varying scales are conducted in each military service on specific training areas, land or sea, with the characteristics of Korean topography and North Korea's tactics taken into account.

1. Army

ROK Army training is classified into two main types: individual training and collective training. All army training is conducted according to unit size, type, function, and branch.

Individual training puts emphasis on specialty tasks necessary for individuals to master basic combat skills. It equips soldiers with professionalism towards their duties based on mental discipline and physical strength.

In collective training, intense and practical training consists of small-unit tactics training including live-fire exercises and force-on-force field training using MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System) equipment in platoon and squad teams.

Battalion training focuses on field maneuver training and situational combat training. Major cold weather regimental training includes regimental combat team (RCT) training designed to perfect combined arms and joint forces operation execution capabilities and is conducted for one week or more from December to February of the following year.

Division-level field maneuver training is carried out under the supervision of the corps commander for over a week on a real time basis and once during the term of a division commander. Division training is focused on integrated battle execution and firepower coordination, obstacle construction and denial operations, CB operations, and combat service support.

The corps- and division-level Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is used to nurture the combat command capabilities of corps- and division-level unit commanders and staff. BCTP includes mastering tactical decision-making processes, strengthening the operational acumen of integrated combat capabilities, and assessing battlefield experiences and field standing operating procedures. BCTP is held under direct supervision of the ROK Army Headquarters within one year after the arrival of a new unit commander.

▲ ROK Army's NBC training

Combined arms and joint training is conducted by each operational unit, and the training includes anti-tank attack training, joint air-ground operations training, joint air-ground-sea operations training, joint amphibious training, and river-crossing training.

Conducted in close consultation with USFK, combined training includes air assault training, NBC training, and counter-fire operations training. All are conducted annually.

Miscellaneous training is carried out in extreme situations simulating combat during the year in each unit as well: night training, cold weather training, ranger training, NBC training, and search-and-rescue training. These types of miscellaneous training are conducted in every unit at each echelon.

To create an atmosphere where one can be fully responsible for the training and education given to soldiers and officers and to encourage creative programs of instruction, commanders of every unit are entrusted with the full responsibility for the proper education and training of their men.

A comprehensive development plan on training areas has been drawn up. Based on this plan the ROK military is promoting the establishment of integrated training areas by administrative or military district. The military is also in the process of building the Korea Combat Training Center where actual combat training using MILES equipment can be conducted against aggressor forces.

2. Navy

The ROK Navy enhances its combat execution capability by various types of naval component operational training events such as anti-submarine, anti-surface vessel and amphibious operations, mine warfare, search and rescue and special operations.

Vessels larger than patrol boats are mainly used for anti-submarine, anti-

air, and electronic warfare training. All battleships are utilized primarily for offensive and defensive training with a special focus on three-dimensional and comprehensive maneuver training in order to deter large-scale enemy maritime provocations, thus upgrading naval wartime capabilities. The navy's amphibious operation capabilities are being upgraded through amphibious assault and surprise amphibious raid training employing landing craft. Mine warfare craft are used to foster minesweeping and mine-laying capabilities, which will enable the navy to respond effectively to already laid enemy mines.

▲ ROK Navy's sea maneuver exercise

Special warfare units are trained to enhance their capabilities to conduct special operations by training for coastal reconnaissance, surprise attack, and survival. Submarine units receive realistic combat training on such missions as port blockades, anti-submarine operations, surveillance of enemy surface activities, and launching torpedoes.

Aviation units concentrate on enhancing their capabilities to conduct three-dimensional operations through the execution of surface patrol operations and anti-submarine training in conjunction with surface vessels, and through training on guiding missile attacks on targets beyond radar range.

Once a year since 1993, the ROK Navy has been conducting a large-scale Combined Surface Maneuver Training in which all available naval forces as well as the army and the air force participate. Through this training, the navy is developing joint operation execution capabilities based on multiple-combat concepts under multiple-crisis situations. Three-dimensional training for surface, underwater, and air assets is being increased in order to block enemy infiltration of special operation forces by high-speed landing craft.

The ROK Navy is vigorously conducting combined training and exercises with the navies of the US and other allies with an eye to establishing a combined maritime defense posture. We continue to exert our efforts in upgrad-

ing the combined operations system between the navies of the ROK and the US by improving the existing ROK-US combined training.

The ROK Navy is also in the process of increasing the frequency of military training and training observer exchanges with neighboring countries. When Korean warships visit a foreign country, e.g., cruise training of Korean Naval Academy midshipmen, or when warships from a foreign country visit Korea, the navies of the two countries conduct combined training, which not only raises Korea's international status but also enhances the ROK Navy's operational capabilities.

3. Air Force

All ROK Air Force training is conducted as if the nation were at war. Such a level of intensity helps to enhance the capability of the air force to successfully finish its given tasks under all circumstances.

There are two main types of training in the air force: air-to-air and air-to-ground training. The purpose of air-to-air training is to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy, at the farthest distance possible, any enemy aircraft that intrude our airspace. The air force also conducts constant day and night interception, air combat maneuver, and air-to-air intercept training. Air-to-ground training is designed to enhance our ability to launch deadly attacks against enemy strategic facilities and major military capabilities. To reach this goal, low- and mid-altitude navigation, tactical firing training, and night and all-weather training are being reinforced.

Electronic warfare, search-and-rescue, tactical airlift, and reconnaissance training are also conducted, and in order to facilitate joint operations with the army and the navy, the air force executes close air support training. Moreover, ROK-US combined air defense training and combined offensive flight group training are conducted in various forms.

▲ ROK Air Force (air defense artillery) cold weather training

Chapter Three

Efforts to Ease Tensions and Build a Peace Regime on the Peninsula

▲ President Kim Dae-jung's Berlin Declaration (March 2000)

Deterring war and sustaining a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula are the most important security concerns. The current legal and institutional foundation upon which the peace on the peninsula rests is the Armistice Agreement of 1953. Moreover, in Article 5 of the South-North Basic Agreement of 1992, both sides have reaffirmed that "South and North Korea shall together endeavor to transform the present state of armistice into a firm state of peace between the two sides and shall abide by the present Military Armistice until such a state of peace is realized."

Under the firm conviction that upholding the existing Armistice Agreement is crucial to a sound settlement of peace on the peninsula, the ROK government is making its utmost effort in this regard. Moreover, the government is seriously considering the Four-Party Talks as a means to change the Armistice Agreement into a Peace Agreement. In order to establish such a peace regime, the talks shall have the South and the North as its main actors since they are the parties immediately responsible for managing peace. Other parties concerned, such as the US and China, shall play supporting roles.

The ROK government is also pursuing a "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" geared towards the North under the recognition that by becoming a responsible member of the international community North Korea will eventually contribute to stability on the peninsula. With the "Berlin Declaration" of March 9, 2000, the four-point message was conveyed both domestically and internationally: support for North Korea's economic recovery; ending of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas; the resolution of the issue of separated families; and resumption of talks between South and North Korean authorities. The "Berlin Declaration" led to the landmark South-North Korea Summit from June 13 to 15, 2000 in Pyongyang culminating in the adoption of the "South-North Joint Declaration of June 15." In order to faithfully implement the Joint Declaration, both sides are actively pushing for exchange and cooperation projects through channels such as South-North Red Cross Talks and Ministerial Talks.

With the first round of Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks held in Cheju Island from September 25 to 26, ROK MND has laid the ground for providing military support for the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Furthermore, MND is executing mine clearance and roadbed construction within the DMZ , in order to provide military support for the Seoul-Shineju Railway and Highway connection project, agreed to by both sides during the second round of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks.

Building a Peace Regime on the Peninsula

A. Maintaining the Armistice Regime and the Panmunjom General Officer-Level Talks

The present state of peace on the peninsula is based on the armistice regime. The armistice regime refers to the system on the Korean peninsula built upon the Armistice Agreement of 1953. For half a century, the Armistice has acted as a legal and institutional mechanism for preventing armed conflict and managing crisis on the peninsula.

However, in March of 1991, when the United Nations Command (UNC)

named a ROK military general as senior member of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), the North refused to participate in the plenary session. As a result, the sound operation of the Commission has been unattainable.

Even after the effectuation of the Basic Agreement of 1992 to which the North agreed that the current Armistice Agreement shall be upheld until the state of peace is settled on the peninsula, the North refused to comply with the armistice system as it withdrew the North Korean and Chinese side of the MAC and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee (NNSC). In March 1995, the North proposed US-North Korea General Officer-Level Talks to replace the MAC. However, under the judgment that there was a need to keep a reliable negotiation channel open for crisis management under the armistice framework, UNC and MND proposed General Officer-Level Talks between the UNC and the North Korean People's Army (KPA) on February 1998. North accepted our offer and eleven rounds of talks were held from June 1998 to September 1999.

The UNC-KPA General Officer-Level Talks covers the issue of implementing the Armistice Agreement. Four representatives from the UNC attend the talks and all participants are given equal rights to speak. The talks act as a channel for crisis management as it addresses the issue of the reasons for and the responsibilities concerning the North's violation of the armistice agreement with a view to stopping further confrontations between the two Koreas.

As the Yonpyong Sea Battle broke out in June 1999, however, the North insisted on initiating a working level dialogue between the US and the North to discuss the NLL (Northern Limit Line) issue in the Yellow Sea. The North set forth conditions indicating it would not have any more contacts in Panmunjom if the UNC did not accept its proposal. Moreover, the North insisted that US should receive the remains of US military personnel missing from the Korean War directly, which had been handed over to the UNC to date, according to the Armistice Agreement and customs.

By denying the UNC, solely responsible for implementing the Armistice Agreement, from further dialogue or any contact, the North is attempting to dismantle the UNC and conclude a US-North Korea Peace Agreement through direct contact with the US.

However, MND maintains its position, based on the Armistice

Agreement and the Basic Agreement, that the current state of armistice must be upheld until a solid peace has settled on the peninsula. Moreover, it believes that operation of the MAC and the General Officer-Level Talks held under its framework, as well as that of the NNSC, should be normalized.

B. Building a Peace Regime through Four-Party Talks

It is stipulated in Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement that, "in order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides... recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively...." In compliance with this agreement, preliminary talks were held to discuss the political conference issue on October 1953, only to result in a collapse. Also, in 1954, a conference was held in Geneva with 20 participant nations of the Korean War but did not yield any substantial outcome. The armistice regime has been left untouched and unstable ever since.

After continuous claims for the establishment of a South-North peace regime, the North began to demand a peace agreement between the US and North Korea since 1974. In particular, as crisis intensified with the North's nuclear issue in 1993, it demanded once again the conclusion of a peace treaty with the US, justified under its "New Peace Ensuring Regime" of April 1994. On April 16, 1996, the Presidents of both the ROK and the US jointly proposed Four-Party Talks in which the two Koreas, US and China would participate to discuss the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The talks envision a system of peace where the two Koreas are the main players in dealing with the peace issue and the US and China are supporters.

In early 1997, a joint briefing session on the Four-Party Talks was held after the North accepted the proposal. During the third preparatory meeting in November of the same year, the participating state parties agreed to adopt the subject "Building a Peace Regime and Tension Reduction on the Korean Peninsula" as the single agenda for the Four-Party Talks and to

hold the first meeting in Geneva in December 1997.

Consequently, two rounds of talks were held, one in December 1997 and another in March 1998. However, due to differences in views between the ROK-US and the North, no concrete agreement could be reached. Whereas the ROK and the US proposed forming a subcommittee to address issues such as establishing a peace regime, reducing tension, and building confidence, the North persisted on placing priority on the withdrawal of US troops in the South and concluding the US-North Korea Peace Agreement.

Nevertheless, during the third round of talks in October 1998, participants agreed to the composition of two subcommittees–the "Subcommittee on Tension Reduction" and the "Subcommittee on Establishing a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula." In January 1999, during the fourth round of talks, the two Subcommittees were activated for the first time, leading to the adoption of the "Memorandum on the Establishment and Cooperation of the Subcommittees." At the fifth and sixth rounds of talks in April and August 1999, respectively, the participants conducted more specific discussions on the agenda for the Four-Party Talks through the two subcommittees.

However, talks have not resumed since the sixth round of talks came to a stall as the North demanded that the withdrawal of US troops and the signing of a peace agreement between the US and North Korea be included in the agenda for the Four-Party Talks. Nonetheless, the ROK government is convinced that the Four-Party Talks is the best approach, and will make continuous efforts to ensure that the two Koreas will play the leading role, with the US and China playing participating and supporting roles during the talks, in order that a peace regime may be established on the peninsula.

C. South-North Summit Talks and Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks

1. South-North Summit Talks

The ROK government has continuously pursued a "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" with the objective of ending the Cold War and realizing peaceful coexistence, and ultimately leading to the realization of *de facto* unification of the two Koreas. This Policy is based on three principles: "No

armed provocation disrupting peace will be tolerated; unification by absorption will never be attempted; and reconciliation and cooperation will be actively promoted."

▲ South-North Summit (June 2000)

According to this policy, the ROK government has continuously pursued policies to promote contacts and dialogue between the two Koreas, encourage economic exchanges and cooperation and provide humanitarian aid to the North in an attempt to guide North Korea into the sphere of reconciliation and cooperation. Through the "Berlin Declaration" of March 9, 2000, four initiatives including support for North Korea's economic recovery, ending the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and realizing peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, calling for the resolution of the issue of separated families, and proposing to hold talks between South and North Korean authorities, were announced both domestically and internationally.

Due to our consistent "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy" and the "Berlin Declaration" the North began to show signs of confidence in our North Korea policy and, at last, the two sides agreed to hold the South-North Summit. As a result, from June 13 to 15, the historic South-North Summit was held in Pyongyang and the heads of both sides announced the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration." The Korean people have at last paved the way for a new history that would end the fifty years of hostility and confrontation and begin the march for reconciliation, cooperation and peace.

The background that made the adoption of the Joint Declaration possible is as follows: first, there was the historic decision by the two leaders of both Koreas to meet, with the recognition that the only possible way to reduce

the severity of the division, to guarantee mutual prosperity and to advance the unification process was through dialogue and cooperation; second, understanding the post-Cold War trends and the matured environment for peace on the peninsula, the North felt the need to readjust its domestic and external policies and improve relations with the South; third, on the basis of mutual understanding and trust, both sides attempted productive dialogue to recognize the differences and find some common denominators; fourth, North Korea came to positively recognize South Korea's sustained policies of reconciliation and cooperation; and fifth, there was public support and international cooperation toward the "Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy."

The South-North Summit marked the first meeting of the two leaders of both Koreas in 55 years of division. The meeting provided both sides with an opportunity to discuss normalizing relations and the unification problem based on their mutual recognition of the current situation. Furthermore, inter-Korean cooperation to resolve the separated family issue, reciprocal improvement in South-North cooperation along with Chairman Kim Jong-il's return visit to Seoul were all agreed upon during the summit. In sum, the summit meeting provided momentum for both sides to ensure the faithful implementation of all agreements reached up to this point and to seek the possibility of regular inter-Korean summits, thus making possible the improved relations between the two Koreas.

2. Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks

After the South-North Summit, both Koreas witnessed exchanges and cooperation taking place in economic, social and cultural fields. The South-North Red Cross Talks were held to discuss the reunion of separated families. Moreover, the first and second rounds of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks were held to discuss the issues of implementing the exchanges and cooperation between the two sides. In the field of military affairs, however, efforts to build confidence and ease tensions have been relatively poor. And it has been pointed out that the successful implementation of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" will be possible only when the military authorities of both sides guarantee an assured peace, doing away with their past mistrust and confrontation.

With the belief that balanced progress in reconciliation, cooperation and peace for both Koreas is important, the government has continuously raised this issue to the North. Finally, during the second round of Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks on September 1, both sides came to the conclusion that, "South and North Korea will work toward easing military tension and ensuring peace. To that end, the two Koreas will discuss the holding of talks between South and North Korean military authorities at an early date."

In a letter dated September 13, sent by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol to the Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-tae, the North announced that they would agree to our proposal to open Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks. On September 14, our side replied proposing that the first round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks shall be held in Hong Kong from September 25 to 26. Also included in our reply were issues not only related to the implementation of the South-North Joint Declaration, but also those of mutual interest to both sides–for example, to promote confidence building measures and to reduce military tension, such as opening a military hotline between military authorities. On September 17, the North modified our reply and proposed the location of the talks to Cheju Island, and on September 18, we delivered a response accepting the modification. Finally, an agreement was reached to hold the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks.

On the afternoon of September 24, the North Korean military delegation, composed of 13 persons including delegates and support staff, arrived via Panmunjom for the first time since the division of the peninsula. Talks were held numerous times from the 25th to the 26th in

▲ Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks (September 2000)

Cheju Island. For the first round of the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks, a delegation of five persons, headed by the Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-tae of the Republic of Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North. Both sides formalized the outcome of the talks with a "Five-point Joint Press Release." Following the talks, the North's delegation returned to North Korea via Panmunjom after paying a courtesy visit to President Kim Dae-jung on the 26th.

Following are the significant aspects of the talks and its outcome:

First, it was the first time since the division of the country for military authorities on both sides to come together face-to-face for dialogue. Considering the fact that the North continuously insisted on conducting dialogue with only the US when it came to military matters, its participation in the talks itself could be marked as a progress in inter-Korean relations.

Second, Defense Ministers of the two Koreas have expressed their willingness to provide military assurance for the implementation of the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration" both internally and externally. In order to remove military obstacles related to assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians, both sides agreed to actively cooperate with each party. What was significant was that this agreement paved the way for active dialogue and cooperation between the military authorities of both sides. With this firm assurance of the implementation of the Joint Declaration, the scope of the South-North relations was expanded into military matters, whereas past relations were basically limited to economic, social and cultural exchange and cooperation.

Third, Defense Ministers on both sides reached a consensus on eliminating the threat of war by easing tensions and establishing a peace regime between the two Koreas, a key concern. Both parties declared domestically and internationally that they would make an even effort in this regard. In the future, military authorities on both sides will be able to discuss measures for reducing military tension and building confidence, such as the establishment of a military hotline, prior notification of military exercises and large troop movements, exchanges of military personnel and informa-

tion, and the peaceful utilization of the DMZ.

Fourth, since related military problems had to be resolved before beginning construction of the Seoul-Shineju Railway and the Gaesung-Munsan Highway, it became possible to begin the project after reaching an agreement to guarantee the safety of the construction effort.

Fifth, to conduct the construction of the railway and road, opening some areas along the MDL and in the DMZ is inevitable. The talks provided an opportunity for both sides to reconfirm the legal and practical effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement as they agreed to set up areas of jurisdiction based on the Agreement. As a result of the talks, both sides have reaffirmed their obligation to carry out the provisions in question until the Armistice Agreement can be replaced by a Peace Agreement.

Sixth, by agreeing to hold the second round of the talks at a location in North Korea, the talks provided an opportunity for the two sides to hold future meetings on a regular basis. Therefore, through the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks, which are expected to continue, the door has opened for the gradual exploration of ways to build confidence and ease military tension.

Improving South-North relations is expected to take a two-track approach, as it will have economic and social exchanges and cooperation on one pillar and reducing military tension and building confidence on the other. The Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks are an important channel for exchange and cooperation, whereas the Inter-Korean Defense Ministerial Talks will act as an important channel for discussing matters related to building military confidence and reducing tension.

Although we share a common wish in reducing military tension and building confidence between the two Koreas, rash expectations have to be avoided. Dialogue between the military authorities of the two sides is only in its initial stages. In the future, we must not be negligent in maintaining a firm security posture, as well as making attempts to improve South-North relations.

3. Seoul-Shineju Railway and Highway Connection Project

The South and the North have both agreed to connect the Seoul-Shineju Line and the Munsan-Gaesung Highway during the second round of Inter-

▲ Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Seoul-Shineju Railway and Highway Connection

Korean Ministerial Talks with a view to implementing the "June 15 South-North Joint Declaration." To support the smooth operation of the construction project, MND is in the process of clearing mines and constructing roadbeds in the length of 9.2km north of the Imjin River, where the mines are buried.

In order to efficiently conduct the mine clearing and roadbed construction projects, the military formed committees in both MND and the Army Headquarters. With the Defense Vice Minister as chair, the "MND Committee" is in charge of coordination and control concerning overall construction, cooperation between government bodies and external agencies, and consultation with the UNC on contact with North Korea. "The Army Committee," with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff as chair, is responsible for detailed planning of project schedules and operations. The Army has delegated the missions of guarding mine clearing and construction units, transferring military facilities and conducting supplementary works to the First Corps, and has launched the "Army Construction Corps" for handling railroad and roadbed construction. Currently, some 2,700 personnel from a total of eight battalions are committed to the construction operation.

Under the conviction that this project, the first of its kind following the "June 15 Joint Declaration," will be a touchstone for future developments in South-North relations, MND has concentrated all of its military resources on this project in order to complete the construction in the shortest period possible. It is also focusing on mine clearing operations and safety measures during construction, and is taking various measures to avoid possible collision with the North. With regard to construction in the DMZ, MND is in close cooperation with the UNC.

On the other hand, the ROK military is analyzing the effect the railway

and highway will have on military operations after their completion and is devising necessary measures. First, the MND countermeasures to minimize military threats resulting from the road construction have been fully reflected from the planning stages of the project. Second, various blockade and denial measures have been set up so that the railway and the road cannot be used as an avenue for tactical maneuver. Third, comprehensive plans are being developed to stop the offense by integrating aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, infantry and AT weapons to block railways and roads and prevent them from being used as a high-speed avenue of approach.

D. Efforts to Solve Problems Concerning ROK POWs and MIAs

Although the two sides exchanged POWs pursuant to the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, a considerable number of ROK POWs among those detained by North Korea were left in North Korea because their individual will had not been considered. Until the early 1960s, the UNC called for the release and repatriation of these ROK POWs through the MAC, but with the North insisting that "no ROK POW lives within our territory," the matter remains unsolved even today.

Since Second Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho's dramatic return to the South in 1994, returning of POWs has continued for four consecutive years; one in 1997, three in 1998, three in 1999, and eight in 2000. This issue has drawn the people's attention to the ROK POWs ever since.

To fulfill its duty and obligation to those who fought and sacrificed their lives for their country, the ROK government is seeking to repatriate the ROK POWs of the Korean War held in North Korea. Considering the fact that most of the ROK POWs are of an old age, the government is calling for a quick resolution of the matter with the North Korean government. The ROK government will continue to negotiate with North Korea with a view to resolving the POW issue as a part of the separated family issue.

In the meanwhile, the government has set up legal and institutional devices for a rational resolution of the matter:

First, the government moved the names of some 24,000 from the MIA list to the list of those killed in action, paving the way for the bereaved families to be eligible for benefits.

Second, it enacted and announced the "Bill on the Treatment of ROK POWs and MIAs," laying a legal foundation for the support and treatment of repatriated POWs and MIAs and their families as well, in order to stabilize their lives and promote their welfare.

Third, in January 1999, a committee on POWs at the government level was organized with the Vice Minister of National Defense as its chairman. The purpose was to reinforce cooperation among different government agencies and to come up with solutions at the government level.

Fourth, the government has established nine "MIA Register Centers" across the country to receive reports from bereaved families and to locate relatives of surviving POWs.

In addition, in case there is a need for additional measures to resolve the ROK POW matter, the government will readily reflect the matter into policies.

Arms Control on the Peninsula

Arms control refers to a national security strategy to fundamentally eliminate threats resulting from military instability by means of political and military negotiations with a hostile or a potentially hostile country in order to fulfill the national security objective. Therefore, arms control focuses on eliminating, *a priori*, the incentive for military threats by a hostile country, reaching a balance at a relatively low level of arms and thereby limiting mutual offensive abilities.

Our government is pursuing arms control policies from a national security perspective in order to eliminate military tension and realize stable military relations on the peninsula where sharp military confrontation still exists. Therefore, if North Korea would comply with arms control between South and North, which includes building mutual military confidence, arms limitation and reduction, our government will actively cooperate and implement arms control.

A. Positions of the Two Koreas

North Korea has consistently proposed arms control schemes, pursuant to its political needs and with its primary focus on the withdrawal of US troops and the conclusion of a US-North Korean Peace Treaty. The North adamantly adheres to its principle of "arms reduction first, confidence building second," calling for drastic cuts in armed forces. Moreover, the North insists on political and military solutions first, before building mutual trust through exchange and cooperation and is calling for a package settlement whereas our government is insisting on a step-by-step approach. The chances of realizing North' s arms control plan seem fairly low since it is overlooking the fundamental principles and procedures of arms control.

On the contrary, our government's policy objective in seeking South-North arms control is to enhance national security and support a peaceful unification while reacting actively to changes in domestic and international trends. That is to say, the government policy aims at establishing a peaceful coexistence through easing tensions between the South and the North and building military confidence, and furthermore laying the foundation for a peaceful unification. In other words, our government is pursuing arms control policies that focus on practicality while reflecting the interests and prosperity of nation.

B. The Basis of Our Arms Control Policy

Our arms control policy basically adopts a gradual, step-by-step approach to arms control under the principle of "confidence building first, arms reduction second." From a political perspective, it focuses on improving mutual trust between the authorities of the two sides and enhancing exchange and cooperation in various fields through mutual recognition of respective regimes and implementation of nonagression and noninterference in internal affairs. From a military point of view, its priorities are set on ensuring military safety by limiting and eliminating the likelihood of a surprise attack and enhancing military transparency and predictability through exchanges of information on military activities of both sides.

The objective of our arms control policy is to eliminate the threat of war

on the peninsula and to build a foundation for unification through the establishment of a joint security regime. The keynotes of our arms control policy are as follows.

First, inter-Korean arms control shall be based on the principle of direct resolution through direct dialogue between the two Koreas.

Until now, North Korea attempted to nullify the armistice regime and to resolve the issues on the peninsula through direct dialogue with the US. However, the ROK government is convinced that the issue of peace and stability on the peninsula has to be managed by South and North. Accordingly, under close ROK-US cooperation, the government is attempting to promote arms control through direct inter-Korean talks and bilateral negotiations. Furthermore, the ROK government is engaged in active discussions with other countries that are interested in the Korean question, including the Four-Party Talks.

Second, priority shall be given to the issues already agreed to between the two sides.

It has been agreed by both sides to place the Basic Agreement as the interim step in the shift from armistice to peace. However, the North is neglecting this agreement. The Basic Agreement includes appropriate arms control measures to build military confidence and control the proliferation of WMDs. Giving priority to the implementation of these issues is the most efficient and appropriate means for South-North arms control.

It is desirable to consult and fulfill the detailed implementation items based on the "South-North Agreement of Nonagression Between South and North Korea," with the South-North Joint Military Commission as its channel. The ROK government is calling for the North to comply with the South-North Basic Agreement, and is developing measures to meet that objective.

Third, in consideration of the progress in inter-Korean relations and changes in North Korea's stance, the ROK government is engaging in a flexible integration of confidence building, arms limitation and reduction.

After the historic South-North Korea Summit and the Inter-Korea Defense Ministerial Talks, the time is ripe for arms control on the peninsula. Fully considering the difference in opinions of both sides with regard to arms control, the ROK government will raise and consult step-by-step arms

control measures to the North in accordance with the progress in tension reduction and confidence building.

In sum, to prevent accidental armed clashes as specified in the Basic Agreement, the ROK government places primary emphasis on building military confidence as shown in the establishment of a hotline between the military authorities of both sides, the exchange of military personnel, mutual notification and observation of large-scale unit movements and major military exercises, an exchange of military information, and the peaceful utilization of the DMZ. Furthermore, the government is seeking measures to put an end to the arms race by freezing the number of arms and troops and model arms control projects.

▲ Ground Leveling for Light Water Reactor Construction Site in North Korea

C. Controlling North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction

North Korea's WMD program, such as its nuclear development program, its chemical and biological weapons, and missiles pose the greatest threat not only to the security of the peninsula, but also to that of Northeast Asia. Removing the threat of these WMD calls for an immediate opening of inter-Korean talks on arms control. Moreover, close ties and support from the international community are required.

Under the Geneva Agreed Framework signed between Washington and Pyongyang in October 1994, the US agreed to provide North Korea with two 1,000 MWe (megawatt-electric) Light-Water Reactors (LWRs) as well as 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year until the first LWR is constructed, to resume inter-Korean talks and to ease economic sanctions against the North in return for the freezing and dismantlement of its nuclear development programs and transfer of spent fuel rods to foreign countries. Accordingly, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was

established with the ROK, US, Japan, and EU as participants. The LWR Supply Agreement was signed between the KEDO and North Korea on December 15, 1995.

Since the construction of the LWR site at Shinpo, commenced in August 1997, the LWR project has so far been proceeding smoothly: ROK-US-Japan talks have been completed on sharing the LWR construction costs, amounting to US$ 4.6 billion; heavy oil continues to be delivered to the North as an alternative fuel source until the completion of the first LWR; the sealing of 8,000-odd spent fuel rods from a 5 MWe nuclear reactor in Yongbyon was completed in April, 2000 pursuant to the Geneva Agreed Framework; and the ROK, responsible for 70% of the total cost, will faithfully play a central role in the project, on the premise that North Korea will implement the Geneva Agreed Framework with sincerity.

Therefore, it is Pyongyang's obligation not only to freeze its current nuclear development program, but also to make known its past nuclear activities, which have caused great anxiety worldwide, and to sincerely comply with IAEA demands to inspect and verify its nuclear facilities. Most of all, North Korea must sincerely execute the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in effect since January 20, 1992.

Furthermore, North Korea must also join in international efforts for peace and stability such as participating in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and abiding by the guidelines set down by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Only when such an effort is made in a transparent way will it improve current South-North relations and will the international community lift economic sanctions, resulting in improved relations with the international community and accession into international economic organizations. Moreover, Pyongyang's international status as a member of the UN will rise correspondingly.

As conveyed to the North during the South-North Korea Summit, our government's firm conviction is that the only way for North Korea to contribute to peace on the peninsula and the world is by accepting the international control regime on WMDs. In the future, we will continuously push for reconciliation, cooperation and confidence building measures so that North Korea may participate in the nonproliferation regime and give up development and operation of WMDs.

Chapter Four

Stability on the Peninsula and the Contribution of External Military Policy for Global Peace

ROK-US Alliance and Our Security

The ROK and the US maintained a steadfast alliance based on the common strategic goal of preserving peace on the peninsula during the half century of the Cold War. Under the stable security environment resulting from the ROK-US combined defense system, rapid economic development and settlement of a liberal democratic regime was possible. In particular, since the inauguration of the ROK "Government of the People," the heads of both allies have solidified their well-coordinated efforts on the reconciliation and cooperation policy toward North Korea, thus manifesting the best possible state of the alliance. Furthermore, during the "ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks" of March 2000 and the 32nd annual "ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting," both nations agreed to firmly maintain the ROK-US combined defense system, and they are working closely on policies geared towards North Korea in order to support the continuous development of South-North relations and to respond together to the changes that may come about on the peninsula.



▲ The ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks (March 2000)

Until peaceful unification is realized on the peninsula, the security part-

nership between the ROK and the US shall continue to deter war and guarantee peace. Even after unification, it is expected that the alliance will contribute greatly to the security of the Northeast Asian region.

A. Background and Significance of ROK-US Alliance

The first official relationship between the ROK and the US was marked by the conclusion of the "Treaty on Peacekeeping, Commerce and Navigation between Chosun and the US" in May 1882. A military relationship between the two nations started in 1888 when the US dispatched a military advisory group composed of four interpreter-officers. In a modern sense, however, military cooperative relations between the two nations solidified in September 1945 when US forces arrived in Korea to disarm the Japanese forces that lost in World War II. It was after the Korean War that the alliance between the ROK and the US began to take an important place in each other's security and foreign policy.

"The ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty" was concluded on October 1, 1953, in Washington DC, immediately following the cease-fire of the Korean War, and came into effect on November 18, 1954. The treaty is a basic framework that has been established for both the ROK and the US to jointly respond to foreign aggression. Even to this day, it contributes greatly not only to maintaining security on the peninsula, but also to stabilizing the Northeast Asian region as a whole. The treaty also serves as the legal foundation of the ROK-US combined defense system: it provides the basis for the ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and other security and military related follow-up agreements signed between the governments or defense authorities.

B. Progress of the ROK-US Security Consultative Body and Combined Defense System

1. The ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM)

The ROK and the US have held the ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) annually since 1968, following the incident when North Korean armed guerrillas attempted an attack on the Blue House (the

Presidential Residence) on January 21, 1968, and when the USS *Pueblo* was captured. Starting with the first meeting in May 1968 in Washington DC, 32 meetings have been held. Following the fourth meeting in 1971, the title was changed to the "ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting" and evolved into a multi-dimensional security meeting, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taking part.

▲ A closed bilateral meeting in the 32nd SCM (September 2000)

The SCM consists of the plenary meeting which centers around the two defense ministers and five working-level committees. The five committees hold a series of meetings prior to the SCM, where the agenda is selected and directions for negotiation are mutually examined.

The procedure of SCMs and Military Committee Meetings (MCMs) is as follows: the SCM informs the "National Command and Military Authorities (NCMA)" of strategic guidelines it may have for the "Military Committee (MC)." The ROK-US MC is co-hosted by the CJCS of the ROK and the US. As the body above the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), the MC, in turn, notifies CFC Headquarters of strategic directives and operational guidelines. The plenary meeting of the MC takes place prior to the SCM, and the results of the MCM are reported to the SCM. Current military issues related to the CFC are discussed at the MC standing meeting whenever necessary.

In the past, the significance of the meeting lay mainly in its declarative role. Starting in the late 1980s, however, the two states have not only consulted on key security issues and drawn up countermeasures on an equal footing; they have been able to jointly design long-term directions for the progress of both nations' military relations as well. These examples represent the evolution of the SCM into a substantial policy consultative meeting.

2. The ROK-US Combined Defense System

CFC has actual operational control over the ROK-US Combined Defense System. The system is based on the "Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Military Committee and ROK-US CFC," which was agreed upon at the tenth SCM held on July 26, 1977, and on the "Strategic Directive No. 1" conveyed by the MCM to the CFC in 1978. It was implemented in November 1978.

The basic goal of the Combined Defense System is to deter war on the Korean peninsula and conduct effective combined operations in a contingency by means of operating the integrated force capabilities of the two nations. Upon the creation of CFC, the operational control over certain designated ROK units that the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), UNC had been exercising since the start of the Korean War was entrusted to the CINC CFC. As of December 1, 1994, however, peace time operational control over designated Korean units, which heretofore belonged to the CINC CFC, was transferred to the ROK CJCS. Since then, during peace time, the CINC CFC has only performed tasks derived from the combined delegated authority (CODA) of the ROK Chairman of JCS .

The rights to maintaining the Korean Armistice Agreement still belong to the CINC UNC. The CINC CFC and the CINC UNC support and cooperate with each other.

C. Sharing USFK Stationing Costs

In 1991, Korea agreed to share USFK costs after comprehensively considering the defense cost-sharing level of other US allies, USFK's contribution to ROK defense, and the need to develop the ROK-US military alliance into that of a "cooperative security partnership" status.

During the first SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing in 1991, the ROK agreed to pay one-third of the total USFK costs associated with maintaining USFK, excluding wages given to US forces and US civilian employees. The two states concluded a follow-up SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing during the 1996-1998 term, which increased the amount of annual ROK burdensharing by 10% compared with the previous year based on the US$300 million which was paid

by the ROK in 1995. As a result of this arrangement, ROK share of these defense costs reached US$399 million. However, taking into account the financial difficulties during late 1997, it was readjusted to US$310 million. On February 25, 1999, the ROK and the US concluded another follow-up defense cost-sharing agreement for the future after 1999. According to this agreement, the ROK would provide 257.5 billion won plus US$141.2 million in 1999, which adds up to approximately US$333 million. ROK defense cost sharing in 2000 and 2001 would be increased in connection with the nominal GDP growth rate of the previous year. Therefore, defense cost sharing in 2000 will increase by 9.78% compared to the agreed amount in 1999, and the defense costs for 2001 is currently under review.

D. Efforts to Resolve Pending ROK-US Issues

Basic military activities such as military base establishment and military exercises may at times, unavoidably, incur inconveniences to nearby residents. As a member of the ROK-US combined defense system, USFK is playing a pivotal role in the ROK's national security. Nevertheless, concerns have increased as recent incidents concerning USFK military bases and military exercises have contributed to the list of people's inconveniences. However, since these problems result from the management of the ROK-US combined defense system and not USFK itself, it is important to note that the principle set forth to resolve the matter must include a measure to promote mutual existence. Under this recognition, the respective governments of the ROK and the US have proposed measures to resolve some of the problems concerning USFK and they are being considered from various angles.

Authorities of both the ROK and the US are working closely on the issue of revising the SOFA, including measures to resolve problems related to clauses concerning unfair criminal jurisdiction in comparison with other countries and the application of environmental regulations. Moreover, to settle the inconvenience of the civilians near a US Air Force base training area in Maehyang-ri, strafing exercises have been terminated since August 2000. In addition, disposal of unexploded shells has been restricted as a countermeasure to minimize the noise problem and to implement safety

measures. On issues related to the US military bases in Korea, both governments are seeking ways to find a resolution through discussions in the SOFA joint committee. Both the ROK and the US will continuously make efforts to develop cooperative defense relations, which has contributed greatly to the combined security on both sides for the past 50 years. Both nations will continuously work towards mutually reducing burdens that may come about.

External Military Exchanges and Cooperation for Peninsular and Global Peace

A. Progress in Military Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries

The objective of our military diplomacy is to deter war and contribute to peace and stability not only on the peninsula but also in the region by building confidence through military exchanges and cooperation with friendly nations.

Maintaining balanced military diplomatic relations with neighboring states, i.e., Japan, China and Russia, is a matter of utmost importance since these relations enhance the international community's understanding of a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula, and they contribute to regional stability and global peace. The ROK's military diplomatic activities have developed significantly since the 1990s.

Since the inauguration of the "Government of the People," a series of successful summit meetings have been held for the sake of enhancing the understanding and garnering cooperation from the neighboring countries on the ROK's policy on reconciliation and cooperation towards the North. Hence, the friendly diplomatic environment has made our military diplomacy with the neighboring countries more active. In particular, following 1999, Defense Ministers' Talks were held with four neighboring countries, US, Japan, China and Russia in 2000. In the future, our military will continuously pursue balanced exchange and cooperation policies with Japan, China and Russia, on the basis of a strong ROK-US alliance.

1. ROK-Japan Relations

The ROK and Japan have gradually expanded and developed military exchanges and relations since the establishment of a ROK military attaché office in Japan in 1966, and a Japanese military attaché office in Korea the following year. Until 1990 these exchanges were mainly personnel-based (e.g., exchange visits of military personnel and students). Since 1990, however, the scope of exchanges has expanded and become diversified.

Defense Ministers' Talks have been held annually since 1994. Since 1998, the annual ROK-Japan Security Policy Consultation Meeting has been held, with participation by high-ranking foreign affairs and defense related officials from both countries. Furthermore, defense staff talks, military information exchange meetings between Defense Intelligence Agencies and the services, and air defense working-level talks have been held regularly.

In 1999, emergency communications channels were established between the ROK MND and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), ROK Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the ROK Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Moreover, communication channels between the ROK Armed Forces and Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) were diversified with the initiation of dialogues between the deputy chief of staff level of the ROK JCS and the Joint Staff Council of Japan and the ROK-Japan Navy-to-Navy talks. In August 1999, a joint search-and-rescue exercise was conducted for the first time by vessels and aircrafts of the ROK Navy and JMSDF on the high seas southeast of Cheju Island.

During the ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks in Tokyo in May 2000, the two Defense Ministers reaffirmed their beliefs that nonproliferation of WMDs on the Korean peninsula is crucial to regional security

▲ ROK Defense Minister's visit to Japan (May 2000)

and that increased military exchange between the two countries will contribute not only in building military confidence between ROK and Japan but also in shaping future-oriented development of mutual relations. In addition, both sides reached an agreement to hold annual exchange visits by the ROK Chairman of JCS. and Japanese Joint Staff Council Chairman, and conducting joint search-and-rescue exercises on a regular basis. Besides, both sides agreed to send one cadet from both the Korea Military Academy and Naval Academy to Japan's Defense University on an exchange program in 2001, following the dispatch of an Air Force Cadet for the first time in March 2000.

In the future, military exchange with Japan will take diverse forms. It will greatly contribute not only to building military confidence and promoting friendship, but also to establishing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

2. ROK-China Relations

There has been significant progress in the political, economic, social, and cultural relations between ROK and China despite the short eight-year relations since the normalization of ties in 1992. In 1998, President Kim Dae-jung visited China where he agreed to construct the "ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century."

Based on the extensive progress in ROK-China relations, the military relations between the two countries have progressed gradually after the establishment of a ROK military attaché office in Beijing in 1993 and a Chinese military attaché office in Seoul in 1994. Currently, ROK-China military exchanges and cooperation have been pursued in various ways.

▲ Chinese Defense Minister's visit to Korea (January 2000)

Annual exchanges of military athletic groups have been made between

the two countries since 1992. In 1999, the ROK Armed Forces Athletic Unit's soccer and basketball teams visited China, and China's handball team and Navy rowing team visited Korea. The fourth "ROK-China Defense Forum" was held in Beijing in 1999 where ideas on security on the peninsula and the region were exchanged.

In addition, with regard to military education exchange, three officers were sent to the Nakyang Foreign Language Institute of the Chinese Armed Forces in 1999 for the first time and a Chinese delegation on military education came to the ROK to visit various military educational institutions. These mutual exchange visits provided a basis for the amicable relations between the military educational institutions of both nations.

For the first time since the Korean War, ROK Defense Minister Cho Seong-tae visited China in August 1999. In January 2000, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian made a return visit to the ROK for the first time, and these mutual visits marked an opportunity to lift the military relations to a higher level. The ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks greatly contributed to building military confidence between the two armed forces. In addition, official visits at the four-star general level, such as the visits by the ROK Navy Chief of Staff in April and the ROK Chairman of JCS in August 2000, paved the way for exchange of high-ranking military officials. In retrospect, the development in the ROK-China military relations in 1999 is expected to contribute significantly to the balanced development of ROK-China relations and the "ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century."

3. ROK-Russia Relations

ROK military relations with the Russian Federation were initiated with the diplomatic normalization in September 1990 and the establishment of military attaché offices in each other's capitals in the following year. Despite the short time period since the normalization, exchanges between high-ranking officers have continued resulting in various measures to build military confidence.

Since the first ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks in Moscow in May 1994, five meetings have been held thus far. In addition, an active exchange of high-ranking officers has occurred as the Chairman of JCS and the Chief of staff of each branch of the ROK Armed Forces exchanged visits with

▲ ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' talks (May 2000)

their Russian counterparts including the Defense Minister and commanding officers of the field army commands. Since 1999, there have been exchange visits by the officers and men of the two armed forces while on leave.

Military relations with the Russian Federation have focused primarily on enhancing mutual interest through exchange of military personnel up until the early 1990s. Since 1994, however, the ROK-Russia relations have been focused on the institutionalization of military confidence building. Hence, the two governments concluded the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Seas beyond Territorial Waters in 1994, MOU on Military Cooperation in 1996, Agreement on Military Science, Defense Industry and Logistics Cooperation in 1997, and MOU on Mutual Visits by Officers and Men on Leave in 1998. Currently, efforts are being made to conclude the Pact on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. Additionally, the Conference on the Implementation of the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Seas beyond Territorial Waters and the ROK-Russia Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting are being held on an annual basis.

The ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks were held in Moscow in May 2000. During the talks, defense ministers agreed to work together towards peace and stability in the Northeast Asian region and the Korean peninsula. Russia welcomed the South-North Summit and announced its full assurance and support.

In addition, both sides agreed to conduct purely peace-oriented joint search-and-rescue naval exercises between the two navies and agreed to dispatch the Russian military band to the Kangwon International Tattoo 2000.

In the future, military relations with Russia will continuously develop in the direction of peace settlement on the Korean peninsula and contribute to the peace and stability in the region based on the systematic efforts towards building military confidence.

B. Diversification of Military Exchanges and Cooperation

The ROK military has exerted efforts to promote military exchanges and cooperation, and to this end it has diversified partnerships and enlarged the contents and scope of such exchanges and cooperation. Military exchanges and cooperation with major partner countries include the establishment and operation of military attache offices, mutual visits of military personnel, cooperative meetings on military exchange, seminars and meetings on military exchanges, mutual visits of naval vessels, defense industrial and logistics cooperation, and signing of military agreements.

Military exchanges have been pursued consistently with geographically close Southeast Asian countries. Following the visit by the Vietnamese Vice Defense Minister in October 1999, the ROK Vice Minister of National Defense paid the first ever visit to Vietnam in April 2000, providing a basis for substantial exchange between the two armed forces. In 2000, the ROK military co-hosted the Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting with Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively, and is actively seeking improved military relations with these countries through mutual visits of naval vessels, and military education exchanges.

President Kim Dae-jung made the first state visit to Mongolia in May 1999. In November 1999, the Mongolian Defense Minister visited the ROK to exchange views on the security situation on the Korean peninsula and the Northeast Asian region and expressed their support for our reconciliation and cooperation policy towards North Korea.

The ROK military's exchange of high-ranking military authorities and annual meetings with European countries are centered on the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The meetings to be held on a regular basis include the Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting and the Joint Committee on Defense Industry and Logistics Meeting. The French Defense Minister called on his ROK counterpart in January 1999. The Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee Meeting was held with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany respectively, in February 2000. Additionally in the following month, defense industry cooperation and defense policies of both sides were discussed through the "Joint Defense

▲ A Korea Military Academy cadet at Saint-Cyr Academy in France

Policy Consultative Meeting." Furthermore, a Korea Military Academy cadet has been sent to the German Military Academy since 1965 and from 2000, one cadet has been sent to the French Military Academy.

In November 1999, the ROK Defense Minister visited Turkey for the first time and in June 2000, the Turkish Defense Minister made a return visit to Korea. Both sides agreed to strengthen the blood-forged relations since the Korean War and promote educational exchanges and cooperation in the defense industry.

In the Middle East region, military attachés have been sent to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel. The Defense Ministers of Kuwait paid their first visits to the ROK in September 1999 and October 2000, respectively, to discuss mutual security interests and measures to accelerate cooperation on military exchanges .

Military diplomacy with the Oceanian region revolves around the two participants from the Korean War, Australia and New Zealand. Since 1996, Korea and Australia have been co-hosting the annual Pol-Mil Talks in which the ministers of foreign affairs and defense staffs from both countries participate, and from 1997, Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting has been held annually. The Australian Chief of Defense Forces visited Korea in March and the Australian Minister for Defense did so in May of 1999. Each time the two countries exchanged views on a wide range of regional security situations and defense policies of interest. In February 2000, the navies of both countries met for the first time to discuss means to increase exchange and cooperation.

In April 1998 the New Zealand military attaché office was established in Seoul. The New Zealand Chief of the General Staff paid a visit in May 1999, and in the following month the first ROK-New Zealand Pol-Mil Talks and

▲ ROK-Australia Navy Meeting (February 2000)

the Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting was held. In July 1999 the ROK Defense Vice Minister visited New Zealand to discuss the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and ways to increase military exchanges between the two countries. Korea concluded the MOU on Defense Industry and Logistics with Australia and New Zealand in November 1998, respectively.

ROK Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

A. Outline of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) can be roughly divided into peacekeeping operations led by the UN and those headed by regional organizations or an individual nation.

The first UN-led PKO was launched with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) in 1948. In the 50 years since, the UN has deployed 800,000 peacekeepers from 118 nations to 53 operations. As of August 2000, over 37,400 military and civil police agents from 87 countries are serving in 15 regions of the world such as Kosovo and East Timor.

Peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations or an individual nation, such as that of NATO, CIS, ECOWAS, etc., have played the role of resolving regional disputes. In the 1990s, various activities were undertaken in Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor.

Operations are composed of military, civilian police, election observers, UN and international organizations, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), etc. Military personnel usually take part as a member of the Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) or as a military observer. PKFs undertake

the peacekeeping operations within the boundaries of authorities bestowed by the UN. Military observers are unarmed and are charged with such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, patrolling, inspections, and arbitration activities.

▲ The Evergreen Unit in East Timor

The UN, in principle, finances the expenses of peacekeeping operations headed by the UN. For operations led by regional organizations, the sending government pays expenses.

B. Status of Participation in PKO

In 1993 a ROK engineer battalion was dispatched to Somalia. Since then, 2,360 Korean peacekeepers have been deployed to 6 different regions. As of August 2000, a total of 476 Korean soldiers are faithfully conducting their missions as apostles of peace.

Table 2-4 PKO Participation Status of the ROK Armed Forces

Region		Unit/Number Dispatched(persons)	Period	Rotation Term	Total Number (persons)
Currently dispatched	Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Korean medical unit/20	September 1994~	6 months	322 1st-4th unit : 42 5th-6th unit : 20 7th unit : 14 8th-12th unit : 20
	India Pakistan (UNMOIG)	military observers/9	November 1994~	1 year	47
	Georgia (UNOMIG)	military observers/3	October 1994~	1 year	27
	East Timor (UNTAET)	infantry battalion/419	October 1999~	6 months	836
		Command staffs/12	January 2000~	1 year	12
		BD Command/ MP section/13	February 2000~	6 months	13

1. International Forces and UN PKO in East Timor

On August 30, 1999, a UN-mandated referendum for independence in East Timor was held, in which 78.5 percent of the electorate opted for independence. However, militias who opposed East Timor's independence caused devastating violence. Accordingly, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to grant installation of the "International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET)," and the UN Secretary General together with the government of Australia officially requested the ROK government's participation. In addition, the Indonesian government agreed to the deployment of the multinational forces and actively requested the participation of Asian nations including the ROK. To maintain security and restore order, the ROK government formed the 419-member Evergreen Unit, composed of 201 infantry troops and support elements such as transportation, supply, communications, and medical personnel. The Evergreen Unit initiated operations on October 22, 1999 in Lospalos, East Timor.

Figure 2-7 Organization of the Evergreen Unit

(Unit: persons)



● The significance and outcome of ROK Armed Forces' dispatch to East Timor

Immediately after the National Assembly's approval for its dispatch on September 28, 1999, the Evergreen Unit was deployed to East Timor on October 22, the same year, following the local acclimatization and orientation training in Australia and carried out its mission as a member of the multinational forces. On February 1, 2000, it was transformed to the UN PKF.

Not only does the Evergreen Unit perfectly conduct operations to maintain security and restore order such as maneuver patrols, guarding main facilities, and resident operations, it is actively engaged in relief activities such as medical treatment of local residents, military support to civilians and provision of relief goods. The locals fully support and trust the Evergreen Unit by referring to it as "the king of all multinational forces." Moreover, the unit's 25 staff members including the Korean Chief of Staff of the UN PKO Command are winning international recognition for their devotion and perfection in conducting their mission, thus greatly enhancing the status of the ROK.

The following outlines the significance of ROK's troop dispatch:

First, the dispatch of troops enabled Korea, which once succeeded in defending freedom and democracy with the help of the UN and the international community, to become a country giving assistance. As a member of the UN, the ROK demonstrated its will to participate in global efforts to achieve world peace.

Second, the ROK dispatched an infantry battalion to broaden the scope of participation in peacekeeping activities. It was the first of its kind as only medical and engineer units were previously dispatched taking our current security situation into account.

Third, with its prompt dispatch and its successful performance of the mission, the Unit is greatly contributing to peace and stability in East Timor.

2. Activities of the Korean Medical Unit in Western Sahara

The Korean medical unit currently participating in the "UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)" started its mission in September 1994, when the very first delegation was dispatched from Korea. As of August 2000, 20 Koreans from the twelfth delegation are conducting the mission. The Korean medical unit is the sole unit within MINSURO and performs the following duties: basic medical support to MINURSO personnel; evacuating severely injured or sick patients to larger hospitals; conducting 24 hour standby for emergency patient treatment; disinfecting the MINURSO Headquarters and inspecting both water and food hygiene. Our

personnel have proudly provided faithful medical care to nearly 28,000 UN personnel for the past six years.

3. Military Observer Activities

As of August 2000 the ROK military has dispatched nine officers to the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and three to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) as military observers. Our dispatched officers serve under the supervision of the local command and perform such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, patrolling, inspection, report, and arbitration.

C. Laying the Ground for UN PKO Participation

1. Participation in UN PKO Stand-by Arrangement System

Under the UN PKO stand-by arrangement system, UN member states designate certain units within their countries and maintain them for UN PKO participation. When the UN requests PKO troops, the requested countries provide the UN with these units within an agreed period of time. While only 35 nations expressed their willingness to participate in 1995, as of March 2000, that number has increased to 88. Korea notified the UN of its ability to provide approximately 800 participants as of March 1995. However, considering the future global security situation and the UN's PKO policy, Korea will adjust that number and give it more detailed explanations.

Table 2-5 ROK's Participation in the PKO Stand-by Arrangement System

(Unit: persons)

Infantry battalion	540	Two bomb disposal teams	11
Heavy construction engineer company	130	Sea-borne search and rescue	10-15
Medical support group	70-80	Military observers	36

2. Development of the PKO Education System

Since 1993, our military has trained experts by sending officers to various PKO training institutions such as the Northern Europe United Nations Training Corps (UNTC), Poland, and Ireland. And since 1995, officers and related government officials have been sent to the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) in Canada.

Table 2-6 PKO Education Abroad

Classification	Courses (Duration)	Year	Personnel
UNTC	Military observer course (3 weeks)	1993~1997	9
Sweden	Staff course (3 weeks)	1993~1997	5
Norway	Logistics course (3 weeks)	1993~1997	3
Poland	Military observer course (3 weeks)	1996	1
Canada	Short course (2-3 weeks)	1995~1999	32
Ireland	Observer/Staff course (3 weeks)	1997	1

To lay the foundation for PKO education domestically, in 1995 the military designated the Joint Services Staff College to be the lead institution to educate officers to become military observers and staff. In May 1998, the PKO Department was officially inaugurated within the college. Moreover, the Special Warfare Command's Education Corps will be designated as the institution solely responsible for unit-level education of PKO forces by providing solid education for infantry and engineer personnel to be dispatched.

3. Keeping Close Ties with the UN

In a bid to nurture UN military experts, from March 1995 to March 1998, the military dispatched two Majors to the UN DPKO (Department of PKO). In December 1999, an official in charge of military affairs was sent to the Korean Mission to the UN in order to maintain close ties with the UN, and in January 2000, a planning officer was dispatched to the DPKO.

Participation in International Security Cooperation and Arms Control Activities

A. Participation in Regional and Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogue

Since the end of the Cold War, countries in the Asia-Pacific and Northeast Asian regions have started showing signs of great concern in arms reduction and arms control. They aim to increase spending on social development

such as in education and welfare and to seek an economy-oriented policy in return for a partial reduction of forces and arms spending. It is hoped that this will make a positive contribution to regional stability and peace.

These limited efforts, however, are not evolving into regional, comprehensive and systematic arms control regimes. Two main reasons for this are the diverse elements of perennial conflict that linger regionally including racial, religious, natural resources, and environmental problems, as well as the fact that individual nations still have different security perceptions, making it difficult to form a cohesive system for regional arms control.

More than ever, it is judged that a consensus on regional arms control achieved through a multilateral security mechanism is essential from mid- and long-term perspectives.

The ROK government is convinced that efforts to control arms through a multilateral security cooperation regime will contribute positively not only to the stability and peace in the region, but also to a peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas, arms control on the peninsula, and the creation of an environment for unification.

1. Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific

Two regular Asia-Pacific multilateral security cooperation dialogues are currently underway: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) at the inter-governmental level, and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) at the nongovernmental level.

Currently, 23 nation members participate in the ARF, a multilateral security cooperation dialogue initiated in July 1994, including North Korea who became a member in July 2000. It consists of a Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM), and a wide range of intersessional meetings including Intersessional Support Group on Confidence-Building Measures (ISG-CBMs). Members exchange views on the regional security situation, and discussions on confidence-building measures, disaster relief, expert group meetings on transnational crimes (piracy, illegal immigration, illegal trafficking of small arms, etc.) and also develop preventive diplomacy that positively contributes to regional peace and stability.

Participating members are actively promoting various confidence-building activities such as publication of defense policy papers, announcement

of defense policies, exchanges/distribution of defense white papers, participation and circulation of annually submitted materials of the UN Register of Conventional Arms(UNRCA), bilateral security/defense dialogue among regional nations, exchanges of high military officials and military exercises, and participation in arms control/nonproliferation systems (NPT, CTBT, CWC, BWC, CCW, etc.).

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are classified into Basket 1 and Basket 2, with those to be enacted during the next one to two years belonging to the former and those to be enacted over the mid- to long-term period belonging to the latter. CBMs that belong to Basket 1 include: Seminar on Transparency and Responsibility in Transfers of Conventional Weapons in February 2001; Seminar on Shipboard Generated Waste Management in March 2001; Joint ARF Seminar on Civil-Military Relations in Peacekeeping Operations in May 2001; Meeting of Heads of National Defense Colleges and Institutions in September 2001; Workshop on Defense/Military Officials' Cooperation within ARF in August 2002; and Multilateral Exchanges and Cooperation in Military Logistics and Academic Research in Fields such as Military Law, etc. In Basket 2, Shootfest among ARF Riflemen; Military Environmental Protection Exchanges; Mutual Legal Assistance Coordination; Cooperation Against International Terrorism and Crime; Maritime CBMs and Links to Maritime Safety/Marine Environment Web Sites; etc. Furthermore, an Expert Group Meeting on Transnational Crime was held from October 30 to 31, 2000 and ISG-CBMs was co-sponsored by the ROK and Malaysia from November 1 to 3 in Seoul.

The participating members have also called for constant progress in preventive diplomacy (PD) and agreed to develop this issue in intersessional meetings.

On the other hand, a non-governmental multilateral security cooperation dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region for enhancing inter-state confidence and assisting in fortifying governmental level security cooperation is held in CSCAP, which was officially launched in June 1993. A total of 20 nations participate in CSCAP, including the two Koreas. CSCAP maintains a close cooperative relationship with the ARF as it makes policy proposals on regional security affairs. Developing concepts and principles in preventive diplomacy for ARF has been CSCAP' s recent contribution.

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogues in Northeast Asia

The need for various forms of regional-level security dialogue has been brought to light since 1990 with the purpose of enhancing stability and peace in Northeast Asia. In May 1994, the ROK government officially proposed the Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) during the first ARF-SOM as a governmental level multilateral security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia. This proposal, however, made no substantial progress due to the passive stand taken by some regional countries. The ROK government has continuously sought the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism among Northeast Asian nations. In particular, with the North Korea's accession to the ARF, it is expected that active discussions on the establishment of a multilateral security cooperation dialogue mechanism in the Northeast Asian region will take place.

In the meantime, multilateral security dialogues at the nongovernmental-level are pursued at a relatively rapid pace. An example would be the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) hosted by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California, San Diego. NEACD officially started in October 1993, and individual defense- or foreign affairs-related officials or scholars from the ROK, the US, Japan, China and Russia are now participating to exchange ideas on the overall regional security issues.

Although North Korea has not joined the dialogue since its participation in the July 1993 NEACD preparatory meeting, the ROK is anticipating the North's participation. The tenth plenary meeting of NEACD was held in November 2000 in Seoul. In addition to the NEACD plenary meeting, the Defense Information Sharing Study Group meeting was also held in Tokyo to search for methods to enhance military transparency among participating members. Current topics of discussion center on regional security issues including the Modernization of Military Forces and Defense Budget.

B. Participation in International Arms Control Activities

Since the end of the Cold War, the scope of international arms control, based on a broad consensus as to its necessity, has expanded to multilateral arms control, which encompasses nearly the entire world.

The ROK government is also an active member of international arms control activities. Its main focus in these movements is to reflect the realities on the Korean peninsula, the national security situation and interests in the policy-making processes of international arms control organizations and inducing North Korean participation.

1. Nuclear Weapons Control

In the 1990s, a series of notable nuclear arms control measures were undertaken. An indefinite extension of the "Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)" was approved at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in May 1995. At the resumption conference of the 52nd UN General Assembly in September 1996, the "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)" was adopted.

In May 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted an additional protocol named the "93+2 Program" which strengthens existing nuclear safeguards. As for the ROK, after signing it in September 1999, preparations are under way to have it ratified by the National Assembly by late 2000. Furthermore, in May 2000, the NPT Review Conference decided that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva shall conclude a "Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)" by 2005, which prohibits the production of fissile materials such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium for military use. Signatories have agreed to establish a supplementary organization for full blown nuclear disarmament negotiations stipulated in article 6 of the NPT.

With its attendance at the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the ROK government has actively participated in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The ROK is also cooperating with other international organizations to promote an early signing and ratification of the CTBT by 44 countries obligated to ratify the treaty, including the five nuclear nations, North Korea, India, and Pakistan. In addition, the ROK government is attempting to dispatch experts to various fields in the IAEA and the "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)."

2. Chemical Weapons Control

The "Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," entered into force on April 29, 1997, and strictly prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or

retention, transfer and use of all chemical weapons. Each State Party to the Convention must submit the declaration stipulated in the provision of the convention to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) no later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force and it is subject to systematic verification through on-site inspection from the OPCW. As of September 2000, 171 nations have signed the CWC and 139 deposited their instruments of ratification or accession.

The ROK government deposited its instrument of ratification with the UN on April 28, 1997 in order to take part in activities of international non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and protect the domestic chemical-related industry by getting rid of the trade restrictions. In May of the same year, the ROK was elected as a member state of the OPCW Executive Council during the first session of the Conference of the State Parties (CSP). Furthermore, Korea undertook the role of the chair nation at the third CSP session in November 1998, and fulfilled its duties as the chair nation until the commencement of the fourth CSP session in 1999. And the CSP has unanimously adopted the Korea-proposed resolution, "Recommendation on Ensuring the Universality of the Convention." The resolution reaffirms the vital and essential importance of universal adherence to the Convention for the realization of its ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons, urges all states which have neither ratified nor acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, and recommends that State Parties to the Convention and the Director-General of the OPCW continue to make every effort to encourage those states believed to possess chemical weapons, which have neither ratified nor acceded to the Convention, to do so as soon as possible. Through this resolution we expect the DPRK to join and implement the Convention.



▲ ADD Chemical Analysis Team

In the meantime, four ROK officers are working at the OPCW Headquarters as high-

ranking officials or international inspectors. The Chemical Analysis Team of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) in the ROK is currently fulfilling its duties as an "Official Laboratory for Chemical Analysis" approved and designated by the OPCW since November 1998.

3. Biological Weapons Control

The "Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)," effectuated on March 26, 1975, has 145 members as of September 2000 (South Korea: June 1987; North Korea: March 1987). Because the BWC is devoid of an adequate inspection and verification system to check the observance of the BWC, member nations now focus on establishing an inspection and verification system at the Verification Experts Group (VEREX) and at the *ad hoc* group meetings.

At the fourth Review Conference of the BWC in December 1996, members agreed to adopt inspection and verification protocols before the fifth review meeting scheduled in 2001. The ROK and western Group including the US, United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia are exerting concerted efforts to adopt the BWC verification protocols through negotiations by the end of 2000 and not later than early 2001. These negotiations, however, have hit a snag as the Nonaligned Movement nations and the western nations disagree on certain controversial points including the selection of sites and items to be inspected, visiting and inspecting systems and technological cooperation.

The ROK government has positively responded to international movements to control the proliferation of biological weapons by sending its delegations composed of experts from the Korean Delegation to Geneva, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, institutes under the Ministry of Health and Welfare to the *ad hoc* group and review meetings.

4. Missile Control

The modern concept of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) extends from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (NBC) to missiles that deliver the nuclear and NBC warheads. In this respect, missile control takes a great portion of overall WMD nonproliferation efforts.

The "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," which is based on the

voluntary export control of member states, is the only international missile control system in existence.

The MTCR was established in 1987 among seven advanced nations, including the US and France by adopting the directives to control the inter-state transfer of parts and technologies as well as the final use of missiles that can deliver at least 500kg warheads to a range of at least 300 km. The MTCR membership has expanded to 32 countries as of October 2000.

Although it does not constrain the civilian aerospace industry, the MTCR has greatly contributed to the prevention and slowdown of the proliferation of attack missiles.

The ROK hopes to join the MTCR, and despite its nonmembership, has observed MTCR guidelines by reflecting them in accordance with the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic Materials," which has been enacted since 1993.

Such decisions and efforts of the government demonstrate, more than clearly, that the ROK is well qualified to become a member of the MTCR.

5. Conventional Weapons Control

With a sharp increase of damage done to innocent civilians in regions of international conflict caused by conventional weapons, the international community has come to realize the need to control these weapons. In particular, discussions on international control over small arms and landmines are spreading among UN members, other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.

The ROK government has been a participant in the "UN Register of Conventional Arms," implemented by UN member nations since 1993. The ROK reports the annual import and export status of the seven major conventional weapon systems registered with the UN. The ROK also participates in the Wassenaar Agreement launched in 1997 to prevent the inappropriate transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. A list of arms subject to the agreement's control is included in the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic Materials" to limit their exportation.

As civilian casualties have recently taken a more serious turn due to landmines, an international consensus has been reached to put anti-personnel

mines under control. As a result, Protocol II (Protocol on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices, or the so-called "Landmine Protocol") of the "Convention of the Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)" was concluded in 1980 to prohibit the use of inhumane conventional weapons, was amended in May 1996. The amended Landmine Protocol rigidly restricts the use of landmines as it not only prohibits the use of non-detectable landmines, but also makes self-destructing and/or self-neutralizing functions of landmines mandatory.

Judging that Protocol II is insufficient for obliterating anti-personnel landmine-caused casualties, however, a group of nations including Canada concluded the Ottawa Convention to ban all anti-personnel landmines. The Convention took effect on March 1, 1999. As of September, 2000, it has been signed by 139 countries, and ratified by 107.

The ROK government supports the fundamental idea of a total ban of anti-personnel landmines from a humanitarian point of view. Nonetheless, because landmines are a most effective means of defense, and given the current security situation on the Korean peninsula with South-North confrontation, we cannot ratify the Ottawa Convention at this time. It is hard for the ROK to stop the use of landmines and discard its stockpile in a short time. Therefore, it is the ROK's official position that it can accede to the Convention only after alternative measures that can supplant the landmines have been devised.

However, considering the necessity of utilizing and acquiring international cooperation and technological support for the elimination of landmines from the peninsula after unification, the ROK is planning to join the relatively flexible, UN-centered CCW within 2000.

The ROK government on the other hand, is endeavoring to achieve an understanding of and obtain support from the international community on the current inevitability of using anti-personnel landmines due to Korea's unique security situation. At the same time, the government is doing its best to acquire alternative devices to replace anti-personnel landmines.

Part Three
Status and Tasks of National Defense

Chapter One
Mid-Term Defense Program and Defense Budget

Chapter Two
Force Improvement Programs for Advanced Weapon Systems

Chapter Three
Defense Digitization for the 21st Century

Chapter Four
Fostering Defense Manpower for Advanced Elite Force Operation

Chapter Five
Stimulating Motivation and Creating a Milieu for Stable Military Service

Chapter Six
Establishing Mobilization Posture for Total War

Chapter One

Mid-Term Defense Program and Defense Budget

Mid-Term Defense Program

A. Characteristics of the Mid-Term Defense Program

In order to plan for future defense needs, to explore the direction of military capability build-up, and to promote efficient defense expenditures, all defense tasks were classified into one of the five steps of the PPBEE System (which MND adopted in 1979, i.e., planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and evaluation), which are closely connected with one another.

The Mid-Term Defense Program is the core document in the programming step of the PPBEE system, providing a blueprint that helps solidify the proposed military capability build-up and maintenance requirements for the five-year term into an executable multi-year programs within the limits of the estimated defense budget. This is established in a rolling plan that is revised and supplemented every year, based on a comprehensive assessment of various factors, including the mid- and long-term security environment, defense policy objectives, force build-up requirements, and the available defense resources.

The Mid-Term Defense Program Report serves as the essential link between the planning and budgeting step and can be viewed as the starting point of defense reforms, and other policy realizations. Thus, it provides the basis for compiling a yearly defense budget as well as establishing annual unit programs such as creating, reorganizing, or disbanding units and drawing up annual military quotas and manpower management programs.

B. 2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program

The 2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program was drafted with the primary objective of maximizing the efficient execution of defense expenditure by re-examining the practicality and priority of each project in light of a Zero-Base perspective in order to implement essential investment as well as operational programs within the bounds of limited available resources.

The size of the available defense-related financial resources for the 2001-2005 period is in line with the ROK government's "Mid-Term Fiscal Plan for 2000-2004," which means that the 6% annual growth rate of the government expenditure was used as the basis for determining the growth rate of defense-related expenditures. As a result, the total available financial resources for defense in the next five years is projected to be 87,493.8 billion won, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP and 16.7% of government expenditure.

The allocation of defense-related financial resources takes into account the urgent need for an actual increase in defense capabilities, thus resulting in a gradual increase in the ratio of Force Investment Programs (FIPs) to total defense-related financial resources from 37.0% to 40.9% by 2005.[1] As Figure 3-1 shows, the relative shares of resource allocations for 2001-2005 are 39.5% for Force Investment and 60.5% for maintenance and operation. This increase reflects the determination of MND to allow early acquisition of core defense capabilities, which will make possible simultaneous preparedness for present and future non-specific threats as well as the resulting increased maintenance and operation cost that comes along with the acquisition of cutting-edge military equipment.

Some of the main projects represented in the FIPs include building the core foundation for C4I systems, improving counter-surveillance and electronic warfare capabilities, upgrading tank capabilities, procuring attack helicopters, mass producing of Korean-style and Aegis-class destroyers (KDX-II/III), next generation fighters, and next generation guided weapons (SAM-X), building up military technology on par with developed nations, and additionally producing KF-16 aircraft.

1) Starting in 2000, equipment maintenance and acquisition costs, which include repair and parts supply costs, have been transferred under the 'FIP', and the concept of life-cycle maintenance now applies to equipment acquisitions in order to seek economical maintenance and increases in the operational rate.

Figure 3-1 Allocation of 2001–2005 Defense Budget

Unit: billion won



The Operation and Maintenance portion of the budget includes projects of constructing an information-based defense force, installing scientific training fields, improving environment preservation facilities, basic military camp facilities, and officer's quarters, improving military educational facilities, training defense specialists and settling financial issues involving civilian lands appropriated by the military for the protection of citizen's property rights and improvements in citizen's convenience. Furthermore, based on a mid- to long-term perspective, MND seeks to reduce investments in stationary facilities and to expand the use of fabricated buildings and container units in order to provide mobile response to the rapidly changing security environment. Such an attempt is in line with MND's objective of ensuring efficient execution of defense-related financial resources.

2000 Defense Budget

The FY 2000 defense budget has focused primarily on reinforcement of core fighting capabilities specializing in cutting-edge information and scientific warfare, improvement of military barracks and subsistence-related funding to boost soldiers' morale, digitization of national defense, and application of scientific methodology in the training process. Moreover, other costly expenditures were reduced to improve fiscal efficiency in the defense-related operations.

A. General Accounts Budget

The general accounts of the FY 2000 defense budget increased by 5.0% as compared with FY 1999, to 14,439 billion won, and the cross-sectional spending is listed in Table 3-1.

The allocation for FIPs has increased 2.2% in comparison to that of FY 1999; however, the actual percentage of FIPs within the defense budget outlay has decreased in comparison to the 1999 figure.[2] This reduction can be attributed to the government's policy of prioritizing the treatment of government employees, which meant higher wages and benefits for military personnel at the expense of a reduced allocation being available for FIPs.

Table 3-1 Defense Budget in FY 2000

Unit: billion won

Classification	FY 1999 (%)	FY 2000 (%)	Increase/Decrease (%)
Total defense outlays	13,749.0 (100.0)	14,439.0 (100.0)	690.0 (5.0)
FIPs	5,230.4 (38.0)	5,343.7 (37.0)	113.3 (2.2)
Operation & maintenance	8,518.6 (62.0)	9,095.3 (63.0)	576.7 (6.8)
Personnel expenses	5,029.8 (36.6)	5,560.9 (38.5)	531.1 (10.6)
Project expenses	3,488.8 (25.4)	3,534.4 (24.5)	45.6 (1.3)

The distribution of FIPs has primarily focused on R&D expenditures for the development of precision weapon systems and cutting-edge core military technology, which would be suitable for the strategic environment of the Korean peninsula. In order to lay the core foundations for information and scientific warfighting capabilities that would be needed in the future security environment, the rate increase of FIPs reflected a greater rate for the Navy and the Air Force than for the Army.

Ordinary Operation and Maintenance expenses have increased by 6.8% in comparison to that of FY 1999; however, when excluding the increase in wages and benefits for military personnel, other major operations expenses have increased by only 1.3%. The distribution of available financial resources pri-

2) 'FIPs' for 1999 have been re-accounted to apply the newly created accounting standard set for 'FIPs' starting in 2000. Previously, prior to the 2000 accounting standards, 'Defense Capability Improvement Costs' were used in lieu of 'FIPs'.

Figure 3-2 Allocation of 2000 Defense Budget by Function



※ 1) Unit activities: facility operation, computerization/information, materiel acquisition, USFK support, etc.
2) Others: training, reserve force capability, R&D support, basic project expenses, etc.

marily focused on the forward-looking areas, namely, training defense specialists, digitization of national defense, and scientific training. Unnecessary and non-urgent projects were eliminated or drastically reduced in scope, improving the efficiency and execution of defense-related operations and maintenance

B. Special Accounts Budget

There are three Special Accounts budgets under the control of the MND: the Special Accounts for Military Pensions, the Special Accounts for National Property Management, and the Special Accounts for Executive Agency.

Revenues for the Special Accounts for Military Pensions come from individual contributions of soldiers on active duty, government payments and subsidies from the national treasury. These revenues are used to provide annual pensions for retired military personnel. The Special Accounts for Military Pensions for FY 2000 increased by 46.3 billion won in comparison to FY 1999 to 1,059.3 billion won in order to provide for the increase in pension receivership, necessary improvements in personnel treatment, and increased demand for the one-time payment of retirement pension.

Revenues for the Special Accounts for National Property Management are derived from selling military facilities that were located in or near the central parts of cities; then, those revenues are spent on relocating military facilities to the suburbs or purchasing private land that the military is cur-

rently using. In order to settle civil petitions, the Special Accounts for National Property Management for FY 2000 set aside 241.4 billion won for relocating 34 military facilities and purchasing private land that military units are presently using.

The Special Accounts for Executive Agency were created for the first time in FY 2000, following the appointment of the Defense Media Service (formerly known as Defense Media Management Center) as an Executive Agency; 18.5 billion won was allocated for this need. MND forced the transformation of the Defense Media Service into a Designated MND Agency in order to increase the efficiency and public nature of its operation.

The Need for a Secure and Appropriate Defense Budget

The Republic of Korea has been pushing for military modernization programs since the 1970s; yet Korea is still short of maintaining a self-reliant war deterrence capability. Furthermore, to secure the cutting-edge technology for countering non-specific security threats in the future, MND foresees the need for immense financial resources. Additionally, due to the rise in the standard of living in the civilian sector, a comparable increase in the standard of living for troops will be necessary, and the need to press ahead with improvements in forward looking projects in scientific training and defense digitization requires a continuous increase in demand for current operations and maintenance expenditures. The effectiveness of the ROK government's North Korean policy is necessarily tied to maintaining an unwavering defensive posture in the South; hence, an appropriate defense budget must have priority in the allocation of the national budget from the perspective of national strategy.

Since the 1990s, however, the ratio of the defense budget to the national economy or the total government budget has consistently decreased. Currently, it stands at the rate of 2.7% of GDP, and 16.7% of the total government budget (General Accounts) for FY 2000. Considering the increase rate of the defense budget for the past five years, the increase rate for the defense budget stands at only half the increase rate of the total government budget, largely due to the financial crisis in 1998 and 1999. If one takes into

Figure 3-3 Proportion of Defense Outlays to GDP and Government Outlays



※ The proportion of government outlays to defense outlays is based on general accounts

account the inflation rate and currency depreciation of the Won against the US dollars, the actual purchasing power of the Korean defense budget is equivalent to the 1980s' level.

The defense outlay of the Republic of Korea (2.7% of GDP) is not in any way high when considering the size of the Korean economy. Countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, facing similar security concerns, maintain average defense outlays of 11.3% of GDP, four times the Korean defense outlay. Even a nation like Singapore who faces no immediate security concerns spends 5.0% of GDP on defense.

In light of these circumstances, the ROK Armed Forces are striving to reduce spending and pursue the most efficient method to carry out defense tasks. Unfortunately, belt-tightening efforts alone will not be sufficient to meet the financial demands required to construct a future-oriented, high-tech force structure that can respond sufficiently to both present and future security threats.

Taking into account that the fielding of advanced weapon systems, training defense specialists, and military organizational restructuring require a long lead-time of 10 years or more, the ratio of the defense budget to GDP must be maintained at a minimum of 3% for a long period of time in order to press ahead with mid- to long-term defense build-up programs (Figure 3-3).[3)]

3) KIDA,「Mid- and Long-Term Defense Budget Need Determination」(1997),「Establishment of Determination System for Mid- and Long-Term Defense Resources Availability」(1999), etc.

Chapter Two

Force Improvement Programs for Advanced Weapon Systems

Policy Directions for Defense Acquisition

The two goals of defense acquisition are as follows: acquiring and fielding high performance weapon systems at a reasonable cost within the requested time frame; and obtaining R&D capabilities for certain key weapon systems and thus realizing a revolution in military affairs (RMA) pertaining to defense technology. Under these goals, MND has set five defense acquisition policy directions.

- **Five Defense Acquisition Policy Directions**
  1. Developing defense science and technology
  2. Pursuing cost-effective defense acquisition
  3. Ensuring the high performance of weapon systems and combat effectiveness of integrated systems
  4. Promoting acquisition projects in line with national industrial development
  5. Enhancing efficiency, professionalism, and clarity in acquisition procedures

First, in order to upgrade the domestic defense science and technology capacity, MND will pave the way for technological reform by increasing investment in R&D for major weapon systems, core technologies, and parts. R&D will also be pursued under the principle of "priority to domestically produced weapons." MND plans to take various measures to strengthen the capability of the domestic defense industries to develop technologies and to give them a competitive edge, e.g., encouraging defense industrial companies to step up restructuring efforts, developing support systems for industry, etc.

Second, cost-effective acquisition will be sought by diversifying the pro-

curement sources of weapon systems and broadening international cooperation in defense industry and technology. Low-cost, highly-efficient acquisition methods will be constantly developed, including the utilization of commodities, performance upgrades, etc. MND will also reinforce pre- and post-evaluations and cost controls, and develop an "integrated project management system" and a "target management system."

Third, the ROK military will ensure weapon systems performance and the combat effectiveness of integrated systems by developing specialized test and evaluation systems and by acquiring such package elements as Integrated Logistics Support. Furthermore, it will enhance integrated real-time combat capabilities through the acquisition of new integrated major and peripheral equipment systems. Integrated combat capability will be fully manifested through the early establishment of an automated information system that will ensure information sharing and dissemination. Rational establishment of technological and concomitant capacities will not only ensure the trustworthiness of these systems but also verify and improve the operational capabilities continuously.

Fourth, acquisition projects, which link defense science and technology to national science and technology, i.e., civil-military dual-use technology, will be briskly promoted. MND will emphasize defense acquisition projects that can be carried out in conjunction with the development of national infrastructure industries.

Fifth, MND will build acquisitions systems that are appropriate for the Electronic/Information Age, e.g., the automatic office-work performance system and the continuous acquisition and life-cycle support system (CALS), and those systems that enhance efficiency, professionalism and clarity in acquisition procedures. In addition, MND will install networks and databases for collecting, analyzing, disseminating and utilizing acquisition-related information, and accordingly, it will systematically secure, educate and manage professional manpower. Above all, the ROK military will build clear acquisition procedures by furthering information disclosure and upgrading fair decision-making processes to win the public's trust.

Changes in the Acquisition Policy

Since the creation of the ROK forces in 1949, our military power had been maintained based on military equipment from U.S. forces. However, a serious build-up of our own military capabilities did not start until the early 1970's when armed guerrillas from the North attacked the Blue House and the withdrawal of an infantry division of the U.S. forces stationed in the Korean peninsula heightened the security threat level on the peninsula. At that time, securing self-reliant defense capabilities through military modernization was an urgent necessity, and as a consequence, an eight-year defense improvement plan, and a five-year defense plan (1st and 2nd Yulgok Projects) were actively supported in order to promote imitative development and import technology-oriented production. Additionally, efforts were concentrated on the promotion of defense-related industry, which meant that the domestic manufacture of most conventional weapons became possible. The weapons acquisition plan of the 1970s~1980s can be labeled as 'home production of weapons.'

With the 1990's came an increased demand for core technology that was necessary to develop cutting-edge precision weapons; it soon became evident that imitative development and import technology-oriented production limit advancements. The dependence of ROK forces on U.S. manufactured weapons increased. However, the U.S. shied away from transferring key technologies. As a result, MND pushed for diversification of acquisition routes for weapons procurement. The ROK forces weapons acquisition plan of the 1990's transformed into 'home production of weapons and source diversification' which was based on existing domestic weapons production and seeking additional advancements through cooperation with Western European nations on defense-industry and technology issues.

Currently, considering our weapons acquisition landscape, one observes the need for acquisition of weapons technology development abilities, a higher degree of precision for weapon systems, and a more complex and integrated method of acquisition demands. Furthermore, an economic, cost-effective, and technology-oriented acquisition plan is needed, and increased clarity in military acquisition projects that are executed as part of defense capabilities improvement programs has taken on increased importance.

Accordingly, MND has completely reviewed and revalidated the existing acquisition plans in 1999 to allow an efficient response to the acquisition environment of the 21st century and the timely completion of defense capabilities improvement goals. Such novel efforts are supported in light of future-oriented and complete perspectives.

Improvements in the Defense Acquisition System

In order to ensure transparency in the weapons procurement procedures, the ROK forces amended the acquisition system on several occasions, and in 1999 systematic operational guidelines were set in place that would fundamentally secure transparency in the acquisition process.

A. Public Disclosure of the Acquisition Process

For a firm to develop weapon systems and produce and participate in the bidding process for military contracts, certain information is a necessity; however, most information is classified as secret and, as a result, the illegal flow of military secrets frequently occurs or the issue of privileged treatment based on personal connections is repeatedly raised. In July 1999, MND drastically relaxed classification standards for military secrets and amended the classification process in order to ensure transparency and resolve issues of illegal flow of military secrets and privileged treatment. Accordingly, projects related to defense acquisition that were classified as secret up until that time became unclassified and, based on the principle of transparency, the equipment names, required numbers, project duration, general capacity and specification, yearly supply data, and total cost of the project were revealed to the public. However, essential areas encompassing secret weapons projects for strategic purposes and related R&D efforts were reclassified to the lowest classified level possible, and the required information for these projects were printed on separate unclassified documents, suitable for general viewing. These were then placed in locations such as the Defense Procurement Agency or Korea Defense Industry Association, so as to allow industry and related institutions to obtain the information.

B. Clear Setting and Prior Notification of Decision Making Standards and Guidelines

Decisions on type classification, acquisition method, and company selection for delivery are the most sensitive topics in the acquisition decision process. Thus, no matter how much the military tries to ensure fairness in

executing defense projects, when specific standards and procedures are not clearly established, such an effort will eventually lead to structural problems of mistrust and misgivings about the final decision by the companies which failed to obtain the right to delivery.

In order to resolve these problems, MND requires all participants in the acquisition process to be notified, prior to decision making, of every evaluation element and standard. Additionally, participants will be notified of each evaluation result and the result of the decision making process. This notification process is systematically applied to every decision making process that involves comparative evaluation among participants, such as the decision on type classification and acquisition methods, field trial evaluation, or company selection for delivery.

Evaluation elements, standards and procedures are developed within the departments responsible for each project. However, experts from related institutions and departments like MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the demanding service component, KIDA, and ADD will participate in an open forum to certify the evaluation methodology. Prospective participants are notified of this methodology prior to the evaluation through RFPs.

C. Prevention of Exorbitant Payments/Budget Waste through Improvement in Cost Information Verifying Abilities

Exorbitant payments made for weapons acquisition and subsequent suspicion of budget waste took place in the past due to lack of expert analysis on cost/price information and capability of inspection. In order to eradicate such suspicions, the collection · analysis · accumulation · distribution · application system was streamlined to a single line, and the cost-analysis element and its role were strengthened. Additionally, KIDA became responsible for expert cost analysis. These steps have improved analysis and inspection of cost/price information.

D. Promotion of Information Exchange between the Military and Arms Industry Participants

Information exchange between the military and arms industry partici-

pants is limited by the existing official contact channels and the military's tradition of avoiding direct contact with industry personnel. These limitations lead to few opportunities for industry participants to promote and participate in procurement efforts, and the privileged treatment of certain companies as well as a loss of fair evaluation standards in the acquisition process have surfaced as the main problems. Accordingly, MND has secured an official channel for information exchange between the military and the arms industry through which the companies can properly provide information on their products and the military can, without any reservation, demand specifications from companies that manufacture products for acquisition. Information requests and retrievals are made on the Internet Home Page on a bilateral basis and, when needed, a standard format for information requests/retrievals is released publicly to formalize information collection. Furthermore, the industry's weapons product/technology conferences are fully utilized to promote frequent and expansive information exchange.

Status of Force Improvement Programs

A. Assessment of 1999 Force Improvement Programs

Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) in FY 1999 suffered through major difficulties in executing the ordinary FIPs budget due to exchange rate and price instability that originated from the financial crisis, poor defense industry management conditions caused by corporate restructuring and labor disputes, creditors' refusal of payment guarantee, and early shut-down of operations for possible Y2K computer-related problems.

Figure 3-4 Allocation of 1999 FIPs Investment



Accordingly, FIPs, if possible, transferred the weapons acquisition routes from foreign to domestic in order to promote domestic employment stability and increase the operations rate of the domestic defense industry. Additionally, a budget was executed early in the fiscal year with an aim of aiding the depressed domestic economy.

As a result, actual resources earmarked for FIPs in 1999 stood at 3,761.2 billion won, and the allocation can be broken down into equipment/supplies, R&D, and facilities improvement as indicated in Figure 3-4.

B. Plans for 2000 Force Improvement Programs

1. Scope of Investment

Of the total defense budget, which amounts to 14,439 billion won, 5,343.7 billion won was set aside for FIPs. This is 37.0% of the total defense budget and is an increase of approximately 1,600 billion won from 1999. However,

Table 3-2 Breakdown of 2000 FIPs Investment

Unit: billion won

Classification	Projects	Number of Projects	Amount
On-going projects	Acquisition of strategic intelligence and battlefield surveillance capability (signal and imagery intelligence collecting equipment, surveillance radar,night vision goggles, etc.)	17	227.1
	Strike capability (MLRS, submarines, destroyers, KF-16 fighters)	34	1,316.7
	Enhancement of basic, mandatory force capability (K-9 self-propelled artillery, tactical communications system, small vessels, 2nd MCRC, etc.)	5	1,247.5
	Projects to ensure war sustainability and survivability (reinforcement of operational bases, repair and maintenance, various ammunition, etc.)	90	1,702.6
	R&D and central support (development of high-tech weapon systems, development of core technology, defense cost-sharing, etc.)	38	655.0
Newly-launched projects	Combat intelligence and surveillance capability (surface surveillance equipment, creation of intelligence battalion)	2	4.2
	Enhancement of strike capability (increased production of KF-16s, amphibious assault armored vehicle, etc.)	4	135.5
	Basic and mandatory force capability (reinforcement of Lynx operability, mock hawk combat system, fixed model TACAN, etc.)	5	14.1
	Force capability to ensure war sustainability and survivability (DP-ICM specification improvements, portable ground positioning systems, submarine exercise equipment, etc.)	4	41.0
Total			5,343.7

when accounting for the fact that approximately 1,500 billion won worth of repair and maintenance parts of the budget have been reclassified into the budget for FIPs, the actual increase stands at 113.3 billion won, which is 2.2% of the total defense budget.

This year's FIPs focus on strengthening the weaknesses of the current force capability and expanding core technology development and base facilities for research for self-reliant weapons system management in the 21st century. Table 3-2 shows the breakdown and details of the 2000 FIP investments.

2. Major Projects in 2000

a. Ground Force

Additional acquisition of 230mm multiple launch rocket systems(MLRS) capable of concentrated strikes, lattice structure tactical communications system(SPIDER) capable of total integrated communication support, tactical C4I systems, K-9 155mm self-propelled artillery pieces, and short-range ground-to-air guided missiles (*Chonma*) will be continuously pursued by the ground forces. In addition, Korean land mine layers, DP-ICM specification improvements, portable Global Positioning System, the activation of a scientific national training center, and expansion of the 3rd Munitions Depot are slated for initial deployments.

▲ K-9 155mm self-propelled artillery

b. Naval Force

Construction of large tonnage cargo ships, the first Korean destroyer in the KDX-II class, 209-class submarines, and the 1st and 2nd mine sweepers, improvement of PCC anti-ship capabilities, and development of a submarine command and communications control system will be continuously pursued. In addition, a 2nd KDX-II, next-generation submarines, domesti-

cally developed beach-landing troop transport armored vehicle, SM-II/SAAM missiles which will be deployed on destroyers, and a towed array sonar system to counter enemy torpedo attacks are slated for initial developments and deployments.



▲ 209-class submarine

c. Air Force

The development of the T-50 high-level training aircraft system, introduction of CN-235 mid-class transport plane, securing domestic mass production of KT-1 training aircraft, replacement of an obsolete radar system, repaving of airfield runways, and development of an unmanned warning system are the main objectives of the Air Force. The fostering of the domestic aircraft industry by additional production of the KF-16, acquisition of flight crew night vision goggles, and development of electronic warfare training equipment for improvement of pilots' electronic warfare responsiveness are slated for initial deployment in 2000.

▲ KF-16 fighter

▲ Unmanned aircraft (UAV)

d. R&D

MND intends to invest heavily in the development of high-tech weapons and in securing the ability to develop long-term core technologies suitable for the Korean military environment. Included among these soon-to-be-launched

projects for systems development are: external electronic warfare equipment for combat aircraft, automated command post systems including the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS), the second air force Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC), UAVs, and a remote-controlled automated chemical warfare alert system.

Strengthening the Basis for the Domestic Defense Industry

A. Expanding Support for R&D of High-Tech Weapons Suited for the Korean Military

Serious defense-related R&D efforts were launched with the establishment of ADD in 1970, and for the past 30 years, the ROK military has succeeded in domestically producing most conventional weapons, which contributed greatly to the establishment of a "self-reliant defense posture."

However, because the primary focus is on the domestic production of conventional weapons, the ROK military is still dependent on the developed nations for their supply of cutting-edge core technologies. As a result, in order to secure cutting-edge weapons development capabilities which would allow for responsiveness to future security environments, the ROK military has set a goal of "acquiring the ability to develop defense science technology on a par with that of advanced nations by 2015," and has systematically pushed ahead with the "Five Plans for the Advancement of Defense Science Technology," established by the MND.

First, the ROK military will select the areas in need of cutting-edge core technologies which would help develop preparedness for future conflicts and, based upon such selection, press for a technological leap which would allow the ROK military to reach a technological level on a par with the advanced nations. To this end, MND published the Defense Science Technology Plan in 1999, and selected "14 major projects for weapon systems and 21 core technologies" to strategically support development efforts which will help the ROK military secure the basis for the future high-tech weapons development capabilities based on the new technology/new con-

Figure 3-5 Concept for Stages of Improvement



cept. Additionally, through step-wise concentrated investment and development, MND hopes to lay the foundations for weapons development, then concentrate on development based on the established foundation. Subsequently, a selective-leap method would be used in the end to select only the cutting-edge technologies that possess global competitiveness. Other areas will receive sponsorship through the gradual expansion of the general technology base, relying on compatible technologies for civilian and military purposes and common technology foundations. (Figure 3-5)

Second, core technologies will be acquired through low-cost/high-efficiency methodology. To this end, seeking to maximize the efficiency of research activities, various technology acquisition models will be applied at each stage and every objective level for technology development. In particular, importing the core technology at its nascent stage and pursing application and improvement-oriented development efforts (so called 'mid-entry' technological development) will be expanded in order to drastically reduce the development time and the budget.

Third, in order to achieve efficient technology acquisition, MND plans to make maximal use of the nation's existing scientific technology base. To this end, MND will actively participate in the initial legislative drafting of the 'National Scientific Technology Council' document, which would allow the aim of the national scientific technology policy to coincide with defense

science technology. Defense R&D is conducted through a cooperative research system among industry, academia, and research centers. For the systematic, efficient execution of basic research conducted in academic fields, MND has designated five University-Based Research Centers (URCs) and government-funded research institutions since 1994.

With an eye on promoting defense science and technology in connection with the progress of national science and technology, the government enacted the Dual-Use Technology Programs Promotion Act in April 1998 and, since the enactment, four government agencies have closely coordinated their efforts on four main projects: technology development, technology transfer, harmonization of standards, and exchange of technical information. Related to such efforts, within the two years since 1997, government agencies launched 7 demonstrative development projects, and in 1999 a total of 47 projects were initiated, showing a gradual increase in efforts.

Fourth, the strengthening of the technology development oriented plan management system. To this end, the entire process of core technology development, specifically the planning, programming, development, application, and feed-back stages, has been designed to be uniformly executed, and the defense science technology database would be constructed in such a way as to ensure that developed technologies would not only be simply compiled in the data base, but directly applied in all stages. Such actions would allow the construction of knowledge-based comprehensive management systems

Lastly, for the long term fostering and support of the defense R&D, MND is gradually expanding the R&D investment budget; currently, MND invests about 5% of its budget in R&D, but expects to reach a 10% level by 2015. Furthermore, MND plans to secure science technology experts for research, as well as secure sufficient funding for establishing a foundation for digitization, which would lead to the build-up of science and technology projects.

In particular, in order to place emphasis on R&D efforts for advanced technology which would be needed in future conflicts, MND restructured ADD into a recognized research center specializing in high-tech weapon systems and core technology development since March of 2000. Additionally, R&D subsidies and bonus incentives for researchers would

be provided for to stimulate productive R&D activities through adoption and execution of various incentive mechanisms.

Thus, the ROK military has pushed ahead with future oriented policy objectives and, in so doing, has independently acquired core technologies and advanced weapon systems suited to the Korean environment. Such efforts would lay a solid foundation for becoming a self-reliant nation equipped with advanced defense science technologies suited for the 21st century.

B. Securing Competitiveness in the Defense Industry and Consolidating Its Foundation

Since the enactment of the Special Law on the Defense Industry in 1973, the defense industry succeeded in domestically producing many conventional weapons by the mid-1980s and did its part in developing industries in the domestic private sector in such fields as precision machinery and the heavy chemical industry.

Almost 80 companies in the defense industry produce approximately 330 defense items whose sales amount to around 3,400 billion won per year. Despite the quantitative growth, however, the increased need for sophisticated weapon systems and the drive for globalization of weapons system development have resulted in lower basic weaponry requirements on the part of the military during the 1990s. Accordingly, the operation rate of the domestic defense industrial firms stands at just 50%, adding to the difficulties the companies are already experiencing.

Thus, MND implemented policies aimed at developing and fostering a system of first- and second-tier companies in order to consolidate the nation's defense industry.

1. Developing a System of First- and Second-Tier Defense Companies

In January 1999, the Special Law on the Defense Industry was amended, providing more opportunities for qualified firms with advanced technologies to participate in the acquisition process. Additionally, MND resolved the problem of redundant investment. It allows items, whose production

facilities and technologies are often interchangeable with those of the civilian sector, to be produced through competitive bidding. On the other hand, certain companies are designated to be fully responsible for developing items that require a large investment but have little demand from the military.

Accordingly, pan-governmental evaluation experts have surveyed the companies, opening 19 of 47 detailed-fields (40%) in the First-tier and 147 of 241 items (61%) in the Second-tier to open-competition companies, and reduced the First-tier companies to 86 from 172, resulting in a drastic reorganization of First- and Second-tier defense companies and items. Of the items to be produced by Second-tier companies, 22 items are designated for only small- or medium-sized venture companies to compete for.

2. Efforts to Encourage Contractors to Consolidate the Defense Industrial Infrastructure

In order to encourage defense companies' investment in R&D as well as the stockpiling of raw materials, MND financed these firms with a total of 321.1 billion won that included 118.6 billion won from the defense industrial fund created from 1980 to 1999 to foster and aid the national defense industry. In 2000, MND provided a total of 42.5 billion to 24 defense industrial companies as subsidies for stockpiling raw materials and for R&D purposes, and the defense industrial fund will be annually created to quickly reach the goal of 300 billion won. As a result, MND will increase the scope of the aid.

In addition, to decrease defense costs and alleviate defense companies' financial difficulties stemming from taxation on defense materials, MND is continually working to revise the relevant tax laws to reduce or extend to zero the rate for customs tariffs, special consumption tax, and value-added tax in the defense industry.

Moreover, in March 1999, the Executive Order on Special Measures for the Defense Industry was revised in order to allow idle defense production lines to be removed since the existence of these idle facilities overburdened the management of their companies. On the other hand, since the currency crisis of 1997-1998, in order to promote a smooth re-structuring and bring in foreign investments, MND has allowed foreigners to invest in domestic

defense firms to the extent that such investments and subsequent acquisitions do not threaten national security.

3. Strengthening International Defense Industry Cooperation

The ultimate goal of international cooperation in the defense industry is to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic defense industry by encouraging joint projects through strengthened international cooperation, joint production, and cooperative export. Furthermore, MND devised institutional methods to foster quality assurance, exchanges of scientists and data technologies, and the conclusion of agreements to provide price information. The latter is crucial to guaranteeing stable operation and maintenance of imported weapons on a long-term basis during the life cycle of the weapons.

To date, MND has concluded defense industry cooperation agreements with 18 countries, including the U.S., Turkey, France, Indonesia, and Venezuela. This expansion in defense cooperation has diversified the industrial cooperation with European, Asian and South American countries, departing from the previous U.S. oriented cooperative basis. In the future, MND will increase cooperative ties with possible export nations for defense industry products.

Meanwhile, MND has relaxed restrictions and increased support for export and marketing activities through military attaches abroad. Recently, MND initiated measures to relax the restrictions on rights to export defense industry products from the issuing of licenses to a simple listing of intents to export. In the case of exporting defense industry products, the legal basis for providing support to military-owned equipment and facilities has been laid down and military-diplomatic ties with the main arms export target nations have been strengthened. Additionally, at the 2nd floor of the War Memorial Building, models of a K-9 self-propelled howitzer, a T-50 advanced trainer plane, and other domestically produced advanced defense products are displayed for public information purposes.

Furthermore, MND hosted the Seoul Air Show in 1996 and 1998 in order to demonstrate the nation's defense and aerospace technologies throughout the world and to seek out fields in which technological cooperation with advanced countries are possible. In 2001, the ROK Air Force, the



▲ 2nd floor of the War Memorial: defense industrial products

Korea Aerospace Industries Association, and the Korea Defense Industry Association will co-host the Third Seoul Air Show, where ground and naval defense products will simultaneously be displayed to advertise the high quality of Korean defense products.

Chapter Three

Defense Digitization for the 21st Century

Directions for Defense Digitization

Defense digitization is the process of transforming the overall defense structure into an information and knowledge-based one using the latest information technology consisting of computers and high-tech communications equipment. Its ultimate goal in war is to support command and control and bring about a quick victory by providing real-time battlefield intelligence and in peacetime, to guarantee the economical operation of the military via efficient defense resource management.

Core Areas (5)	Main Projects (15)
Creation of Integrated Defense Digitization Network for information warfare in the future	· Creation of Integrated Defense C4I system for execution of Information/System integrated warfare · Creation of Integrated Defense Resource Management System for efficient defense operation · Laying the foundation for Defense Information and Communication
Improving and increasing the efficiency of human resources network/pool for digitization	· Encouraging the Defense CIO system and its organization · Complementing and improving organization specializing in digitization and their role · Fostering experts in the digitization field and the education of all armed forces personnel in information technology
Improving the system and arrangements of digitization process	· Building the basis for system integration and common maintenance environment · Improving the evaluation procedure and operation management for defense digitization · Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in all defense-related activities utilizing information digitization
Build-up of Defense modeling and simulation capabilities relying on Information Communication technology	· Maintenance of the defense simulation environment · Laying the basis for distributed simulation · Build-up of a simulation and modeling system for each branch of the military and for each unit of the military
Increasing cooperative efforts with national digitization policy objectives	· Increasing the cooperative ties for national digitization efforts · Fully relying on the national digitization infrastructure · Building a cooperative basis for digitization fields including the industry, academia, and research institutes

To fulfill these goals, MND has selected 5 core areas of concentration and 15 main projects and classified them into stages as a part of the digitization policy of the ROK military.

The first stage is to lay the foundations for digitization by building an ultra-high speed defense information communications network by 2005 and, in so doing, first build the command and control system (C4I) and the defense resource maintenance system which will function as the core systematic foundation for defense digitization. The second stage is to increase processing capabilities and integrate various systems while keeping up with the information technology environment by 2010 and in the process, seek to maximize efficiency in systems maintenance. The third stage is to build all encompassing defense digitization systems appropriate for a knowledge-based information society by 2015; such measures are aimed at launching the digital status of the ROK military into the top 10 ranking of militaries from around the world within the area of the digitization.

Establishment of a Command and Control System for Integrated Warfare

Future warfare will not be mobile warfare centered on manpower and materiel; it will evolve into an integrated information systems warfare which will integrate battlefield functions where each service of the military will be an essential element of future warfare. To prepare for such a battlefield environment, the ROK military is in the process of constructing an integrated defense C4I system, joint and combined C4I systems, and a tactical C4I system for each service of the military.

A. Integrated Defense C4I System

An integrated defense C4I system would be the core of the joint C4I system and, in times of war, a national emergency planning system and a combined C4I system will also be coordinated with the integrated defense C4I system to completely command and control national warfare. To this end, the basis for a national information system and the coordinated maintenance operation environment will be constructed prior to other initiatives.

Figure 3-6 Integrated Defense C4I System Diagram



B. Joint and Combined C4I Systems

Since 1999, the joint and combined C4I systems have overseen the operation of the Command Post Automation System (CPAS), which is the automation method of maintaining the joint chiefs of staff and command posts of each main strategic unit of the army, navy, and the air force. Based on CPAS, MND is pressing ahead for building a joint C4I system which would integrate joint military information systems, joint operations planning, programming and execution system, and combined war game systems. Additionally, Global Command and Control System-Korea (GCCS-K) and an information collection system, which are used for coordinating Korean-American efforts, will be integrated with the joint C4I system in order to gain superiority in battlefield information gathering abilities and to promote the efficient operation of the C4I system.

C. Tactical C4I System of Each Service

The C4I system in each service is being built in sequential stages in order to focus on essential functions and accommodate the different missions and battlefield functions of each service; the tactical C4I system for each service forms the lowest level of the command and control structure in which the information collection assets (Sensor) and strike capabilities (Shooter) are

connected in real time. Such a system will be coordinated with the joint and combined C4I systems so as to allow smooth interface between the information collection system and the weapon systems.

The goals of the ROK Army are to automate the battle field functions of tactical echelons of the corps-level and below it and then establish an integrated combat management system. Bearing this in mind, in 1999 the army built and operated a demonstration system in one of its operational units, and as a result, sequential stages are set around the essential functions to improve capabilities and seek systematic expansion simultaneously.

In the ROK Navy, the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS), which automates surface and vessel situation information processing, is already in full operation in certain theaters of operation and its operational areas will be expanded. At the same time, some of the capabilities will be complemented to allow surface situation information processing in real time that would make integrated surface operations command and control possible; such improvements would upgrade the KNTDS into a potent tactical C4I system and allow coordinated operations with the ROK Army and the Air Force.

The tactical C4I system of the ROK Air Force is the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC) and because its features are aging and nearing obsolescence, the construction of 2nd MCRC will be completed by 2002 for use in tactical operations. The 2nd MCRC will be coordinated with the command & control and information collection system for tactical wings to build a fully coordinated C4I system, and such a system would allow coordinated operations with the ROK Army and the Navy.

Establishment of a Resource Management System for Efficient Defense Administration

A. Defense CALS and EC System

MND established the Defense CALS Master Plan in 1997 and is doing its utmost to complete construction of a defense CALS based on this plan to automate the acquisition and disposition of defense related items through-

out their life cycle in order to prevent waste of the defense budget.

For a smooth operation of the defense CALS system, MND is concentrating its efforts on standardizing the operating procedures while concurrently pressing for the development of the complete system. At the same time, acquisition of computing equipment and a digital communication network is taking place as one of the objectives of MND.

When the defense CALS system is completely set up for front-line units with respect to ammunition, equipment maintenance, transportation and facilities information systems, the On-Line Real Time mode will be the functioning mode under which all the units of the ROK military, including MND, operate. Furthermore, an integrated database system will be established for joint operation of all the services (the army, the navy, and the air force) and a real time display of crucial information and efficient supply support will be realized.

Due to recent developments in the Internet, the global economy is moving towards the paradigm of Electronic Commerce (EC) and under such a rapidly evolving environment, a nation or an institution that cannot adjust

Figure 3-7 Defense CALS Objectives System Diagram



to the changing milieu of commerce will fail to survive in the 21st century, called "the time of infinite competition."

To adjust to the shifting paradigm of commerce the ROK government is trying its utmost to increase the nation's competitiveness and build a knowledge-based management structure into existing industries; to this end, the ROK government has selected the acquisition and supply chain of the ROK military as the route on which the 'Model Project for Government-Industry Electronic Commerce' will be carried out. Accordingly, MND has built the Defense Procurement Agency Management Information System (DPAMIS) and peripheral system interconnecting MND, industry, and financial institutions for information sharing and exchange. By the end of 2000, in conjunction with Government Integrated Technical Information System (GITIS), the Procurement Electronic Data Interface (EDI) will have been set for an expansion that would allow a customer-oriented information system by which a procurement technical information service, electronic auction, and expanded Web-services will be available.

Subsequently, according to the Defense CALS total development plan, a military supply system that integrates the process from acquisition stage to the actual operations at the field-unit is being constructed and such a system will be interwoven with the ROK government, civilian, and foreign defense-related systems so as to make real time support possible during times of peace and war.

B. Functional Resource Management System

MND has classified defense resources according to their respective assignments and functions and considered the life-span of defense resources in order to increase operational efficiency. Such considerations and classifications will be the bedrock of a cutting-edge information system that will be integrated in sequential stages.

From 1995 to 2007, the primary focus will be to establish a foundation and expand capabilities by building a comprehensive defense budget management system and human resources management system, among others. For each service, and for each of the functions (Personnel, Adjutant, Judge

Figure 3-8 Defense Resource Management System Development Plan



Advocate, Military Police, Inspector, Intelligence, etc.), the system will be expanded in the construction process. From 2007 to 2010, this system will be integrated to include MND and the field units, and crucial data classified according to functionalities will be stored in the policy DB. The policy DB will be developed to aid in the decision-making process. Additionally, by 2015, a system comparable to the standards of advanced nations will be completed; during this time frame, a comprehensive defense resources management DB and a decision guidance system for service branch or function should be completed.

C. Implementation of Office Automation System

Since 1996, MND has pressed ahead with the agenda of realizing small but efficient digital defense and paperless defense administrative work by adopting and implementing the defense office automation system in the entire military.

Such an office automation system is set for transformation into a Web-based environment and relies on the latest information technology. By the

end of 2000, division and brigade units will have the LAN infrastructure in place and, by 2004, regimental units will have their proprietary LAN installed. By 2001, administrative personnel in the division and brigade units will have one PC per person to carry out their duties and, gradually, PC's will be supplied to administrative personnel at the company level.

Building the Base of an Information Technology System Allowing Real Time Information Processing

A. Laying the Foundation for the Defense Digitization Communication System

The defense digitization communication system is designed to guarantee the production, preservation and flow of all military information necessary for warfighting and defense-related activities. It is a system that cross-connects the strategic and tactical information communication systems linked with the National Ultra-Speed Information Network and the Satellite Communications Network, which will be implemented on a gradual basis. Such a system calls for the formation of a Wide Area Network (WAN) and a

Figure 3-9 Defense Digitization Communication Network System Diagram



Local Area Network (LAN) in regimental units or higher echelons by the end of 2000. Additionally, each unit will possess an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) switch to process large quantities of military information.

Furthermore, the defense digitization communication network is being built with the intent of securing Wide-band information processing and real-time synchronization of operations among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. These efforts will lead to the construction of a defense digitization communication system for real time, ultra-speed processing of large blocks of military information by 2005.

B. Ensuring Network Security for the Defense Digitization Communication Network

Due to the rapid developments of the digitization and information processing capabilities of the military, large quantities of military information are being processed at a high speed and with increased accuracy; such advancements result in increased risk of information leaks.

To counter such a possibility, the defense digitization network will be closed to outsiders, and it will operate independently from the Internet and other outside networks. Additionally, the proper prevention of information leakage along communication lines between separate units will be ensured by operating a security lock between each unit. All the information will be encoded (100%) to completely prevent hacking on inter-unit lines, and the main PCs in each unit will have their own security mechanism installed to prevent information leaking from CDs and diskettes. Later on, in order to prepare for the eventuality of increased information exchange via the Internet and advancements in communication technology, increased efforts will be directed towards developing methods for H/W and S/W security encryption.

Concurrently, all major communication routes will be monitored with increased scrutiny by the formation of a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) that will work to prevent all computer-related problems and seek responsible response efforts. Later, a security breach attempt recognition/security lock-up mechanism will be installed under the guidance of CERT and their role will be expanded.

On the other hand, to ensure that the computer security-related human resource pool is not drained, there will be a selection and reclassification among officers to be trained in the security breach area as their functionality; enlisted men will be screened for information and technology-related majors in their education before enlistment. Among the officers selected, there will be increased opportunities for advanced education in the academia of Korea and the rest of the world. Furthermore, inter-ministerial efforts to prevent security breaches via the communication network will be sought among various divisions of the government on a cooperative basis.

Educating Enlisted Men for Digitization

MND is preparing for future conflicts by fostering an elite force, and transforming the enlisted men into a productive factor in the knowledge-based information society by educating them on the digitization efforts along the line of national digitization education policy.

To this end, MND is seeking to foster digitization experts that will allow efficient operation of the defense information system. These educational efforts are carried out while considering each unit's specialties and assignments. An organized education atmosphere is being built according to these considerations.

Currently, 150 division and brigade-level or higher units are planning to be equipped with digital education facilities, and approximately 60 units are operating such education facilities. By the end of 2000, education facilities in 90 units will be additionally built for improving the digitization education atmosphere. Also, starting in April of 2000, approximately 1,600 battalion units will be furnished with digitization education facilities to allow Internet Information Retrieval Engineer license education to be carried out for the 270,000 current enlisted men and people who have finished their obligatory military service requirements. 6,800 company level units were provided with PC education facilities for digitization education. The ROK military has built a digitization education environment to increase the operative capabilities of the Defense Information System and nurture experts in

digitization within the armed services. Additionally, in order to keep up with the knowledge-based information society, plans for distance learning and a virtual education system have been implemented to systematically establish an education system for the digitization of the officers and enlisted men.

Chapter Four

Fostering Defense Manpower for Advanced Elite Force Operation

Fostering and Managing Elite Manpower

In order to respond to the rapidly changing defense environment, MND is pressing ahead with the goal of educating and managing defense manpower with unique abilities and specialties. To this end, MND is working to build a defense manpower management system, foster defense specialists, and utilize and expand the role of women in arms.

A. Efficient Manpower Operation

The primary theme of the ROK military's manpower policy is to foster an elite force that can develop a military that will be strategically suitable to the 21st century battlefield environment and to seek transformation of the military from its current manpower intensive structure to a technology intensive structure that relies on specialists for sustained operation.

MND will manage manpower according to changes in the security atmosphere of Far East Asia and situations in inter-Korean relations; however, the ROK military will try to reduce the number of enlisted men in the Army while seeking to increase the number in the Navy and the Air Force, managing the overall manpower with a degree of flexibility. This effort is sought for a balanced development of the three services in the military.

On the other hand, the current human resource (HR) system will be reformed in order to keep up with the concept of a future high-technology combat capability, by which the higher ranks will be reduced and middle ranks will be expanded in number to facilitate the expansion of units. Additionally, to the same end, the retirement age of ranking officers will be

adjusted, with practicality as the most important consideration; and other efforts will be carried out with the intention of increasing efficiency of manpower management.

B. Fostering Defense Specialists

The ROK military is seeking to reform the special manpower management system to be in sync with the future warfare patterns and multifaceted security environment.

MND established the Special Policy Post management system based on the detailed analysis of specialties in 5 areas: Human Resource · Organization · Training, Policy Planning · Military Strategy · Operation, Defense Capability Improvement, Supplies · Procurement, and Defense Management Analysis.

To promote efficient human resource management, an appropriate human resource structure capable of independent human resource management has been established; under such a structure, the acquisition, training, post assignment, and promotion are possible. Policy Devising Specialty Training was distinguished in order to classify training into degree-oriented and specialty-oriented one. Job assignments will be so designed as to provide experience in the field, policy-related offices, schools, and research institutions, thus promoting professional specialties on the basis of field experience. Additionally, considering human resource management, MND will guarantee promotion of an appropriate number of personnel.

C. Expanding the Role of Women in Arms

In accordance with the government's women resources management policy of "Guaranteeing Women's Rights, Allowing Women's Development, and Expanding Opportunities for Social Participation," MND plans to expand the number of women in arms according to requirements of positions suitable for women.

Currently, the number of women in arms stands at 2,085 (including officers and non-commissioned officers); however, by 2003, the number will be increased to 3,327 and, by 2020, the number will stand at 7,038. This expansion is set to drastically increase the ratio of women among officers and

Table 3-3 Women Resources Management Plan

(Unit: persons)

Time Frame	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force
December 1999	2,085	2,021	34	30
2003	3,327	2,785	134	408
2020	7,038	5,030	1,023	985

non-commissioned officers from 1.4% to 5%.

To secure female officers each service is reserving some 10% of freshmen enrollment each year for female cadets in their respective academies. The Army recruited 62 female officer candidates graduating from civilian colleges in 1999 and, in 2000, the number of recruits was 110, a dramatic increase. The Navy and the Air Force have also established a college graduates' commissioning system and in 2000, recruited 15 female officer candidates in the Navy and 20 female officer candidates in the Air Force.

Currently, only the Army is recruiting female non-commissioned officers. However, the Air Force plans to recruit 90 female non-commissioned officers each year. Starting in 2003, the Navy also plans to recruit 40 female non-commissioned officers each year. As can be seen, MND has plans to increase female participation in the armed forces, so as to expand the number of female officers and non-commissioned officers from 360 in 1999 to 473 in 2000, 573 in 2001, and 669 in 2003.

In principle, female armed personnel will be assigned their posts without discrimination based on sex; however, combat, technical, and administrative posts will be assigned to women with due consideration for their suitability and preference. Additionally, female law personnel, medical personnel, and dental personnel will be sought after in an effort to broaden female participation in all aspects of military life. To attract exceptional female candidates to the military, working conditions will be improved and assign-

▲ A female cadet aspiring to be the first fighter pilot

ments of posts and promotion will be executed without discrimination based on sex, allowing women in the military to reach their maximum potential.

Education Improvement for Fostering Quality Manpower

The ROK military needs to recruit quality manpower and offer solid educational opportunities to those already recruited in order to build the elite combat force it desires. To this end, the ROK military is actively pressing ahead with the following main objectives for improvement in education .

A. Education Reforms to Foster an Elite Combat Force "Winning through Preparation for the Fight"

The ROK military's primary defense management goal is "for operating units under each Service Headquarters to maintain tactical plan execution capabilities and for each Service Headquarters or above units to plan for the future and support the units under its supervision." To realize this goal, the ROK military recognized the requirement that education units within the military carry out training for elements needed for achieving the stated objective. Hence, each education unit has designed a curriculum based on combat-oriented thinking and preparation so as to allow the concept of "a winning military prepares itself for battle before getting into the fight" to be embedded in the minds of military personnel. Such education reforms will enable the military to construct a strong elite force.

The current education reforms are rooted in the belief that readiness requirement is fulfilled by high-quality education and training.

Accordingly, every education unit within the military is screening instructors very selectively and is designing its curriculum in a way that will satisfy the criteria of combat readiness and immediate transferability of the acquired knowledge to field and administrative duties upon graduation.

B. Creation of the National Defense University

As of January, 2000, MND chartered the National Defense University, which is an amalgamation of the National Defense College, the National Defense Leadership Institute, and the Defense Staff College; thus, the National Defense University will be a comprehensive university encompassing a variety of fields under its control. The National Defense University will become a supreme education and research institute within the military, comprised of the National Security College, the National Defense Management College, and the Joint Staff College. Additionally, the Assignment Training Department for short-term education, the National Security Issues Research Center, and the Center for Joint Education Policy Development are located within the National Defense University.

The education span of the National Defense University is, for the basic course of study, one year. There is a two year span for a Master's course, and four to twelve week courses designed specifically for the needs based on enrollee's administrative posts. Thus, there are a total of 13 education courses in the University and 1,400 national security experts are processed through the National Defense University each year.

C. Expanding Civil-Military Education Exchanges

As a means of establishing a civil-military cooperation system and upgrading the quality of military education, MND is in the midst of expanding civil-military education exchanges.

In particular, the academies of each service and the National Defense University which confer degrees upon completion of studies will play a crucial role in mutual exchanges with civilian education institutes and research centers. The exchange of instructors and administrators, bilateral exchange of academic information, joint research efforts and seminars will be promoted as a part of the basic pattern of bilateral exchanges. Student exchanges and cross-conferring of grades for courses taken at each other's institution will also be promoted to improve the level and content of exchanges with civilian institutions.

The National Defense University will open its doors wider for civilians.

Thus far, only executives from defense industrial companies or defense-related economic and social organizations had the opportunity to receive NDU courses as civilians. However, starting in 2000, executives from civilian institutions, academic organizations and companies unrelated to defense will be able to receive education at these defense-related institutions. Active civil-military exchanges will solidify the national consensus on defense, and will provide the military with an opportunity to disseminate national support for an idea that both the military and civilians are responsible for defense and security. These initiatives will also provide an opportunity for the military to nurture civilian military experts at a time when military-related research in the civilian sector needs to be stimulated.

Chapter Five

Stimulating Motivation and Creating a Milieu for Stable Military Service

The lives of military professionals are often characterized by risk taking, frequent changes of residence, work in remote and isolated areas, and difficulties with children's education. In light of their special working environment, military professionals must receive more benefits in comparison to other occupational groups. Bearing this in mind, the ROK military is pursuing various policies to guarantee job security and provide support for active-duty military families and military veterans who are striving to lead stable lives.

Guarantee of Job Stability for Military Professionals

A. Improvements in the Salary System Reflecting Uniqueness of the Military

Improvements in the compensation system for the military will be executed according to the Civil Servant Compensation Improvement Plan, but this will account for the uniqueness and specialty of the military service by creating a new subsidy for college education and a compensatory payment for living apart from families while on duty. Additionally, hazard · flight · sail · proximity to the enemy · encouragement allowances will be increased in line with inflation.

For the past two years, the ROK has experienced economic difficulties and, as a consequence, some provisional allowances were eliminated or trimmed. However, starting in 2000, basic salary and family allowances were increased, and to narrow the discrepancy between the compensation package and a comparable work level in the civilian sector, a new compensatory adjustment allowance was created in the second half of 2000.

B. Increasing Support for House Purchases and Plans to Secure and Rebuild Military Residences

Due to the uniqueness of military service, men and women in the military generally work in remote areas and move frequently. Not only do service personnel themselves encounter difficulties in leading stable lives, but the same goes for their families as well. Therefore, it is the ROK military's principle to provide its members who do not have their own homes with military housing regardless of where they may be stationed, while enthusiastically helping military professionals purchase their own homes.

As of the end of 1999, the number of military housing units available for occupancy stood at 67,528, or 97.3% of the actual number needed (69,374 units). The military plans to secure 100% occupancy by 2000. However, decrepit houses or quarters more than 25 years old comprise 9.0% of the available residences (about 6,000 units). Also, dwellings smaller than 43 square meters (13 pyung) constitute 15% of the available residences (10,240 units). Starting in 2000, the ROK military plans to alleviate these adverse living conditions by acquiring standardized units in each city or area that has decent transportation, cultural and educational environment for military personnel, relying on the government budget and self-reliant financial resources. Rather than building new housing units, the ROK is concentrating its efforts on the acquisition of existing units that will allow for the flexible adjustment of military-owned assets in case the need for military restructuring arises in the future. Also, the acquisition plan takes into account the age · sex · number of family members who would be living together, diversifying the sizes (24/28/32 pyung) to allow for improvements in the quality of living for those families.

As of the end of 1999, long-term military professionals (serving for more than 10 years) who owned homes accounted for only 52.3% of the force, far below the civilian average of 84.2%. To expand opportunities for military professionals to purchase their own homes, MND fully supports a project for supplying housing through the Military Mutual Aid Association and plans to provide 2,000 or more home buying opportunities by relying on mortgage loans provided through MMAA.

C. Improvements in the Living Conditions of Military Families

1. Duty Free System for Military Personnel

The duty free system for military professionals was introduced to provide indirect fiscal support to military personnel, although in contrast to the time of inception, various duties for home electronics (excluding air-conditioners) have been eliminated and the tax-exemption level has been brought down enough to transform the current duty free system to a nominal tax-exemption mechanism. To improve this situation, starting in 2000, duty free items were drastically expanded to a variety of consumption goods, and durable goods were brought into consideration for tax exemption by cooperating with the agencies responsible for appropriate taxation.

2. Educational Support for Children of Military Personnel

Children of military professionals suffer an educational handicap because of their parents' frequent change of residence, work in remote and isolated areas, and separation from their families.

The ROK military is currently pursuing options to install dormitories for military children and special admissions quotas for military children to various universities. Presently, the ROK military maintains 12 units of dormitories in 10 major cities across the country, providing housing for 1,868 children, and in the year 2000, the Jawoondae area of Taejon will host a new dormitory which will accommodate an additional 100 children. After 2001, there will be additional funding for children's dormitories should the need arise. Also, through a special admissions quota for military children, 137 military children were admitted to 13 universities, including the prestigious Korea University and Seogang University. In 2001, the special admissions quota is expected to be applied to 29 universities via negotiations with related administrative agencies and universities.

3. R&R Facilities

Support for leisure and Rest & Recuperation facilities is primarily carried out by increasing the number of central R&R facilities, and acquiring additional membership privileges at civilian condominiums across major tourist attractions of the nation. Currently, the ROK military is operating six central R&R facilities, and the Taejon-Yusong R&R center and seven other central

R&R facilities are slated for opening. Presently, 1,500 civilian condominium membership privileges are maintained by the ROK military, and additional 160 accounts are planned for acquisition each year.

Extending Support to Veterans

A. Reinforcing Job Guidance Training Before Retirement and Expanding the Scope of Re-employment

Due to the characteristics of the hierarchical system of the military, mandatory retirement is inevitable for most military professionals around the age of 50. This means that the retirees must find jobs. However, the re-employment pattern of retired officers leans heavily towards military positions such as Emergency Planning Officer, Reserve Force Commanders, Military Civilian Employees, and the employment rate for the retirees over the past five years has averaged a meager 29.0%.

Therefore, the military is pushing ahead to increase support for job-research for those who retire after a long service record. Since 1998, the job guidance training period was extended from six months to one year before retirement. The military also grants a certain level of financial support to individuals receiving this benefit as the budget permits .

Table 3-4 Re-employment Status of Military Veterans in 1999

Unit: persons

Classification	Total	Emergency Planning Officers	Reserve Force Commanders	Military Civilian Employees/ Research Positions	Military Welfare Support Group/Military Mutual Aid Association	Private Companies
Total	1,093	66	476	45	99	407
Officers	860	66	476	45	72	201
WOs/NCOs	233	-	-	-	27	206

※ Most officer retirees are employed in military-related positions while WOs and NCOs usually find jobs in civilian companies.

Major curricula include courses provided within the military, private institutions outside the military, Ministry of Labor-approved on-the-job training courses, and courses for self-employment and business start-up's. This job

guidance training enables service members to acquire technical or professional licenses necessary for employment before they retire.

▲ Referral training of retired service members

The military is increasing the job training courses assigned to the Korea Manpower Agency in order to develop courses that will aid adjustment to civilian job requirements. The MND Job Referral Support Center was established under the Korea Institute of Military Studies in 1997 to help service members find jobs after retirement. Also, starting in 2000, MND has cooperated with the Ministry of Labor to ensure all military retirees will be qualified to receive Ministry of Labor-sponsored job training for free. MND also expanded education opportunities at professional education organizations such as the Korea Productivity Center and the Korea Efficiency Promotion Association.

In close cooperation with the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, the Emergency Planning Committee, and defense industrial companies and defense suppliers, MND is raising the mandatory legal employment rate for military veterans. By linking a job information computer network between the Central Employment Information Management Agency of the Ministry of Labor and the MND Job Referral Support Center, MND plans to give full support to retirees seeking jobs with private companies.

Figure 3-10 Employment of Veterans with More Than Ten Years of Military Service



Classification	Average	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Retirees	3,208	4,049	3,353	1,980	3,012	3,650
Employed retirees	930	1,216	951	749	646	1,093

B. Increasing Benefits for Retirees on Par with Active Duty Officers

The enforcement order of the Retired Military Personnel Support Act in 1998 laid the legal foundation for veteran support with regard to re-employment, education and medical services and, in December 1999, the "Retired War Veterans Support Act" was amended to expand benefits for the veterans who were involved in the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

Furthermore, starting in July 2000, the Military Mutual Aid Association apartment receivership was granted to veterans, and physical fitness center admissions fees for veterans will be exempt from the special consumption tax. Also, in instances of death, funeral costs and the provision of the national flag for burial ceremonies have been granted to veterans. Free visits to military hospitals, the expansion of special considerations when applying for various government-issued licenses for people with military service records, and improvements in the issuing process of the certificate of military service are also goals intended to benefit the lives of military retirees. In addition, the relevant ministries are coordinating for the earliest possible enforcement of legislated provisions whose implementation has been delayed. These provisions include the designations of certain job positions within security or defense industrial companies and military suppliers for which military veterans receive first employment priority, special sale of houses built by public firms, and fee waivers for entrance to national parks and palaces.

C. Raising Reserve Force Funds through Profit-Seeking Initiatives

The Center for Military Affairs was established in 1994 to support military-related research activities by reserve force members. The center participates in profit-seeking initiatives such as the investment projects of qualified venture firms to provide funding for the reserve force.

Amendments to the Additional Point Provision for the People with Military Service Record

The Additional Point Provision for people with a military service record was established in 1961 and has been in operation for 40 years. The purpose of the provision was to compensate people whose chances for employment after the service were adversely affected by suspending their studies or livelihood. Such compensation was designed to boost the morale of service personnel. However, on December 23, 1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that enforcement of the provision was unconstitutional and violated the rights of women and people who were exempt from military service due to entrance in the public service.

After the ruling, complaints from the people who served the obligatory military service have been on the rise, and people came to view the sanctity of military service with a negative viewpoint. The morale of service personnel was lowered as a result. To counter such a negative effect, MND is enlisting the help of related government agencies, and the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs has taken on the central role of enacting the following seven points that will counteract the negative effect of nullifying the Additional Point Provision by the Constitutional Court.

○ Six points in the process of legislative amendments:
- The following points have already been drafted and by the end of 2000, will be enacted through amendments to the Retired Military Service Personnel Support Act:

① Upward extension of three years in age limits for hiring civil servants
② When passing the civil servant examination, priorities will be given with regard to appointments
③ Accrediting the time spent in the military as work experience
④ Salary computed with steps.
⑤ Strengthening the job training program for retired military personnel:
- MND, on its own initiative, is sponsoring active career related public relation and digitization-related education opportunities.
- the Ministry of Labor is sponsoring retired military personnel through its job specific abilities developments program

⑥ A tuition assistance loan program on a no-interest or low-interest basis for those returning to universities after the service was perceived as being unfair for other students, and thus only higher preference would be given.

○ ⑦ The National and Community Service Additional Points Provision is under a long term review at MPVA as a research project because of probable protests from women's rights groups and the lack of social infrastructure that would accommodate such a provision.

Chapter Six

Establishing Mobilization Posture for Total War

The current global trend in force structure is to increase the proportion of reserve forces to standing forces. The ROK Armed Forces are no exception, as decreases in the defense budget due to a limited government budget is expected to result in more dependence on reserve forces.

Reserve forces will play a pivotal role in the total national force as future warfare is likely to bear characteristics of both total wars and wars of attrition. Thus, to foster and develop efficient reserves that can immediately materialize their force, the military is focusing on building an elite reserve and establishing an immediate response mobilization posture for the early stages of war.

Establishment of Mobilization Posture for Wartime

A. Manpower Mobilization

Mobilized manpower is classified into three types: combat troops, wartime labor personnel, and technical personnel. Combat troops refer to those who are mobilized in wartime to augment or create combat units. They are directly committed to the active duty force as combatants. Wartime labor personnel are mustered to carry out the simple labor of supporting the military, e.g., delivering ammunition and other supplies. Technical personnel are also mobilized to operate equipment that demands specialized skills or knowledge.

Since 1999, the ROK military has been stepping up its management system for reserve combat troops, which make up the main axis of reserve forces. Thus far, the following improvements have been made:

First, because local reserve companies that heretofore have been formed and operated by *up*, *myun*, and *dong* (administrative districts) have been eliminated, the number of civil servants responsible for mobilization at the Military Manpower Administration has increased. Additionally, the reporting areas for mobilization were adjusted to allow troop transport within a short period of time, which will strengthen mobilization capabilities.

Second, by comparing and analyzing the mobilization needs and available resources, unit allocation was reorganized. Additionally, taking into account the military specialties of the available manpower, the range of manpower resource allocation was expanded to allow efficient manpower mobilization to take root.

Third, when designating mobilization resources, only those inappropriately placed special personnel or people who have surpassed the obligatory period for mobilization will be accounted for by designated replacements. Hence, constancy in the make-up of units and assignment of posts will be maintained to improve combat ability, and complaints due to changes in unit and post assignments each year should be alleviated.

Fourth, a program for determining replacement needs will be developed to allow for the adoption of a practical determination system. Such a program would link the manpower mobilization needs and execution to promote clarity in the mobilization process.

Fifth, the homeland reserve force defense plan and the security plan for force concentration areas were combined to strengthen the homeland defense capability.

Sixth, in order to adjust the time needed to increase the size of each unit and create new units in accordance with the duties assigned to each reserve unit in wartime, the practicality of the mobilization operation plan was guaranteed and the burden of wartime mobilization reduced.

Seventh, by carrying out a promotion policy for reserve force commanders, MND seeks to restore balance in the rank hierarchy, and at the same time, increase the desire to work as reserve force commanders for those who have chosen such a path.

Personnel for simple labor tasks will be substantially reduced, while civilian experts with technical skills will be given more opportunities to be

employed. This policy grants first priority to reservists who have received licenses or national certificates in the technical field or specialty, to be assigned as technical personnel during wartime mobilization. Additionally, wartime mobilization notices, which are distributed via mail during peace time, will be handed out in person during a *Chungmu* -Type 3 Situation Alert in order to increase the efficiency of wartime mobilization.

B. Material Mobilization

Material mobilization is defined as civilian or government resources used to supplement the military with material in areas where there are shortages in peacetime, or to prepare for the military's strategic demands in a contingency, or finally, as material and resources to be stored for wartime.

Government- or civilian-possessed materiel, equipment, facilities and services are mobilized and used in accordance with one of the following three methods: "usage mobilization,"[4] "consumables mobilization,"[5] and "control management."[6]

Ministries in charge of mobilization materiel required in wartime-industrial, transportation, construction and communication-mobilize and provide materiel to the military. The military draws up the annual mobilization operation plan before exercising materiel mobilization.

In the case of industry, however, certain types of materiel fall short of the military's demands. The military is now analyzing the reasons for these shortages and is formulating various alternatives. Additionally, it is endeavoring to come up with a mobilization system that will enable the military to take full advantage of civilian transportation, construction and communication resources.

An automation program of industrial mobilization was finished in

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4) Usage mobilization is applied when equipment and civilian firms are mobilized for a specified duration and returned to ordinary status after the mobilization period expires.

5) Consumables mobilization is applied when, at the inception of mobilization, the ownership of materiel and civilian firms are transferred to the institution which oversees such specific mobilization. Ordinarily, when expendable goods and products are mobilized, consumable mobilization is applied.

6) Control management is called for in order to achieve the mobilization objectives by controlling the production, repair, manufacturing and distribution processes as needed. Processes other than those specified above are left under the guidance of civilian firms.

October 1997, and is currently in operation. MND plans to automate transportation, construction and communication mobilization efforts. Furthermore, a separate mobilization plan was drawn up in support of US augmentation forces should the US make such a request.

Additionally, each year, MND tabulates the compensatory scheme for wartime or peace-time exercises during which civilian materiel and supplies are requisitioned for military use. Such a scheme is designed to minimize the burden of civilians by coming up with an appropriate level of compensation.

1. Industrial Mobilization

Included in industrial mobilization are class I to class IX supplies, manufacturing and repair companies, hospitals, gas stations, etc. Due to the requirements of strict military standards, however, the military is facing difficulties in securing sufficient supplies for early-stage requirements.

To resolve such a difficulty, the military is considering loosening the strict standards for military consumable goods so that similar civilian items can be used by the military without having to meet strict military specifications. Also, actual wartime production training is carried out among mobilized companies to enhance the wartime production capabilities.

Furthermore, each year, a joint survey of resources with other government agencies are carried out to identify the reality of mobilization capacity, and the results will be reflected in the mobilization operation plan so as to guarantee the practicality of the mobilization efforts.

In order to maximize the use of civilian hospitals in place of military hospitals during war, civilian hospitals will be mobilized according to the "control management method" instead of the "usage mobilization method." The current military hospital-centered evacuation system will gradually be transformed into one centered on civilian hospitals, which will lead to the creation of a medical system that simultaneously caters to military and civilian needs.

2. Transportation Mobilization

Transportation mobilization refers to "usage mobilization" or "control management" of transportation equipment, e.g., automobiles, ships, aircraft, etc., and firms for maintenance, transport, loading and unloading of

such equipment.

Through the "package mobilization" or "set mobilization" of firms that maintain complementary and cooperative relations with one another, the ROK military intends to decrease the on-hand equipment in military units during peacetime as well as the requirements for creating new units during war.

Additionally, efforts are being made to enhance wartime mobilization capabilities. For example, freight vehicle shortages in certain areas can be alleviated by the utilization of other types of vehicles within the same area. In addition, the need for the wartime creation of new units is being reduced to save precious national budget for defense related expenditures.

3. Construction Mobilization

Building, land, and construction machinery, firms maintaining construction machinery, construction firms, etc. are included under "usage or consumables mobilization."

In order to maximize the use of civilian resources, MND is expanding the mobilization capacity by replacing standard military equipment with similar civilian equipment. Also, equipment of comparable applications are being pursued by the military to meet this policy objective.

4. Communication Mobilization

Satellite communication, communication lines (namely, city and international telephone lines) and public information and communication companies are placed under "usage mobilization" or "control management." In order to promptly support its command and control communication networks during times of war, the military is designating superior quality lines for mobilization and conducts actual line mobilization training to familiarize personnel with the mobilization procedure. Such training will enable the military to eliminate loop-holes in the mobilization process and encourage the development of civilian resource requisition methods.

Enhancement of Homeland Defense Operational Capabilities

A. Mobilization for Homeland Defense Operations

Reserve troops are mobilized in both peacetime and war to neutralize enemy and armed infiltrators or to guard major facilities and lines of communications in areas where armed infiltration is launched or is very likely to be launched.

The Homeland Reserve Forces Organization Act, first enacted in 1961, has served as the foundation for conducting homeland defense operations, and it has gone through a series of revisions. The infiltration by a North Korean armed guerrilla who came ashore in Kangnung in a submarine in September 1996 revealed the problems in the homeland defense operation. To help overcome the vulnerabilities, the act underwent substantial revisions in July 1999.

To increase the attendance rate in the early stages of mobilization, reservists who are given mobilization orders are now obligated to report to a designated spot at a designated time, as shown in Table 3-5. Also, reservists who change residence must report this fact to the commander of the unit to which they belong. Any reservists, who refuse to follow these orders and obligations, or those who feign a change of residence to evade mobilization, will be punished.

A set of rules have been drawn up to further enhance homeland defense operational capabilities: details are stipulated for the roles of government organizations and local governments in fostering and supporting work-

Table 3-5 Standard Time Spans for Mobilization Attendance

Classification	Standard Time for Call-ups
• Residents inside the "area" (area of the designated unit) / those on temporary leave inside the area (in relevant *gu, shi, gun* and nearby *gu, shi* and *gun*))	• Within 6 hours after the homeland defense mobilization order is issued
• Residents living outside the "area" / those on temporary leave staying in areas other than the "area"	• Within 24 hours after the homeland defense mobilization order is issued
• Residents in an island area / those on board a fishing vessel	• Within 48 hours after the homeland defense mobilization order is issued

place reserves, and for activating the roles of the Local Defense Council in these operations; meals for reservists mobilized for homeland defense operations will be provided by local governments, whereas the company will provide workplace reservists with meals.

B. Combat Service Support

To provide more efficient combat service support to reserve troops mobilized for homeland defense operations, the military has upgraded prior plans and procedures for the allocation of weapons and ammunition. Also, individual equipment is prepared according to a set concept, ready for distribution and use at any time.

For the efficient feeding of reserve troops, a detailed food support system, which includes the designation of various cooking utensils, transportation means and fuel supplies, was established under close cooperation with local defense support headquarters. Appropriate transportation means and the required numbers of transportation equipment have been decided. The number and types of transportation equipment needed for homeland defense operations will be maintained through close cooperation with the local defense support headquarters. All of these improvements have been made to build a firm combat service support posture.

Management and Training of Reserve Troops

A. Organizational Formation and Management of Reserves

Due to the restructuring of government organizations, military administrative offices located in up, myon and dong have been closed down, and dong offices in small dongs have been either closed down or merged. The military administrative and dong offices in charge of the administrative work related to reservist mobilization were readjusted as well.

Previously, the chief of each up, myon and dong office was responsible for forming reserve forces and conducting mobilization functions. This function, however, was shifted to the head of each local Military Manpower

Administration (MMA). Also, to minimize the work load of the local home defense company and the local MMA as well as to sponsor practical operation of reserve organization and manpower resource management, a digital communication line will be brought on-line between the local MMA offices and local home defense company headquarters.

Figure 3-11 Status of Reserve Forces

Unit: persons



The criteria for selecting reserve force commanders include physical fitness test scores, personal records while on active duty and, finally, diligence. To improve the working and living environment of reserve commanders, the military reduced the restrictions that previously were placed on commanders who wished to change work places. Additionally, in order to establish discipline over their troops, the military may transfer commanding officers, who demonstrate a lack of diligence to units located in other areas.

Reporting for reserve forces has become easier for new reserve candidates. They automatically become part of the reserve force when the units in which they have served send their personal records and other necessary materials to the relevant local MMAs, replacing the mandatory in-person reporting system for reserve candidates. The status of the resource pool for the home defense forces is illustrated in Figure 3-11.

B. Education and Training

The education and training periods for reserve troops have gradually decreased for the public's convenience. Moreover, reservists who are in the first and eighth year of duty are exempt from training. However, if we compare the total time our men spend in reserve training with that of other

countries, not to mention North Korea, it is obvious that current reserve training is insufficient. Also, the level of reservist training was previously decided by the type of service each individual had fulfilled during his obligatory military term, and thus familiarizing reserves with their actual wartime tasks had its limits. In order to solve these problems efficiently, the frequency of training has been reduced and the length of each training period increased. Tasks to be performed during training are selected from mission-essential tasks and those critical to wartime operations, shifting the core of training to practical drills. By classifying the reserve duty system into two parts, the military enhanced the equity of reserve service: those in the first-to-fourth-year of reserve service are called Mobilization Reserve Forces; those in the fifth-to-eighth-year are named Homeland Defense Reserve Forces.

▲ Training for mobilized reserves

On the other hand, the mobilization and training abeyance system for certain reservists changed due to new developments in the security environment and social atmosphere. Certain tasks became obsolete, and posts that are deemed unessential were eliminated. Additionally, by considering the equity issue in comparison to other similar posts, reservists selected for the abeyance system will be reduced to those needed for performing essential functions of the nation during times of war and peace.

1. Mobilization Training

Mobilization training makes up the core of reserve force training, and it is conducted among Mobilization Reserve Forces. Training focuses on the execution of tasks specific to individuals or teams, execution of wartime operation plans, and mastering the procedures of expanding and creating units.

Starting in 1999, the training period was increased to 3 nights/4 days , and

Figure 3-12 Period and Contents of Mobilization Training



the focus was shifted to strengthening night combat training, job performance, and tactical skills training. Figure 3-12 contains the details.

2. Training for Absentees and Non-designated Reservists

Reservists in their second-to-fourth-year training, who are not participating in or designated for mobilization exercises, are subject to a four-day training period.

This training focuses on specialty and team-level job performance training, and, with the exception of basic infantry training that is common to all branches, is conducted under the leadership of each branch commander.

3. Basic Homeland Defense and Homeland Defense Operational Plan Training

Fifth-to-seventh-year reservists are subject to basic homeland defense training. The goal of this training is to nurture the ability to defend their homeland. Thus, the training focuses on mastering combat skills and enhancing the ability of each individual to execute homeland defense missions through task-centered training.

Personnel to be mobilized for the homeland defense operation plan training are the second-to-fourth-year reserve privates who are non-participants in mobilization exercises, fifth-to-seventh-year reserve privates, and second-to-seventh-year sergeants who are not designated for mobilization exercises. This biannual training focuses on mastering the execution procedure of operation plan and is held once in the first half of the year and once in the second half.

4. Education and Training Support

Reserve force training areas and facilities have been reorganized to enable all participants to take simultaneous, round robin training, which prevents idle time between practice sessions and facilitates training supervision. In order to maintain the participants' interest in the training, the military is developing unique training supervision techniques and continues to secure training facilities as well. The military is currently converting training areas into public parks based on the comprehensive development plans for each training area so that they can be utilized as recreational areas by residents. In an effort to enhance the welfare for reserve troops, 1,500 won of daily lunch allowances are provided to participants during basic homeland defense training and to absentees during mobilization exercises. In particular, reservists are able to voluntarily enter training centers across the nation which will facilitate the training in centers outside their living areas in case entrance to those centers are more convenient for the reservists to fulfill their obligations.

Education and training hours for reservists in 2000 are listed in Table 3-6.

Table 3-6 Education and Training Hours for Reservists in 2000

Unit: hours

Classification				Total	Mobilization Training	Training for Non-participants in Mobilization Exercises	Basic Homeland Defense Training	Homeland Defense Operational Plan Training	Attendance Checks	Spare Time
Newly discharged (cadres and men)				100						100
Soldiers	First-year reservists			100					4	96
	2nd–4th year reservists	Designated		100	34 (3 days & 4 nights)					66
		Non-designated		100		32		12		56
	5th–7th year			68			8	12		48
	8th year			68						68
Cadres	1st year			100					4	96
	2nd–7th year	Designated		100	34 (3 days & 4 nights)					66
		Non-designated	Officers	100		34 (3 days & 4 nights)				66
			NCOs	100		32		12		56

Part Four
Defense Reform for the 21st Century

Chapter One
Directions of Defense Reform

Chapter Two
Fruits of Defense Reform

Chapter Three
Future Defense Reform Plan

Chapter One
Directions of Defense Reform

With a goal of constructing a digitized and advanced national defense system in the 21st century, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) is systematically implementing the "Five-Year Defense Reform Project (1998~2003)."

For the past 2 years, MND has been steadfastly carrying out short- and mid-term defense reform projects that include military organization and structure reform, force improvement, personnel and education system reform, and defense management reform among others. In the future, MND will concentrate on the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Defense Digitization" and accelerate its ability to drastically reform the military to become the best developed national defense for the 21st century.

Goals and Key Points of Reform

The goal of the Five-Year Defense Reform Project, due to last until 2003, is to solidify the basis for accomplishing long-term defense objectives and then to pursue reform-oriented defense progress so that the ROK military can always stay one step ahead of the times.

Four goals to be achieved by the year 2003 have been established:

1. "Strong and elite armed forces" whose members are well-disciplined and have high morale
2. "Military professionals" with pride and a strong sense of duty
3. "Increased efficiency in the Armed forces" by means of management reform and defense digitization
4. An "Armed Forces of the People" loved and trusted by the public

In order to achieve these defense policy goals, MND selected and promoted the priorities listed below for short- and mid-term defense reform. As for long-term defense reform, MND will focus on creating a view of the future security environment and the defense concept. Another focus will be on fostering advanced, elite forces capable of providing a powerful national defense, through digitization and leveraging scientific advances along with the revolution in military affairs in an economical way.

1. Transformation of the military structure into an economical one, more suited to the current Korean situation
2. Implementation of transparent, goal-oriented Force Improvement Programs (FIPs)
3. Development of rational personnel and education systems and improvement of the current military service system to increase fairness
4. Streamlining military management for the efficient operation of defense resources

Reform Efforts in Progress

The National Defense Reform Committee (NDRC) was officially inaugurated on April 15, 1998. The committee, under direct control of the Defense Minister, plays a leading role in implementing the Five-Year Defense Reform Project. Each service launched its own working-level reform committee and adhered to directions from the NDRC, thus acting as a bridge between each service and MND.

Having established the "Five-Year Defense Reform Project," officially approved by President Kim Dae-jung on July 2, 1998, the NDRC set forth an array of full-scale reform tasks. A total of 45 out of 58 projects were completed by the end of August 2000.

The "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Planning Group" was established within the NDRC in April 1999 to devise a long-term defense blueprint detailing the future of the ROK Armed Forces. The goal of the RMA Planning Group is to create a defense strategy by analyzing the future secu-

rity environment and national developmental trends and to research the general concept and direction of each of the following fields: battlefield management, military creed, military technology, force capability system, management system, and leadership and education training.

In order to carry out defense digitization more aggressively, the NDRC commissioner was appointed as the Defense Minister's Head Advisor for Defense Digitization, and the Defense Digitization Planning Group was established within the NDRC in December 1999 to handle the overall planning, coordination and control of defense digitization.

Chapter Two
Fruits of Defense Reform

Restructuring the Military

For efficient, economical management of the military, high-level organizations, i.e., MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the headquarters of each service, were restructured and their functions readjusted in December 1998.

MND has been reorganized with the aim of solidifying the core, essential functions of national defense policy (refer to Appendix 39). The Force Programming Office and the JCS Central Directorate for Force Test and Evaluation were merged into the Acquisition Office for efficient execution of Force Improvement Programs (FIPs). The integration of procurement and quality assurance-related units and offices under direct control of MND contributed to simplifying the organization.

To ensure rapid operational command, JCS combined the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics and the C4I Directorate of the Central Directorate for Operations into the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command and Communications. The Intelligence Fusion Directorate, which was recently activated, is now under the Central Directorate for Intelligence. JCS promoted the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics to the Central Directorate for Personnel & Logistics by combining them together, reinforcing the JCS mission of supporting and planning operations as the top organization in the military as well as assisting the President during war.

Each branch of service gave all C4I functions to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command and Communications; hitherto these functions were dispersed throughout different service directorates. Not only have combat development and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) functions been reinforced, but relevant organizations were also streamlined accordingly

within each branch of service. A division with the sole responsibility for promoting FIPs was established in each service.

Restructuring at the command and unit levels took place vigorously throughout the military, particularly in the Army. First, the Army Aviation Unit, whose role was providing operational support for each echelon and ground forces, was reorganized into the Army Aviation Operations Command, which is capable of conducting its own strategic, operational, and offensive operations. (April 1999) The Air Assault Brigade was organized under the Aviation Operations Command, combining several combat functions, for use as either an area combat support force or an operational reserve. Therefore, now having the capability of running combined arms operations, the Aviation Operations Command can run a limited independent operations and be operated as the main offensive force. In addition, MND transformed the single form of the Special Warfare Command's structure into versatile forces that can respond promptly to various threats and conflicts, particularly possible future non-military threats. (June 2000)

In June 1999, the NBC Defense Command was organized under the direct control of the Army HQ in order to be able to respond promptly to massive NBC attacks launched by the North. To reinforce planning, coordinating and controlling strategic land, sea, and air transportation support, which is an important necessity in war, the Defense Transportation Command, modeled after the Army Transportation Command, was created in March 1999. In the past, each service operated its own headquarters service support office. Taking into account that all three service headquarters are located in Kyeryongdae area, the three offices were merged into one, the

Figure 4-1 Kyeryongdae Service Support Group



Kyeryongdae Service Support Group in December 1998. This merge allowed the military to greatly reduce manpower and budget.

In a bid to incorporate or abolish task redundancies, in April 1999, widely dispersed information command systems were centralized and intelligence collection units were reorganized according to their respective functions, i.e., signals intelligence, human intelligence and imagery intelligence. Demands for more efficient patient evacuation in emergency situations resulted in the birth of the "Aeromedical Evacuation Unit."

Research institutions under the direct control of MND were subject to restructuring as well. The Defense Quality Assurance Agency (DQAA), whose research function was rather limited, has been transformed into a non-research institute. In January 1999, the Institute for Defense Information Systems merged with the Agency for Defense Development (ADD). These changes have resulted in a clear delineation of functions, one belonging to the policy-focused Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the other belonging to ADD, whose primary mission is to develop weapon and information systems.

In January 2000, the National Defense University, the National War College, and the National Defense Leadership Institute were merged into the National Defense University (NDU), while maintaining their own objectives and characteristics.

Figure 4-2 Creation of National Defense University (NDU)



Pursuit of Transparent and Goal-Oriented Force Improvement Programs

The process of Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) was boldly reformed in order to maximize efficiency, transparency and impartiality.

Acquisition- and development-related organizations were overly dispersed; their functions were subdivided too minutely. These organizations are now reorganized under the Acquisition Office, which is now responsible for all acquisition-related tasks. The key concept of this reorganization was to transform the functionally separated organizations into a single process-based organization capable of managing FIP-related tasks.

Acquisition procedures for weapon and non-weapon systems were integrated and transformed into a responsible management system. Analysis and evaluation functions have been reinforced for effective decision-making support. Cost analysis and evaluation are now required before making any important decision.

Most important of all, the Defense Minister issued a special mandate to the Acquisition Office to command, control and supervise tasks performed by the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and Defense Quality Assurance Agency (DQAA). This allows the Acquisition Office to command and supervise the entire acquisition administration, maintain cooperative relationships between agencies, and adjust and regulate related matters so that they correspond with the overall defense policy.

With an eye on reforming acquisition procedures in general, the eight consultative bodies that were involved in the acquisition decision-making process have been drastically reduced to three. The original 38 steps in the acquisition process were cut down to 24, and 17 acquisition-related regulations have been either abolished or integrated into a single regulation. While responsibility for and authority over acquisition policy is concentrated into one department, its execution is entrusted to each service and relevant organizations. The so-called "real name system" was adopted for project management, test and evaluation, selection of equipment, and contracting.

To provide a competitive edge to the defense industry, those acquisitions that demand massive capital investment and have little or no civilian requirements regarding either maintenance, manpower or technology were handed over to companies designated by MND. Moreover, various barriers to entering the defense industry were eliminated to encourage the active participation of small- and medium-sized companies or venture companies that possess high-tech industrial technology. To create more opportunity for small- and medium-sized companies and venture companies, only 24% of second-tier companies maintain monopolies over production while 76% are left to compete on their own.

Additionally, in order to prepare for future warfare and uncertain security threats, it is essential for the ROK military to acquire core technologies needed for the development of high-tech weapon systems suited to the Korean defense environment. ADD was reorganized into a professional research institute for the development of high-tech weapon systems as well as core technologies. A civil and military dual-use technology center was also established for joint research projects and data sharing between relevant organizations. In addition, MND selected 15 high-tech weapon systems and related core technologies to promote independent development capability.

Development of Rational Personnel and Education Systems

A. Personnel and Education Management Improvement

The ROK military firmly established impartiality and transparency in the personnel management sector by addressing a variety of problems in its assignment management and promotion systems, the nucleus of personnel management.

Detailed qualification requirements for key positions were set. Selection to these positions will be determined solely by personal competence. The entire process of personnel management for officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel will be computerized by late 2000. Moreover, the System of Advance Notification of Assignment, which was originally applied to com-

mand positions only, is now gradually being applied up to the level of lieutenant colonel.

As for the promotion management system, the number of personnel to be promoted will be determined in an open policy review meeting aimed at ensuring transparency in the decision-making process related to promotions. Evaluation standards for promotion will be established and quantified. These standards are scheduled to be fully implemented in the year 2000. For efficient personnel management and a higher rate of promotion, the Military Personnel Act was revised in March 1999 to readjust the minimum period of service for promotion eligibility. Officers in the rank of major and below will have more years of active duty service than in the past before they are promoted. The years of service required for colonels and lieutenant colonels in order to be considered for promotion will be shortened. Moreover, in an effort to solve the bottleneck problem in the promotion system, the System of Promotion by Term of Office and the Honorary Promotion System have been applied respectively to lieutenant colonels and majors.

The educational goals and foci for all courses from candidate training to National Defense University (NDU) level, including OBC, OAC, and each service's college, were reestablished in order to improve the education management system. NDU reinforced its education program for national security policy professionals by fully utilizing its National Security College, National Defense Management College, National War College, and Job Refresher Course, along with its research institutes, the Research Institute for National Security Affairs, and the Institute for Joint Doctrine Development. For the faster import and practical use of advanced scientific technologies, a graduate program at NDU was improved by introducing an exchange program with other major research universities. However, a graduate program in the Advanced Institute of Military Science and Technology was closed down and its role of educating professionals in military science has been transferred to other civilian universities.

B. Promoting Comprehensive Improvement for Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs)

In order to be able to keep up with the development of the military and to correspond with the present and future battlefield environments, the military reestablished the role of the NCO and is promoting a comprehensive improvement plan for NCOs in order to strengthen military infrastructures.

For a clear classification of the role, authority, and responsibility of NCOs, the military has clearly specified the role of the NCO: supervision · command of soldiers, personal affairs management, barracks training, training & evaluation of soldier's specialty, management of their military lives · food · clothing · shelter, accident prevention campaigns, supply management, and facility & disaster management. This division of roles and functions allows officers to be devoted to the maintenance of combat preparedness.

The military also improved the NCO recruiting system by requiring different physical and aptitude draft standards for each branch and expanding its scholarship program for junior college and technical university students to promote stable recruitment and quality improvement of NCOs. Additionally, the NCO candidate training system and the refresher training system have been improved. By extending exchange programs to civilian universities, the current average number of NCOs with college degrees (6%) is expected to increase to 11%. The military is also planning to make appropriate changes in the table of organization to allow more NCOs to carry out high echelon staff duties.

To give more authority to the NCO, the military is planning to change the current name of NCO to "Deputy Officer" since the current name NCO has a meaning that is subordinate to officers. The process of making the appropriate changes in the related law is in progress.

Defense Management Reform

A. Laying the Groundwork for Defense Digitization in Preparation for Future Warfare

The goal of defense digitization is to foster an "elite group of information-oriented professional forces" that are fully capable of carrying out information warfare by the year 2015.

Table 4-1 Goals of Each Phase of Defense Digitization

Step 1 (1999–2005)	Step 2 (2006–2010)	Step 3 (2011–2015)
Establishment of infrastructure and core system	Expansion of functions and system integration	Completion of advanced information system & development of elite forces with information skills

To further accelerate defense digitization projects, MND reorganized the Information Planning Office into a subaltern organization under the Vice Minister of Defense in April 2000 and constructed an overall management system. MND also recruited civilian specialists as information planning officers so the entire defense management system can run on the latest techniques and skills.

The ROK military is now consistently pushing ahead with the defense digitization's planning · programming · budgeting execution system. It has laid the foundation for defense digitization development by setting up defense standards, compatibility evaluation, S/W management, and security.

▲ Internet Call Room (Calling Scene)

MND has also reorganized its structure around the maintenance and enhancement of information systems and scheduled systems to be developed as well as trained its manager-level officers on new IT technologies so that their business procedures can be improved by

utilizing new IT technologies.

To build the infrastructure for IT resource development in the military, MND has been setting up IT training facilities across the military, such as IT training rooms in divisions and brigades, internet training and call rooms in battalions, and PC rooms in companies. Other tasks, such as the management of military information system configuration and security enhancement, are also under step-by-step implementation for military digitization.

B. Establishing a Transparent and Competitive System for Materiel Procurement

Reform efforts in materiel procurement have focused on assuring transparency in the procurement procedure and establishing a competitive system between supply companies based on a free competition principle.

More civilian companies may become suppliers to the military under the principle of free competition as discrimination against civilian businesses is uprooted; many restrictions against military suppliers, including supplier registration and inspection procedures, were abolished. The number of businesses and goods subject to safety checks were sharply cut from 1,235 to 361.

Procurement-related information, which was only available at the DPA General Counseling Office, can now be easily obtained from the "DPA website at <http://www.dpa.go.kr>."

The task of purchasing common goods is now gradually being transferred from DPA to the Supply Administration of the Republic of Korea (SAROK), and the purchase of 740 line items has already been turned over to SAROK in 2000. The remaining 126 line items will gradually be turned over to SAROK after evaluating the economic benefits.

Additionally, as a means of enforcing the real-name responsibility system, MND extended the period of keeping the original contract document until the rescission date while at the same time specifying in a contract the names of the person and office in charge when the goods were purchased. Sharing detailed information about the overall process of selecting a successful bidder or company with the public has helped increase transparency in materiel procurement.

C. Building an Effective Logistical Support System

Under the policy of minimizing military stockage of materials that can be easily obtained from the civilian sector in peacetime, the military switched 520 line items of military standard equipment with commercial materials, designating them as organizational materiel, and also turned 3,564 transportation and construction vehicles permanently reserved for wartime only into wartime mobilization materials. By doing so, the military was able to save 79.9 billion won from its budget. The military was able to improve its material mobilization ability by lowering the standards for 3,929 wartime mobilization items. The military was also able to secure sufficient supplies needed at the beginning stage of a war by switching 365 line items to commercial materials that can be utilized as war materials during wartime. The military is conducting an analysis of the economy and effectiveness of the possibility of supply · maintenance · transportation branches being operated by nonmilitary or private management. Based on the analysis results, the military plans to expand its application after going through the testing period.

The flow of military logistics will be much improved with the "Military CALS Project" and other reform measures in the pipeline. The military is preparing detailed logistics reform measures such as lowering the supply level, reducing delivery time and ensuring balanced distribution.

Judicial Reform of the Military

The judicial system and organization of the military was restructured and improved to better serve military justice and the chain of command.

Prosecution was separated from the bench to ensure the impartiality and justice of the court. The MND Legal Affairs Service, which had been playing the role of both the court and the prosecution, was dissolved, and two separate bodies, the High Military Court and the MND Prosecutor's Office, were established. Moreover, an independent military court was established at each service's headquarters in July 2000. For research and study of military law, the Military Justice Research Division was established under the

High Military Court and is conducting a variety of research on topics such as case analysis. Meanwhile, the MND Prosecutor's Office runs a Task Force for more rigorous investigation of corruption charges including the violation of conscription laws. Enhanced human rights protection is also included in the justice reform effort of the military. In order to better protect the rights of soldiers subject to a court martial and to alleviate their financial burden of hiring private attorneys, the military installed an Office of Court-Appointed Attorneys at the High Military Court and at each service's headquarters and created a pool of lawyers working only for the cases assigned by the military court.

As the Defense Minister lifted the sanction on the establishment of a new military court, 50 additional General Military Courts were set up across division level units in June 2000. This will help reduce the need to travel a long distance to file for a warrant or to appear in court. In the end, this will increase the protection of the basic rights of the defendant and ensure the smooth and stable operation of the court martial system during war. In addition, the Summary Trial System was introduced in May 2000 to provide speedy and simple trial procedures for minor offenses.

To secure talented legal resources with military experience, the military strives to revise the related laws that will open doors for reservist judge advocates to become judges of the military court and to allow them to maintain their lawyer licenses even when they retire before their compulsory military service period expires due to accidents or diseases. In addition, as part of its efforts to improve working conditions and quality of judge advocates, the military expanded opportunities for overseas training. It also plans to recruit 25 judicial officers each year through the Bar Examination for Judge Advocates to ensure a stable supply of these officers whereas the current system recruits 40~50 officers every other year.

Creation of New Culture in the Barracks

The creation of a new culture in the barracks aims to nurture "winning soldiers" who are armed with a strong spirit and a combat-oriented mind.

To create this cultural environment, the military has been implementing the following plan.

First, standard daily and weekly scheduling methods were changed to increase those hours that soldiers can use at their own discretion. The new scheduling methods were designed to encourage soldiers to be more concentrated on their tasks during duty hours and to allow opportunities for the soldiers to pursue their personal development in their own areas of interest, such as PC skills, English, Classical Chinese, etc., during off-duty hours. Also, roll calls at dawn and sunset will be used more for checking the status or physical condition of the soldiers than for disciplining and inspection.

Second, in order for officers to be more focused on "planning, preparation, and execution" of military exercises, the military reduced the workload on officers in squad administration. For example, the number of reports, inspections, and auditing visits by higher echelons were eliminated. In addition, since the outcome of any field operation actually lies in the hands of division commanders or brigade commanders, the military increased the power of these commanders so that they can lead their soldiers with more freedom and responsibility.

Third, the "Operational Guidelines" were distributed to those officers who do not have much experience in field operations. These "Guidelines" are filled with actual examples of field operations to illustrate directions and measures newly commissioned officers can employ in the management of their units.

Fourth, military facilities including barracks and various systems will be continuously improved to create an environment that satisfies the emotional needs of individual soldiers and boosts their morale.

The military will continue to work for the creation of a new culture in the barracks to accomplish the following. First, military camps will no longer be seen just as "detention facilities." Rather, it will be regarded as "training facilities" for soldiers who require self-discipline and responsibility. Second, officers will be able to focus on combat readiness and capabilities. Third, officers will be armed with technical skills and knowledge and also be able to gain confidence in unit administration by using these newly

acquired capabilities. Fourth, military systems and facilities will be changed and improved to accommodate the new barrack culture built on the principle of self-discipline. In the end, the military will respect the privacy of individual soldiers and inspire and encourage them to achieve greater goals.

Chapter Three
Future Defense Reform Plan

Continuing Mid- and Long-Term Defense Reform

A. Continuous Restructuring of the Military

MND, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the headquarters of each service, and the RMA Planning Group are working close together on a research project to develop a future military structure in preparation for the post-unification situations.

A research project on future security situations, threat analysis, military strategy, and its operational capabilities has already been carried out. Using the result obtained from this project as the basis, now the focus of the research is on figuring out the optimum level of military capability and unit structure suited to be ready for uncertain future threats. The research results will be presented in MND and JCS planning documents and the detailed execution plan will be prepared so that it can be executed without any confusion or chaos in the continuously changing South and North Korea relationship.

Additionally, as a part of defense reform, the plan to restructure two field army commands and two corps commands will be carried out based on the future military structure research project results. According to this plan, "two field army commands located in the forward area will be replaced with the newly created Ground Operations Command," and "two corps commands in the rear area will be replaced with the newly created Rear-Area Operations Command."

Medical unit reform was carried out by simplifying the five-step medical support system to a three-step process, thereby improving soldiers' medical benefits. The patient transfer system and medical facilities were also improved. As a part of the plan to reduce unnecessary hospital sickbeds, the number of hospitals in both forward and rear areas will be cut from 18

to 16 by the year 2004. The current total of 7,400 sickbeds will be reduced to 6,000 by 2009.

MND previously decided to disband the Armed Forces Athletic Unit. However, considering the role it plays in national sports events, the World Cup or the International Council of Military Sports (CISM), the decision will be postponed until late 2000.

The Korea Armed Forces Nursing Academy stopped accepting students in 1999. In its place, a system that facilitates securing civilian nurses will be adopted not only for efficient budget management, but also expansion of women's roles in the defense sector.

The Korea Women's Army School, in charge of fostering and giving refresher training to female officers and NCOs, will be closed in 2001. These officers and NCOs will be educated at the Korea 3rd Military Academy and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, respectively. Refresher training will be taken over by each branch.

B. Creation of New Culture in the Barracks

In the face of future warfare paradigm shifts which are best represented by Digitization and scientific advancement, the role of the individual soldier will inevitably expand. The sophisticated and diverse future war situations will require proper judgment and professionalism from each soldier.

Taking this new paradigm shift into consideration, "the creation of a new culture in the barracks" will reform military culture to enable soldiers to think in an active and innovative manner. By doing so, it will help soldiers to develop judgment, creativity, and spontaneity.

To create a new culture in the barracks, short-term projects, which can be executed immediately, are being implemented in the year 2000. As for the mid-term projects, which require testing as well as adjustment, they are scheduled to be implemented in late 2000 after close examination. Additionally, a long-term project, which requires a budget as well as system reform, will be carried out after close examination.

The importance of the military barracks culture reform lies in nurturing a strong military. Therefore, instead of regulating and/or interfering with subordinate units, the military will try to provide space and give encour-

agement to subordinate units to enable them to use their own creativity to carry out their projects successfully.

Continuing Efforts for the Progress of Defense Digitization

The defense digitization drive pursues the development of information- and technology-oriented professional forces capable of carrying out future information/system integration warfare and aims to achieve synchronization and integration of combat operational capabilities based on an advanced C41 system by the year 2015. Moreover, military resource management will be automated and systemized to guarantee efficient and economic administration of the military in both peacetime and wartime. Moreover, in preparation for future information warfare, efforts will be made to train IT resources systematically, and these trained resources, in turn, will further accelerate the digitization of the military.

Meanwhile, the digitization efforts in force capability areas will focus on automated command systems (C4I system) which will increase the chances of winning any war. Above all, a comprehensive management body will be established at the MND level, and this body will lead military digitization efforts by restructuring the organization and functions of related agencies and departments and developing institutions and procedures to respond to changes in the digitization environment. This will lay a solid foundation for the effective management of defense digitization.

With regards to the communication infrastructure for the military, the Information Super Highway, which is under construction at the moment, will be fully utilized. In addition, the strategy control network, satellite network, and Data-Link will be built to ensure wartime survivability as well as the reliability of military IT networks. C4I enhancement and the implementation of a resource management system are being pursued under a comprehensive plan in order to activate the two systems at the same time and complete the military communication network. In addition, to prevent any negative side effects of digitization, security functions will be greatly enhanced.

The digitization of military resource management will focus on building an integrated resource management system and a knowledge-based decision-making support system for the effective management of the military. More specifically, efforts will be focused on constructing the CALS system and a resource management system as well as carrying out defense strategy modeling and simulation initiatives. The implementation of these systems will be guided by an objective- and system integration-oriented management approach. This will also set the example of a phase-structured system implementation practice in the military and facilitate the implementation of an efficient system which fully satisfies user requirements identified in Business Process Reengineering (BPR) efforts.

Human resources needed for defense digitization will be developed through systematic implementation of IT training for all soldiers in the military. While in service, these trained IT resources will contribute to military digitization, and after the service, they will bolster the digitization of the country. To carry out defense digitization more effectively and efficiently, the IT training will be expanded to all managers, IT experts at home and abroad will be more aggressively utilized, and regulations and procedures will also be streamlined.

Reforms in Defense Research & Development

Defense technologies lie at the heart of military capabilities. Especially in the information age of the 21st century, technological superiority of the military, not the manpower of military forces, will determine the outcome of a war. Therefore, self-reliant and domestic military technologies cannot be overemphasized as a significant means to prepare for future warfare because advanced military technologies bought from abroad are not only expensive but also restrictive and limited due to the controls and regulations that their mother countries impose on technology transfers to other countries.

The Korean military has been implementing various efforts to lay the foundation for the development of military technologies since the 1970s.

Nevertheless, the technological gap between Korea and advanced countries is still wide in most areas, especially in the area of core technologies. Korea still purchases major military parts and equipment from abroad. The reason behind this technological gap is partly due to military acquisition policy which has kept on purchasing finished products from abroad or producing and assembling military goods with imported parts and technologies.

The digitization era has brought forward a paradigm shift in warfare and is requiring us to revolutionize the existing concept of military force development. From now on, any efforts to enhance military capabilities should be focused on the "software" of the military forces rather than its "hardware." Therefore, research and development systems for military technologies should be reformed first to enhance our defense technologies up to the level of advanced countries.

Research and development system reforms in the military will require redesigning R&D systems and procedures for the development of advanced technologies and a stronger infrastructure for defense industries. As a stepping-stone to reach these goals, five tasks were selected as follows. First, infrastructure for advanced defense technologies will be built in connection with national science and technology strategies. Second, efforts will be focused on the development of core technologies identified on the basis of their potential values. Third, some of the core technologies identified will be subject to intensive R&D efforts to bring them up to a world-class level. Fourth, cutting-edge technologies developed by the private sector will be adopted and employed for defense technology development, if they have a comparative advantage. Lastly, defense industries will receive the necessary support to acquire international competitiveness.

These tasks will be led by the "R&D Reform Team" that was added to the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Planning Group" in May 2000. This Team will redefine and improve the paradigm of R&D efforts for defense technologies and the roles of defense industries. This Team will also make policies and plans based on these new paradigm and roles.

Military Reform in Preparation for Future Warfare

The drastic development in science and technologies spurred mainly by the advances in IT technologies have brought about a paradigm shift in warfare; the mass killing and destruction in the wars of the industrial age are changing into precision targeting and paralysis of intelligence systems in the information age. The Gulf War and the civil war in Kosovo have provided us with a glimpse of what future warfare will be like. Battlefield visualization, information sharing and communication capabilities will be enhanced thanks to leapfrogging advances in precision-guided weaponry, stealth delivery systems, sophisticated sensor devices, and IT technologies. Moreover, the battlefield itself will be expanded from the earth, sea, and air to include outer space and cyberspace. This expanded battlefield will in turn stimulate the development of long-distance and precision combat capabilities. Additionally, the capability to penetrate and break down the information systems of enemies and to secure the systems of one's own country will be critical in future warfare.

To meet these changed needs of the information age, the Korean military is pursuing reforms to restructure its defense systems by using the latest science and technology and to redesign the guidelines and organizations for military operations so that the new defense systems can produce their best performance. All of the restructuring and reorganizing efforts will add up to a drastic amplification of combat capabilities. The United States is drawing up the chart for the new paradigm in warfare, which is built on IT technologies, robot engineering, and micro-technologies. The main concepts behind this paradigm are "Digitization" in the Army, "Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)" in the Navy, and "Global Engagement" in the Air Force. In combination, these concepts will integrate sensor devices and precision targeting systems across the battlefield to maximize information sharing and the effects of integrated combat capabilities. The decision-making process in battles will also be accelerated by the integrated information and communication network.

Likewise, the Korean military has installed the "RMA Planning Group" under the "National Defense Reform Committee (NDRC)" in April 1999

and launched large-scale reforms to better cope with the changing security environment around the Korean Peninsula and the paradigm shift in warfare. The objectives of the on-going military reforms in Korea are to foster combat capabilities based on IT skills and knowledge as well as to more actively tackle and satisfy the national defense requirements posed by the information age. In the end, the reforms are required to ensure survival, prosperity, and reunification of the country in the 21st century. The four areas of focus are as follows.

- Establishment of Military Reform Vision and Concept. This is to make the military reforms fit together with the mid- to long-term national development visions and plans.
- Development of Reform Implementation Methodologies. The methodologies identified will help the Korean military concentrate its reform efforts on core tasks and areas.
- Defense Technology Development. By identifying the trend and directions of scientific and technological development one step ahead, the Korean military will develop military science and technologies that will play a leading role in the evolution of science and technology.
- Stronger Defense Capabilities. Latent social resources with a comparative advantage will be actively developed to enhance defense capabilities at a lower cost.

In line with these goals, the "RMA Planning Group" will present philosophies and methodologies of military reforms that will be most compatible with the national security and defense environment of Korea through three different phases of a research project. The completed first phase of the project delivered an analysis of the expected changes in the national security environment and the direction of national development for the next 2~3 decades and a national defense strategy based on the results of this analysis. Another benefit of the first phase was the master plan for various areas of the military including battlefield administration, principles and theories of warfare, systems for defense technology and combat capabilities, administrative systems, leadership trainings and drills. In the second phase in

2000, the project will select the main tasks based on the defined master plans and develop measures to execute these tasks. Then, the last phase in 2001 will formulate them into specific policies and plans, which will be reflected in long-term planning such as the Defense Master Plan and the overall military reform efforts.

Part Five
National Defense with the People

Chapter One
Realizing a "National Defense with the People"

Chapter Two
Public Benefits Enhancement and Public Rights Protection

Chapter One

Realizing a "National Defense with the People"

Institutional Improvement for Fulfillment of Sacred Military Service

A. Institutional Progress for Creating a Sound Military Service Culture

The utmost priority in the administration of military service is to create a culture in which military service is considered both a duty and an honor. The public's confidence in the impartiality and equality of the draft is prerequisite for creating a condition in which every Korean man can fulfill his military service with a sense of conviction.

The Military Manpower Administration (MMA) has launched an enormous project of innovation on the over-all matters of administration of the draft to establish a new military service culture. The major contents of this project are: securing clarity of information through opening it to the public and sharing it with the people; realizing a customer-oriented administration service; and pursuing innovation through the establishment of a competitive administration system.

1. Establishment of Rational Draft Standards

Draft standards are the deciding factors by which one's service type and period are determined. In determining these standards, the average physical grade and education level of all the draftees each year are the base factors, and the yearly requirement for draftees and the conditions of candidate supply are the sub-factors. The standards for year 2000 draft candidates are shown in Tables 5-1 and 5-2.

Table 5-1 Draft Standards Based on Education and Physical Grade

Physical grade / Education	Grade 1	Grade 2	Grade 3	Grade 4	Grade 5	Grade 6	Grade 7
College/ University students & graduates	Active duty					Military service exemption	Physical re-examination
High school graduates							
High school dropouts	Recruit service						
Middle school graduates							
Middle school dropouts or below	Second militia service						

Table 5-2 Those Exempted from Military Service Regardless of Physical Grade

Classification	Service Period
■ One among the children or siblings of soldiers or policemen killed in action, soldiers and policemen who were injured in war or soldiers injured on active duty who are classified as having a grade VI physical disability	Recruit service (six-month service as public service personnel)
■ Past convicts who served in prison for more than six months and less than a year half ■ Past convicts who served their time on probation more than one year	Recruit service (28-month service as public service personnel)
■ Convicts who served in prison for a year and half or more (except those who served their time under probation) ■ Middle school dropouts or below ■ Orphans, naturalized citizens, citizens with a partial Korean lineage ■ Those who spent more than one year with physical grade VII	Second militia service (to be called up only in time of war)

2. Implementation of the "Real-Name Military Service Act"

On May 24, 1999, the Act of "reporting and making the military records of public office holders public" was enacted and promulgated. This Act requires elected government officers and high-ranking public officials and their sons to report and make their military records public.

Public office holders are required to report and reveal their military service records as well as their immediate family members' military service records to the head of their organizations within a month after assuming their positions, and the head of their organization should report the records to the Military Manpower Administration (MMA) within a month. The head of MMA, then, should release their records to the public within one

month. However, when changes in military service records occur, a report of periodic changes is required until January of the following year considering yearly December as the standard. This process is shown in Figure 5-1. For candidates for elected public offices, or those candidates who require confirmation by the National Assembly, each subordinate Chairman of the Election Management Office and the Speaker of the National Assembly are required to release the records to the public.

Figure 5-1 Reporting and Releasing Procedures of Military Service Records



In relation to this announcement, for the first time in the military administration history, 12,674 military service records from 5,885 public office holders and 6,789 immediate family members were released on October 29, 1999, and as of September 2000, a total of 13,965 records including 7,413 from immediate family members have been released.

3. Medical Specialists in Charge of Physical Examination

Previously, active-duty military surgeons conducted preinduction physical examinations. Starting in 1999, however, civilian doctors are in charge of these examinations. The doctors are chosen from the private sector and are employed by MMA as public servants under a three-year contract.

Of the 111 contracted medical doctor positions at 11 centers conducting physical examinations for conscription, 71 positions have been filled at 7 centers by 2000. Starting in 2001, all positions will be filled by contracted medical doctors.

4. Faithful Operation of "Physical Grade Evaluation Committee"

The Physical Grade Evaluation Committee at the MMA headquarters supervises the physical grade evaluation systems as well as inquiries raised with regard to the physical grade determination system. A similar committee within each local MMA is in charge of evaluating problematic conscrip-

tion cases in its district.

Additionally, local MMAs handle cases of those who wish their designated service type to be changed as well as those who do not agree with the results of their physical examinations. All final judgments by the committees require unanimity, and should this fail, draft candidates are subject to an additional in-depth physical examination at a medical hospital.

The whole process of evaluating each problematic case is open to the family of the draft candidate, who may voice their opinions on the spot. If necessary, a representative from the candidate's family or participants from the draft administration briefing sessions may be invited to join the committee for a particular case. Moreover, in a bid to increase public trust in these judgments, family doctors will be asked to deliberate relevant cases with the committee starting in 2000.

A total of 12,784 service exemption cases were brought before local committees in 1999; as a result, 12,558 men were exempted and 226 were subjected to in-depth physical checkups at military hospitals.

Additionally, as of August 2000, a total of 9,088 service exemption cases were brought before local committees; as a result, 8,975 men were exempted and 113 were subjected to in-depth physical checkups at military hospitals.

5. Rational Readjustment of the Alternative Draft System

Use of the alternative draft system is now emphasized more as it promotes efficient allocation of draftees, thus greatly contributing to the society and the nation. In light of this, the ROK military has prudently readjusted the types and fields of alternative service.

First, in order to recruit public service personnel with a higher level of education, the draft priority was improved changing the previous priority order of 1) faster date of physical examination for conscription and 2) older age preference to a new order of 1) higher level of education, 2) faster date of physical examination for conscription, and 3) older age preference. Therefore, in the future, in locations where there is a surplus of recruits, those with lower education will not be recruited ahead of those with higher education.

In addition, to prevent problematic social disturbances caused by public service personnel while they are on duty, the "last order of the draft priority

system" for public service personnel was newly established. According to this system, the following personnel are last in order of draft priority: past convicts with educational background below high school level who served in prison or received sentences more severe than paying fines (excluding convicts who violated military service law or special traffic accident law or traffic law), those who served in youth detention centers, mental patients, and personnel who have a physical grade of four on draft standards due to severe tattoos or suicidal records.

Table 5-3 Number of Public Service Personnel by Field in 2000

Total	Administration Office				International Cooperation	Fine Arts/ Sports
	Central Government	Local Government	Public Organizations	Social Welfare Facilities		
55,257 (Persons)	12,513	35,742	5,544	1,253	101	104
Rate (%)	22.6	64.7	10.0	2.3	0.2	0.2

The military has elevated its management efficiency level of technical research personnel and skilled industrial personnel as part of the alternative draft system. Instead of canceling privileges of those serving as technical research and skilled industrial personnel when they violate service duty in their fields, the personnel are required to serve extra time equal to the length of their absences if the violations are light enough in such cases as non-intentional incidents or cases caused by unfair work loads or harsh orders from their superiors.

Starting in 2001, research organizations that have benefited as a "designated enterprise" for more than ten years or engineering field designated enterprises for more than eight years will have limitations in recruiting technical research and skilled industrial personnel. This policy is designed to increase manpower efficiency in situations where too many designated enterprises were created. The demand for public service personnel is increasing due to the government's policy of developing small and medium sized (venture) enterprises while the number of technical research and skilled industrial personnel is limited.

Table 5-4 Active Servicemen in "Designated Enterprises" in 2000

Classification	Total	Technical Research Personnel	Skilled Industrial Personnel
Designated enterprise	13,414	2,395	11,019
Servicemen	70,231	14,675	55,556

6. Enhancing Draft Administration Service for the Public

MMA's internet website (www.mma.go.kr) is currently in operation and systematically carries data in over 45 fields and 360 kinds of information related to draft administration. Through the "Internet Civil Service Office" MMA provides advice on draft-related problems or questions, and openly receives various opinions, suggestions, and complaints from the public. The office also provides enlistment dates and other information requested by the public. In addition, an automated response service (ARS) telephone system is operated 24 hours a day throughout the year to provide 92 kinds of draft-related information on areas such as enlistment date, draft of supportive troops, physical examination for conscription, and so on.

Centers used for physical examinations of draftees are always open to the public, and briefing sessions are held to improve public understanding on how service type and period are determined. MMA is making efforts to provide advice to draft candidates in person; at the beginning of the school year, it operates a mobile draft counseling office and conducts lecture tours. MMA routinely provides counseling and advice through newspapers, TV, and radio. MND has increased the number of flyers and booklets which provide draft-related information as well.

Until recently, students younger than 17 were required to submit certificates or special confirmation of overseas study approval issued by the Ministry of Education when they intended to travel for study abroad. However, MND abolished this regulation in order for students younger than 17 to travel as general international students. Furthermore, the permission of an extension period while studying abroad has changed from every two years to the time of the student's graduation. Additionally, those who completed or were exempted from their military service duty are no longer required to report to MMA offices located at airports and harbors when they travel abroad.

Draftees who desire to take the physical examination for conscription earlier than the scheduled date of the physical examination for either overseas travel or earlier enrollment purposes will be able to take the physical examination for conscription on the date of their choice, if they submit a "first priority physical examination for conscription application" before the date of their preference.

B. Innovation of Military Service Administration (MSA): Pursuit of "MSA Vision 21"

To promote a new military service culture with a clear military service administration, efficient personnel management, and recruitment of high quality manpower, MSA established "MSA Vision 21" to innovate the military service administration.

As a result, MMA will gradually pursue an advanced military service administration by reforming its systems, procedures, and developing a new computerized information system. New computerized information systems in the areas of drafting and recruiting military personnel will be developed in 2000. In 2001, the computerized systems for reserve force management support of decision-making processes, and evaluation of military administration will be developed, and these systems will begin its operation in 2002.

1. Achievements

Starting from January 2000, MMA operated an "automated e-mail postal service center" for mailing notices of physical examination and mobilization in order to significantly reduce the administrative workload of the military service.

Since March 1, 2000, certificates of military service that were previously issued only at MMA are now issued at local military service administration offices and district offices located near city, county, district, and town. Starting on May 1, 2000, civilians can gain access to the entire process of civil petition management in real time through the internet "civil petition online system."

2. Future Plans

Starting in 2001, all processing of physical examinations for conscription will be computerized. The main purpose of this automation is to obtain clarity and fairness in the physical examination processes and to prevent malpractice related to military service administration. In the past, draftees used to submit a "request form for postponing enlistment date" at either local MMA offices or district offices located near city, county, district, and town. Now draftees can submit the request through the internet, and they can immediately receive the answer through the internet as well. Also, current college students can decide their enlistment dates through the internet website by consulting the list of enlistment dates and the troop status of each recruiting unit.

MMA also plans to process military service related jobs through the internet by networking with organizations employing public service personnel, designated enterprises of technical research (or skilled industrial) personnel, local reserve companies, and various colleges and universities. The current computer networks that are connected to share information among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice will be enlarged to include other organizations such as the Ministry of Education and the National Police Agency.

Currently, draftees receive the physical examination for conscription either at MMA or military hospitals. However, in the near future, a single institution "MMA central physical examination center" will be in charge of physical examination, and this change is expected to increase consistency in draft related decisions. MMA will also adopt a double check system on decisions of military service exemption to prevent malpractice related to military service administration.

Efforts to Protect the People's "Right to Know"

A. Information Disclosure and Civil Petitions

1. Information Disclosure

The ROK government promulgated an act on the "obligatory disclosure of information by public offices," and the reason behind this is simple: to

satisfy the people's right to know and to ensure clarity in administrative procedures. To keep pace with the government's policy, MND has specified, and is now implementing methods and procedures for disclosing information.

MND and its affiliate organizations have set up service windows and improved their internet website to make public non-classified information and other information on major military projects. Even classified information is now released to the public when it becomes unclassified.

The public has access to a sea of information; lists, handbooks of major documents, and other information that is available to everyone, and people can request the documents they desire through the internet website. The MND department in charge of releasing documents and information answers a request within fifteen days after it is received, informing the requester whether or not a document can be released.

If the document can be released, it must be made available within fifteen days after the date the document's releasability is determined. Should the department reach a decision that a certain document or piece of information cannot be released, it must inform the requester of the reasons. On the other hand, the requester may appeal in writing against the decision reached by the department within thirty days after being informed. The MND Headquarters or the affiliate that produced the document or information then decides whether or not the appeal is accepted and informs the

Figure 5-2 Process of Information Disclosure



requester of the results in a letter within seven days after submission of the appeal. If the request is declined, an information notice of the administrative appeal will be mailed together with the decision.

2. Civil Petitions

MND, looking towards better management of civil petitions, opened an internet homepage offering civil service information and made available a main MND telephone number (02-748-1111) and civil petition office number (02-748-6891~2) for civil affairs administration. Suggestions for national defense policy, and cases of assault or malpractice within the military are also processed through the Defense Reporting Center (02-748-5959). During off-duty hours, the civil petition office number is operated by an automatic recording system for the public to voice complaints. The recorded civil petitions are processed immediately after the duty hour begins the next day, and the petitioners are notified of the results.

Table 5-5 Civil Petition Settlement (As of Dec. 31, 1999)

Documented Petitions	Internet Petitions	Personal Visit	Telephone Counseling
3,899 cases annually	5,920 cases annually	2,658 cases annually	110 cases per day average

Out of the total civil petitions, cases of wounded on duty and veterans' benefits comprised the highest percentage (34%). Most of the petitions submitted through the internet were simple questions on enlistments and recruits of military civilian employee with 5,539 cases (94%), while those petitions resorting to law accounted for only 381 cases (6%).

B. Open Defense and Defense Publicity

MND has been continually supporting the national administration through the principle of an "open defense policy" which will satisfy the public's right to know and gives the citizen an understanding of defense policy.

MND regularly offers a "daily press briefing" to defense publicity media such as the "Kook-Bang Ilbo," the "Armed Forces Broadcasting System," and the "National Defense News" where public interests such as the

progress of the major defense policies and the security situations surrounding the Korean peninsula are addressed.

▲ Youth's Barracks life experience at Marine Corps camp

In March 2000, the "Ministry of Defense Internet Website" was upgraded to improve users' convenience and to make two-way communications with the people possible. For speedy and accurate responses to civil petitions, all civil petitions submitted through MND's internet website homepage will be handled directly by each bureau, department, and the armed service concerned. A variety of information on military affairs, military movies, and military songs are also being provided through the internet website.

In addition, various public opinions collected through public pools, public bulletin boards, e-mail discussion groups, and personal computer communication are scrutinized and the result is taken into consideration when establishing national defense policies.

Aside from publicity, MND engages in a variety of military events, e.g., sponsoring the yearly Hokuk Training (Hokuk means "guarding one's country") for approximately 150,000 teenagers, opening up Marine Corps camps and other military units to the public, and giving prizes for high-quality literature on Hokuk related themes. The main aims of their involvement are to increase national security concerns and promote the martial spirit.

The Korean War and National Defense

A. The Significance and Missions of the Korean War

The Korean War was the first war ever fought to stop the spread of communism after World War II. Under the UN banner, the ROK Armed Forces and the United Nations Command defeated the North Korean Forces sup-

ported by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that began with the North's surprise invasion across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. The Korean War represented the triumph of free democracy in defending the freedom of the world against communist expansion. At that time, 16 nations including the USA sent combat troops as UN Forces, 5 nations including India dispatched medical support units, and over 20 nations provided material supports.

The Korean War left a deep scar on humanity. It cost lives of over four million people, separated over ten million families, and destroyed $23 billion worth of properties. Also, it resulted in the continued division of the Korean peninsula for the past 50 years.

We must consider the current national security situations and remember the historical lessons from the Korean War. And, we must ensure that the tragedy of the Korean War will never happen again in this Korean peninsula.

B. The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration

The objectives of the 50th AKWC is to promote reconciliation, reunification, and prosperity of the Korean people in the 21st century by 1) recalling the significance and lessons of the Korean War, 2) honoring the Korean War veterans and expanding their welfare, 3) promoting national security awareness to the post-war generation, and 4) obtaining international confidence through solidifying bonds with the 21 Korean War Allied Nations. The theme of these projects that began on June 25, 2000, anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, and continue till July 2003, marking the Armistice Agreement, is 'Pursuing Peace beyond the Korean War, Pursuing Reunification beyond the Division.' The projects are categorized into 52 core projects conducted by the government and 41 commissional projects by local governments. In 2000, 39 core projects including the main commemoration ceremony and 36 commissioned projects were conducted.

1. The Significance of the Korean War and Its Historical Lessons

The objectives of commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War are to promote national security awareness through a clear understanding of the Korean War and to remind the post-war generations of the

historical lessons and significance of the Korean War. To this end, the areas of Korean War history which are still under discussion will be analyzed in a scholarly manner. A total of 29 research projects including 16 military and 13 non-military–i.e. political, economic, sociological and cultural–projects, will be carried out and the results will be published as appendices to the Korean War History.

In relation to these scholarly activities, MND hosted two seminars to reexamine the historical significance of the Korean War in 2000. The title of the first seminar held in April 2000 was "Pursuing Peace beyond the Korean War" with various national scholars as well as foreign scholars from the USA, Japan, China, and Russia. The title of second seminar held in June was "Fifty Years after the Korean War, from Confrontation to Peaceful Coexistence" in which scholars from the ROK, USA, and Japan participated.

In addition, to honor and elevate the sprit of war heroes, the government is planning to construct the "Monument of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War" at the Korean War Memorial. The government is also in the process of renovating 667 battlefields throughout the nation. Furthermore, projects that will transform historical battlefields into tourist attractions are now being implemented.

▲ Academic Seminar on National Defense

2. Honoring Korean War Veterans and the Enlargement of Welfare Policies

The aim of this project is to honor Korean War veterans who dedicated themselves to their nation and to elevate their pride in their participation in the Korean War by providing practical welfare benefits.

Letters of Appreciation with the official seal of the President of the Republic of Korea were presented (June 2000), and the Minister of National Defense presented gifts to 53 Taeguk Order of Military Merit recipients and their families. A variety of other programs for war veterans are now in the process of implementation. These programs are: constructing monuments

for KIAs in each county, writing names of the Military Merit Awardees on the road signs, emplacing doorplates at war veterans' houses, awarding honorary diploma for war veterans and constructing torsos of Military Merit Awardees and war heroes. In addition, other programs to honor war veterans include: visiting veterans' homes for consolation, inviting veterans to national events, visiting wounded veterans, searching for war comrades and commemorating the dedicated war heroes.

In order to return the remains of the dead who sacrificed their lives for the country to their families, the ROK government launched a project to exhume the remains of 29 major battlefields including Dabu-Dong and Angang. During the first half of the year 2000, 41 complete remains, 1,410 fragmentary remains, and 2,361 relics were found near Dabu-Dong, Angang, and the Gaehwa mountain areas. Out of these exhumations, 144 unidentified remains were enshrined in the National Cemetery Charnel House and 2 identified remains were buried in the National Cemetery. One American remain was sent to the USA and 2 North Korean remains were buried in the North Korean Army Cemetery in Paju. During the latter half of 2000, the project to exhume remains continued around Kumsung, Baeksuk mountain, Bloody Ridge, and the Choongju area.

In an effort to honor war veterans and promote their sense of pride, the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (MPVA) revised the "regulations on benefits and support for national heroes," raised the pension of war veterans and expanded the grades. MPVA also revised the law on supporting war veterans and its enforcement ordinance to bring about a substantial increase in welfare benefits for elderly veterans with extra living expenses, funeral costs, burial subsidies, and extended their medical benefits.

▲ Exhumation of remains

3. Establishing National Identity and Security Consciousness in the Post-War Generation

The post-war generation

comprises 70% of the Korean population, and various events are planned to help them understand the significance and historical lessons of the Korean War as well as stimulate their national security awareness. One important event is the revision of the war related curricula for the elementary, middle, and high school education programs in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education. To this end, in 2000, educational curricula for the first and second grades of elementary school students were revised. According to the yearly plans of revision, curricula for higher grades up to the third grade of high school will be revised by the year 2004. Educational posters and video tapes teaching the historical lessons of the Korean war were also prepared and distributed as educational materials to soldiers, reserve troops, elementary, middle, and high schools, and other social educational organizations.

In addition, MND held a public collection for war memoirs and defense related literary works. It later published the book, *You Are Beautiful* (June 2000). Also, MND presented the Korean War Photo Exhibition Tour in 11 different areas including Seoul. Furthermore, MND hosted a variety of education and training camps, disciplinary educational programs for soldiers and reserve troops, and speech contests. Typical among these activities was "A March for Unification" from AeKeeBong through DMZ areas to the Unification Observatory, in which 200 members of the Boy Scout federation participated.

4. Enhancing International Status of the ROK with Stronger Ties among Korean War Allies

Various projects are scheduled to enhance Korea's national prestige abroad and to strengthen security ties by expressing gratitude to the 21 Korean War allies and veterans. These projects include: inviting representatives of the Korean War allies and veterans to a variety of memorial events, supporting home ceremonies and events for the Korean War allies, and sending Korean representatives to various ceremonies and events in allied countries.

On June 25, 2000, the main event of "The 50th AKWC Main Commemoration" was held with over 10,000 people present including the President of the ROK, Ministers of Defense from the 21 Korean War allies, ambassadors in Korea, and war veterans home and abroad. Included in this

▲ "Unveiling of the Honor Roll" at the 50th AKWC Main Commemoration

▲ Dedication Ceremony of the Korean War Monument

event were the opening ceremony of "The Korean War Special Exhibition" and the dedication of a war memorial for 38,000 UN soldiers and 30,000 soldiers who died during the Korean War. This event reminded people of the historical significance of the Korean War and enhanced Korea's international confidence among the Korean War allies and veterans.

MND also held ceremonies in commemoration of the major battles in the Korean War to promote national security awareness: Pusan Perimeter, Inchon Landing Operation, Seoul Recapture, and each Armed Force's commemoration. Students, citizens, and war veterans from all nations were present at these ceremonies.

▲ The Korean War Allied Nations' Ceremony of Constructing the Korean War Participation Monument

In support of the Korean War allies' commemorations held in Korea, the Korean delegation including Gen(Ret) Paik Sun-yup, chairman of the 50th AKWC Committee participated in ceremonies such as the "Task Force Smith Commemoration" at Osan (July 2000) and the "Jangjin Reservoir Battle Commemoration" held by the CINCCFC (Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command). As part of supporting the commemorations

held in allied countries, a Korean delegation including the chairman of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee, DCINC-CFC (Deputy Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command) and officers from the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs were represented at events that included the "Korean War Memorial Dedication Ceremony in Washington D.C.," "Korean War Veterans' Day Ceremony," "Inchon Landing Commemoration" held at Norfolk, Virginia, USA, Korean War Memorial Parade in New York City, and the dedication of a monument commemorating Korean War participation held at Cambra, Australia.

Letters of Appreciation of the ROK President were presented to the Korean War veterans' organizations and individuals in the 21 allied nations. In the letter, the ROK President expressed a respect for their noble sacrifices and devotion, particularly their noble efforts to uphold the ideals of democracy. The President highly praised their contributions for the freedom and democracy on the universal value of mankind. He also stated that he would do his part for world peace and prosperity in the New Millennium. The Korean War allied nations paid particular attention to our sincere efforts to appreciate their sacrifices and dedication. Through newspapers and TV broadcasts, they expressed special thanks for our efforts. Some veterans wrote on their letters that they were proud to be Korean War veterans and would put the presidential letter in a frame to hang on their living room wall.

During the Korean War, the ROK government presented the "Korean War Service Medal (KWSM)" but was unable to grant these medals to veterans of the United States of America and some countries of the British Commonwealth due to their home regulations that forbid them from receiving foreign decorations. However, in commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, the Minister of National Defense formally presented the KWSMs to the CINCCFC (Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command) for those veterans who requested the medals (July 2000). The President of the ROK also presented KWSMs to the veterans at the UN Millennium Summit (September 2000). The project of presenting KWSMs will continue until 2003. These activities of the ROK government are expected to promote pride in Korean War veterans and will strengthen ties between the ROK and USA. Likewise, the Korean War veterans in some countries of the British Commonwealth are scheduled to receive KWSMs in 2001.

▲ Delivering KWSM Award and the President's Letter of Appreciation

In addition, in order to promote pride in Korean War veterans abroad and strengthen ties among Korean War allies, other programs to invite allies' Korean War veterans and their families are planned. Furthermore, the committee schedules to support foreign commemorative programs in near future and will publish or broadcast special fea tures on Korea in major foreign media.

Increased Civilian Specialist Participation in Defense Decision Making

The era of "National Defense with the People" can arrive only when the entire nation is inspired to take a keen interest and participate in defense policies. The priority, then, is to establish and clearly execute defense policies, and to disclose the policies to the public as they stand. From this viewpoint, it is not only necessary but also efficient to encourage civilian experts to take part in the defense decision-making process.

MND is taking actions to stimulate the participation of civilian experts as well as to garner their opinions when deciding on and establishing defense policies.

A. Defense Policy Advisory Committee

Through the operation of the Defense Policy Advisory Committee composed of civilian experts, since 1981, MND has strived to enhance mutual understanding of defense affairs between the society and the military.

The committee is divided into 12 subcommittees and consists of 44 civilian experts with profound knowledge and long term experience in academ-

ic and mass media circles. These subcommittees include: policy, arms control, troop information and education (TI&E), planning and management, legal affairs, personnel and welfare, mobilization, logistics, acquisition, facilities, information systems, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each committee member's role is to advise MND on the decision-making process of major defense policies.

Committee members are requested to take part in an annual plenary meeting chaired by the defense minister, and quarterly meetings called by subcommittees. Apart from these regular meetings, members give ad hoc advice by making personal visits or by other means, e.g., mail or fax, should urgent events arise.

In 1999, a total of 15 consultations were made on policies, including "Waste Water Disposal Facilities" and "Command and Control of KNTDS (Korean Navy Tactical Defense System)," and in 2000, a topic such as "Adequacy of North & South Korean Arms Possession Limit During the Period of Peaceful Co-existence" was taken up by the committee. In the future, the Ministry of National Defense is planning to fully cooperate with committee members to effectively cope with the rapidly changing internal and external situations.

B. Increased Participation of Civilian Experts in Policymaking Processes

Previously, the participation of civilian experts in defense policy making was mainly indirect; opinion surveys, exchange of views at seminars, and research results were exploited in defense policy making.

MND, however, has recently formed new committees consisting of civilian experts directly involved in policy formulation and decision-making. The Defense Policy Review Committee was set up in 1997, the National Defense Reform Committee in 1998, and the RMA Planning Group in 1999. Civilian experts have been assigned as policy advisors or evaluators on each committee.

Especially in the case of "RMA Planning Group," the committee members are selected on a part time basis from a "pool" of military experts and civilian experts. The main purpose of the pool system is to garner a variety

of innovative ideas from civilian society and expand public understanding of military policy.

Since 1996, MND has been encouraging and endorsing defense related seminars hosted by civilian organizations in order to maintain the interest of civilian experts in defense issues; the research reports from these seminars provide vital information related to the review and determination of policies.

Starting from 1999, government funded research projects, which were monopolized by KIDA in the past, are awarded through competition among all MND affiliated research institutions as well as civilian research institutes. Such a change in the government funded research allocation system has brought about higher quality research reports and increased the participation of civilian experts in the defense policy making process.

Chapter Two

Public Benefits Enhancement and Rights Protection

Environmentally Friendly Military Management

In order to improve the environmental conditions of national land, the precious home of our people while setting national defense as the primary duty, each unit and regional command of the Korean Armed Forces is intensifying activities that preserve the surrounding environment.

A. Laying the Foundation for the Military's Environmental Management

1. Development of Environmental Business Management Process

The military is a special group, the members of which subsist completely (food, clothing and shelter) inside their bases. Therefore, specializations in environmental management tasks are required to realize, prevent, and manage pollution on military installations. Realizing these needs, the military created an Environmental Division under MND as well as each headquarters and specialized the process of environmental management tasks through the environmental military service personnel system.

However, due to increased demands for improvements in the military base environment such as basic environmental facilities, water quality management, and waste disposal, developing professional military environmental management procedures has become an urgent matter. To satisfy these needs, starting in 2000 MND plans to upgrade the professionalism and effectiveness of the basic environmental facilities and military environment management by developing a military environmental specialist system recruiting people who majored in environmental science in college with environment related licenses and completing the installation of basic environmental facilities by 2005.

2. Strengthening Military Personnel's Environmental Education

In order to build a firm foundation for environmental management, all military personnel must have an enhanced regard for and knowledge of environmental protection. Furthermore, to make military personnel active environmentalists for society as much as possible, MND seeks to establish a firm conceptual foundation of environmental protection and integrate it in daily routines of military personnel.

Particularly, the environmental education for generals was reinforced to raise the knowledge of high-level commanders, and in the future, institutions like the Armed Engineer School will train environmental specialists.

Representatives from the Ministry of Environment, the local environmental management office, local government, and various environmental organizations provide environmental education for military service personnel and commanders to reinforce the importance of the environment through troop information and education periods.

In efforts to improve environmental education, a research report entitled "Standardization and Program Development of the Military's Environmental Education" will be used as the primary guideline for developing proper environmental education textbooks.

3. Constructing Military Environmental Cooperation System

A Government-Military Environmental Consultative Committee (GMECC) was organized in 1998 for the purpose of improving environmental conditions in the military and adjacent areas. The GMECC is composed of a Central Committee, four subcommittees at four major river watershed areas, and two regional committees near Taegu and Wonju. Each committee conducts 4-5 regularly scheduled meetings as well as numerous unscheduled meetings yearly.

As part of GMECC's projects, the committees have strengthened their relationship by enforcing cooperative activities to recover the polluted Daeam mountain and Backdu Daegan, preserving the ecosystem near the civilian control line and cleaning the Han river estuary numerous times in cooperation with the military every year.

The Ministry of Environment and local governments have compromised on an issue of managing the waste disposal on military posts, providing

Figure 5-3 Composition Chart of the Government-Military Environmental Consultative Committee



※ Members of each committee: approximately 20 people (Officials of the Military, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, and local governments)

environmental management technology, supplying textbooks for environmental education, and supporting qualified instructors and disposal equipments, as well as manpower.

Meanwhile, MND avidly supports environmental subcommittee activities under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) because they provide opportunities to discuss environmental pollution concerns posed by US Forces in Korea (USFK). Moreover, the working-level environmental cooperative system strives to upgrade the environmental situation on USFK installations.

In cooperation with international military environmental management, an effort has been made to acquire environmental management technologies and information from developed nations with the intent to strengthen the military's international position. Additionally, "the research for international cooperation of military's environmental management system" was conducted to build a firm foundation of armed forces' international cooperation on environment.

▲ Armed Forces' Environmental Preservation Research Seminar

4. Environmental Studies Conducted by the Armed Forces

In order to eliminate environmentally detrimental factors

unique to the military, and to draw up an "environmental management system," the military has conducted continuous studies. Through the "Armed Forces' Environment Preservation Research Seminar," which has been held periodically since 1998, the desires of working-level officers as well as environment experts have been encouraged, and their consciousness of environmental protection has been enhanced.

B. Prevention of Environmental Pollution at Military Posts

1. Expansion of Basic Environmental Facilities and Equipments

It is known that military posts and units are protected from non-authorized personnel by the military facility protection act. Because military posts and operating areas are close to and have relation with water supply protection zones, the efforts and responsibilities of the military as well as authorities to protect the environment are strongly recommended.

From this perspective, legal disposal facilities and equipment such as wastewater treatment facilities must be purchased quickly in order to prevent contravention of environmental laws and environmental pollution on the military's posts and in its operations.

The military plans to expand 706 wastewater treatment facilities by the end of 2000; wastewater treatment facilities will be constructed in the Han and Nakdong river watershed by 2001, in the Kum river and Young San river watershed by 2002, and in the remaining watershed areas by 2003.

Furthermore, a total of 4,427 environmental facilities such as incinerators and soil pollution prevention facilities will be in place by 2005 and insufficient environmental facilities that were built previously will be upgraded in the near future.

Table 5-6 Military Owned Environmental Facilities and Equipment

Classification	Total Demand	1999 Holdings	Total (%)	Plans for 2000	Total (%)	Plans for 2001~2005	Total (%)	After 2006
Basic environmental facilities (places)	4,427	764	17	87	19	3,576	100	
Environmental equipment (units)	5,789	3,400	59	117	61	1,394	85	878

※ Environmental facilities include 2,256 soil pollution prevention facilities (51%)

In relation to the development of environmental facilities and equipment, environment public relation activities such as collecting new information and opening exhibitions were initiated and the "natural purification plan for polluted water" using swamp land and fields of parsley is in the application stage.

2. Waste Management and Recycling Resources

The military has shown continuous efforts to prevent environmental pollution and recycle wastes through its intensive waste management. The wastes accumulated by the military are either burned by its own incinerator or sent to local governments or waste disposal companies. The wastes that cannot be treated by the armed forces are sent to professional waste disposal companies in order to prevent environmental pollution and recycle wastes. In addition, 19,991 facilities for separating solid waste materials have been placed throughout the nation to reduce the amount of waste and to recycle resources.

Table 5-7 Military Wastes and Disposal (Based on 1999)

Unit: ton

Classification		Amounts Produced	Entrusted for Disposal	Self Disposal		
				Recycling	Burning	Holding
Total		222,424	151,726	44,433	12,114	14,151
Livelihood waste	Regular waste	147,053	118,745	15,838	11,601	869
	Food waste	32,780	6,992	25,331	457	-
Designated waste		19,130	9,118	2,386	0	7,626
Construction waste		23,461	16,871	878	56	5,656

3. Environmental Impact Assessments on Military Facilities

Environmentally harmful factors are carefully eliminated beforehand during the planning stage of constructing military facilities by observing the procedural details of construction stipulated by the "Act for Environmental, Traffic and Disasters Impact Assessments." This is to prevent possible civil appeals from the residents living nearby.

4. Entrusting Management Plans of Environmental Facilities

In order for the military to determine the realities of environmental management, find suitable solutions for each problem, and expand and operate

environmental facilities and equipment effectively, each military unit is required to secure more manpower to be responsible for environmental issues. However, it is extremely difficult for the armed forces, located throughout the nation, to recruit environmentally savvy active duty personnel and specialists in short period of time because of the military's unique characteristics of maintaining force capabilities and implementing improvements. Therefore, in order to minimize losses in force capabilities, maximize effectiveness, and maintain the professionalism of environmental management, the military seeks to increase its support of environmental management plans that have been under review and are currently being used in some military units.

Having professional environmental management firms for environment management will draw numerous benefits: solving environmental management problems that were a burden to military commanders, gaining the reliance and trust of citizens in military environmental management, and maximizing force capabilities by concentrating on combat drills.

C. Nature Conservation Activities

1. Local Environmental Cleanup Activities

To prevent environmental pollution within the military, preserve the natural environment, and provide a clean environment for the public, the military plays a leading role in cleaning the local environment near military units.

Major environmental cleanup activities launched by the military include the Navy's engagement in activities to improve the maritime environment of approximately 60 islands in cooperation with local governments and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and nature conservation activities by army

▲ Armed Forces' environmental preservation activities

military personnel were held in Backdu Daegan in cooperation with the public and government.

2. Nature Preservation Proposition of Military Posts and Operating Areas

The special interests and efforts of the military to preserve the environment are required due to the characteristics of military units that are located near forests and ecological protection zones and military combat exercises that are performed in natural environments. Military operations are conducted all over the mountains and damage the environment by cutting down trees to gain vision and constructing artificial bunkers, obstacles, and military quarters. Because military operations are repeated every year, environmental protection awareness by commanders as well as military service personnel is being reinforced and environmental protection plans are being considered before conducting military operations in order to prevent damage to nature as well as after completion of the military operation in order to recover the damage.

D. Environment Restoration

1. Contaminated Soil Restoration Project

Leakage of oil from storage facilities pollutes not only the soil but contaminates underground water, which poisons nearby crops and becomes a reason for civil petitions. The military forces are actively involved in recovering polluted soil and will complete its first round of soil contamination tests on approximately 1,300 registered oil storage facilities by 2000. All contaminated soil will be restored by 2010 based on a year-by-year plan.

Table 5-8 Soil Contamination Tests and Restoration Projects

Classification	Total	1998 (Executed)	1999 (Executed)	2000 (Planned)
Soil contamination test	1,242	228	623	391

※ Oil storage facilities with a capacity of more than 20,000 liters were subject to tests. The number of restoration projects was estimated to be 25% of the total number of facilities tested.

Two maintenance depot sites in the Pusan area have been under restoration since 1997, with the first one fully restored. Soil contaminant characterization was completed on the second depot site, and it is now undergoing restoration.

2. Achievement of a Firm Basis for the Restoration of Environmentally Polluted Areas

Although military forces are actively involved in recovering soil polluted by oil leaks and other buried wastes, various soil restoration technologies have not been invented. The development of contaminated soil restoration technology and procedures is an urgent matter due to the possibilities of further contamination caused by the operation of special weapons and munitions.

Therefore, the military continually supports research for developing contaminated soil restoration technologies. The research is conducted by the armed forces within budget constraints as well as by professional research institutes that have recognized the necessity and significance of developing contaminated soil restoration technologies.

In efforts to develop contaminated-soil restoration technology, the military conducted a test restoration of oil-contaminated soil using technologies developed by the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST). Additionally, MND has made attempts to commission a project that would develop contaminated soil restoration procedures and create a system similar to a research institute.

In the process of pollution disposal and restoration, rational standards of pollution allowance levels and environmental disposal and restoration are being planned. Furthermore, the information gathered from pollution disposal and restoration will be accumulated to increase effectiveness, achieve objectivity, and benefit other similar projects.

E. Management of Work Environment and Toxic Chemicals

The "Regulation on the Military Work Environment and Health Management of Employees" and "Regulation on Safe Management of Military Radiological Emissions" were enacted for the safe management of radiological emissions used by the military and to protect military service

personnel from harmful pollutants such as heavy metals, organic compounds, noise, chemical dust, and medical and industrial radiation. In 1999, MND created a radiological safety inspection organization. By 2002, MND plans to form organizations to conduct specialized medical examination and inspect work environments for the health management of military personnel.

At present, "Guidelines for Managing Toxic Chemicals in the Military" are being developed in order to ensure the safety of those who work with hazardous materials and are planned to be applied in 2001. In addition, the material management guideline that provides information on toxic wastes will be displayed on the intranet of MND and additional information on toxic materials will be continuously accumulated.

The Local Community and Military Facilities

A. Settlement of Private Land Used by the Military

In an attempt to protect individual property rights, our military has persistently sought ways to fairly compensate citizens or organizations for private land occupied and used by the military.

In accordance with the Special Act on Acquisition or Reparations for Loss on Public Lots, the military either purchases private land it must continue to use or otherwise compensates the owners for it. If private land is deemed unnecessary for military use, it is returned to the owner immediately.

If the owner of the private land that the military is currently using needs to use the land in the future or wishes to exchange it for idle public land, the military will willingly accept this kind of exchange. Aside from the general accounts budget, since 1995 the military has been allowed to use the Special Accounts Budget for National Property Management, whose main financial sources come from selling idle public land to purchase or compensate individuals for the private land it needs.

Though situations may arise where the military must use a certain piece of private land for urgent military purposes, it must receive the approval of the owner, or purchase it through appropriate legal procedures. Table 5-9

shows the number of private land cases that were settled between the owners and the military.

Table 5-9 Settlement of Private Land Cases

Classification	Total Size of Land to be Settled	Cases Settled (1983–1999)	Plans	
			2000	After 2001
Size (hectares)	15,516.2	10,569.9	762.3	4,184.4
Budget Required (billion won)	546.8	319.1	49.0	178.7

B. Relocation of Military Facilities

For increased efficiency of land use, balanced development of urban areas, enhanced benefit to the public, and modernization of military facilities, the military is gradually relocating its units to the suburbs as long as military operations are not hindered.

As shown in Table 5-10, a total of 3.01 trillion won was spent on the relocation of 209 units from 1966 to 1999. In 2000, the military plans to relocate 12 out of 44 units at a cost of 200.1 billion won.

Table 5-10 Relocation of Military Facilities (As of Late 1999)

Unit : number of unit

Regional Classification	Total	Seoul	Pusan	Taegu	Taejon	Kyungju	Wonju	Inchon	Other
Total Project('66~'99)	209	53	40	18	20	18	23	9	28
Completed in 1999	10	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	5

Furthermore, a cooperative council will be formed and operated for a smoother execution of relocation projects. This will consist of relevant ministries and local governments. The military also plans to allow local governments or government-contracted organizations to construct replacement facilities for the military, and turn existing military facilities over to them.

C. Revision and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas

Under the Military Facility Protection Act, the Naval Base Act, and the Act on Air Bases for Military Use, the military has designated and managed military facility (base) protection areas that account for approximately 11.12 billion hectares.

Recently, systems related to military facility protection areas were improved, and the boundary of these areas are being rationally readjusted not only to ensure operational efficiency but to enhance public benefit.

First, a series of laws pertaining to military facility protection areas were enacted and amended from 1997 through the first half of 1999. Villages within the protected area north of the civilian control line, areas necessary to carry out unification policies, and areas used by security facilities have been designated as "limited protection areas." Under no circumstances have houses near ammunition depot protection areas been allowed to be torn down or rebuilt. But, if public projects, e.g., railway or road construction, make the removal of houses within a specific zone inevitable, the houses may be torn down and replaced. The scope of restrictions on the areas surrounding air bases was reduced. The air base protection zone for a support aircraft base area has been reduced from 5 kilometers to 2 km from the outer security line of the air base; operational bases for helicopters were separately classified and downsized in the public interest.

Second, with the prior analysis system on military facility protection adopted in August 1998, consultations were left partially in the hands of administrative departments that currently are available to the public. With the introduction of this system, people can now check on local land use-related information at local civil petition offices (change of form and nature of land, permitted range or height of construction). In November 1999, 34 military facility protection areas, such as Paju, Munsan, and Yonchon in the Kyunggi province, that are 4,950 hectares in size were commissioned to the administrative government.

Third, military facility protection areas were readjusted to coincide with changes in the operational environment. As of June 1998, the military lifted restrictions on 1,079.76 hectares in ten places including parts of Seoul and in areas near ammunition warehouses, all judged as marginally relevant to military operations. Restrictions on a total of 768.9 hectares in sixteen villages within the civilian control line have been reduced from "restricted protection areas" to "limited protection areas." The residents in these villages may now build or rebuild their houses or farm buildings without consulting military units.

Table 5-11 Cancellation and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas

(Unit: hectares)

Year	Total	Before 1980	1981~1985	1986~1988	1989~1993	1994	1995~1998
Cancellation	290,571.6	2,805	4,950	101,805	2,745.6	176,609.4	1,310.1
Revision	32,085.9	858	1,402.5	10,728.3	2,745.6	14,081.1	2,270.4

Support for Public

A. Military Support for Public and National Projects

1. Military Support for Public

The military actively participates in various endeavors where they are most needed by making the best of its manpower, equipment and technology, while not hindering fulfillment of its basic missions.

In particular, given manpower shortages and economic difficulties in rural farming areas, the military is an enthusiastic volunteer and source of farmhand support in such work as transplanting rice seedlings and harvesting rice, etc.

The military formed farm machine repair patrol service teams and dispatched them to places that lacked farm machine service centers.

Table 5-12 Farmhand Support in 1999

Participants	Equipment	Major Support Achievements				
		Farming Support	Farm Machine Repair	Road Repair	Water Supply	Medical Support
772,931 persons	5,593 units	5,614 hectares	7,659 units	217 km	179 tons	24,694 persons

Meanwhile, the military also provides medical service for residents in remote areas with insufficient medical care, legal counseling services to local residents, and conducts sister-relationships with nearby social welfare facilities or the underprivileged.

When there was an infectious disease outbreak in Paju, Kyunggi province and Hongsung, Chungnam province between March and July of 2000, an

average of 330 military service personnel and 90 sterilization vehicles per day helped prevent the spread of the infectious disease.

2. Support for National Projects

With an eye on enhancing public welfare and developing the nation's industrial infrastructure, the military has continuously taken part in national land development projects such as road construction and the reorganization of arable land. From 1990 to 1993, the military supplied manpower and equipment to help pave the Freedom Expressway. In 1996, the military completed road renovation projects on both Paekryong Island and Daechong Island.

▲ Renovation of a coastal road on Kangwha Island

Between May 1997 and December 1999, military service personnel and construction equipment have been put to work on the renovation of a coastal road on Kangwha Island. A 19-kilometer section of the Freedom Expressway was paved and starting in June 2000, a 9.5-kilometer section has been worked on with various construction equipment such as excavators and dump trucks, and the work will continue until December 2001. This military support is expected to save 18 billion won. The road, when finished, will fulfill the transportation, tourism, and farming needs of the local residents; it will enhance military operational capability as well.

B. Support Activities for Disasters and Accidents

1. Military Preparation of Support Activities for Disasters and Accidents

The disaster and accident support activities of our military are in accordance with the Countering Natural Disasters Act, the Provisions for Countering-Disaster Tasks, and the Regulation on the Formation and Operation of the Search-and-Rescue Headquarters. The latter two are based on the Calamities Management Act.

Recently, the military made efforts to reinforce and diversify its own capability for disaster and accident rescues.

First, 18 military units under the control of the Special Warfare Command, the Aviation Command, and the Naval and Air Operation Commands have been designated to be a stand-by force under the command of JCS in the event of a natural disaster or a large-scale accident. The military dispatches appropriate units depending on the situation.

Second, a total of 14 disaster rescue units, one at each metropolitan city or province, were designated for emergencies to provide prompt and timely life-saving rescue and emergency restoration support. These units and local administrative organizations work in close cooperation with each other. They periodically undertake joint rescue exercises and demonstrations that assess the cooperation levels among the military, the government and the civilian sectors.

Third, the chains of command of supporting units are integrated for effective rescue support. In other words, ground force support is placed under the supervision of corps commanders, and maritime support under the supervision of fleet commanders. Together they have the authority to control rescue personnel and equipment.

Fourth, counter-disaster monitoring centers are set up at regiment-level units whenever large-scale natural calamities are likely to occur. Military units located in neighborhoods susceptible to heavy snowfall or heavy rain are provided with restoration equipment that include snowplows and bulldozers.

Fifth, the military has made it easier for residents to report accidents or disasters by setting up a nation-wide telephone number (080-960-6119). The caller can be automatically connected to the nearest military unit. Also, a "support first, report second" system was established in order to immediately mobilize military manpower and equipment from the unit closest to an affected area.

Sixth, 3.7 billion won worth of life-saving equipment was procured during 1996-99 to enhance rescue and support capabilities in times of disasters or accidents. In 2000 the military plans to purchase 0.87 billion won worth of equipment to continue the upgrade of restoration support activities and capabilities.

Seventh, a range of military support capabilities for civilians including medical aid, disinfection, water quality testing, laundry, and water supplies have been incorporated into a package program. In particular, an aeromedical evacuation company was created to rapidly transport patients in a serious condition from areas inaccessible by an ambulance.

2. Records of Disaster and Accident Support Activities

In 1999, the country experienced numerous large-scale disasters simultaneously at multiple locations that required military assistance in restoration activities at an unprecedented level.

Disasters, natural and man-made, occurred in various areas, and their severity increased as shown in Table 5-13. In response, the military promptly carried out restoration support activities and employed available manpower and equipment to the maximum level possible.

Although torrential rains in August 1999 cost the military many casualties, the military first helped civilians overcome the disaster and then worked to repair the damages to itself.

The "Armed Forces of the People" will continue to provide strong support during disasters or calamities. Our military will strive to enhance its capability to respond to national crises by properly training its personnel and improving its equipment, all to minimize damage to life and property.

▲ Armed Forces' disaster and accident restoration activities

Table 5-13 Disaster and Accident Support Records in 1999

Classification	Support		Major Achievements					
	Military Personnel (person)	Equipment (unit)	Rescued Person (person)	Road Repair (km)	Riverbank/ River Repair(km)	Medical Treatment (person)	Farmland Restored (ha)	Other Support
Total	1,446,651	20,452	578	534.9	485.3	12,861	1,429.1	
Flood Assistance of Typhoon "Olga" (Jul.31-Aug.25)	1,103,123	20,452	578	534.9	485.3	12,861	131.0	· Housing victims 306per · Evacuation support 3,430per · Cleaning household 21,071houses · Wall 8,274m · Land slide clearing 114places · Prevention of epidemic 22,274ha · Wash area 72,650kg · Water supply 19,939t · Waste disposal 427tons
Planting Rice Support of Typhoons "Ann," "Bart" (Sep.21-Oct. 7)	343,528						1,298.1	· Army: 297,655 per 3,819.8ha · Navy: 22,448 per 202.84ha · Air Force: 14,864 per 151.15ha

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Status of Global Conflicts in 1999

Region	Armed Conflict	Confrontational Conflict	Potential Conflict	Total
America	Columbia Mexico Peru	-	Falkland Islands	4
Africa	Burundi Guinea-Bissau Namibia Liberia Ethiopia Rwanda, Angola Uganda Ethiopia-Eritrea Chad, Somalia Sierra Leone Congo (Zaire) Congo (Brazzaville) Nigeria Sudan, Algeria	Egypt-Sudan Western Sahara Nigeria-Cameroon Senegal Djibouti Kenya Togo Egypt	Niger Lesotho	27
Middle East	Turkey-Kurds Lebanon Iran-Iraq Iraq Palestine US · England-Iraq (Gulf war) Iran	Iran-UAE Israel-Syria Iran-Afghanistan	Iraq-Kuwait Israel-Jordan	12
Asia	Sri Lanka Indonesia (East Timor) Afghanistan Myanmar India Cambodia Kashmir Philippines, North-South Korea Nepal Bangladesh	Spratly Islands Paracel Islands Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands China-Taiwan China-India Kurile Islands Tibet	-	18
C I S	Georgia-Iphasia Tajikistan Russia-Chechnya Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan	Moldova Azerbaijan-Armenia Estonia-Russia North Osetia-Ingush	-	9
Europe	Kosovo Northern Ireland	Greece-Albania Cyprus Albania	Greece-Macedonia Romania Bosnia Voivodina Bulgaria Slovakia Aegean Sea Istria	13
Grand Total	45	25	13	83
	Subtotal: 70			

※ Source: *The Status and Prospect of Global Conflicts (www.kida.re.kr)*

Appendix 2

Nuclear Capabilities of the Nuclear Powers

Classification		US	Russia	China	United Kingdom	France
ICBMs (inter-continental ballistic missiles: 5,500km or more)	Total	550	756	35~40	0	0
	Type/ Quantity	*Minuteman* III: 500 *Peacekeeper*: 50	SS-18 : 180 SS-19 : 160 SS-24 : 46 SS-25 : 370 SS-27 : 20	CSS-4: 15~20 (DF-5) CSS-3/20: 10 (DF-4)	–	–
IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles: 2,500~5,499km) MRBMs (mid-range ballistic missiles: 800~2,499km)	Total	0	0	46	0	0
	Type/ Quantity	–	–	CSS-2 : 38 (DF-3) CSS-5 : 8 (DF-2)	–	–
SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles)	Total	432	412	12	48	?
	Type/ Quantity	*Trident* C-4: 192 *Trident* D-5: 240 (including 18 SSBNs)	SSN-8 : 60 SSN-18 : 160 SSN-20 : 80 SSN-23 : 112	CSS-N-3 : 12	Trident D-5: 48 (including 3 SSBNs)	M-51 : ? M-45 : ? (including ? SSBNs)
Strategic bombers	Total	178	74	–	–	–
	Type/ Quantity	B-2A : 17 B-1B : 91 B-52H : 70	TU-95 : 68 TU-160 : 6	–	–	–

※ Source: *The Military Balance 1999-2000*

Appendix 3

Military Capabilities of Neighboring States

■ Total

Classification	US	Russia	China	Japan
Total troops	1,371,500	1,004,000	App. 2,480,000	236,300
Reserves	1,303,300	App. 20,000,000	1,200,000+	49,900

■ Army

Classification	US(Reserves)	Russia	China(Reserves)	Japan
Troops	469,300 (783,900)	348,000	1,830,000 (1,000,000)	145,900
Divisions	10(8)	37	80	12
Tanks	7,684	15,500	9,300	1,080
Light tanks	6,715	200	1,200	-
Reconnaissance tanks	113	2,000	-	90
Armored vehicles	17,800	26,300	5,500	840
Towed artillery	1,593	2,075	14,500	460
Self-propelled artillery	2,555	2,636	Various	310
MRLS	857	900	〃	110
Mortars	879	254	〃	1,250
Anti-tank guided weapons	TOWs: 8,457 Dragon: 24,400 Javelin: 500	Various types of AT but quantity unknown	Various types but quantity unknown	680
Ground-to-air missiles	1,737	2,300	11	710
Helicopters	4,923	2,300	143	453
Aircraft	249	-	-	10

■ Navy

Classification	US(Reserves)	Russia	China	Japan
Troops	369,800 (23,480)	171,500	230,000	43,800
Submarines (Strategic)	84(18)	70(21)	71(1)	16
Aircraft carriers	12	1	-	-
Cruisers	27	7	-	-
Destroyers	54	17	18	9
Frigates	37	10	35	46
Corvettes	21	112	676	3
Minesweepers	26	72	119	34
Landing vessels	42	25	70	6
Landing craft	202	?	140	-
Support vessels	92	436	160	29
Cargo vessels	24	-	39	10
Strategic transportation	86	2,800 commercial vessels	?	-
Reserve transportation	142	-	-	-
Fighters	1,510	114	435	90(P-3C)
Helicopters	506	362	176	100
Marine divisions	3	1	2 (brigade)	-

■ Air Force

Classification	US(Reserves)	Russia	China	Japan
Troops	361,400 (176,500)	210,000	470,000	45,600
Long-range bombers	208	232	320(bombers)	-
Reconnaissance aircraft	259	135	290	26
Command aircraft	40	-	-	-
Fighters	2,598	1,455	3,000	363
Transport aircraft	1,051	App. 280	425	43
Tankers	606	20	?	-
Training aircraft	1,217	1,000	200	170
Helicopters	216	-	210	-
Civilian reserve aircraft	630	1,500	?	-

※ Source: *The Military Balance* 1998—1999

Appendix 4

Comparison of Economic Indices Between South and North Korea

Classification	South Korea		North Korea		Comparison of South Korea over North Korea	
	1998	1999	1998	1999	1998	1999
GNP ($ billions)	313	402.1	12.6	15.8	24.9 times	25.5 times
GNP per capita ($)	6,742	8,581	573	714	11.8 times	12 times
Economic growth rate (%) by GNI	-6.7	10.7	-1.1	6.2	-	-
Total trade volume ($ billions)	225.59	263.44	1.44	1.48	156.7 times	178 times
Total amount of foreign debt ($ billions)	149.35	136.45	12.1	12.3	12.3 times	11.1 times
Total population (millions)	46.43	46.86	21.94	22.08	2.1 times	2.1 times

※ GNI(Gross National Income): International Organizations such as the UN,IMF and main advanced nations are using GNI instead of GNP.

Appendix 5

North Korean Military Expenditures by FY

( ) : Military expenditures officially announced by North Korea (unit: $ billions)

Year	GNP (as announced by South Korea's Bank of Korea)	Total Budget (as announced by North Korea)	Military Expenditure	Ratio (%) of GNP to Military Expenditure	Ratio (%) of Total Budget to Military Expenditure	Exchange Rate (1 US dollar to North Korean won)
1991	22.9	17.17	5.13(2.08)	22.4	29.9(12.1)	2.15
1992	21.1	18.45	5.54(2.10)	26.3	30(11.4)	2.13
1993	20.5	18.72	5.62(2.15)	27.2	30(11.4)	2.15
1994	21.2	19.19	5.76(2.19)	27.2	30(11.5)	2.16
1995	22.3	20.82	6.3	27	30	2.05
1996	21.4	?	5.78	27	?	2.14
1997	17.7	9.1	4.78	27	52	2.16
1998	12.6	9.1	4.78(1.33)	37.9	52(14.6)	2.20
1999	15.8	9.23	4.78(1.35)	30	51(14.6)	2.17
2000	?	9.36	4.5~5.0(1.36)	?	48~53(14.5)	2.18

※ The scale of military expenses from 1995 to 1997 averaged 27% of GNP, and the 1998 expenditure temporarily rose to 52% of the total budget.

Appendix 6

Comparison of South and North Korean Military Capabilities

As of Dec. 31,1999

Classification				South Korea		North Korea	
Troops			Army	560,000	690,000	1,000,000	1,170,000
			Navy[1]	67,000		60,000	
			Air Force	63,000		110,000	
Principal force capabilities	Army	Unit	Corps	11		20	
			Divisions	49[2]		67[3]	
			Brigades[4]	19		78 (Excluding about 30 Artillery Brigades)	
		Equipment	Tanks	2,360		3,800	
			Armored vehicles	2,400		2,300	
			Field artillery[5]	5,180		12,500	
			Helicopters	600		-	
	Navy	Surface combatants		160		430	
		Support vessels		20		470[6]	
		Submarines/submersibles		10		90[7]	
		Aircraft		70		-	
	Air Force	Fighters		540		870	
		Special aircraft		40			
		Support aircraft		230		840[8]	
Reserve troops				3,040,000[9]		7,480,000[10]	

※ 1) Marine Corps included
2) Marine Corps divisions included
3) One missile division included
4) Mobile and combat brigades such as light infantry, mechanized infantry, tank, special warfare, patrol, marine, and assault, etc.
*Combat support / combat service support brigades excluded
5) Field artillery includes rockets, guided weapons and MRLS.
6) Approximately 170 surface patrol boats of the Surface Patrol Boat Forces included
7) Some 40 Sang-0-class submersibles included
8) All North Korean aircraft(helicopters) operated by its air force
9) Eighth-year reservists included
10) The Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker/Peasant Red Guards, Red Youth Guards and social security agents included

Appendix 7

North Korea's Missile Development and Specifications

■ Chronology of North Korea's Missile Development and Production

Date	Development and Production Activities
Early 70s	• Involved in China's development of missiles, and acquired missile technology(estimation)
1976~1981	• Introduction of USSR-made Scud-Bs and launchers from Egypt
1984	• First test-firing of improved Scud-B
1986	• Test firing of Scud-C
1988	• Operational deployment of improved Scud-B/C
1989	• Assumed to have started the development of Rodong missiles • First identification of Rodong missile
1993	• First test-firing of Rodong-1
1994	• First identification of the Taepodong-1
1998	• Operational deployment of Rodong missiles
1998. 8	• Test-firing of the Taepodong-1 (North Korea asserts of having launched satellites)

■ Specifications of North Korea's Missiles

Classification	Scud-B	Scud-C	Rodong-1	Taepodong-1	Taepodong-2
Range (km)	300	500	1,300	2,500	Development estimated
Warhead weight (kg)	1,000	770	1,000	1,000 (estimated)	
Remarks	Operational deployment	Operational deployment	Operational deployment	Test-firing	

Appendix 8

Combined and Joint Training Exercises

1. ROK-US Combined Exercises

Name	Type	Purpose	Contents
Ulchi-Focus Lense (UFL)	Consolidated command post	Exercise Chungmu Plan and OPLAN 5027	• Wartime watchover procedures • Deployment of US reinforcement forces • Execution of procedures in OPLAN 5027 • Combined procedures of crisis management
RSOI	Command post	Master procedures of the US reinforcement plan as well as ROK force support, mobilization, logistical supports, role of rear area coordinator, force restoration procedures	• Movement management of US reinforcements and exercise of the procedures of forces deployment • Wartime host nation support (WHNS) • Protection of airport and port of debarkation and exercise of controlling combined vessels • Exercise of procedures of ROK vessels mobilization • Combat power demobilization
Foal Eagle	Field maneuver	Combined special operations, combined operational capability in the rear area, and combined and joint air/ground/navy operational capability improvement	• Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force's execution of OPLAN 5027 • The Second ROK Army rear area and integrated defense operations training • Corps level FTX and combined/ joint amphibious operations
Team Spirit	Field maneuver	Improvement of ROK-US combined and joint operation capability • Discontinued since 1994	• Theater-level combined and joint training • Air assault, river-crossing, division-level exercises • Aircraft carrier training, emergency runway exercises

2. Joint Exercises and Training (ROK Forces)

Name	Type	Purpose	Contents
JCS Command Post Exercise	Command post exercise	Improvement of operational command capabilities of the ROK JCS	• Mastery of armistice operational command and staff activities • Mastery of war deterrence and transformation procedures for crisis management • Improvement of integrated defensive operation capabilities
Hokuk Training	Field maneuver exercise	Improvement of the joint operation capabilities and establishment of military readiness	• Improvement of counter infiltration operation capabilities • Joint air-ground-maritime training • Review of new operations plan and preparedness for NBC warfare • Establishment of realistic combat support system

3. Major Training of Neighboring States

Name	Type	Participants	Contents
RIMPAC	Even year (May-July)	ROK, US, Japan, Canada, UK, Australia, and Chile	• Offensive/defensive exercises at sea, protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) • Naval blockade and air attack • Naval gunfire training
ROK-JAPAN Search and Rescue training	Odd year (August-September)	ROK, Japan	• Search and rescue training for stranded vessels and aircrafts of ROK/Japan.
Pacific Reach	First held in 2000 (October 1-14)	ROK, US, Australia, Japan, Singapore.	• Submarine evacuation and rescue training in the west pacific region.

Appendix 9

Korean Armistice Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING A MILITARY ARMISTICE IN KOREA

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Article I Military Demarcation Line and Demilitarized Zone

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil skipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone .

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless

specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.

Article II Concrete Arrangements for Cease-Fire and Armistice

A. General

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63. hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all

of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all such hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it seems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between Hwanghae-do and Kyonggi-do shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the island groups of Paengyong-do (37° 58′ N, 124° 40′ E), Taechong-do (37° 50′ N, 124° 42′ E), Sochong-do (37° 46′ N, 124° 46′ E), Yonpyong-do (37° 38′ N, 125° 40′ E) and Woo-do (37° 36′ N, 125° 58′ E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units of personnel by other units of personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis: provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of the side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include place of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry eumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statement regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall conduct supervision and inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective parts of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their functions, including privileges,

treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters continuous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters continuous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. Military Armistice Commission

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of generals or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing recordkeeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat, a Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of

both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of Panmunjom (37° 57′ 29″ N, 126° 0′ 00″E). The Military Armistice Commission may re-locate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the activities of the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to

dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dispatched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched any one time by the senior of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall be reported to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior member of either side; provided that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Commander-in-Chief,

United Nations Command, namely, Sweden and Switzerland, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The term neutral nations as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants, who may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary recordkeeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.

2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be carrying out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Sub-paragraphs 13. c. and 13. d. and Paragraph 28. hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall :

a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission,

b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13. c. and 13. d. of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28. hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, anti-ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristic of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.

d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43. hereof located in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.

f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either side on the Commission .

g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspections Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command		Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers	
INCHON	(37° 28′ N, 126° 38′ E)	SINUIJU	(40° 06′ N, 124° 24′ E)
TAEGU	(35° 52′ N, 128° 36′ E)	CHONGJIN	(41° 46′ N, 129° 49′ E)
PUSAN	(35° 06′ N, 129° 02′ E)	HUNGNAM	(39° 50′ N, 127° 37′ E)
KANGNUNG	(37° 45′ N, 128° 54′ E)	MANPO	(41° 09′ N, 126° 18′ E)
KUNSAN	(35° 59′ N, 126° 43′ E)	SINANJU	(39° 36′ N, 125° 36′ E)

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within

the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map.

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which they were received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side .

49. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission

Article III Arrangement Relating to Prisoners of War

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody to each side at the time

this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English "송환" (Songhwan) in Korean, and "還返" (Chien Fan) in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated in accordance with the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement .

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route .

54. The repatriation of all of the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51. a. hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. Panmunjom is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57. hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of

war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53. and 54. hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; to arrange for security at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war; and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51 a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by performing such humanitarian services which are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and receiving prisoners of war by both sides at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of both sides to comfort the prisoners of war, and to bring in and distribute gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while on route from prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

b. The joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below :

1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely, ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordinated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China shall serve as chairman of this team.

3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely, thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side, to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman of this team.

4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team with an equal number of representatives from

each side, may be formed as circumstances require.

5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters, and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to team operating in the territory under his military control.

6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both sides on any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic, administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross team shall be dissolved upon completion of the program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51. a. hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information concerning prisoners of war :

1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped since the effective date of the data last exchanged.

2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality, rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial, of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War, the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph 58. a. hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoners of war who return to the custody of the detaining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commission for disposition.

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military Demarcation Line; and all civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People' s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance of all such civilians who desire to return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so, and civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory tinder the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59. a. hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Sub-paragraph 59. b. hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. 1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and directions of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing point and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.

Article IV Recommendation to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Article V Miscellaneous

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Article and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 22:00 hours on 27 July, 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 10:00 hours on the 27th day of July, 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

MARK W. CLARK
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command

PENG THE-HUAI
Commander
Chinese People's Volunteers

KIM IL SUNG
Marshal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander; Korean People's Army

PRESENT

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

Appendix 10

Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North

To enter into force as of February 19, 1992

The South and the North,
In keeping with the yearning of the entire Korean people for the peaceful unification of the divided land;
Reaffirming the three principles of unification set forth in the July 4 (1972) South-North Joint Communique;
Determined to remove the state of political and military confrontation and achieve national reconciliation;
Also determined to avoid armed aggression and hostilities, reduce tension and ensure peace;
Expressing the desire to realize multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation to advance common national interests and prosperity;
Recognizing that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification;
Pledging to exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification;
Hereby have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION

Article 1 The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's system.

Article 2 The two sides shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Article 3 The two sides shall not slander or vilify each other.

Article 4 The two sides shall not attempt any actions of sabotage or overthrow against each other.

Article 5 The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such a state of peace has been realized.

Article 6 The two sides shall cease to compete or confront each other and shall cooperate and endeavor together to promote national prestige and interests in the international arena.

Article 7 To ensure close consultations and liaison between the two sides, South-North Liaison Offices shall be established at Panmunjom within three (3) months after the coming into force of this Agreement.

Article 8 A South-North Political Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North reconciliation.

CHAPTER II SOUTH-NORTH NONAGGRESSION

Article 9 The two sides shall not use force against each other and shall not undertake armed aggression against each other.

Article 10 Differences of views and disputes arising between the two sides shall be resolved peacefully through

dialogue and negotiation.

Article 11 The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.

Article 12 To implement and guarantee nonaggression, the two sides shall set up a South-North Joint Military Commission within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement. In the said Commission, the two sides shall discuss and carry out steps to build military confidence and realize arms reduction, including the mutual notification and control of major movements of military units and major military exercises, the peaceful utilization of the Demilitarized Zone, exchanges of military personnel and information, phased reductions in armaments including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack capabilities, and verifications thereof.

Article 13 A telephone hotline shall be installed between the military authorities of the two sides to prevent accidental armed clashes and their escalation.

Article 14 A South-North Military Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on nonaggression and to remove military confrontation.

CHAPTER III SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION

Article 15 To promote an integrated and balanced development of the national economy and the welfare of the entire people, the two sides shall engage in economic exchanges and cooperation, including the joint development of resources, the trade of goods as domestic commerce and joint ventures.

Article 16 The two sides shall carry out exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science and technology, education, literature and the arts, health, sports, environment, and publishing and journalism including newspapers, radio and television broadcasts and publications.

Article 17 The two sides shall promote free intro-Korean travel and contacts for the residents of their respective areas.

Article 18 The two sides shall permit free correspondence, meetings and visits between dispersed family members and other relatives and shall promote the voluntary reunion of divided families and shall take measures to resolve other humanitarian issues.

Article 19 The two sides shall reconnect railroads and roads that have been cut off and shall open South-North sea and air transport routes.

Article 20 The two sides shall establish and link facilities needed for South-North postal and telecommunications services and shall guarantee the confidentiality of intro-Korean mail and telecommunications.

Article 21 The two sides shall cooperate in the economic, cultural and various other fields in the international arena and carry out joint undertakings abroad.

Article 22 To implement accords on exchanges and cooperation in the economic, cultural and various other fields, the two sides shall establish joint commissions for specific sectors, including a Joint South-North Economic Exchanges and Cooperation Commission, within three (3) months of the coming into force of this Agreement.

Article 23 A South-North Exchanges and Cooperation Committee shall be established within the framework of the South-North High-Level Talks within one (1) month of the coming into force of this Agreement with a view to discussing concrete measures to ensure the implementation and observance of the accords on South-North exchanges and cooperation.

CHAPTER IV AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 24 This Agreement may be amended or supplemented by concurrence between the two sides.

Article 25 This Agreement shall enter into force as of the day the two sides exchange appropriate instruments following the completion of their respective procedures for bringing it into effect.

Signed on December 13, 1991

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea
Chief delegate of the South
Delegation to the High-Level Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier of the Administration Council of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Head of the North
Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks

Appendix 11

Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North

To enter into force as of September 17, 1992

The South and the North,
As a result of concrete negotiations to ensure compliance with and implementation of Chapter I, Reconciliation, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S SYSTEMS

Article 1 The South and the North shall recognize and respect each other's political, economic, social and cultural systems.

Article2 The South and the North shall guarantee the freedom to disseminate information about the truth of the other's political, economic, social and cultural systems and institutions.

Article3 The South and the North shall recognize and respect the authority and competence of the other's authorities.

Article4 The South and the North shall have a working-level legal group discussion and resolve issues of revising or scrapping legal and institutional devices that infringe on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North.

CHAPTER II NONINTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Article 5 The South and the North shall not interfere in the legal system and policies of the other side.

Article 6 The South and the North shall not interfere in the external relations of the other side.

Article 7 The South and the North may request the other side to redress any matter that infringes on the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation.

CHAPTER III CESSATION OF VILIFICATION AND SLANDER

Article 8 The South and the North shall not slander or vilify the other side through the news media, leaflets or other means.

Article 9 The South and the North shall not revile specific persons of the other side.

Article 10 The South and the North shall not vilify and slander the authorities of the other side.

Article 11 The South and the North shall not distort facts about the other side nor fabricate and disseminate false facts.

Article 12 The South and the North shall not regard as slander or vilification objective and factual media coverage of the other side.

Article 13 The South and the North shall not vilify or slander the other side within the Demilitarized Zone

through broadcasts, billboards or any other means.

Article 14 The South and the North shall not vilify or slander the other side at mass meetings or events.

CHAPTER IV PROHIBITION AGAINST SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSION

Article 15 The South and the North shall not attempt any acts of sabotage or subversion against the other in any form, direct or indirect, violent or nonviolent, including acts of terror, abduction, recruitment, murder or injury.

Article 16 The South and the North shall not resort to propaganda or agitation aimed at sabotaging or subverting the other side.

Article 17 The South and the North shall not organize, support or protect any terrorist organization in its own area, the area of the other side, or overseas, intended to sabotage or subvert the political or legal system of the other side.

CHAPTER V
TRANSFORMATION OF STATE OF ARMISTICE INTO STATE OF PEACE

Article 18 The South and the North, in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North, shall sincerely comply with and implement the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, and the Joint declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Article 19 The South and the North shall adopt appropriate measures in order to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North.

Article 20 The South and the North shall sincerely abide by the Military Armistice Agreement until a solid state of peace has been established between the South and the North.

CHAPTER VI COOPERATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Article 21 The South and the North shall not vilify and slander each other in the international arena, including at international meetings, and shall closely cooperate with each other in order to maintain the dignity of the Korean people.

Article 22 The South and the North shall consult with each other on matters effecting national interests and take the necessary joint measures.

Article 23 The South and the North, in order to promote the common interests of the Korean people, shall maintain close contacts between their diplomatic missions overseas in areas where both sides have diplomatic missions.

Article 24 The South and the North shall champion and protect the ethnic rights of overseas Koreans and shall endeavor to promote reconciliation and unity among them.

CHAPTER VII IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS

Article 25 The South and the North, to implement Chapter I, South-North Reconciliation of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperationbetween the South and the North, shall organize and operate the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission. An agreement to establish the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall be separately adopted.

Article 26 The South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission shall have a working-level legal group and a working-level group for cessation of slander and vilification. It may form additional working-level groups with concurrence of both sides. Accords concerning organization and operation of the working-level groups shall be adopted by the South-North Joint Reconciliation Commission.

CHAPTER VIII AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 27 This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 28 This Protocol shall enter into force the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The following provisions proposed by the North but not included in this Protocol shall be further discussed in the South-North Political Committee:

1) The North and the South shall endeavor to affiliate with international organizations under a single name for a single seat;
2) The North and the South shall endeavor to participate in political events including international meetings as a single delegation representing the entire Korean people;
3) The North and the South shall not side with nor cooperate with attempts by a third country in the international arena to undermine the interest of the other side; and
4) The North and the South shall have the working-level legal group discussion and resolve the issue of revising or abolishing treaties or agreements signed by either side with other countries which run counter to the unity and interests of the Korean people.

September 17, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea
Chief delegate of the South
Delegation to the High-Level Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier of the Administration Council of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Head of the North
Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks

Appendix 12

Protocol on the Compliance with and Implementation of Chapter II, Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North

To enter into force as of September 17, 1992

The South and the North,
As a result of concrete negotiations to resolve military confrontation as well as to comply with and implement Chapter II, Nonaggression, of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North, have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I NONUSE OF MILITARY POWER

Article 1 The South and the North shall prohibit the use of military power, including shooting, bombarding, bombing and other forms of attack and destruction, against the people, property, vehicles and civil and military ships and airplanes on the other side of its jurisdiction including the Demilitarized Zone. Neither side shall resort to armed provocation that inflicts damage to the other side.

Article 2 The South and the North shall not infiltrate into or attack by military force the administrative region of the other side or even temporarily occupy part or whole of the area of the other side. Under no circumstances shall the South and the North infiltrate a regular or irregular force into the administrative region of the other side with any means or method whatsoever.

Article 3 The South and the North shall not engage in hostile acts against citizens from the other side, who are visiting in accordance with an agreement between the two sides, or their belongings or transportation vehicles, nor block their way. In addition, the issues of the nonreinforcement of military power along the Demilitarized Zone, suspension of scouting activities against the other side, and nonblocking of territorial waters and air space of the other side (all proposed by the North), and the issue of guaranteeing the security of Seoul and Pyongyang (proposed by Seoul) shall continue to be discussed in the South-North Joint Military Commission.

CHAPTER II
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL ARMED CLASHES

Article 4 The South and the North upon detection of any sign of deliberate armed aggression from the other side, shall immediately notify the other side and demand clarification and shall adopt necessary measures so as to prevent it from escalating into an armed clash. The South and the North, upon the discovery of any unintentional armed clash or aggression due to misunderstanding, misperception, mistake or unavoidable accident, shall immediately notify the other side in accordance with the signals agreed to by both sides, and shall adopt precautionary measures to prevent such incidents.

Article 5 When an armed group, an individual, a vehicle, a civil or military ship or airplane has violated the administrative region of the other side due to natural calamity, navigational error or other unavoidable cause, the trespassing side shall immediately notify the other side of the incident along with the fact that it has no aggressive intent and shall abide by instructions of the other side. The other side shall immediately confirm the incident, guarantee the safety of the persons and equipment concerned and take measures to repatriate them. Repatriation shall be completed within a month in principle but may be further delayed.

Article 6 In the event of an outbreak of a dispute such as accidental aggression or armed clash between the South and the North, the military authorities of both sides shall immediately have the hostile acts of

the armed group of its own side stopped and shall immediately notify the military authorities of the other side through the military hotline or other available means of communications.

Article 7 The South and the North shall discuss and resolve all military disputes and confrontation through a mechanism agreed to by the military authorities of both sides.

Article 8 The South and the North, whenever either side has violated this Protocol on the compliance with and implementation of the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement, shall conduct a joint investigation to determine the cause of and responsibility for the violation and shall adopt measures to prevent the recurrence of such an incident.

CHAPTER III
DEMARCATION LINE AND AREAS OF NONAGGRESSION

Article 9 The South-North demarcation line and areas for nonaggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice Agreement and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.

Article 10 The South-North, sea nonaggression demarcation line shall continue to be discussed. Until the sea nonaggression demarcation line has been finalized, the sea nonaggression zones shall be identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time.

Article 11 The air nonaggression demarcation line and zone shall be the skies over the land and sea demarcation lines.

CHAPTER IV
ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF MILITARY HOTLINES

Article 12 The South and the North in order to prevent the outbreak or an escalation of any armed clash, shall establish and operate direct military hotlines between the Minister of National Defense in the South and the Minister of the Peoples Armed Forces in the North.

Article 13 The direct military hotlines shall use means of communication agreed to by both sides to send the texts of messages over telex, facsimile or telephone. If necessary, the military authorities of both sides may directly converse with each other over the telephone.

Article 14 Technical and practical matters concerning the establishment and operation of the hotlines shall be discussed and resolved by a working-level communications group, composed of five members from each side, as soon as possible following the coming into force of the Protocol.

Article 15 The South and the North shall open the military hotlines within 50 days of the effectuation of the Protocol.

CHAPTER V
MECHANISMS FOR CONSULTATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Article 16 The South-North Joint Military Commission shall carry out its duties and functions as provided in Article 12 of the Basic Agreement and Article 2 of the Agreement to Establish a South-North Joint Military Commission.

Article 17 The South-North Joint Military Commission shall discuss and adopt concrete measures on issues both sides recognize need to be resolved to effectively comply with and implement the nonaggression chapter of the Basic Agreement and remove the military confrontation between the South and the North.

CHAPTER VI
AMENDMENTS AND EFFECTUATION

Article 18 This Protocol may be amended or supplemented by agreement between the two sides.

Article 19 This Protocol shall enter in force on the day it is signed and exchanged by the two sides

September 17, 1992

Chung Won-shik
Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea
Chief delegate of the South
Delegation to the High-Level Talks

Yon Hyong-muk
Premier of the Administration Council of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Head of the North
Delegation for the South-North High-Level Talks

Appendix 13

SOUTH-NORTH JOINT DECLARATION

In accordance with the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation, President Kim Dae-jung of the Republic of Korea and National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held a historic meeting and summit talks in Pyongyang from June 13 to June 15, 2000.

The leaders of the South and the North, recognizing that the meeting and the summit talks, the first since the division of the country, were of great significance in promoting mutual understanding, developing South-North relations and realizing peaceful reunification, declared as follows:

1. The South and the North have agreed to resolve the question of reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the Korean people, who are the masters of the country.

2. Acknowledging that there is a common element in the South's proposal for a confederation and the North's proposal for a loose form of federation as the formulae for achieving reunification, the South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.

3. The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation Day and the question of unconverted long-term prisoners who have been given long prison sentences in the South.

4. The South and the North have agreed to consolidate mutual trust by promoting balanced development of the national economy through economic cooperation and by stimulating cooperation and exchanges in social, cultural, sports, public health, environmental and all other fields.

5. The South and the North have agreed to hold a dialogue between relevant authorities in the near future to implement the above agreement expeditiously.

   President Kim Dae-jong cordially invited National Defense Committee Chairman Kim Jong-il to visit Seoul, and Chairman Kim Jong-il decided to visit Seoul at an appropriate time.

June 15, 2000

Kim Dae-jung
President,
Republic of Korea

Kim Jong-il
Chairman, National Defense Committee
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Appendix 14

The Joint Press Release from the First Round of the Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Talks between the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea and the Minister of the People's Armed Forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were held on Cheju Island in the South on September 25~26 to provide a military assurance for the implementation of the June 15 South-North joint declaration adopted during the historic inter- Korean summit.

A delegation of five headed by the Minister of Defense Cho Seong-Tae of the Republic of Korea represented the South while a delegation of five headed by the Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Il-chol of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represented the North in the talks.

In the talks, the two sides held the same view that since the adoption of the joint declaration various projects are being pursued for its execution and that appropriate military measures are necessary. On such basis, the two sides agreed as follows:

1. Both sides shall do their utmost to implement the joint declaration made by the heads of the South and the North and actively cooperate with each other to remove military obstacles in assuring travel, exchange and cooperation between civilians.

2. Both sides shared the same view that to reduce military tension on the Korean peninsula and to remove the threat of war by establishing a durable and stable peace is a matter of vital importance and agreed that they shall work together toward this goal.

3. Both sides shall allow the entry of personnel, vehicles and equipment into their respective section of the Demilitarized Zone with respect to the construction of a railway and a road that connects the South and the North, which is a pending issue between the South and the North, and guarantee their safety. The working-level officials from both sides shall meet in early October to discuss the details related to this.

4. The two sides will handle the problem of opening the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone in the areas around the railroad and the road that connect the South and the North on the basis of the Armistice Agreement.

5. Both sides agreed to hold the second round of the talks at a location in the North in mid November.

September 26, 2000

Cho Seong-Tae
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Kim Il-chol
Minister of People's Armed Forces
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Appendix 15

Chronology of Major Events Related to North Korean Nuclear Issues

Date	Contents
Jan. 1962	• North Korea builds IRT-2000 type research reactor: construction started by support from the Soviet Union
Sep. 1974	• North Korea joins the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Sep. 1977	• North Korea concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA on the research reactor
July 1980	• North Korea starts building the 1st atomic reactor with 30MW heat output
Dec. 1985	• Soviet Union concludes a technological cooperation agreement with North Korea to support the nuclear power plant (400MW × 4)
Dec. 12	• North Korea joins the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Dec. 1986	• North Korea State Administration Council newly establishes atomic energy department
Feb. 1987	• North Korea operates a test run on the 2nd atomic reactor
June 5	• IAEA Executive Board forwards the safeguards agreement to North Korea based on INFCIRC-153
Mar. 6, 1990	• IAEA Executive Board advises comprehensive safeguards agreement to North Korea
Nov.16	• North Korean ambassador to UN proposes the simultaneous nuclear facilities inspection of USFK andNorth Korea for allowing IAEA inspection
June 28, 1991	• President Roh Tae Woo expresses the possibility of Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula under the assumption that north-east Asia will be denuclearized
Nov. 8	• President Roh Tae Woo declares 5 principles for denuclearization: "Korea will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons," and that "they shall not possess reprocessing and enrichment facilities"
Dec. 31	• Signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsular · Manufacturing and the use of nuclear weapons will be prohibited · Nuclear energy will be used for maintaining peace · Nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities shall not be possessed · Organizes a procedure for inter-Korean inspection · Organizes North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) within a month · Declaration will be made effective when the text is changed
Jan. 30, 1992	• North Korea signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA
Mar. 14	• Organizes the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC)
April 9	• North Korea ratifies the IAEA safeguards agreement
May 4	• North Korea submits the initial report to the IAEA. North Korea reports the 7 facilities and the possession of 90g of reprocessed plutonium
May 23~June 5	• IAEA undergoes an inspection to verify the accuracy and completeness of the initial report submitted by North Korea
Dec. 12	• IAEA informally demands North Korea the access of the 2 areas suspected of nuclear waste storage. North Korea allows the inspection of only 1 area
Feb. 10, 1993	• Hans Blix, the secretary-general of the IAEA, urged a special inspection of the 2 undeclared facilities in North Korea
Mar. 12	• North Korea announces withdrawal from the NPT

Date	Contents
May 11, 1993	• UN Security Council passes a resolution urging North Korea to (1) accept the IAEA inspection and (2) suspend it's withdrawal from the NPT
June 2~June 11	• US holds the first top-level talks with North Korea in New York • North Korea agrees to the comprehensive and unbiased safeguard measures by the IAEA
July 14~July 19	• US and North Korea hold a second round top-level talks in Geneva, Switzerland • Discusses the reduction of graphite-moderated reactors and substitution of the related facilities with LWR
November	• North Korea proposes a packaged management of nuclear problems to the US
May 1994	• North Korea disobeys the safeguards agreement and unloads fuel from its 5MW nuclear reactor
June 13	• North Korea submits a withdrawal agreement to the IAEA
June15~June18	• Former US president Carter visits North Korea • North Korea proposes reopening of the US-North Korea top-level talks for freezing its nuclear program
July 8~July 10	• The third US-North Korea top-level talks were held in Geneva, and the issues of North Korea's its nuclear program freeze were discussed
Oct. 21	• US and North Korea sign an Agreed Framework in Geneva · Replace the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project (supply two 1000MW level LWR) · Deliver 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually · Improve US-North Korean relations · Achieve denuclearization of the Korean peninsular and reopen inter-Korean talks · North Korea's obligation for denuclearization
Nov. 1	• North Korea agrees to freeze its existing nuclear program
Jan.18 ~ Jan. 23, 1995	• US and North Korea hold a conference to remove fuel rods from the 5MW reactor
Mar. 9	• Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agreement signed in New York · Executive Board Members: ROK, US , Japan, and EU (4 countries) · Non-Executive Board Members: Finland, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Argentina and Indonesia (7 countries)
June 20	• US technology team arrives in North Korea to remove fuel rods from North Korea's 5MW reactor (8000 fuel rods were found)
Dec. 15	• KEDO and North Korea sign the Light Water Reactor (LWR) Supply Agreement · 18 full text reorganized / 4 sub-departments
April 27, 1996	• US NAC International starts canning fuel rods of 5MW atomic reactor

Date	Contents
July 11	• The Protocols on Exemption of Privileges, Transportation, and Communication are signed between KEDO and North Korea.
Sep. 18	• Incursion of a North Korean submarine onto the east coast of South Korea
June 24, 1997	• KEDO and North Korea sign the protocol concerning actions in the event of nonpayment with respect to financial obligations regarding the LWR
July 28	• Opening of KEDO office in Kumho area of North Korea
Aug. 10, 1998	• Time Magazine (Aug. 17) suspects underground nuclear facilities in Kumchangri, North Korea
Aug. 31	• North Korea fires a ballistic missile (Taepodong-1)
Sep. 24	• IAEA General Assembly adopts a resolution calling for North Korea's allowing nuclear inspections
Nov. 10, 1998	• The KEDO Executive Board adopts the resolution on cost-sharing for light-water reactors (LWR)
Mar. 16, 1999	• The US and North Korea conclude an agreement on the inspection of underground facilities in Kumchangri
May 3	• Japan signs an agreement on extending loans to KEDO
May 18~May 24	• The US delegation visits the Kumchangri site · State Department Korea Division Deputy Manager Joel Wit and 14 other staff members
May 25 ~ May 28	• US North Korean policy coordinator William Perry pays a visit to the North
July 2	• Conclusion of the South Korea-KEDO agreement to extend loans worth $3.22 billion
Aug. 12	• National Assembly ratifies KEDO agreement to extend loans
Aug. 24	• North Korea demands countermeasures against the delays in building the LWR
Sep. 12	• Agreement is reached between US-North Korea on missile issues
Sep. 15	• William Perry, the special assistant to the President of the US, reports to the US Congress on the policies towards North Korea
Sep. 17	• Bill Clinton, President of the US, announces partial release of the restrictions against North Korea
Sep. 25	• In the keynote address of UN General Assembly, Park Nam Soon, the minister of foreign affairs of North Korea declares that North Korea will not fire missiles during the US-North Korea top-level talks
Sep. 30	• Australia decides to support KEDO, donating 2 million Australian dollars
Oct. 1	• IAEA adopts a resolution calling North Korea's allowing nuclear inspections
Oct. 5	• KEDO annual meeting held in New York
Oct. 7	• US Congress approves $35 million crude oil budget for the year 2000
Oct. 13	• US Senate rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification proposal
Oct. 23	• Radioactivity detected in a Russian train headed for North Korea

Date	Contents
Oct. 28, 1999	• KEDO watches North Korea's heavy oil using ultrasonic flux measuring instrument
Nov. 3	• The US Republican Party's policy report points out the possibility of North Korea's developing Nuclear weapons
Nov. 16	• KEDO completes the donation of 500,000 tons of heavy oil for 1999
Nov. 23 ~ Nov. 24	• A KEDO Executive Board meeting is held to discuss financial plans and issues on concluding contracts
Dec. 15	• KEDO signs a Turn-Key Project (TKC) with the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) · Estimates the completion dates as the year 2007 for the first, and 2008 for the second
Dec. 28	• KEPCO's domestic enterprises conclude an agreement with KEDO
Jan. 22, 2000	• US and North Korea hold the Berlin conference, agreeing to hold the Washington top-level talks (Jan. 28)
Jan. 28	• KEDO and International Cooperation Bank of Japan agree to loan funds for the construction of LWR
Feb. 2	• North Korea warns the possibility of annulment of the Geneva Agreement due to the delay in building the LWR
Feb. 3	• Construction of the LWR is commenced
Mar. 7	• US and North Korea hold a preliminary top-level talks in New York · North Korea demands its exclusion from the terrorist countries and to improve relations with US · US persuades North Korea to abandon the development of missiles, and to continue the Geneva Agreement
April 1 ~ April 4	• KEDO and North Korea negotiate the training protocol (3rd) · Agreement was reached, but signatures still needed
May 25 ~ May 27	• US undergoes the 2nd inspection of the Kumchangri area in North Korea
July 3 ~ July 4	• KEDO and North Korea negotiate the quality guaranteeing protocol (4th)
July 30	• KEDO and EU deliberate over additional contribution issues

Appendix 16

Major International Arms Control Treaty/Organization

1. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Main Contents	• Promoting peaceful use of nuclear power • Prohibiting the acquisition, transfer and assistance of nuclear weapons technology and nuclear materials • Concluding a safeguard measure agreement with the IAEA is obligatory, when joining the NPT
Status of Progress	• In 1958, Ireland submitted an informal petition to the UN General Assembly on the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons • In 1966, the UN agreed to a resolution allowing the 18 ENDC countries to set the treaty principles • In 1970, effectuated by US, Russia, and UK
Status of Affiliation	• 187 countries (as of September 2000) ※ Major non-participant countries: Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba, etc • In 1975, South Korea joined, and in 1985, North Korea joined (In March 1993, announced to secede, and in June 1993, withheld to secede)
Current Situation	• In May 1995, the NPT Review and Extension Conference was held, deciding on an indefinite extension • Reveiw Conference to be held every five years • Advanced countries with nuclear power continue to insist on the enforcement of NPT whereas, developing countries with nuclear power are urging for passive guarantee of security and collaboration with developed nuclear powers for a peaceful utilization
Future Directions	• South Korean government supports the Nuclear nonproliferation regime, and urges North Korea to abide by the IAEA safeguard measures • Promotion of international technology cooperation for a peaceful utilization of nuclear power is not restricted • Non-nuclear states are urging nuclear states to decrease their substantial nuclear stockpile.

2. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Main Contents	• Prohibiting overall nuclear experiments including peaceful nuclear blasts in all areas such as, underground, underwater, atmosphere, universe, etc. • Establishment of an inspection performance system (international inspection organizations, construction of nuclear experimentation monitoring station system, etc.) ※ Effective after 180 days from the date of ratification in five countries that possess nuclear weapons, South and North Korea, India, Pakistan, Israel, and 44 other nations (countries that possess nuclear power plants) (Cf., impropriety within two years of its effectuation)
Status of Progress	• After 1970, the 1st UN committee (field of politics and security) failed to adopt the resolution of CTBT's recommendation over several occasions due to lack of cooperation from the major nuclear power countries such as US • Conclusion of CTBT increasingly required due to the cessation of the cold war, conclusion of START, NPT Extension Conference in 1995, etc. • Introduction and adoption of the resolution on CTBT in the 52nd United Nations General Assembly by a collaborative proposal of 126 countries including South Korea, US, Russia and other countries under the lead of Australia in September 1996

Status of Affiliation	• Since opening membership in September 1996, 155 countries have signed the Treaty by September 2000, including South Korea, US, Japan, China, Russia, etc., (28 countries sanctioned among mandatory ratification of 44 countries), ratification by 55 countries
Current Situation	• Since March 1997, signatories have been attempting to establish CTBTO (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization) with the object of carrying out investigations, education and operation of inspection system • Western group including US is inducing the early signing of the treaty by major non-member countries such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, etc. • Signatories have concluded a mutual agreement on the organization and funds necessary for an interim administrative office, and have finished the composition of the organization chart on practical affairs, and are trying to adopt proper means
Future Directions	• Continuous international efforts to urge India, Pakistan, and North Korea's signing of CTBT is expected • Continuous efforts for South Korean experts to join the organizations of CTBT

3. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Main Contents	• Banning development, production, storage, acquisition, use of biological weapons and launch pads, and conversion and abandonment of stored biological weapons and production facilities for peaceful objectives • Continuous efforts for a peaceful utilization of bacteriology • BWC Review Conference held every five years ※ Problems on implementation of treaty - Lack of plans to supervise its implementation and to impose sanctions on those who violate the treaty - Potential use of biological weapons for attack purposes by permitting the research activities to be used for defense purposes - Absence of an organization responsible for overall administrative and technical operations
Status of Progress	• Adoption of Geneva Protocol in June 1925 - Prohibits the use of suffocative, toxic gases and bacteria for the purpose of war - However, there are no regulations on its development, production and storage • In the 1970s, although Russia and the East European countries insisted on the comprehensive prohibition of biological & chemical weapons, only the provisions for the Biological Weapons Convention was presented due to US and United Kingdom's assertion of dealing with the two matters separately • The BWC negotiations were accelerated due to US's announcement of abandonment of chemical & biological weapons in 1969 and production, storage and use renouncement of its weapons in 1970 • Adoption of biological weapons convention among member nations in December 1971 • Convention effectuated on March 26, 1975
Status of Affiliation	• 141 countries (as of September 2000) joined; South Korea joined in June 1987 and North Korea signed in March 1987 • Most countries have signed except Israel, Syria, Egypt, etc.

Current Situation	• Discussions currently under way on plans to establish an international inspection system (establishment of an inspection organization and detailed procedures for inspection) • Since 1995, special group meetings are being held to discuss BWC inspection provisions in Geneva. - Organization of ROK delegation (composed of personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy) • During the 3rd Evaluation Conference (December 1996), member nations established a mutual agreement to conclude negotiations on a verification protocol until the next Evaluation Conference in 2001
Future Directions	• Actively participated in negotiations for BWC verification protocol, reflected the situation of South Korea - Continuous consideration on the plan to minimize damage on the biological industry • Induce participation of North Korea in BWC verification system - Possibility of eliminating the threat of North Korean biological weapons with North Korea's participation in the verification system

4. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Main Contents	• Prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling, use of chemical weapons • Destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities (within ten years of the effectuation of the Convention) • Subject to international inspection of Convention's implementation • The states directly under the threat of the chemical weapons have rights to be supported and protected internationally
Status of Progress	• CWC was launched as a result of multilateral negotiations from the 1968 Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) • 126 states including ROK signed the CWC in Paris on January 13, 1993 • The convention entered into force on April 29, 1997 ※ The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established to verify and coordinate the States Parties pursuant to the provision of the Convention
Status of Affiliation	• 171 states signed and 139 states ratified the Convention as of September 2000 • ROK signed the Convention in 1997; the DPRK has not yet signed
Current Situation	• At the 3rd session of the Conference of the States Parties in 1998, the ROK was elected as chair of the Conference • The Chemical Analysis Laboratory of ADD was designated as one of 12 OPCW's official laboratories • The Director-General of the OPCW visited Seoul on November 1998 • Four ROK officers are working at the OPCW Headquarters as high ranking officials or international inspectors
Future Directions	• Urging all states including North Korea to join the convention • Promote international cooperation on protection against the threat of chemical weapons

5. Zangger Committee (ZC)

Main Contents	• Function: When exporting nuclear related materials, exports must be made under IAEA security measures within the international exporting control system • Items under export control: nuclear materials, equipment, and facilities ※ Excludes technology and double purposed items
Status of Progress	• In order to comply with NPT Article 3, "the countries directly concerned cannot provide nuclear materials and equipments without the condition of safety measures," this committee was established in August 1974 with the lead of Swiss diplomat, Zangger
Status of Affiliation	• 34 countries (South Korea signed on October 17, 1995/North Korea has not joined)
Evaluation	• Overall peformance is weak due to few limited items and meager export conditions

6. Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG)

Main Contents	• Conditions for exporting nuclear related materials - Application of IAEA comprehensive safeguard measures on exports - Advance agreement with the original supplier country is required when re-transfering(exporting) to a third country - Pledge on physical defense measures and use for peaceful purposes • Items under control - Section 1 : 43 items including nuclear materials/facilities/equipments/technology etc. (including Zangger Committee's limited items) - Section 2 : 69 double usage items (high-tech materials including robots, machine tools, high explosives, etc.)
Status of Progress	• After the nuclear experimentation of India-Pakistan, more and more countries are recognizing the necessity of a stronger control system that can supplement the Zangger Committee. • In January 1978, 7 countries led by the US and the UK announced the London Guideline, which resulted in the establishment of NSG.
Status of Affiliation	• 35 countries including US, England, Russia (South Korea joined October 13, 1995/North Korea has not yet signed).
Current Situation	• Nuclear export control regarding technology transfer is expected on the Third World/developing countries. • Establish a cooperative regime among members and continue monitoring North Korea to reduce nuclear threats on the Korean peninsula.

7. Australia Group (AG)

Main Contents	• Close cooperation among member nations to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons - Consideration of efficiency on measures used by members concerning information exchange and consultations on proliferation of chemical weapons - Adoption of additional measures when necessary • Carries no legal binding force as it is an unofficial conference - Each member nation carries out its own control measures - Control measures depend upon member nations' willingness to stop the proliferation of genocidal weapons
Status of Progress	• Claims of chemical weapons use were raised during the Iran-Iraq War • Consultation on export control of chemical materials was suggested by the Australian Foreign Minister Haydon in April 1985, and the Australia Group was established • After the first meeting in June 1985, meetings were held at the Australian Embassy in Paris two times every year • Export control on 54 items of raw materials used in production of chemical weapons • Agreement on the limitation of moving raw materials used in production of biological weapons, its producing facilities/equipments (December, 1992)
Status of Affiliation	• 30 countries (as of March, 1999) (South Korea joined in October, 1996)
Current Situation	• With the effectuation of CWC, more emphases put on stopping the proliferation of chemical weapons

8. Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

Main Contents	• Export restrictions on strategic materials - Conventional weapons : items such as tanks, armored tanks, artillery, aircrafts, attack helicopters, battleships, missiles, etc. according to "UN Register of Conventional Arms system" (February, 1992) - Dual-use goods and technologies : precise machine tools, super computers, etc. • Restriction criteria - Selecting controlled items by each member nation, decision on the exportation will be made by each individual nation - Obligation to exchange information concerning exports, planning cooperation between member nations and exporting control
Status of Progress	• In November 1996, 17 member nations including COCOM (anti-communist bloc export control system, established in 1949), US, England, France, and others dismantled the previous COCOM and established new strategic material export control system including Russia, East European countries, and communist bloc in order to stop the flow of strategic materials into countries located in troubled spots after the end of the Cold War.
Status of Affiliation	• 33 countries signed as of September 2000 (including South Korea)
Current Situation	• After the launching of the current system, detailed discussions on operational policy are under way • South Korea cooperates through the "Public Notice on Export/Import of Strategic Materials" (Issued 1993, Revised May 1995)

9. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Main Contents	• International convention to limit/prohibit the use of certain conventional weapons which may result in indiscriminatory killings. Composed of four protocols. · 1st protocol : prohibit fragmentation weapons undetectable by X-Ray · 2nd protocol : prohibit mines and booby-traps · 3rd protocol : prohibit flame weapons · 4th protocol : prohibit laser weapons that cause blindness • Major context of the revised 2nd attached protocol (mine) (May 3, 1996) · In principle, prohibit the use of undetectable anti-personnel mines · Only allow its use with measures to protect civilians with detectable materials (more than 8 grams of metal) · Deferring the attachment of detectable materials possible for nine years · Remote delivery (over 500m) anti-personnel mines to be equipped with self-destruction and self-neutralizing functions · Permitting the transfer of technology among member nations and prohibiting the transfer of mines/technology among non-member nations
Status of Affiliation	• 79 countries signed as of September 2000 (US, China, Russia, Japan, and others joined; North Korea has not joined; South Korea is in the process of attempting for accession)
Current Situation	• It is not an option but a basic obligation to become a member of CCW (as a mutually compensating measures to persuade non-members to at least join), including the context of urging CCW non-member nation's signing on the draft of Ottawa convention

Appendix 17

Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America

Signed at Washington October 1,1953
Entered into force November 18,1954

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stand alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this treaty to further its purpose.

ARTICLE 3

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE 4

The Republic of Korea grants, and the Unites States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 5

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instrument of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE 6

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October 1953.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:
Y. T. Pyun

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
John Foster Dulles

Appendix 18

31st ROK-US SCM Joint Communique (November 23, 1999, Washington, D.C.)

1. The 31st ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington on November 23, 1999. ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Seong Tae and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cho Yung Kil and General Henry Shelton, presided over the 21st RQK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM) also on November 23.

2. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen assessed the current international security situation and the security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula. They reaffirmed that the security of the Korean Peninsula is vital to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region as well as to the security of the United States. Both Ministers noted the significant contributions that the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and US and ROK forces have made, and continue to make, to the deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula and to the stability of Northeast Asia.

3. Both Ministers reaffirmed that matters involving the Korean Peninsula should be resolved primarily through direct dialogue between South and North Korea, as the parties directly concerned. To this end, they emphasized that dialogue between the authorities of the South and the North should be resumed to implement the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North" (the South-North Basic Agreement) of 1992. Secretary Cohen expressed his appreciation for the ROK Government's efforts to lay a firm foundation for the promotion of exchange and cooperation between South and North Korea through active implementation of its engagement policy, which is based on three principles: 'no tolerance for any armed provocation, no pursuit of unification by absorption, and promotion of reconciliation and cooperation.' Secretary Cohen noted the achievements the ROK Government has made in its engagement policy as witnessed in the Mountain Kumgang Tour and the proposed West Coast Industrial Complex projects. He also expressed his hope that the ROK Government's consistent efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea would achieve the intended results. Both Ministers also agreed that a strong ROK-US combined defense posture ensuring firm security on the Peninsula is essential for the ROK Government's engagement policy to attain its objectives.

4. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho welcomed the recent developments in US-DPRK relations developing out of the Perry review process and the September and November rounds of talks in Berlin. The Ministers concurred that continued progress on a comprehensive approach is important to laying the foundation for peaceful coexistence and ending the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. They also expressed their hope that continuing US-DPRK discussions will provide the political foundation for improved bilateral relations and will also contribute to progress in South-North dialogue. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen commended the close consultation and coordination among the ROK, US, and Japan during the course of Dr. Perry's policy review, and also expressed their commitment to maintain this close trilateral coordination as they pursue a comprehensive approach toward North Korea.

5. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen concurred that positive progress in the Four Party Talks is important for the reduction of tension and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, they noted the accomplishment of the four parties in pursuing substantive discussions during the fourth, fifth, and sixth plenary sessions through two subcommittees: one on tension reduction and the other on

establishment of a peace regime on the Peninsula. The two Ministers also expressed their hope that the seventh plenary session will produce more substantive progress toward the objectives of the talks. Both ministers reaffirmed that the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains valid and should be observed until superseded by a permanent peace arrangement. They shared the view that the ongoing General Officer Talk, agreed to by the United Nations Command and the Korean People's Army, will contribute positively to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, as well as crisis management along the DMZ.

6. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho reaffirmed that the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," concluded in February 1992, should be fully implemented and that North Korea's pledge in the US-DPRK Agreed Framework to freeze arid eventually dismantle its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon should be faithfully upheld. The two Ministers concurred that smooth implementation of the light-water reactor (LWR) project in North Korea is critical to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. With regard to the suspect underground construction in North Korea, the two Ministers expressed their satisfaction that access to the site, which will continue in the future by agreement with North Korea, had allayed suspicions about the nature of the site.

7. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho expressed concern about the threat that North Korea continues to pose to US and ROK national interests on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. With regard to the June naval clash, both Ministers urged the North to accept the practical value of, and abide by, the Northern Limit Line, which has been an effective means of separating South and North Korean military forces and thus preventing military tension for forty-six years. They expressed concern that North Korea, despite profound economic difficulties, continues to develop and produce major weapons systems, such as submarines, long-range artillery, and ballistic missiles. They also noted that North Korea's chemical and biological weapons pose a threat to ROK and US security interests and urged North Korea to abide by international conventions banning the production, possession, and use of these weapons. In particular, they stressed that North Korea should accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention without delay. Both Ministers once again reaffirmed that North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons would not be tolerated in any situation.

8. The two Ministers assessed positively North Korea's September 1999 announcement that it will not test-launch another missile for the duration of US-DPRK negotiations to improve relations, and urged the North to cease its testing, development, deployment, and export of missiles. They also shared the view that the US and ROK will squarely address the threat posed by North Korea's missiles by continuing close consultations and maintaining a solid combined defense posture.

9. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed that the ROK-US security alliance is stronger than ever and that combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained against a wide range of possible threats. The two Ministers stressed that the combined ROK-US forces on the Peninsula are a defensive force that should continue to maintain and develop combined readiness, tactics, doctrine, professionalism, training, and interoperability. Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the US commitment to render prompt and effective assistance to the ROK in deterring and repelling any armed attack against the ROK in accordance with the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The US also reaffirmed its commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK. The two Ministers agreed that in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the US and the ROK will closely cooperate in dealing with the situation. In this regard, they discussed several practical steps, including the timely deployment of US reinforcements in an emergency. Both Ministers shared the view that

robust combined exercises are vital to deterring war on the Peninsula and enhancing combined readiness, and noted the significant progress the ROK has made in chemical and biological defense preparedness.

10. Regarding the long-term future of the bilateral security alliance, the Ministers reaffirmed that the ROK-US security alliance will play a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which is essential to the process of reunification. They also expressed their belief that the US and ROK will continue to share democratic values and security interests even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean Peninsula. The two Ministers concurred that the affiance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia- Pacific region as a whole. They also agreed that the two countries will most effectively promote their common values and interests by maintaining their bilateral security alliance for the long term, while adapting it to changing circumstances. In this regard, the two Ministers agreed to discuss the long-term development of ROK-US security relations for the 21st century through periodic working-level security dialogues.

11. The Ministers pledged that the two governments would make joint efforts through the Bilateral Coordinating Group to establish the facts of what happened at No Gun Ri. Both also noted that the No Gun Ri incident will not undermine the close bilateral cooperation based upon trust and friendship built over nearly fifty years of partnership. In that regard, both Ministers agreed that the process should be thorough, complete and transparent, and concluded as quickly as possible.

12. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed to work together closely in completing the SOFA revision process as expeditiously as possible. Both Ministers agreed that adjusting the ROK's current voluntary restraint on missiles should be accomplished as soon as possible in accordance with the MTCR guidelines.

13. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen expressed their appreciation for the important contributions of the SCM subcommittees on policy review, logistics cooperation, security cooperation, and defense technology and industry cooperation. They looked forward to seeing the positive work begun under the ROK-US Joint Working Group on Acquisition Matters continue through the efforts of the SCM subcommittees and proactive efforts by the industries of both countries. The two Ministers also agreed to pursue expeditious conclusion of technical arrangements and annex to the Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement (WHNS) on the basis of agreed cost-sharing principles.

14. The two delegations agreed that the 31st SCM and the 21st MCM provided an excellent opportunity to further solidify the ROK-US security alliance and address issues related to the current and future security relationship. Secretary Cohen and Minister Cho agreed to maintain close consultations and to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2000 in Seoul.

15. Minister Cho expressed his gratitude to Secretary Cohen for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality and also for the excellent arrangements that made this meeting a success.

Appendix 19

32nd ROK-US SCM Joint Communique (September 21, 2000 Seoul, Korea)

1. The 32nd ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting(SCM) was held in Seoul on September 21, 2000. ROK Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-Tae and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairmen of the respective Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cho Yung Kil and General Henry Shelton, presided over the 22nd ROK-US Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on September 20.

2. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reviewed the current security situation in and around the Korean Peninsula and assessed the positive developments that have been taking place on the Korean Peninsula since the historic inter-Korean summit meeting held in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15. Both Ministers hoped that active implementation of the South- North Joint declaration of June 15 would lead to broad cooperation and a fundamental reduction of tensions on the Peninsula. In this regard, Secretary Cohen welcomed the decision to hold an inter-Korean Defense Ministers meeting, and the two Ministers hoped that a substantial discussion regarding military confidence building measures would take place there. Both Ministers reaffirmed that they would maintain close policy coordination toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK/North Korea) in order to ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

3. The two Ministers shared the view that the inter-Korean summit meeting was the result of four factors: a) the engagement policy towards North Korea, which has been consistently pursued by the Republic of Korea and the United States; b) a strong ROK-US security alliance; c) close ROK-Japan-US trilateral coordination: and d) support by the international community.

4. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the importance of full implementation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Declaration of the Korean Peninsula, the Agreed Framework of 1994, and North Korea's responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and associated safeguards agreement. With regard to the suspect underground site at Kumchang-ri in North Korea, the two Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the prompt completion of the second visit there, which confirmed the conclusion of the first visit in May 1999 that the facility did not violate the Agreed Framework.

5. The two Ministers concurred that measures such as the reunion of separated families, the continued dialogue between South and North Korean authorities, inter-Korean economic cooperation. and the reduction of loudspeaker denunciations along the DMZ have created a positive environment for inter-Korean reconciliation. However, they noted that North Korea's chemical, biological, nuclear, and long-range missile programs continue to pose a threat to ROK, US, and regional security. They urged North Korea to abide by international conventions banning the production, possession, and use of these weapons. The two Ministers emphasized the need for North Korea to take substantial and verifiable measures to reduce military tensions and support the positive environment created by recent inter-Korean dialogue and diplomatic progress between North Korea and other countries.

6. Both Ministers welcomed the efforts by the US and North Korea to hold bilateral talks on matters such as

nuclear nonproliferation, missiles, and terrorism. They also took positive note of the first meeting between the US Secretary of State and the North Korean Foreign Minister, held at the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) in July 2000. In particular, the two Ministers welcomed North Korea's reaffirmation in June 2000 of its missile testing moratorium and the resumption of US-DPRK missile talks. They also hoped that the U.S. and North Korea would resolve issues of mutual interest through dialogue, leading to the improvement and development of their bilateral relationship.

7. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen shared the view that the Four Party Talks are a valuable forum for the reduction of tensions and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Both Ministers expect that the recent developments in inter-Korean relations and US-DPRK relations will result in a resumption of the Four Party Talks. Both Ministers reaffirmed that the Military Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains valid and should be observed until superceded by a permanent peace regime.

8. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen agreed that the ROK-US security alliance is stronger than ever and that combined defense readiness should be steadfastly maintained to deter a wide range of possible threats and to reinforce engagement with the North. Secretary Cohen reaffirmed the US commitment to render prompt and effective assistance to the ROK in deterring and repelling any armed attack against the ROK, in accordance with the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The US also reaffirmed its commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella for the ROK. The two Ministers agreed that in case of an emergency on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK and the US will closely cooperate in dealing with the situation. In this regard, they discussed several practical steps, including the timely deployment of US reinforcements in an emergency. Both Ministers shared the view that combined training and exercises are crucial in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and enhancing combined readiness.

9. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen reaffirmed that the ROK-US security alliance plays a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The two Ministers expressed their belief that the alliance will serve to maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole even after the immediate threat to stability has receded on the Korean Peninsula. They also agreed that the two countries would most effectively promote their common values and interests by maintaining their bilateral security alliance for the long term, while adapting it to changing circumstances. In this regard, the two Ministers agreed to continue their joint efforts for the long-term development of ROK-US security relations in the 21st century.

10. The two Ministers appreciated their two governments' joint efforts through the Bilateral Coordination Group to establish the facts of what happened at Nogun-ri and agreed to continue these efforts. Both also noted that the Nogun-ri incident will not undermine the close bilateral cooperation based upon trust and friendship built through fifty years of partnership. In that regard, both Ministers agreed that the process of establishing the facts of what happened at Nogun-ri should be thorough, complete and transparent, and should be concluded as quickly as possible.

11. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen expressed their satisfaction that the negotiations to revise the SOFA had

resumed in Seoul in August 2000 and that the ROK and the US agreed to revise the SOFA as soon as possible. The two Ministers concurred that the revision of the SOFA, taking both sides' interests into full account, will positively contribute to the long-term strength of the ROK-US alliance, and they agreed to make active efforts for completing the SOFA revision process as expeditiously as possible.

12. The two Ministers also agreed that the issue of adopting the ROK's new missile guidelines should be resolved as soon as possible in accordance with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines.

13. Secretary Cohen announced that he had given authority to United States Forces Korea to begin work with the Korean Government on the development of a Land Partnership Plan. While recognizing the need for cooperation on this plan, and for balancing the desires of the Korean public and the training needs of U.S. Forces Korea, the two Ministers agreed to fully discuss the detailed plan between USFK and the Korean Government. The plan seeks to consolidate U.S. units and installations through a small number of new land grants and the return of a substantial amount of the land currently used by U.S. force stationed in Korea.

14. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen acknowledged the important contributions of the SCM subcommittees on policy review, logistics cooperation, security cooperation, and defense technology and industry cooperation in facilitating consultations on, and the resolution of, issues between the two Ministries.

15. The two delegations agreed that the 32nd SCM and the 22nd MCM provided an excellent opportunity to further solidify the ROK-US security alliance and address issues related to their current and future security relationship. Minister Cho and Secretary Cohen agreed to maintain close consultations and to hold the next SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2001 in Washington, DC.

16. Secretary Cohen expressed his gratitude to Minister Cho for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality extended to the U.S. delegation and also for the excellent arrangements that made this meeting a success.

Appendix 20

Chronicle of Major Foreign Military Exchanges and Cooperation(1995~2000)

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1995	Jan.19	US JCS Chairman	
	Jan. 27	US Secretary of Defense	
	Feb. 8	US President of the Korean War Veterans Association (KWVA)	
	Feb. 24	US Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific	
	March 21	US Army Chief of Staff	
	March 27	US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM	
	April 3 - 14		JCS Chairman to US, Japan
	April 18	US Congress specialists and assistants	
	April 29 - May 10		Vice Minister of National Defense to Canada, Poland, and Japan
	May 1 - 5	ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan	
	May 7 - 12	Malaysia War College Professors	
	May 19 - 21	ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks	
	May 19 - 22	Australian Navy Port Call	
	May 22 - 28	Students from National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan	
	May 23 - 27	German Defense Minister	
	May 24	Members of the US Defense Map Agency	
	June 1 - 7	Thailand Army College Students	
	June 5	US Military Academy Cadets	
	June 6 - 9	Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan	
	June 9		The 2nd East Asia Security Conference (US)
	June 11 - 16	Peruvian Defense Minister	
	July 10 - 15		Vice Minister of National Defense to Malaysia
	July 25 - 28	Army Chief of Staff, Malaysia	
	Aug. 16	US Ambassador of Defense Cost Sharing	
	Aug. 24	US Senator (1)	
	Aug. 26 - 29		ROK-Israel Defense Ministers' Talks(Israel)
	Aug. 28	US Undersecretary of Navy	
	Sept. 2		ROK-US, ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks
	Sept. 6	US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Defense Affairs	
	Sept. 14 - 15	ROK-Germany Defense Staff Talks	
	Sept. 22 - 24	ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks	
	Sept. 30	British Royal Defense College students	
	Oct. 11 - 14	ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks	
	Oct. 18	US Ambassador of Defense Cost Sharing	
	Nov. 2	US Secretary of Defense, JCS Chairman	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1995	Nov. 4 - 10	Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Turkey	
	Nov. 9 - 23		Asia Pacific Security Seminar (Japan)
	Nov. 13 - 18	Students from Staff College, Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan	
	Nov. 29	Defense Minister, Ethiopia	
1996	Jan. 5	ROK-UK Defense Ministers' Talks	
	Jan. 15	US Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific	
	Jan. 18 - 19		ARF Intersessional Support Group Meeting (Japan)
	Feb. 25 - 29	Army Commander, Paraguay	
	Feb. 26	ROK-Sweden Defense Ministers' Talks	
	March 2	US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM	
	March 18 - 26		Asia Pacific Multilateral Security Conference (Thailand)
	March 26	Air Force Commander, Philippines	
	March 30 - April 2	A Cruise Squad of the Singapore Naval Academy	
	March 30 - April 6	Navy War College Students, Pakistan	
	April 4 - 9	French Navy Port Call	
	April 15	US Secretary of Defense	
	April 27 - May 3		International Security Cooperation Meeting (U.K.)
	May 13		ROK-Japan Defense Ministers' Talks (Japan)
	May 17		ROK-Thailand Defense Ministers' Talks (Thailand)
	May 19		ROK-Saudi Arabia Defense Minsters' Talks (Saudi Arabia)
	May 26 - 28	Former Gulf War Commander, Saudi Arabia	
	June 3	ROK-Pakistan Defense Ministers' Talks	
	June 3 - 8	Commander of the Warsaw Forces, Poland	
	June 4	Members of the Japanese Diet	
	June 7		The 3rd East Asia Security Conference (US)
	June 9 - 14		The 5th West Pacific Navy Symposium (US)
	June 10 - 16	Defense Institute students, Japan	
	June 12	Minister of Communications, Netherlands	
	June 13 - 17	National War College Students, France	
	June 21 - 25		Vice Minister of National Defense to Singapore
	June 29 - July 4	A Cruise Squad of the Thai Naval Academy	
	July 2 - 14		JCS Chairman to Romania, Switzerland, Sweden, and Japan
	July 8	US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM ROK-Australia Pol · Mil Talks	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1996	July 8 - 10	ROK-Malaysia Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee	
	July 16	US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs	
	July 26 - Aug. 2	Participation in the 300th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Russian Navy	
	Aug. 6	Members of the Military Research Committee, World Politics Association	
	Aug 7	US Commander-in-Chief, the 7th Fleet Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency	
	Sept. 2 - 6	Japanese Navy Port Call	
	Sept. 14 - 18	New Zealand Vice Defense Minister	
	Sept. 17 - 20	Air Force Chief of Staff, U.K.	
	Sept. 21 - 24	Commander-in-Chief, Malaysia	
	Oct. 16 - 19		ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks
	Oct. 21 - 24	Defense Minister, Malaysia	
	Oct. 30 - 31		Minister of National Defense to US
	Nov. 3 - 6		Minister of National Defense to Russia
	Nov. 15 - 20	Italian Navy Port Call	
	Dec. 8 - 10	Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, Japan	
	Dec. 11 - 21		ROK-Europe(Germany/France/UK) Defense Staff Talks
1997	Feb. 1 - 4	US Army Reserve Commander	
	Feb. 3 - 5	Defense Minister, Kirghiz	
	Feb. 25 - 29	Army Chief of Staff, Paraguay	
	March 20 - 22	Chief of Staff, GSDF, Japan	
	March 29	National Defense Chief of Staff, Switzerland	
	April 1	US Secretary of Defense	
	April 8 - 9	US JCS Chairman	
	April 20 - 26	Commander-in-Chief, Sweden	
	April 21 - 25	Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Mongolia	
	April 22	US Secretary of the Navy	
	April 22 - 29	Minister of State, JDA, Japan	Global Air Chiefs Conference
	April 30 - May 4	Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Turkey	
	May 6	US Secretary of the Army	
	May 18 - 21	ROK-Israel Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee Vice Defense Minister, Israel	
	May 21 - June 19	British Navy Port Call	
	June 2	US Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces	
	June 14 - 16	Navy Chief of Staff, India	
	June 21 - July 5		JCS Chairman to US, Mexico, and Japan
	June 23 - 27	The 6th ROK-Thailand Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee	
	June 26	The 2nd ROK-France Defense Staff Talks	
	July 4 - 9	Vice Prime Minister, Russia	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1997	July 5 - 8		JCS Chairman to Japan
	July 7 - 11	Vice Defense Minister, Bangladesh	
	July 9 - 11	Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Thailand	
	July 10 - 12	Defense Minister, Philippines	
	July 13 - 17		ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks(Japan)
	July 22 - 26	The 3rd ROK-Philippines Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee	
	July 28 - Aug. 1	Assistant Defense Minister for Economy & Technology, Turkey The 2nd ROK-Turkey Defense Industry Meeting	
	July 31 - Aug. 1		Pacific Area Logistics Conference (Vancouver)
	Aug. 7 - 9		The 4th ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks (Japan)
	Sept. 2 - 6	ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan	
	Sept. 3 - 5		The 4th ROK-France Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee (Paris)
	Sept. 5 - 8	Australian Navy Port Call	
	Sept. 8 - 10		The 7th ROK-Britain Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee (London)
	Sept. 21 - 25	UK Navy Chief of Staff	
	Sept. 24 - 28	German Navy Port Call	
	Oct. 8 - 10	Deputy Director General of the JDA Defense Bureau (US-Japan Defense Guideline Briefing)	
	Oct. 20 - 24		The 2nd Asia Pacific Defense Officials Forum (Tokyo)
	Oct. 27 - 28	The 3rd ROK-Germany Defense Staff Talks	
	Oct. 27 - Nov. 1	Students from Staff College, Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan (28 students)	
	Nov. 5	Vice Director of Japan Defense Institute visits the ROK MND Policy Deputy Minister	
	Nov. 6 - 20		The 4th Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (Tokyo)
	Nov. 16 - 19	Vice Defense Minister, Germany, Signs the MOU of ROK-German Defense Industry Cooperation	
	Nov. 19 - 21	Brazilian Navy Port Call	
	Nov. 19 - 23	Italian Permanent Deputy Minister of National Defense; attends Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee(Seoul)	
	Nov. 19 - 26		Vice Minister of Defense to Russia and China
	Nov. 21		ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks (Moscow)
	Nov. 26 - 29	Romanian Defense Minister Signs the MOU of ROK-Romania Defense Industry Cooperation	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1997	Dec. 5	ROK-Australia Defense Seminar (KIDA)	
	Dec. 9		The 29th SCM/MCM (Washington)
1998	Jan. 21 - 22	US Secretary of Defense	
	Feb. 2 - 4	Air Force Chief of Staff, Japan	
	March 24	Australian Foreign Minister visits Minister of National Defense	
	April 1	Director of Japanese Defense Intelligence Agency	
	April 19 - 25	Head of the National Defense College, Kenya	
	April 23 - 24	ROK-US-Japan East Asia Security Forum	
	April 24	Delegation of the US CFR	
	April 27 - 29	US JCS Chairman	
	May 1 - 4	US Air Force Chief of Staff	
	May 2 - 17	Australian Military Academy Cadets	
	May 6	US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs	
	May 6 - 9	Head of the National Defense College, Italy	
	May 6 - 10	Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces	
	May 9 - 14	Delegation of Switzerland Officers	
	May 13 - 28	Participation in the 100th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Philippines Navy (one convoy)	
	May 28 - June 3	The First Vice Minister of National Defense, Russia	
	June 8 - 12	Special Envoy of the French Defense Minister	
	June 14 - 21		Australian Defense Management Seminar
	June 16 - 18	The 30th SCM Subcommittee	
	June 16 - 19	The 2nd ROK-UK Defense Staff Talks	
	June 25	The 5th ROK-Japan Defense Staff Talks	
	June 26	The 1st ROK-Japan Security Policy Council	
	July 6, 1998	National Defense University students, Nigeria	
	July 8-13	A Cruise Squad of the Thai Naval Academy	Minister of National Defense to the US
	Aug. 21	PLA Vice Chief of Staff, China	
	Aug. 25-Sep. 25	Vietnamese Military Personnel Soccer Team for Training	
	Aug. 31-Sept. 2		Minister of National Defense to Japan
	Sept. 9-10	The ROK-Australia Defense Staff Talks	
	Sept.12-18		Civil-Military Forum in the Asia-Pacific (US)
	Sept. 19	Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Defense	
	Sept. 28-Oct. 2		High-level Military Talks in the Asia-Pacific (US)
	Oct. 12	Head of the Federal Department of Defense, Switzerland	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1998	Oct. 28-Nov. 2	Minister of Brazilian Army	
	Oct. 29	Air Force Chief of Staff, France	
	Nov. 10	The Chairman of the US Asia-Pacific Senate Subcommittee on Asia-Pacific Affairs	
	Nov. 16	Defense Chief of Staff, Canada	
	Nov. 16-21	The 5th ROK-France Defense Industry and Logistics Joint Committee	
	Nov. 26	Chief of Army Staff, Japan	
	Nov. 29-Dec. 3	The ROK-Canada Defense Staff Talks	
	Dec. 15-20		ROK-China Defense Staff Talks
1999	Jan. 6-8	Minister of State, JDA ('99)	
	Jan. 14-15	The 30th SCM (US Defense Secretary, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM)	
	Jan. 19	French Defense Minister	
	Feb. 2-14		JCS Chairman to the US and Canada
	Feb. 5	Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan	
	Feb. 26-27	The ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Meeting	
	March 2-7	Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Russian Federation	
	March 10-14	Director of US DIA, US Secretary of the Army	
	March 17-19	US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM	
	March 21-24	Naval Chief of Staff, France	
	March 23 - 26	National Defense Chief of Staff, Australia	
	March 29-April 1	MSDF Working-level Officers, Japan	
	April 12-16	PRC Naval Boat Race Team, China	
	April 22	Commander-in-Chief, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces	
	May 6	ASDF Chief of Staff, Japan	
	May 7	Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand	
	May 9-19		MND Personnel & Welfare Bureau Director participates in the 54th CISM General Meeting in the Netherlands
	May 13	Chief of the Navy, Bangladesh	
	May 17-21	The ROK-Philippines Joint Conference on Defense Industry	
	May 21	US War College students	
	May 26	The ROK-Australia Defense Ministers' Meeting	
	June 4	Singapore Defense Minister visits his counterpart	
	June 6-12		Observers for Amphibious Training of the Turkish military
	June 13-21	The ROK-Australia and the ROK-New Zealand Pol · Mil & Mil · Mil Talks	

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
1999	June 16-17	Goodwill Envoy to Russia	
	June 16-20	Army Commander-in-Chief, Ecuador	
	June 17	Heads of the Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protectional Sports, Switzerland	
	June 21-26		The 31st SCM/SCC, DTICC, LCC Subcommittee to the US
	July 4-6	Minister of Education (also 2nd Minister of Defense), Singapore	
	July 7 - 9		Vice Minister of Defense to New Zealand, Brazil, and Venezuela
	July 13-14	ROK-Japan Security Policy Consultation	
	July 15		JCS, ROK-JSO, JDA Staff Talks
	July 19-24		ROK Naval Academy Midshipmen to China
	July 29	ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks	
	Aug. 6-19		The ROK Armed Forces Athletic Unit participates in the 2nd International Military Sports Council (CISM)
	Aug. 12	ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks	
	Aug. 23-29		ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks
	Sept. 3	ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks	
	Sept.13-17	Kuwait Defense Minister	
	Oct. 4-9	Members of the Swiss Society for Military Historical Studies, Switzerland	
	Oct. 5	Students of the British National Defense College visit Defense Vice Minister	
	Oct. 6	President of the German War College visits Vice Defense Minister	
	Oct. 11	The President of the Japanese Self-Defense College visits Policy Counselor	
	Oct.18-22	Vietnamese Vice Defense Minister	
	Nov.10-15	Chinese Educational Representatives	
	Nov.11-21		Sang-mu Basketball Team to China
	Nov.17-21		Minister of National Defense to Turkey
	Nov.21-23		The 31st SCM/ 21st MCM
	Nov. 24		ROK-Canada Defense Staff Talks
	Dec.5-11	Inspector General, Venezuela	
	Dec.7-10	ROK-Mongolia Defense Ministers' Talks	
	Dec.14-18		ROK-China Defense Policy Consultation
2000	Jan.19-23	ROK-China Defense Ministers' Talks (Jan. 20)	
	Jan.23-27	ROK-Turkey Defense Industry & Logistics Joint Committee	
	Feb. 8		ROK-Russia Intelligence Staff Talks
	Feb.12-13		The 2nd ROK-Egypt Intelligence Exchange Meeting

Date		Visits to the ROK	Overseas Visits
2000	Feb. 14-15		The 1st ROK-Australia Navy-to-Navy Meeting
	Feb. 14	Delegation of the Military Advanced Research Institute, France	
	Feb.17-18		ROK-Russia Arms Control and Non-proliferation Meeting
	Feb. 24	Former Defense Minister, Australia	
	Feb. 26	US Commander-in-Chief, PACOM, visits Defense Minister	
	Feb.27-March 9		ROK, UK, France, Germany Defense Industry & Logistics Joint Committee
	March 14-17	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Japan	
	March 15-25	Shenyang Military Region Basketball Team, China	
	March 17-18	US Secretary of Defense	
	March 19-22	Air Force Chief of Staff, US	
	March 23-April 1		ROK-UK-France-Germany Defense Staff Talks
	April 13-19		JCS Chairman to East Timor, Australia
	April 22-27		Vice Defense Minister to Vietnam
	April 24-28		ROK-Russia Defense Staff Talks
	May 1-5	Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Turkey	
	May 9-10	ROK-Australia POL · MIL/MIL · MIL Talks	
	May 14-18	Air Force Chief of Staff, Spain	
	May 14-19	Navy Chief of Staff, Indonesia	
	May 15-24		Minister of National Defense to Russia and Japan
	May 28-June 6	Representatives of the Chinese Defense College	ROK-Indonesia(May 28-31)/ ROK-Philippines(June 1-3)/ ROK-Thailand(June 4-6) Defense Industry & Logistics Joint Committee
	May 29 -June 2	Chief of Navy Staff, Japan	
	June 3 - 28	The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War (Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Belgium, Canada, Turkey, Philippines, US, France, Australia, New Zealand, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Thailand, Colombia)	
	July 5 - 8	Defense Minister, New Zealand	
	Aug. 27 -31	Navy Chief of Staff, Bangladesh	
	Aug. 28 - Sept. 4		JCS Chairman to China
	Sept. 3 - 7	Navy Commander-in-Chief, Philippines	
	Sept. 25 - Oct. 1	Army Chief of Staff, Malaysia	

Appendix 21

Participants in Multilateral Security Dialogue in the Asia-Pacific Region

Country	ARF (23)		NEACD (5)	CSCAP (20)
	ASEAN (10)	Nonmember Countries in the ASEAN (13)		
ROK		○	○	○
DPRK		○		○
US		○	○	○
Japan		○	○	○
China		○	○	○
Russia		○	○	○
Australia		○		○
Canada		○		○
New Zealand		○		○
Malaysia	○			○
Thailand	○			○
Indonesia	○			○
Singapore	○			○
Philippines	○			○
Vietnam	○			○
Laos	○			
Myanmar	○			
Brunei	○			
Cambodia	○			○
Papua New Guinea		○		○
India		○		○
EU Chair Country		○		○
Mongolia		○		○

Appendix 22

Status of MND Participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF)

(From January 1996 to July 2000)

Date/Place	Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings
Jan. 18-19, 1996 Tokyo, Japan	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - discussed promoting periodical issuance of *Defense White Paper* and submitting to Senior Officials Meeting - promoted Defense Authorities' participation in Senior Officials Meeting and Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting
April 15-16 Jakarta, Indonesia	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - promoted the participation of UN Register of Conventional Arms(UNRCA) - discussed member countries' participation in military training and prior notification
Feb. 19-20, 1997 Dublin, Ireland	• ARF Disaster Relief Meeting - discussed building contact point between each nation's disaster relief systems - discussed continuous information exchange of each nation's disaster relief activities
March 6-8 Beijing, China	• ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Confidence Building Measures(ISG-CBMs) - maintained each nation's discussion on defense policy and recommended submitting the national defense policy book - urged participation of the non-member nations in UN conventional weapons relocation registration system - discussed vitalizing plans on confidence building measures in non-militarized fields
March 10-14 Kuala-Lampur, Malaysia	• ARF PKO Meeting - discussed standardization of training courses for PKO personnel - introduced Korea's policy of peacekeeping activities and status of participation
April 7-11 Wellington, New Zealand	• Workshop on Clearing Mines - discussed world-wide mine issues - announced ROK government's position toward the use of mines.
May 19-20 Langkawi, Malaysia	• The 4th ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) - discussed regional security situation, evaluated inter-sessional meetings - agreed to hold the Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions.
July 27 Kuala-Lampur, Malaysia	• The 4th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) - confirmed support for the peace regime of the Korean peninsula and the four-party talks - emphasized the impropriety of Taiwan's relocation of nuclear wastes and guided understandings/support
Oct. 7-8 Manila, Philippines	• The 1st ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions - discussed regional security education and cooperation in the research area -discussed continuous holding of the Meetings of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions
Nov. 4-6 Brunei	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - reviewed security situations in the Asia-Pacific region - discussed promoting cooperation of maritime security

Date/Place	Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings
March 4-6, 1998 Sydney, Australia	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - discussed new confidence-building measures, national defense policies and preventive diplomacy - exchanged views on CWC and the ban on anti-personnel landmines
May 20-22 Manila, Philippines	• The 5th ARF Senior Officials, Meeting (ARF-SOM) - discussed security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, arms control/disarmament and nonproliferation - reflected the development of South-North Korea Talks, Four-Party Talks and KEDO in the chairman's statement
July 27 Manila, Philippines	• The 5th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) - discussed regional security situation and reviewed the result of the intersessional meeting - encouraged the participants to support the NEASED - reflected the ROK government's view on the ban of anti-personnel landmines - reconfirmed the holding of the 2nd Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions in Seoul
Sept. 1-3 Canberra, Australia	• ARF Defense White Paper (DWP) conference - discussed the contents and ways to write the DWP - provided advice to the countries which have not published the DWP
Sept. 8-10 Seoul, Korea	• The 2nd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions - information exchanges through the internet and e-mail among colleges and institutions and joint studies on the textbooks - discussed promoting the exchange programs of students and professors, and enhancing security consensus among Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions
Nov. 4-6 Honolulu, US	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - reviewed confidence-building measures (short-, mid- and long-terms) - discussed the law and order at sea and sea preservation issues at a meeting of maritime security and environmental experts
Nov. 25-27 Beijing, China	• ARF Military Medicine Symposium on Tropical Medicine and Epidemic Control in Tropical Regions - discussed tropical epidemics including malaria, and visited medical centers and military hospitals
March 2-5, 1999 Bangkok, Thailand	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - exchanged regional security perceptions among countries; reviewed confidence-building and preventive diplomacy - explained engagement policy toward North Korea, Four-Party Talks, South-North Basic Agreement, KEDO, ROK's position on the ban of anti-personnel landmines, and proposed joint dealing of the Y2K problem - discussed international arms control/disarmament and nonproliferation
March 22-26 Tokyo, Japan	• ARF PKO Seminar - exchanged advanced experiences and training for PKO operations
April 11-14 Moscow, Russia	• ARF Disaster Relief Meeting - discussed ways to reinforce bilateral and multilateral cooperation - tour of disaster relief activities employing advanced equipment
April 18-23 Washington DC, US	• ARF Professional Development Program - trained on multilateral security cooperation techniques - visited crisis management center and multilateral cooperation simulation
May 19-21 Singapore	• The 6th Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) - shared regional security perceptions among countries and reviewed confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy - discussed international arms control/disarmament and nonproliferation - combined the results of intersessional meetings and made recommendations for the ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting

Date/Place	Multilateral Security Cooperation Meetings
July 26 Singapore	• The 6th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) - exchanged views on international/regional security issues (the Korean Peninsula, South China Sea, East Timor, and the importance of the major powers' relations) - agreed on the continuous development of arms control, disarmament, confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy - approved the meetings/activities of the next intersessional year (1999-2000)
Sept. 21-25 Ulaanbaatar,Mongolia	• The 3rd ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges and Institutions - Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century - Multilateral Cooperation among the Defense Colleges and Defense Research Institutions of ARF Member Countries
Oct. 19-20 Beijing, China	• ARF Professional Development Program - Introduced Chinese Security Policy - discussed the concept of preventive diplomacy
Nov. 12-15 Tokyo, Japan	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG-CBMs) - exchanged the perception of regional security issues -defense official's lunch discussions on defense issues; discussed the promotion of the role of the military in ARF
Dec. 13-16 Canberra, Australia	• ARF Seminar on Law of War or Armed Conflict - discussed the application and education of the Law of War or Armed Conflict - discussed the problems on abiding by the rules of engagement to prevent the war or armed conflict
Jan. 25-28, 2000 Bangkok, Thailand	• ARF Seminar on Disaster Relief - discussed disaster relief cooperation on the levels of individual nations, small regions and regional areas - discussed plans for the readiness of regional disaster posture
March 28-31 Canberra, Australia	• ARF Defense Language School Seminar - discussed each nation's National Defense language training situations, and exchanged information - Introduced Military English education situation in Korea
April 4-7 Singapore	• ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures - explained ROK's engagement policy toward North Korea, Berlin Declaration etc., and to gain international support - discussed transnational crime, and exchanged security perceptions
April 23-28 Brunei	• ARF Professional Development Programs - discussed bilateralism and multilateralism - promoted understanding of ASEAN cooperation methods
May 4-6 Hanoi, Vietnam	• ARF Disaster Relief Meeting - discussed efficient cooperation ways for disaster relief among participant nations - discussed the role of the military for disaster relief
May 17-19 Bangkok, Thailand	• The 7th ARF Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) - explained South-North Korea Summit Meeting - discussed DPRK's joining ARF
July 27 Bangkok, Thailand	• The 7th ARF Foreign Ministerial Meeting (FMM) - welcomed North Korea's ARF participation and discussed the progress of South-North relations - discussed the peaceful settlement of regional problems and CBM, and agreed to actively involve in developing preventive diplomacy

Appendix 23

Current Peacekeeping Operations

As of August 30, 2000

No.	Name	Date of Establish-ment	Location of Deployment and Missions	Number deployed	Number of nations
1	UNTSO	1948. 6	UN Truce Supervision in Palestine	153	22
2	UNMOGIP	1949. 1	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	46	8
3	UNFYCIP	1964. 3	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1,251	11
4	UNDOF	1974. 6	UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights	1,035	6
5	UNIFIL	1978. 3	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	5,619	11
6	UNIKOM	1991. 4	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	1,111	32
7	MINURSO	1991. 9	UN Observation Mission for Referendum in the Western Sahara	265	29
8	UNOMIG	1993. 8	UN Mission of Observers in Georgia	102	22
9	UNMIBH	1995. 12	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,723	43
10	UNMOP	1996. 1	UN Mission of Observers in Peninsula of Prevlaka(Croatia)	27	23
11	UNMIK	1999. 6	UN Peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo	4,018	57
12	UNAMSIL	1999. 10	UN Truce Supervision in Sierra Leone	12,481	35
13	UNTAET	1999. 10	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	9,352	48
14	MONUC	1999. 11	UN Truce Supervision in the Democratic Republic of Congo	262	37
15	UNMEE	2000. 8	UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea	10	8

※ 15 Mission Areas, 89 Nations, and 37,400 People Participated

Appendix 24

Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the PKO

■ Participation Records

○ Regions: 6 (Somalia, Angola, Western Sahara, India · Pakistan, Georgia, East Timor)

○ Number of participating personnel: Approx. 2,820
※ Aug. 1999: 32(50th in the world) → Nov. 2000: 476(26th in the world)

■ Status of Participation in detail

(As of Nov. 2000)

Region		Number of people	Period	Rotation Period	Number of People yearly
Past Participations	Somalia	252 Engineer battalions	1993. 7~1994. 3	6 months	504 (2nd detachment)
		6 Headquarters command staffs	1993.12~1994. 9	1 year	6
	Angola	198 Engineer battalion	1995.10~1996.12	6 months	594 (3rd detachment)
		6 Headquarters command staffs	1996. 2~1997. 2	1 year	6
Present Participations	West Sahara	20 Medical units	1994. 9~	6 months	345 1st-4th detachment : 42 5th-6th detachment : 20 7th detachment : 14 8th-13th detachment : 20
	India · Pakistan	9 Military observers	1994.11~	1 year	54
	Georgia	3 Military observers	1994.10~	1 year	27
	East Timor	419 Infantry battalions	1999.10~	6 months	1,256
		12 Headquarters command staffs	2000. 1~	1 year	12
		13 Brigade Headquarters	2000. 2~	6 months	21

Appendix 25

The Logbook of the Korean Evergreen Unit's Dispatch to East Timor

■ Preparataration for dispatch ~ Move to Townsville, Australia

Date	Contents	Notes
Sep. 7, 1999	Examined (unofficially) dispatch possibilities from UN	
Sep. 12	President Habibie showed approval to the deployment of the multinational army	
Sep. 13	The standing committee of the National Security Meeting considered plans for dispatch (The 70th)	Decision made on dispatch policy
Sep. 14	Party · Government coordination meeting on dispatch	
Sep. 15	Approval of activation of UN Security Council multinational army (Resolution no.1264) Official dispatch demanded by UN Secretary General and Australian Foreign Minister	* activation of multinational army headquarters command(Sep.16)
Sep. 19	Dispatched Ministry of National Defense field investigation Team (Sep. 19 ~ Sep.25/Austrailia, East Timor)	Brigadier general Kim Tae-Young and 1 member
Sep. 20	Informed the Blue House of dispatch plans and explained to the National Assembly Domestic training before dispatch (Sep.20~Oct.2, 2 week period)	* deployment of Australian Army to East Timor
Sep. 21	Decided on dispatch plans in a cabinet meeting	
Sep. 24	Liaison officer deployment (Sydney, Australia Theater Headquarters)	2 lieutenant-colonels
Sep. 28	Proposal of agreement to dispatch passed National Assembly plenary meeting	Ministry of national defense issue dispatch order
Sep. 29	Evergreen unit activation ceremony (5th brigade, Special Warfare Command, supervised by the Army Chief of the Staff)	
Oct. 1	Departure of advance element (58) Evergreen unit report to the President (Kyeryongdae, on the Armed Forces Day ceremony)	Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Cooperation/Reconnaissance team ride together
Oct. 4	Evergreen Unit farewell ceremony (14:00/Seoul International Airport, supervised by the minister of national defense) The 1st echelon's departure (15:00, 209)/moved to Townsville, Australia	* on-site coordination adjustment training(1 week for each echelon, Townsville)
Oct. 9	The 2nd echelon's departure (15:00, 152)/moved to Townsville, Australia	

■ After East Timor deployment

Date	Contents	Notes
Oct.16, 1999	Advance element deployment to East Timor (156) Cargo-transport ship arrived in Port Com	
Oct. 22	Main body deployment to East Timor (263) Finished unloading and transport of equipment and material transport	
Oct. 25	Multinational Force's command group visited Evergreen unit (general in command/deputy commander)	* UNTAET activation approved (Security Council resolution no.1272)
Nov. 27	Received UN's East Timor PKF involvement request	
Dec. 7	Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on-site visit for guidance(Dec.7 ~ 11)	Acofs, J-3, and 18 members
Dec. 21	National Defense Committee comforting party of National Assembly visited Evergreen unit	Chairman of the National Defense Committee and 4 Assemblymen
Jan. 8, 2000	Dispatched staff to PKF headquarters command	Brigadier general Kwon, Haing-keun and 11 staff
Jan. 28	CNRT Chairman Gusmao visits minister of national defense	
Feb.1	Multinational Army switched over to UN PKF	
Feb.18	Dispatched east brigade liaison group/military police element	Colonel Lee, Byung-Ju and 12 members
Mar.10	Resupply for the preparation for rotation of units (Mar.10 ~ April 8)	2 vessels of Navy LST
Mar. 20	The activation ceremony of 2nd detachment unit	
April 18	The departure of 1st echelon, 2nd detachment	* Guidance visiting team rides together(6)
April 20	The return of 1st echelon, 1st detachment	
April 26	The departure of 2nd echelon, 2nd detachment	
April 27	The 1st and 2nd detachments change command	The 2nd detachment commences mission
April 28	The return of 2nd echelon, 1st detachment	
May 3	The 1st detachment disband ceremony (drill ground of 5th Brigade, Special Warfare Command)	
Sep. 29	National Assembly's approvan of the extension of the Evergreen Unit's operation in East Timor	Extension period: Oct. 2000 ~ Dec. 2001

Appendix 26

Government and Defense Budgets by FY

(unit: 100 million won, %)

Classification	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
• Current GDP (Increase Rate)	3,773,498 (16.7)	4,184,790 (10.9)	4,532,764 (8.3)	4,443,665 (△1.9)	4,837,778 (8.9)	5,321,556 (Around10.0)
• Government Budgets (Increase Rate)	556,058 (16.8)	635,883 (14.4)	711,528 (11.9)	807,629 (13.5)	884,850 (9.6)	926,576 (4.7)
· General Account (Increase Rate)	518,811 (20.0)	588,228 (13.4)	667,064 (13.4)	755,829 (13.3)	836,852 (10.7)	864,740 (3.3)
· Government financing special accounting (Increase Rate)	37,247 (△14.9)	47,655 (27.9)	44,464 (△6.7)	51,800 (16.6)	47,998 (△7.3)	61,836 (28.8)
• Defense Budgets (Increase Rate)	115,070 (9.9)	127,360 (10.7)	143,505 (12.7)	143,755 (0.2)	143,368 (△0.3)	150,432 (4.9)
· National DefenseBudgets (Increase Rate)	110,744 (9.9)	122,434 (10.6)	137,865 (12.6)	138,000 (0.1)	137,490 (△0.4)	144,390 (5.0)
· Office of Military Manpower Administration (Increase Rate)	1,161 (8.1)	1,388 (19.6)	1,599 (15.2)	1,590 (△0.6)	1,422 (△10.5)	1,305 (△8.2)
· Combatant Police Unit and National Maritime Police (Increase Rate)	3,165 (11.1)	3,538 (11.8)	4,041 (14.2)	4,165 (3.1)	4,456 (7.0)	4,737 (6.3)
• Defense Budget Rate						
· Ratio of defense outlay per GDP (%)	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.0	2.9
· Ratio of defense outlay per budget (%)	22.2	21.7	21.5	19.0	17.1	17.4

※ Ratio of defense budget per fiscal budget is found according to the General Accounts Stands

Appendix 27

Year 2000 National Defense Budget by Category

(unit: 100 million won)

Classification	1999 Budget	2000 Budget	Increase	%
Total	137,490	144,390	6,900	5.0
Investment budget	52,304	53,437	1,133	2.2
• Improvement of defense capacity	41,403	42,188	785	1.9
• Equipment maintenance	10, 514	10,878	364	3.5
• Acquiring supporting equipments	387	371	△16	△4.1
Current Operating expenses	85,186	90,953	5,767	6.8
• Personnel expenses	50, 298	55,609	5,311	10.6
• Project expenses	34,888	35,344	456	1.3
• Subsistence	9,467	9,567	100	1.1
• Clothes	2,161	2,212	51	2.4
• Unit activity	2,993	3,380	387	12.9
• Education and training	1,521	1,295	△226	△14.9
• Equipment management	4,550	4,151	△399	△8.8
• Facility construction	3,888	4,061	173	4.4
• Facility management	2,020	2,061	41	2.0
• Material procurement	717	670	△47	△6.6
• Reserve forces	594	568	△26	△4.4
• Research/Auxiliary	1,060	964	△96	△9.1
• Support for stationing forces	1,968	2,255	287	14.6
• Basic project expenses	3,949	3,985	36	0.9
• Financial transfer expenses	-	175	175	-

Appendix 28

Composition of MND Budget by FY

(unit: 100 million won)

Year	MND Budget		Current Operating Expenses			Force Investment		
	Amount	Increase Rate	Amount	Increase Rate	Composition Rate	Amount	Increase Rate	Composition Rate
1979	15,366	-	9,077	-	51.9	6,289	-	40.9
1980	22,465	46.2	13,219	45.6	58.8	9,246	47.0	41.2
1981	26,979	20.1	16,408	24.1	60.8	10,571	14.3	39.2
1982	31,207	15.7	19,392	18.2	62.1	11,815	11.8	37.9
1983	32,741	4.9	20,525	5.8	62.7	12,216	3.4	37.3
1984	33,061	1.0	20,122	△2.0	60.9	12,939	5.9	39.1
1985	36,892	11.6	21,845	8.6	59.2	15,047	16.3	40.8
1986	41,580	12.7	23,842	9.1	57.3	17,738	17.9	42.7
1987	47,454	14.1	26,001	9.1	54.8	21,453	20.9	45.2
1988	55,202	16.3	30,550	17.5	55.3	24,652	14.9	44.7
1989	60,148	9.0	34,155	11.8	56.8	25,993	5.4	43.2
1990	66,378	10.4	38,515	12.8	58.0	27,863	7.2	42.0
1991	74,764	12.6	44,988	16.8	60.2	29,776	6.9	39.8
1992	84,100	12.5	51,968	15.5	61.8	32,132	7.9	38.2
1993	92,154	9.6	57,981	11.6	62.9	34,173	6.4	37.1
1994	100,753	9.3	64,637	11.5	64.2	36,116	5.7	35.8
1995	110,744	9.9	71,032	9.9	64.1	39,712	10.0	35.9
1996	122,434	10.6	79,772	12.3	65.2	42,662	7.4	34.8
1997	137,865	12.6	89,032	11.6	64.6	48,833	14.5	35.4
1998	138,000	0.1	87,098	△2.2	63.1	50,902	4.2	36.9
1999	137,490	△0.4	85,186	△2.2	62.0	52,304	2.8	38.0
2000	144,390	5.0	90,953	6.8	63.0	53,437	2.2	37.0

Appendix 29

Defense Budgets of Major Military Powers

(unit: Constant in 1998)

Country	GDP (US $ billion)	Defense Budget (US $ billion)	GDP to Defense Budget(%)	Manpower (thousand persons)	Military Expenditure per Capita (US$)
US	8,500	265.9	3.2	1,402	982
Japan	3,800	37.0	1.0	243	293
Germany	2,100	32.4	1.5	334	395
France	1,400	39.8	2.8	359	676
Russia	1,100	53.9	5.2	1,159	368
United Kingdom	1,300	36.6	2.8	211	624
Canada	604	6.6	1.1	61	229
Italy	1,200	22.6	2.0	298	391
Spain	553	7.3	1.3	194	186
Mexico	400	3.8	1.0	175	39
Brazil	583	18.1	3.2	313	108
Argentina	289	5.2	1.8	73	147
China	703	36.7	5.3	2,820	30
Taiwan	310	13.9	4.6	376	642
Indonesia	189	4.9	2.6	299	24
Thailand	137	2.0	1.5	306	32
Israel	97	11.0	11.6	175	1,844
Malaysia	88	3.2	3.7	110	146
Singapore	96	4.7	5.0	73	1,543
Egypt	69	2.8	4.1	450	45
Australia	390	7.4	1.9	57	391
India	469	13.8	3.0	1,175	14
South Korea	426	12.9	3.1	672	278
North Korea	14	2.0	14.3	1,055	93

※ Source: *The Military Balance 1999 - 2000*

Appendix 30

2000 Force Integration Project of Major Military Equipment

Type		2000 Force Integration Project (Number)	Other
Ground Force Capability	Command/fire control armored personnel carrier (APC)	48/56	R&D
	New model of K-9 155 mm self-propelled artillery	18	R&D
	CBR scout car	23	R&D
	BO-105 light scout helicopter	10	Import & Production of technology
	MSC-500K Tactical Communication System	6	R&D
	The next generation VHF	34	Import & Production of technology
	Low-altitude detection acquisition radar	8	R&D
	Oerlikon upgrade	10	R&D
Naval Force Capability	Destroyer (KDX-I)	1	Domestic construction
	Landing ship (LST)	2	Domestic construction
	SSM Harpoon	16	FMS
	Submarine(KSS-1)	2	Domestic construction
	Sea patrol aircraft (ISAR)	5	FMS
	Maritime operation helicopter (LYNX)	8	Foreign purchase
	Sea surveillance radar	13	R&D
Air Force Capability	Fighter (KF-16)	10	Licensed production
	Basic training aircraft (KT-1)	13	R & D
	HARPY	110	Foreign purchase
	Air-to-air Missile(AIM-120)	100	FMS

Appendix 31

Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements

As of late June 2000

Agreements on Cooperation in Defense Industry and Logistics	Agreements on Science and Technology Data Exchanges	Agreements on Quality	Agreements on Providing Cost Information
US	US	US	US
United Kingdom	France	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
France	Italy	France	Germany
Italy	*United Kingdom*	Spain	
Spain		Switzerland	
Indonesia		Canada	
Israel		Italy	
Thailand		Netherlands	
Malaysia		Belgium	
Philippines		Denmark	
Romania		Australia	
Canada		Philippines	
Russia		Germany	
Germany		*Israel*	
New Zealand		*Turkey*	
Netherlands			
Turkey			
Venezuela			
18	4	15	3

※ *Italic* 6 countries are newly joined members for the Agreement since 1999

Appendix 32

Status of International Weapons Imports and Exports (1994 –1998)

1. Major Weapons Export Total by Country

(Unit : Constant US$ million in 1990)

Exporter and ranking			1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total 1994-1998
1994-1998		1993-1997						
1	U.S.	1	9,844	9,580	9,712	12,404	12,342	53,882
2	Russia	2	1,155	3,271	3,602	2,956	1,276	12,260
3	France	5	756	806	1,924	3,284	3,815	10,585
4	United Kingdom	3	1,494	1,708	1,800	3,238	673	8,913
5	Germany	4	2,637	1,425	1,399	686	1,064	7,211
6	China	6	731	849	751	338	157	2,826
7	Netherlands	7	495	378	414	551	506	2,344
8	Italy	8	306	330	366	442	298	1,742
9	Ukraine	10	189	192	195	516	449	1,541
10	Canada	9	365	436	239	137	217	1,394
11	Spain	11	275	111	99	637	221	1,343
12	Israel	12	115	206	257	292	147	1,017
13	Czech Republic	13	378	188	132	30	16	744
14	Belarus	14	8	24	129	516	16	693
15	Belgium	16	20	296	144	89	51	600
16	Sweden	17	63	180	155	51	136	585
17	Moldova	15	165	-	-	392	-	557
18	Poland	20	131	184	65	20	1	401
19	Australia	19	24	22	15	318	3	382
20	Switzerland	18	70	75	122	62	35	364
21	Norway	21	186	54	9	56	2	307
22	Denmark	22	230	-	3	-	-	233
23	Slovakia	23	28	85	48	44	-	205
24	Uzbekistan	63	-	-	-	-	170	170
25	Brazil	25	38	40	28	28	-	134
26	Singapore	31	11	2	-	75	41	129
27	North Korea	24	48	48	22	-	-	118
28	Indonesia	33	25	38	-	-	52	115
29	Qatar	26	51	15	-	44	-	110
30	South Korea	29	8	25	20	27	30	110
31	Greece	35	-	-	30	52	18	100
	Others*		226	298	303	131	209	1,167
Total			20,073	20,861	21,984	27,416	21,944	112,278

* Countries that exported less than US $100million from 1994 to 1998(Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1999)

2. Major Weapons Import Total by Country

(Unit: Constant US$ million in 1990)

Importer and ranking			1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total 1994-1998
1994-1998		1993-1997						
1	Taiwan	2	731	1,162	1,451	5,311	4,656	13,311
2	Saudi Arabia	1	1,298	1,249	1,961	3,292	1,948	9,748
3	Turkey	3	1,386	1,327	1,132	1,394	1,376	6,615
4	Egypt	4	1,926	1,645	940	931	440	5,882
5	South Korea	5	642	1,553	1,589	731	656	5,171
6	Greece	7	1,172	943	241	832	1,566	4,754
7	India	8	497	932	988	1,266	466	4,149
8	Japan	6	678	948	624	662	1,181	4,093
9	Arab-Emirates	11	629	442	600	840	756	3,267
10	Thailand	12	758	628	555	1,128	63	3,132
11	Kuwait	10	49	974	1,338	418	228	3,007
12	Malaysia	15	453	1,143	200	780	59	2,635
13	Pakistan	14	683	242	552	614	525	2,616
14	China	9	112	427	1,115	834	104	2,592
15	US	13	711	459	431	696	223	2,520
16	Israel	20	796	229	73	46	1,285	2,429
17	Spain	18	646	395	441	230	402	2,114
18	Finland	19	196	162	581	439	647	2,025
19	Singapore	26	187	232	538	123	685	1,765
20	Indonesia	21	600	359	547	141	66	1,713
21	Brazil	23	236	236	491	437	196	1,596
22	Swiss	31	114	106	199	400	441	1,260
23	Chile	25	151	537	223	194	103	1,208
24	Iran	16	348	243	537	24	24	1,176
25	Italy	24	131	187	241	552	4	1,115
26	Qatar	36	14	15	58	553	389	1,029
27	Germany	17	596	130	110	18	132	986
28	Oman	30	201	175	347	158	17	898
29	Canada	27	432	177	164	86	33	892
30	Peru	29	142	97	182	469	-	890
31	United Kingdom	44	38	93	216	88	362	797
32	Vietnam	37	-	277	246	96	168	787
33	Australia	28	302	71	149	24	189	735
34	Mexico	40	65	65	63	230	306	729
35	Sweden	35	252	84	47	258	87	728
36	Norway	34	57	102	200	186	170	715
37	Netherlands	38	140	47	187	99	242	715

Importer and ranking			1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total
1994-1998		1993-1997						1994-1998
38	Myanmar	32	-	223	93	243	131	690
39	Kazakhstan	39	-	162	219	166	-	547
40	Algeria	41	161	332	5	29	-	527
41	Argentina	47	148	85	44	98	110	485
42	Armenia	45	310	51	106	-	-	467
43	Portugal	33	431	15	3	14	-	463
44	Denmark	49	66	129	53	74	141	463
45	Austria	54	56	37	14	169	177	453
46	France	55	3	41	30	160	210	444
47	Columbia	50	39	87	39	160	119	444
48	New Zealand	46	16	4	18	349	17	404
49	Morocco	43	129	40	89	143	-	401
50	Cyprus	48	61	29	177	110	18	395
51	Bahrain	51	14	26	225	74	9	348
52	Jordan	64	-	24	43	104	164	335
53	Hungary	22	4	67	125	72	58	326
54	Sri Lanka	50	56	60	158	42	40	356
55	Slovakia	41	35	252	35	-	-	322
56	Poland	58	6	154	114	-	-	274
57	Philippines	56	109	32	30	54	47	272
58	Bangladesh	57	89	126	4	24	-	243
59	Yemen (Southern Rebels)	62	196	-	-	-	-	196
60	Angola	63	96	1	10	3	84	194
61	Croatia	60	57	86	2	37	-	182
62	Tunisia	64	21	58	60	40	1	180
63	Belgium	59	64	28	2	34	34	162
64	Bulgaria	65	1	-	51	77	16	145
65	Yemen	67	-	142	-	-	-	142
66	Syria	53	63	43	21	-	-	127
67	Lebanon	66	13	59	27	6	17	122
68	Eritrea	75	16	1	30	48	27	122
69	Romania	73	43	1	35	12	20	111
70	Cambodia	72	64	-	34	6	4	108
71	South Africa	68	19	38	51	20	-	128
	Others*		334	342	398	512	241	1,827
Total			20,073	20,861	21,984	27,416	21,944	112,278

* Countries that imported less than US $100million from 1994 to 1998(Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1999)

Appendix 33

Annual Investment in R&D

(Unit: 100 million won)

Year	Defense Budget	FIP[1] Expenditure	R&D Expenditures			R&D Expenditures to (%)	
			Force Development	Operation Expenses	Total	Defense Budget	FIP Expenditures
1996	122,434	42,662	3,008	1,095	4,103	3.4	7.1
1997	137,865	48,833	3,432	1,211	4,643	3.4	7.1
1998	138,000	50,902	3,661	1,129	4,790	3.5	7.2
1999	137,490	52,304	5,960	1,051	7,011	5.1	11.4
2000	144,390	53,437	6,482	967	7,449	5.2	12.1

※ This recalculation is based on the output criterion of the OECD research development costs
(R&D budget of the Department of Planning Budget is based on the government common standard from 2000)
1) FIP: Force Improvement Programs

Appendix 34

Defense R&D Investments of Major Military Powers

Country \ Year		1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Unit
US	MND budget (A)	274,624	271,739	257,975	253,423	252,379	US$ (million)
	R&D budget (B)	36,597	35,772	36,404	36,469	35,324	
	Ratio (B/A)	13.30	13.16	14.11	14.39	14.00	(%)
United Kingdom	MND budget (A)	35,725	34,196	35,736	36,111	33,254	US$ (million)
	R&D budget (B)	3,408	3,422	3,491	3,785	3,909	
	Ratio (B/A)	9.54	10.01	9.77	10.48	11.75	(%)
France	MND budget (A)	42,240	37,861	32,711	30,703	28,353	US$ (million)
	R&D budget (B)	5,525	4,932	3,821	3,254	3,148	
	Ratio (B/A)	13.08	13.03	11.68	10.60	11.10	(%)
Germany	MND budget (A)	34,625	32,745	26,641	26,002	23,790	US$ (million)
	R&D budget (B)	1,981	1,850	1,487	1,410	1,262	
	Ratio (B/A)	5.72	5.65	5.58	5.42	5.30	(%)
Japan	MND budget (A)	53.4	46.4	41.7	37.6	39.9	US$ (billion)
	R&D budget (B)	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.0	1.1	
	Ratio (B/A)	3.00	3.02	3.12	2.66	2.76	(%)
Russia	MND budget (A)	48,577 (59,379)	80,185	104,300 (83,000)	81,765	-	Russia Rubles (billion) ※ ( ) is revised
	R&D budget (B)	4,936	6,475	11,574	10,800	-	
	Ratio (B/A)	10.16	8.08	11.10	13.2	-	(%)
China	MND budget (A)	7.47	8.6	9.7	11.0	-	US$ (billion)
	R&D budget (B)	-	-	-	-	-	
	Ratio (B/A)	-	-	-	-	-	(%)

※ Source (excluding Russia, China) : *The Military Balance* 1999-2000

* Unit : Constant 1997 US$million (Japan : 1998 US$billion)

Appendix 35

Status of Dual-Use Technology Development Assignments

Classification	Assignments	Remarks
Assignments planned in 1997 (3)	• High output coil laser. • Uncooled thermal imaging device. • Auxiliary power unit.	Supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology
Assignments planned in 1998 (4)	• Wideband adaptive antenna for satellite communication. • High voltage/super capacitor. • Carbon-carbon brake disk. • Semi autonomous underwater vehicle & manipulater technology.	
Assignments planned in 1999 (12)	• Low Capacity ATM switching system. • Automatic intellectual tracking/recognition algorithm of multi targets. • Neutron detector using semiconductor. • Phase shifter/radiating element module for the passive phased array antenna. • Traveling wave tube. • High sensitive, broadband DLVA. • High voltage power supply for high power amplifier. • Multi-channel high temperature superconducting SQUID(Superconducting Quantum Interference Device) Sensor technology. • Magnetite coating treatment by using Plasma. • Semiconductor bridge. • Digital controlled anti brake system. • High performance hydraulic serve valve.	Supported by the MND
Assignments planned in 2000 (4)	• Real time simulation using 3D-VR. • Blind Source Noise Cancellation technology. • Shock-absorbing titanium alloy. • High Voltage/ high current closing switches.	Supported by the MND

Appendix 36

Status of Transferring Defense Science and Technology to Civil Industries

■ Industries/Organization

Name	Approved Cases	Transferring Enterprise/Institution	Remarks
Information on computer instruction and graphics S/W	46	LG Software, Ministry of Maritime Affairs & Fisheries, Headquarters of Air Force, Defense Security Command, National Intelligence Service, Korean Mechanics, Korea Telecomm. tech., Samsung Elec., Ministry of Environment, Handong Univ., Wisdom Enterprise, Korean Tele-optics, Army, Engineering Information 21, Emergency Planning Commission, Aerospace, Panasia Eng., Plus Telecom, Shinhwa, Girlim System, Korea Water Resources Corp., LG precision, Geobank, Media Data System, Korea Resources, More Tech., Daewoo Heavy Industries & Machinery, Choongang JDS.	Transferring Done (28)
		Korea Land Corporation, Samsung SDS, Dacom.	Transferring (3)
Infrared detecting device manufacture technology	1	Taesan, Precision Co. Ltd.	Transferring Done
Acoustic shielding device design technology	1	Unison Industry.	Transferring Done
300 ton-level catamaran type semi-submarine design technology	2	Korean Mechanics.	Transferring Done(2)
Analysis of ceramic oscillation and design technology	1	Daewon Electronics.	Transferring Done
Oil pressure driven control technology	3	Samsung Aerospace, Hyundai Precision, Korean.	Transferring Done(3)
S/W forecasting morning and evening in Korean coast	1	Korean Mechanics.	Transferring Done
Super-light deposition processing technology	1	Korean Tele-optics.	Transferring Done
Optical fiber device using optical fiber grating, optical fiber birefringence modulator etc. (4 types)	1	Donam System.	Patent Pending
Wireless ATM connection technology	2	Gauri Info-Comm. Corp., K-JIST.	Transferring Done(2)
Real time, flying orbit monitoring S/W	1	K-JIST.	Transferring Done
Closed circuit digital propelling device	1	Hankook Industrial Machinery.	Transferring Done
Design air pressure driven device for posture control	1	Aerospace Research Institute.	Transferring Done
Low noise, fast frequency shifting microwave signal generator	1	Radionics.	Transferring
Small size, high performance vein-pump design technology	2	Movies/Hanhwa.	Transferring (2)
Microwave vector receiver design technology	1	KMW.	Transferring
High performance molecular explosive, Improved composition techniques of HNIW	1	Dongwon Special Chemicals.	Transferring
Future tactical communication system technology	1	LG Innotek.	Transferring

■ Defense Industry

Name	Enterprise	Remarks
Highly explosive compound manufacturing and KM-180 refilling tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Compressed composite explosive (DXD52, 56) tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Molded composite explosive (DXD-3) tech. and mine refilling tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Propellant material composition tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Molded composite explosive (DXD-4) tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Compressed composite explosive (DXD-53) tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Compressed composite explosive (DXD-57) and Pentolite tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
HNS composition tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Molded composite explosive (DXD-5,6) tech.	Hanhwa	Transferring Done
Highly explosive compound processing tech.	Poongsan	Transferring Done

Appendix 37

Defense Education and Training System



Appendix 38

Status of ROK Armed Forces Digitization Training and Pursuit

1. Purpose of pursuit and needs

A. Purpose of pursuit

- Digitization Training for servicemen connected with civic digitization education.
- National defense digitization training will function as citizen's digitization education.
- Providing digitization training for the 200,000 discharging servicemen each year.
- Strengthen digitization training by the introduction of the defense chief information officer(CIO) system.

B. Needs

- Digitization of Armed Forces personnel on preparation for the future Information Warfare.
- Digitization training for servicemen to suit information-oriented society.
- Production of digitally educated personnel for national education environment.
- Production of digitized technical personnel by modernization of the digitization training system of Armed Forces.
- Strengthening digitization training for all service members following the introduction of CIO system and the construction of C4I and CALS.

2. Status of Digitization Training

A. Digitization Training System

Classification		Computer Technical Personnel	General Users
Army	Basic Education	Beginner's course for computer operation officers	Officer's Basic Course, Officer's Advanced Course, Army College (Lt. Colonel class, Colonel class)
	Career Education	Residence course of civilian graduate schools and of National Defense University	Self-Education of Service Unit (Division level or higher)
Navy	Basic Education	Computer Science department, General Administration Service School	Computer Science department, General Administration Service School
	Career Education	Residence course of civilian graduate school and of National Defense University	Navy College, Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University
Air Force	Basic Education	Computer training center, School of Communications and Electronics	Computer training center, School of Communications and Electronics, computer center in each service unit
	Career Education	Residence course of civilian graduate school and of National Defense University	Air Force College, Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University
Directly Subordinate Organization to MND	Basic Education	Residence course of civilian graduate school and of National Defense University	Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Defense Computing Center
	Career Education	Residence course of civilian graduate school and of National Defense University	Armed Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Defense Computing Center, KIDA, Civilian Organization

B. Digitization Training Records

(Units: Persons)

Classification		Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Subordinate to MND
1998	Total	14,423	8,739	2,861	1,821	1,002
	Users	13,404	8,088	2,790	1,725	801
	Managers	1,019	651	71	96	201
1999	Total	93,298	49,849	10,151	23,049	10,249
	Users	85,900	46,360	9,643	21,698	8,199
	Managers	7,398	3,489	508	1,351	2,050

C. Business Residence Course

(Units: Persons)

Classification	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Subordinate to MND
1998	549	120	69	64	296
1999	725	261	83	122	259

※ Intelligence communication education center, government computer information management center, information technology education center, industrial technology education center, etc.

D. Construction of Digitization Training Center for Division/Brigade level and higher level Units

(Units: Centers)

Classification	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force
1998	16	12	4	-
1999	43	25	11	7

E. Construction of Computer Education Center (PC room) for Company-level Unit

(Units: Centers)

Classification	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force
1999	6,842	5,978	459	405

※ Establishment of three 486 class PCs in company-level units(20,526 total): comfort kit, lease expired PC, etc.

3. Digitization Training Plans

A. Yearly Goals of Personnel Education

(Units: Persons)

Classification	2000	2001	2002
Total	200,000	270,000	270,000

B. Education Contents and Organization

Classification		Education Contents/Level	Education Organization
Intelligence Technical Personnel	· Intelligence System Masters/Doctorate · Intelligence System experience of 5 years or more	· Acquiring advanced intelligence policy and new technology · Possess the ability of R&D of core technology · Design information system and possess development tech.	· National defense university, Advanced Institute for Military Science and Technology · Domestic and foreign civilian college/research institution · Korea Institute for Defense Analysis · Government computer information administration center.
Intelligence System Management Personnel	· Intelligence, Signal Corps · Intelligence System Operation supporting personnel	· Possess ability for information system administration/operation · Possess the ability to support the execution of combined information warfare	· Candidate/refresher education - Each information communcation institute · Supplementary training - Civilian college/research institute
Users Of Intelligence System	· Major Ranked Person - Policy decision/managers - Leader of colonel-level or higher	· Advanced nation/Digitization policy of ROK armed forces and propelling direction · Combined information warfare /possess ability to execute CIO	· Senior service college/National defense university - CIO training course · Supplementary training - School institution/education center - Lecture tour
	· General Leader - Officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, - Military-civilian employee/regular jobs	· Possess operation ability of the Information System (C4I, Resource Administration System, OA, etc.) · Possess the ability to execute information warfare	· Candidate education - Officer/NCO training course · Refresher education - Armed forces staff college, senior service college, service school · Supplementary training - Information education center
	· Regular soldier	· Possess ability to use information tools · Acquiring 2nd level license of Information Searching Ability before discharge	· Information education center · Internet education center in battalion · PC room in company

C. Phase of Propelling Strategy in Detail

(1) Construction of Digitization Training Center (Division/Brigade level Unit)

(Units: Centers)

Forces \ Year	1998	1999	2000	2001 ~ 2002	Remarks
Total	16	43	55	36	
Army	-	18	28	-	Defense budget
	12	7	5	36	Supported by Ministry of Information and Communication
Navy	4	8	6	-	Defense budget
	-	3	5	-	Supported by Ministry of Information and Communication
Air Force	-	4	2	-	Defense budget
	-	3	9	-	Supported by Ministry of Information and Communication

※ During 2001 ~ 2002, 48 centers in division level unit or higher echelons will be equipped with 50 seats size training center

(2) Construction of National Defense Cyber Education System (2000~2002)

- Research on the Construction of Remote Defense System space(ADD project): 1999~2001
  - ※ Completion of research on defense cyber education system and the prototype
    =>Build cyber education system environment for the military
- Select test sites on the basis of research results, construct system and promote gradual enlargement.
- Establishing the foundation for defense remote education system by using the facilities of digitization training centers (150 centers)
  - ※ Enabling the digitization training and remote education through Defense Intranet
- Provide and support combined education environment for cyber education training.
- Cyber education system for civil service workers from the government organization and promote combined cyber education system in tandem with industry, schools and research centers

4. Expected Results

A. Increase digitization training opportunities for servicemen by the enlargement of training centers.

B. Develop digitized minds by high-tech digitization education.

C. Develop high-tech intelligence warfare ability by fostering information application ability for managers/officials/users.

※ Develop high-rank officials (battalion level or higher) to lead digitization→promote digitization policy, integrate digitization/possess CIO execution ability

D. Military's leading role in developing digitized personnel in realizing information-oriented society.

Appendix 39

Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Current Number of Military Personnel



(Unit : persons)

Classification	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Others
Total	759,059	608,903	74,739	68,049	7,368
Military personnel	691,600	560,500	67,850	63,250	-
Military civilians	28,583	13,980	4,834	4,799	4,970
Civilian government officials	2,398	-	-	-	2,398
Full-time reservists	36,478	34,423	2,055	-	-

Appendix 40

Status of Nations that Participated in the Korean War

■ Nations that Dispatched Combat Troop Units: 16 Nations

Allies	Number of Participants	Scale of Participation		
		Ground Force	Navy	Air Force
USA	1,789,000	8 Infantry Divisions 1 Marine Division 2 Regimental Combat Corps 302,483 Troops	Far East Navy US 7th Fleet	Far East Air Force
United Kingdom	56,000	2 Infantry Brigades 1 Marine Special Commando 14,198 Troops	17 Navy Vessels (Including 1 Aircraft Carrier)	-
Australia	8,407	2 Infantry Battalions 2,282 Troops	1 Aircraft Carrier 2 Destroyers 1 Frigate	1 Fighter Squadron 1 Transport Aircraft Formation
Netherlands	5,322	1 Infantry Battalion 819 Troops	1 Destroyer	-
Canada	25,687	1 Infantry Brigade 6,146 Troops	3 Destroyers	1 Transport Aircraft Squadron
New Zealand	3,794	1 Artillery Battalion 1,389 Troops	1 Frigate	-
France	3,421	1 Infantry Battalion 1,119 (1,185) Troops	1 Destroyer	-
Philippines	7,420	1 Infantry Battalion 1,496 Troops	-	-
Turkey	14,936	1 Infantry Brigade 5,455 Troops	-	-
Thailand	6,326	1 Infantry Battalion 1,294 (2,274) Troops	7 Frigates 1 Cargo Vessel	1 Transport Aircraft Formation
Greece	4,992	1 Infantry Battalion 1,263 Troops	-	1 Transport Aircraft Formation
Republic of South Africa	826	-	-	1 Fighter Squadron
Belgium	3,498	1 Infantry Battalion 900 Troops	-	-
Luxemburg	83	1 Infantry Platoon 44 (48)Troops	-	-
Columbia	5,100	1 Infantry Battalion 1,068 Troops	1 Frigate	-
Ethiopia	3,518	1 Infantry Battalion 1,271 Troops	-	-

■ Nations that Dispatched Medical Support Units and Facilities: 5 Nations

Allies	Number of Participants	Scale of Participation	
		Service Personnel	Support Unit and Facilities
Sweden	160	154(162)	Red Cross Hospital
India	627	70(333)	60th Field Hospital
Denmark	630	100	Hospital ship
Norway	623	105(109)	Mobile Surgical Hospital
Italy	128	72	68th Red Cross Hospital

※ Participated Troops were counted according to the maximum amount of troops at the end of the Korean War (1953. 7.)
※ Number inside of parenthesis indicates maximum number of troops during the Korean War.

Appendix 41

Casualties during the Korean War

(Unit : persons)

Allies	Total	Killed in Action/Death	Wounded in Action	Missing in Action	Prisoners of War
Total	776,360	178,569	555,022	28,611	14,158
South Korea	621,479	137,899	450,742	24,495	8,343
U.S.	137,250	36,940	92,134	3,737	4,439
United Kingdom	4,908	1,078	2,674	179	977
Australia	1,584	339	1,216	3	26
Netherlands	768	120	645	-	3
Canada	1,557	312	1,212	1	32
New Zealand	103	23	79	1	-
France	1,289	262	1,008	7	12
Philippines	398	112	229	16	41
Turkey	3,216	741	2,068	163	244
Thailand	1,273	129	1,139	5	-
Greece	738	192	543	-	3
South Africa	43	34	-	-	9
Belgium	440	99	336	4	1
Luxemburg	15	2	13	-	-
Columbia	639	163	448	-	28
Ethiopia	657	121	536	-	-
Norway	3	3	-	-	-

※ The number of ROK Army's POWs includes the number of POWs who were exchanged and additionally repatriated.

Appendix 42

Comparison of Military Powers between South and North Korea during the Korean War

Classification	Units / Troops		Major Equipments	
	South	North	South	North
Ground Force	Infantry: 8 divisions Marine: 1 dnit Other support dnits 96,140 persons	Infantry: 10 divisions Tank: 1 brigade Other mechanized units, guards, special units 191,680 persons	Howitzer: 91 Anti-tank artillery: 140 Mortars: 960 Armored Vehicles: 27	Howitzer: 552 Anti-tank artillery: 550 Mortars: 1,728 Armored Vehicles: 54 Tanks: 242
Navy	7,715 persons	4,700 persons	Guarding Ship: 28 Auxiliary Vessel: 43	Guarding Ship: 30 Auxiliary Vessel: 80
Air Force	1,897 persons	2,000 persons	Training/Liaison Plane : 22	Fighter/Bomber/Others : 211
Total	105,752 persons	198,380 persons		

Appendix 43

Comparison of Economy Indices between South and North Korea around the Korean War

Classification	South	North	Remarks(Year)
Total Population (Millions)	20.19	9.75	1949
GNP ($ millions)	710	390	1949
Total Food Products (10,000 ton)	345.5	124.4	1950
Total Aquatic Products (10,000 ton)	21.6	27.3	1949
Total Coal Production (10,000 ton)	112.9	400.5	1949
Total Production of Electric Power (10,000 Kilowatts)	23.1	104.7	1950
Total Length of Rail roads (Km)	4,423	3,815	1950
Total Length of Road (Km)	24,932	13,549	1949
Total Trade Volume ($ millions)	140	510	1949

※ Source: The Changes in Viewpoint of ROK' s Economic World (Aug. 1998, National Bureau of Statistics)

Appendix 44

Establishment Plans of Military Environmental Facilities

(Unit: Centers)

Classification	Total Requirement	Maintain (by 2000)	Mid-term Plans					
			2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total
Total	4,427	851	540	1,119	1,160	416	341	3,576
Waste Water Disposal Facilities	1,308	632	279	222	175	0	0	676
Combined Purifying Group	621	74	261	151	135	0	0	547
Incinerating Facilities	229	138	0	26	27	26	12	91
Noise Preventing Facilities	13	7	0	2	1	2	1	6
Soil Contamination Preventing Facilities	2,256	0	0	718	822	388	328	2,256
Required Budgets (billion won)		2000:15.0	84.5	77	68.6	10.7	10	250.8

Appendix 45

Classification of Military Owned Lands and Buildings

(As of December 31, 1999)

■ Lands

(Unit: Hectares)

Use \ Service	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Subordinate to MND
Total	136,561	96,020	10,926	17,757	11,857
Building	26,004	20,929	987	1,571	2,518
Training	67,914	52,163	2,584	7,250	5,917
Ammunition	12,306	10,415	693	921	277
Air field	8,333	1,016	191	6,897	228
Other sites	22,004	11,497	6,471	1,119	2,917

■ Buildings

(Unit: Hectares)

Use \ Service	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Subordinate to MND
Total	2,300	1,515	238	343	205
Administration	304	155	30	53	66
Residence	993	690	109	119	76
Factory	149	83	20	43	3
Storage	376	273	23	69	10
Other	479	314	56	59	50

Appendix 46

National Defense Committee of the National Assembly

■ Functions of the Committee

The Committee performs the examination of bills and petitions falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense(MND) and concerning affairs of the National Security Council(NSC), carries out the inspection and investigation of the State Administration on the Administrative Agencies under its jurisdiction and takes on other duties as prescribed by law.

■ Committee Activities for 1999/First Half of 2000 (Related to the MND)

Classification	Committee Meeting	Contents
The 201st Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (Feb. 8 ~ Mar. 9)	Feb. 24, 1999	· Organizes the evaluation subcommittee to improve the defense capacity. · Reports on the pending defense issues and answers questions.
The 203rd Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (April 9 ~ May 3)	April 14	· Decides to organize the petition evaluation subcommittee. · Reports the investigation results on the death of Army 1st Lieutenant Kim, Hun and answers questions.
	April 23	· Reports the examination results of evaluation subcommittee to improve defense capacity. · Reports the reinvestigation results on the death of Army 1st Lieutenant Kim, Hun.
	April 27	· Reports main pending issues/investigation on conscription absurdity and answers questions.
	May 3	· Deliberates and decides on the legislative bill of reporting and opening conscription records of public servants to the public.
The 204th Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (May 31 ~ June 25)	June 10	· Reports the situation of North Korean patrol boats intruding the Northern Limit Line(NLL) and answers questions.
	June 17	· Reports plans to deal with North Korean ships intruding the Northern Limit Line and answers questions. · Chooses the resolution "Warning towards North Korea".
The 206th Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (Aug. 2 ~ Aug. 14)	Aug. 10	· Decides on the bill of establishment of National Defense College and to choose the revised acts among the acts on the military personnel acts. · Reports examination results of petition evaluation subcommittee. · Reports pending issues and answers questions.

Classification	Committee Meeting	Contents
The 207th Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (Aug. 17 ~ Sep. 9)	Sep. 7, 1999	· Reports on the main pending issues. · Reports on the current military situation of North Korea and our military readiness concerning the North's declaration of NLL nullification and answers questions.
The 208th Regular Session of the National Assembly (Sep. 10 ~ Dec. 18)	Sep. 20	· Decides on the proposed plans on the Inspection of State Administration in 1999. · Approves organizing the subcommittee that writes the final report on the Inspection of State Administration in 1999.
	Sep. 21	· Decides on the bill of approval of settlement of accounts and disbursement of reserve fund for the fiscal year of 1998. · Reports on the current issues on the troop dispatch to East Timor and answers questions.
	Sep. 29~Oct. 18	· Inspects State Administration (20 organizations including MND, Joint Chiefs of Staff, each Service HQs, etc.).
	Nov. 5	· Reports on the crashing accident of an air force fighter.
	Nov. 17	· Reports on the budget bill of tax revenues and annual expenditures for 2000 and answers questions. · Reports on the pending problems of spreading defoliant in the DMZ and answers questions.
	Nov. 18	· Decides on the budget bill of tax revenues and annual expenditures for 2000.
	Nov. 23	· Approves the revised service acts. · Approves organizing the fact-finding committee for the crashing accident of the air force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ. · Reports on the pending problems of the crashing accident of the air force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ.
	Nov. 24	· Investigates the crashing accident of the air force fighter.
	Nov. 29	· On-site investigation of the defoliant spread in DMZ.
	Dec. 1	· Decides to choose the final report on the Inspection of State Administration. · Reports on the investigation on the crashing accident of the air force fighter and the spreading of defoliant in the DMZ.
Being out of Session	May. 17, 2000	· Reports on the main pending defense issues including the Baekdu project and answers questions. ※ The 15th National Assembly's last Committee Session.
The 212th Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly (June 16 ~ July 4)	June. 22	· Reports on the status of duty of the MND and answers questions. ※ The 16th National Assembly's 1st Committee Session.
	June. 28	· Reports on the work status of the Military Manpower Administration Agency and answers questions.

■ Members of National Defense Committee, National Assembly

Chairman

Chun, Yong Taek

The Grand National Party
(Executive Member)

Park, Se Hwan

Kang, Sam-Jae

Kang, Chang-Sung

Kim, Ki Bae

Kim, Tae Ho

Park, Sung-Kook

Lee, Yun Sook

Lee, Hoi-Chang

Chung, Jeymoon

The Millennium
Democratic Party
(Executive Member)

Yu, Sam Nam

Park, Sang Kyu

Rhee, In-Je

Chang, Young Dal

Chyung, Dai Chul

Choi, Myung Hun

Hahn, Hwa Kap

Independent

Kang, Chang Hee

Appendix 47

Status of the Enactment and Revision of Defense-related Acts

■ Organization Field

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Act on the Organization of National Armed Forces	Enacted no. 9 (Nov. 30, 1948)	· Determines the defense organization establishment system.
	Partially revised no. 2642 (Oct. 10, 1973)	· Assigns Marine Corps to the Navy and uses colors for classification. · Prepares grounds to authorize each service component commander a part of the authority given to the Minister of National Defense in order to establish units and organizations under control.
	Partially revised no. 2829 (Dec. 31, 1975)	· Determines details of establishing Joint Chiefs of Staff and of composing Joint Chiefs of Staff Council.
Act on the Establishment of National Defense College	Enacted no. 937 (Dec. 31, 1961)	· Establishes National Defense College as subordinate to the MND to nurture officers who can contribute to national security.
	Partially revised no. 3202 (Dec. 28, 1979)	· Classifies education course as security course, master's course, special short term course. · Establishes National Security Research Institute.
	Nullification and Enactment no. 6017 (Sep. 7, 1999)	· Enacts Act on the Establishment of National Defense College to unify National Defense College and National War College.
Act on the Establishment of Short-term Military Academy	Enacted no. 2073 (Dec. 21, 1974)	· Establishes short-term military academies to train short-term service officers.
	Partially revised no. 3112 (Dec. 5, 1978)	· Grants college admission to graduates of short-term military academy.
	Partially revised no. 3596 (Dec. 31, 1982)	· Undergraduate course newly-established.
	Partially revised no. 4838 (Dec. 31, 1994)	· Changes admission requirements to admit 2-year college graduates or those who have completed 2-years or more in a 4-year college.
Act on the Establishment of Korea Armed Forces Nursing Academy	Enacted no. 2828 (Dec. 31, 1975)	· Prepares establishment grounds for Korea Armed Forces Nursing School (3-year course) as subordinate to MND to train armed forces nurses.
	Partially revised no. 3247 (Jan. 4, 1980)	· Changes Korea Armed Forces Nursing School to Korea Armed Forces Nursing Academy. · Grants 2-year college nursing degree qualifications to those commissioned as second lieutenants after graduation.
	Partially revised no. 3267 (Dec. 4, 1998)	· Changes 2-year college course to 4-year college course.
Act on the Establishment of Military Academy	Enacted no. 374 (Oct. 1, 1955)	· Establishes a 4-year military academy to train army · navy · air force career officers.
	Partially revised no. 2670 (Dec. 31, 1973)	· Adds Bachelor of Arts and Sciences and Bachelor of Engineering courses to the general education course.
	Partially revised no. 5058 (Dec. 29, 1995)	· Changes admission requirements to recruit female cadets.

■ Personnel Affairs

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Military Personnel Act	Enacted no. 1006 (Jan. 20, 1962)	· Regulates various fundamental laws related to military personnel administration.
	Partially revised no. 3265 (Dec. 4, 1980)	· Expands the application of Military Personnel Act to reservists. · Classifies long-term service NCO and short-term service NCO.
	Partially revised no. 4085 (Mar. 22, 1989)	· Changes the rank structure of NCO. · Newly establishes the branch of air defense artillery in the basic branch of Air Force. · Establishes Honorable Discharge Policy for personnel with 20 years or more in service.
	Partially revised no 4839 (Dec. 31, 1994)	· Newly establishes the policy of workplace difficulty resolution. · Newly establishes education on vocational guidance.
	Partially revised no. 5703 (Jan. 29, 1999)	· Establishes officer promotion committee meeting of marine corps in the headquarters command of marine corps.
Appointment of Military Advocates Act	Enacted no. 243 (April 24, 1952)	· Prepares grounds for the appointment of judge advocates.
	Partially revised no. 1904 (Mar. 3, 1967)	· Judge advocates should be treated at the same level as a civilian judge or a prosecutor.
Act on Military Court	Enacted no. 1004 (Jan. 20, 1962)	· Newly established.
	Partially revised no. 2539 (Feb. 17, 1973)	· Newly establishes the policy of transferring cases between the military prosecution department and the civilian prosecution. · Newly establishes the policy of immediate appeal and changes causes for arrest. · Newly establishes the regulation for issuing detention warrant after arresting criminals in the act.
	Partially revised no. 3993 (Dec. 24, 1987)	· Revises name to military court.
	Partially revised no. 4704 (Jan. 5, 1994)	· Unites High Military Court in the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and that in the headquarters of each service, and establishes it inside the MND. · Separates military prosecution department from military court and newly establishes the policy of criminal investigation. · Grants military judges the authority to issue warrant for arrest, and guarantees the approval of the unit commander before being arrested by the prosecutor. · Newly establishes the policy of informal trial.
	Partially revised no. 6037 (Dec. 28, 1999)	· Introduces the policy of urgent arrest. · Newly establishes the policy of notifying charges. · Introduces the policy of summary judgment.
Act on Military Civilian Employees Personnel Administration	Enacted no. 1337 (May 1, 1963)	· Establishes the standards for personnel administration, such as the definition of military employees and their treatment, qualifications, etc.
	Totally revised no. 3342 (Dec. 31, 1980)	· Changes the name of military employee to military civilian employee · Classifies regular and special military civilian employees.
	Totally revised no. 4159 (Dec. 30, 1989)	· Classifies regular and functional military civilian employees and introduces the regulation of appointment after examination. · Newly establishes the policy of workplace difficulty resolution.
	Partially revised no. 5061 (Dec. 29, 1995)	· Guarantee of social status for class I military civilian employee shall be eliminated. · Administrative litigation for long-term sentence must pass through the military civilian employee administrative adjudication committee.
Act on the Treatment of Prisoners of War	Enacted no. 5705 (Jan. 29, 1999)	· Establishes and enforces the basic policies regarding prisoners of war such as repatriation plans, and prepares grounds for compensation once they return.

■ Logistics

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Act on the Management of Military Supplies	Enacted no. 1310 (Mar. 23, 1963)	· Establishes the standards for the management of military supplies based on article 3 of Act on Materiel Management.
	Partially revised no. 4248 (Aug. 1, 1990)	· The heads of organizations subordinate to MND and the Chief of Staff of each service component shall lease the military supplies in an emergency when executing combined operations with foreign forces, and must get the approval from the Minister of National Defense afterwards.
Act on Special Measures for Defense Industry	Enacted no. 2540 (Feb.17, 1973)	· Enacted for the purpose of promoting development of logistics industry and contributing to the procurement of logistics material.
	Partially revised no. 3003 (July 23, 1977)	· Establishes logistics industry promoting funds.
	Partially revised no. 3699 (Dec. 31, 1983)	· Renames Special Act on Logistics Procurement as Special Act on Defense Industry.
	Partially revised no. 5614 (Dec. 31, 1998)	· Encourages the participation of the competent industries in the defense industry. · Newly establishes the policy on supporting exportation.

■ Facility/Communication Fields

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Protection of Military Installations Act	Enacted no. 2388 (Dec. 26, 1972)	· Establishes military facility protection area for the purpose of protecting military facility and securing efficient military activities guaranteeing safety.
	Partially Revised no. 3497 (Dec. 31, 1981)	· Classifies military facility protection area as controlled protection area and restrained protection area. · Establishes the military facility protection area review committee in MND.
	Partially Revised no. 5270 (Jan. 31, 1997)	· Reduces and readjusts the scope of restricted areas for civilians to resolve inconveniences of those living near the DMZ. · Prepares grounds to appoint anti-aircraft defense coordinated area.
Military Telecommunications Act	Enacted no. 901 (Dec. 30, 1961)	· Establishes grounds to protect military telecommunication functions that contribute to military administration as well as execution of operations.
	Partially revised no. 4346 (Mar. 8, 1991)	· Establishes grounds for consulting with the related central administrations' organizations when removing obstacles etc.

■ Martial Law/Requisition

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Martial Law Act	Enacted no. 69 (Nov. 24, 1949)	· Prepares grounds for the military to restrain the rights and obligations of people for the benefit of national security, in times of war, disaster, or in a state of national emergency.
	Totally revised no. 3442 (April 17, 1981)	· In the case of security status martial law, the national assembly must be informed. · Sufficient compensation shall be made when having damaged the peoples' properties in the area of emergency martial law.
Requisition Act	Enacted no. 1336 (May 1, 1963)	· Establishes details about requisition and compensation for materials, facilities, or rights which are essential to the military operations in the area of emergency martial law.
	Partially revised no. 2263 (Dec. 31, 1970)	· Establishes legal procedures for requesting payment for requisition compensation.
	Partially revised no. 3527 (Dec. 31, 1981)	· Eliminates articles that allow the requisition of real estates necessary for military operations even in time of peace.

■ Conscription Affairs

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Military Service Act	Enacted no. 41 (Aug. 6, 1949)	· Requires compulsory military service all male citizens.
	Totally revised no. 444 (Aug. 15, 1957)	· Classifies service status as 3 categories of active duty, reserve, and citizen service. · Newly establishes the regulation of short-term service for elementary school teachers.
	Totally revised no. 1163 (Oct. 1, 1962)	· Classifies service status as active duty, reserve, replacement status, and citizen service. · Establishes the conscription office in order to divide draft administration duties.
	Partially revised no. 2226 (Aug. 7, 1970)	· The head of the conscription office will supervise the administration of draft.
	Totally revised no. 2259 (Dec. 31, 1970)	· Enforces military education for those enrolled in high school level or higher. · Part of draft administration will be authorized by the ward head, mayor, county chief, etc.
	Partially revised no. 3111 (Dec. 5, 1978)	· For those drafted in active service with qualifications of a judge, prosecutor, doctor, pastor, or priest shall be allowed to be transferred to active or reserve officer status.
	Totally revised no. 3696 (Dec. 31, 1983)	· Abolishes the Act on the Special Treatment of Military Obligation and the Act on the Special Measures for the Disobedience of Military Service. The contents of these two acts will be united. · For those killed or injured during military education, compensation shall be made in veteran's welfare, and medical facilities of the military shall be made available. · Expands the policy on postponing the examination of conscripts to include those enrolled in high school.
	Totally revised no. 4685 (Dec. 31, 1993)	· Abolishes reserve conscript system and newly establishes full-time reserve service system and public service personnel system. · Unites the acts on regulation of military obligation .

Name	Law Number and Date of Promulgation	Main Contents
Military Service Act	Partially revised no. 4840 (Dec. 31, 1994)	· Newly establishes the pro bono lawyer system. · Newly establishes the law of criminal punishment for public service personnel who are absent without leave for 8 days or more.
	Partially revised no. 5271 (Jan. 13, 1997)	· Selects full time reserve service system draftees by draft only · Abolishes technical qualifications for those who apply for skilled industrial personnel.
	Partially revised no. 5757 (Feb. 5, 1999)	· Draft administration affairs commissioned to a town, *Myon* (a subdivision of a *Kun*), or a village shall be restored to a local conscription office. · Imports the policy of dedicated physicians for the examination of conscripts. · Adjusts the age that qualifies for exemption from the military service for overseas immigrants (31 years of age →36 years of age).

Appendix 48

Reform of the Judicial System of ROK Armed Forces

□ Outline

· Reorganized the armed forces judicial organization and operating system
· Enhanced the efficiency · fairness · reliability of the judicial system

□ Direction of Reform

· Strengthened the command authority of the armed forces → Established division level common military courts
· Established the principle of restraint and balance/enhanced the fairness of decision → Reorganized the judicial organization (separated the military court from the military prosecution)
· Strengthened the competitiveness of the judicial organization → Reform the judge advocate acquisition and personnel management system
· Promoted the interests of servicemen → Supplemented the public defense department, imported the summary judgment system

□ Established Division Level General Military Courts

· Abolished restriction on establishing a total of 50 (34 in the Army, 7 in the Navy, 9 in the Air Force) division-level unit general military courts
· Prepared for a harmonious management of military court in times of war and secured basic rights for the accused by quick judgments

□ Revamped Judicial Organization

· Divided/separated judicial and prosecuting organizations
- Abolished MND Legal Affairs Service → Newly established High Military Court /MND Prosecutor's Office
- Separated/established military court in each headquarters
· Assigned general officer as the head of High Military Court
· Organized special department in the MND Prosecutor's Office to settle large/mid-sized cases
· Operate the Second Division of High Military Court in each service headquarters
· Endowed the functions of examining laws and research by means of establishing the Military Justice Research Division

□ Improved Recruit/Management of JAG Officers

· Improved the appointment examination of JAG officers (recruiting annually)
· Arranged the ground for appointing reserve service judge advocates into judges
· Promoted maintaining lawyer status for the JAG officers who were discharged by accidents in line of duty or sickness during the mandatory service
· Expanded the opportunities of overseas training courses for judge advocates
· Varied the source of recruiting JAG officers (including foreign license holders)
· Promoted the stipulation of acts regarding the treatment of JAG officers

□ Newly Established the Public Defense Department

· Newly established the public defense department in each service headquarters and in High Military Court
· Operating the pool system for public defenders in military court

□ Final Evaluation

· Assigned the jurisdiction for military justice to the division-level commanders
· Protected the rights of the accused by establishing the public defense department
· Enhanced professionalism and trust within and outside the military by separating the military court from the military prosecution
· Substantiated the military law personnel and boosted their morale

Appendix 49

Major Deregulation List Concerning Civil Petition

Classification	Context	Date of Operation
Restrictions Concerning Registration of Reserved Forces (2 Cases)	1. Nullify members of reserved forces' reporting. 2. Nullify reporting changes of residential area and military service record.	July 1, 1999
Restrictions Related to Military Purveyance Firm Registry (3 Cases)	3. Nullify military purveyance firm registry and the term of validity. 4. Nullify researching the actual condition of military purveyance firm. 5. Made drastic cut on the safety diagnosis items of military purveyance firm (1,235⇒361 items).	July 16, 1998
Restrictions Related to Non-profit corporation Supervision (6 Cases)	6. Nullify the property changes reporting of non-profit corporation. 7. Nullify the property increase reporting of non-profit corporation. 8. Nullify the member selection reporting of non-profit corporation. 9. Nullify the member inauguration approval of non-profit corporation. 10. Nullify property transferring and disposition and issue of bonds reporting of non-profit corporation. 11. Nullify the disposition of fundamental property and the approval of issue of bonds of non-profit corporation.	Jan. 11, 1999
Restrictions Related to Military Pension (10 Cases)	12. Nullify submitting accompanying documents to request reissuing military pension certificate application. 13. Nullify the obligation of appointing representative for salary receiving personnel. 14. Nullify address change(changing name and etc) reporting obligation of pension receiving personnel. 15. Nullify submitting accompanying documents when reporting changes on pension payment institution. 16. Nullify reporting receiving-personnel' s re-retirement retirement pension. 17. Nullify reporting obligation on selecting(change, dissolution) representative of the family of the deceased. 18. Nullify reporting obligation of the birth of an unborn child of receiving personnel of the family of the deceased pension. 19. Improvement on accompanying documents when reporting for re-employment(re-inauguration) receiving personnel of retirement pension. 20. Improvement on reporting personal history of overseas residents' retirement pension. 21. Improvement reporting loss of receiving rights of the family of the deceased pension.	Dec. 18, 1998

Appendix 50

The Government' s Administrative Projects in the Field of Defense

Number of Projects : Total 64

Subject	Time taken for measure (deadline)	Section in charge
<Military Structure oriented toward Technology and Information>		
□ Transparency and rationalization of the Force Improvement Program (FIP)		
* The redirecting of force improvement and its goal	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Acquisition Policy Bureau
* System of pre-evaluation and post evaluation of the departments	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Analysis and Evaluation Bureau
* Improving the usage and the weapons-cost information gathering	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Analysis and Evaluation Bureau
* Improvement of acquirement development organization and procedure	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Acquisition Policy Bureau
* Preparation of the civilian specialist usage system for international contracts	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Programs Management Bureau
* Expanding support for Korean high-tech weapons R&D	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Programs Management Bureau
□ Efficiency of supply procurement		
* Strengthening the competitiveness and clearness of munitions purchasing and facilities ordering.	Continued	Logistics Management Bureau/ Military installations Bureau
* Investigation of the supply specialist agencies security	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Logistics Management Bureau
* Guaranteed participation in competing for the Defense Industrial Company	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Logistics Management Bureau
* Maximizing the use of Civilian resources	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Logistics Management Bureau
□ Expanding the competitiveness of the defense industry		
* Maintaining the systemization and specialization of the defense industry	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Acquisition Policy Bureau
* Defense industries development and the changing international defense industry co-operative	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Acquisition Policy Bureau
□ Structural reform for efficient and economic military management		
* Re-examination of the functions of senior ranks	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Planning and Coordination Bureau
* Simplifying the system of command	Finished (1st half of 2000)	Defense Reform Committee
* Reorganization of research body and the subsidiary organizations	2002	Planning and Coordination Bureau
* Integration of corps and common functions	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Planning and Coordination Bureau
□ Promoting of defense digitization for future warfare		
* Setting the main objective and direction for defense digitization	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Defense Digitization Planning Bureau
* C4I construction	Continued	Defense Digitization Planning Bureau
* Construction of the automated Information system	Continued	Defense Digitization Planning Bureau
* Development of the Information security system	Continued	Defense Digitization Planning Bureau
* Promoting of the Korean Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)	2002	Defense Reform Committee
* Reinforcing the education of the soldiers defense digitization knowledge	Continued	Defense Digitization Planning Bureau
□ Strong force built on solid training		
* Strengthen simulation training	Finished (1st half of 1999)	JCS Force Analysis Office
* Developing the next generation soldiers command and leadership ability	Finished (2nd half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* The improvement of living standards for the new generation of soldiers	Continued	Defense Reform Committee
* Promoting and developing the plan for better treatment and self-development of Non Commissioned Officer.	Continued	Defense Reform Committee
* Military schooling reform	Second half of 2000	Personnel and Welfare Bureau

Subject	Time taken for measure (deadline)	Section in charge
□ Elite orientation of reserved forces.		
* Betterment of reserved forces management system.	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Mobilization Bureau
* Operation preparedness supplementary for the homeland defense.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Mobilization Bureau
* Betterment of personnel management system for the commanders of reserved forces.	Finished (1st half of 1998)	Mobilization Bureau
<Fairness of the personnel management raises the morale of the troops>		
□ Build the ability first personnel management system.		
* Setting up the qualification of the main assignment to a position/ assignment to a position.	2nd Half of 2000	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* A system of advance notice for an assignment to the position by an echelon.	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* Betterment of a promotion system.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
□ Consideration for the professionalism of military manpower.		
* Setting up the occupation for the professional manpower.	Finished (1st half of 1998)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* Betterment of personnel management for professional manpower.	Finished (1st half of 1998)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* The ministry of national defense/JCS (joint chiefs of staff)/combined forces command, settle the assignment system (to a position) of the best manpower.	Finished (1st half of 1998)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
□ Betterment of service condition for the professional soldiers/ service men.		
* Betterment of service condition for the professional soldier.	Continued	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* Consideration on the efficiency of feeding management and betterment of a kitchen condition.	Continued	Logistics management Bureau
□ Support the transferred soldiers for stabilization of livelihood.		
* Reinforce the report activity on professions.	Continued	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* Magnify an employment occupation and betterment of honorable treatment.	Continued	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
<The ROK - U.S., and multilateral security system is essential for national defense>.		
□ Solidify the Korea - U.S. security corporation system.		
* Development of a joint defense project.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	JCS Central Directorate for Operations
* Resolve the defense cost sharing.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Policy Planning Bureau
* Deliberation about the military facilities of U.S. armed forces in Korea and removal of military bases.	Continued	Military Installations Bureau
□ Reinforce the military diplomacy with surrounding countries.		
* Build a military reliance with Japan.	Continued	Policy Planning Bureau
* Restrain North Korean provocations and, lead to the point in opening with China.	Continued	Policy Planning Bureau
* Exchange with Russia on defense scientific techniques, information, protection of marine resources, and military exchanges on related matters with Russia.	Continued	Policy Planning Bureau
□ Active participation in the multilateral security cooperation for all.		
* Participation of all, for Security Corporation in military field.	Continued	Arms Control Bureau
* Participation for all security policy development.	Continued	Arms Control Bureau

Subject	Time taken for measure (deadline)	Section in charge
<Accessible military facility for the people>		
□ Adjustment of military protection area and the expansion of the authorization limits for the government office		
* Revision of a variety of regulation on military facility protection areas.	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	JCS Central Directorate for Operations
* Adjustment of military facility protection areas.	Continued	JCS Central Directorate for Operations
□ The settlement of the issues of private land occupied by the military and re location of military facilities.		
* The project of relocation status of military facilities.	Continued	Military Installations Bureau
* Expedition of the settlement of the issues of private land occupied by the military.	Continued	Military Installations Bureau
* Transfer to the KEPCO from the military high voltage cable.	2002	Military Installations Bureau
□ Activities of enhancement of peoples benefits		
* Always ready for the disaster and accident relief system.	Finished (2nd half of 1998)	Logistics Management Bureau
* The military nature protection activities strengthen.	Continued	Military Installations Bureau
* The military campaign of publicity with the people.	Continued	Troop Information and Public Affairs Bureau
* Projects to commemorate the 50th Commemoration of the Korean war.	2002	Committe for the 50th Commemoration of Korean War
<The fairness of obligatory military service>		
□ Reform military service system to exterminate draft irrationality		
* Real Name Military Service Act for elected government officers and high-ranking public officials.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau / Military Manpower Adm.
* Limiting and discontinuing factors of military service exemption.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau / Military Manpower Adm.
* Reducing the scope of service exemption.		Personnel and Welfare Bureau / Military Manpower Adm.
* Public service personnel and full time reservist system has been upgraded.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau / Military Manpower Adm.
* Reinforcement for condition of medical discharge.	Finished (1st half of 1999)	Personnel and Welfare Bureau
* Justice and clearness of physical exams course.	2002	Military Manpower Adm.
<Productive national research and development project>		
□ Expedition for development of applied technology and putting the research results into practical use		
* The systematic promotion of civilian-military integrated technology research results.	Continued	Programs Management Bureau

Appendix 51

Chronology of ROK National Defense

Date		Contents
1945	Oct. 21	The national police was organized.
	Nov. 11	Ceremony to celebrate the creation of the Liberation Army Corps.
	Nov. 13	A military command was set up at the US Military Government Office.
	Dec. 5	The Military English school was created.
1946	Jan. 15	The South Chosun Defense Guard was created at Taeneung.
		Organization of one regiment for each province commenced space(nine regiments).
	Jan. 17	The Naval Midshipmen Academy (now the ROK Naval Academy) was established.
	Jan. 21	"Student-soldier alliance" incident forced private military organizations to be removed.
	Feb. 7	The South Chosun Defense Guard General Command was set up at Taenung.
	March 29	The Defense Command was renamed the Ministry of Defense (MOD).
	May 1	The South Chosun National Defense Guard Academy was created at Taeneung.
	June 15	MOD, the South Chosun National Defense Guard, and the Marine Corps were renamed the Domestic Guard Department (the Ministry of Unification and Defense, or MUD), the Chosun guard, and the Chosun Coasts Guard, respectively.
1947	Aug. 30	The Chosun Coast Guard took over the responsibility from the US Navy of guarding coastal areas.
1948	May 5	Aviation units were created under the direct control of MUD at Susaek.
	Aug. 16	Inauguration of the lst Minister of National Defense, Lee Bum-suk.
	Aug. 24	The ROK-US preliminary security agreement was concluded.
	Aug. 26	The US Preliminary Military Advisory Group (PMAG) in the ROK was created.
	Sept. 1	The Chosun Guard and the Chosun Coasts Guard were incorporated into the armed forces.
	Sept. 5	The Chosun Guard and the Coastal Guard were renamed as the Chosun Armed Forces and the Navy, respectively.
	Sept. 13	The Air Force received its first L-4 aircraft.
	Oct. 19	The 14th regiment rebelled in Yosun.
	Nov. 30	The law on formation of the armed forces was enacted.
	Dec. 15	The Army and the Navy General Commands were renamed as the Army Headquarters and the Navy Headquarters, respectively.
1949	Jan. 20	The preliminary order on the volunteer military personnel to save the nation was enacted.
	Feb. 15	The Women' s Aviation Training Unit was created.
	March 21	Shin Sung-mo was inaugurated as the 2nd Minister of National Defense (MND).
	April 15	The Marine Corps was created.
	May 12	The Army was reorganized into six divisions.
	June 30	The withdrawal of USFK was completed.
	July 1	The Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG) was created.
	Aug. 6	The Military Service Law was enacted.
	Oct. 1	The Air Force was created.
		The Air Force Headquarters announced its regulations on organization of an office.
	Oct. 17	The ROK' s first combatant ship named Paektusan (PC-class) was purchased from the US.
	Dec. 6	The first physical examination for conscription was held.
1950	Jan. 26	The ROK-US Mutual Defense Aid Treaty was concluded.
		The Agreement of the Establishment of the United States Military Advisory was organized.
	Feb. 28	The regulations on the duties of the military personnel were announced.
	March 2	The Naval Base Law and the Maritime Defense Act were enacted.
	April 14	The Military Personnel Assistance Law was enacted.
	April 28	The Military-owned Territories Law was enacted.
	June 25	The North Korean military crossed the 38th parallel, conducting an unprovoked attack on South Korea.
	July 2	The air force received its first F-51 fighter from the US.
	July 9	The 8th US Army Command was established in Taegu.
	July 11	The ROK Navy was incorporated into the Far East Navy.
	July 16	Operational control of the ROK Army, Navy and Air Force went to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

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1950	Sept. 1	The ROK Women's Army Corps was established.
	Sept. 15	The United Nations Forces (UNF) conducted the Inchon amphibious operation.
	Sept. 28	The ROK government recovered Seoul.
	Oct. 1	The ROK Armed Forces crossed the 38th parallel.
	Oct. 19	The ROK Armed Forces captured Pyongyang.
	Oct. 25	The Chinese Communist Army (CCA) entered the Korean War. (First engagement of the war with the CCA in Unsan)
	Dec. 1	The United Nations Command (UNC) decided upon a full retreat of the UNF.
1951	April 1	The Marine College was established.
	May 7	Lee Ki-bung was inaugurated as the 3rd Minister of National Defense.
	July 10	The plenary session of the armistice talks was initiated.
	Aug. 17	The Korean military attache office was established in the US.
	Oct. 26	Second recruit service personnel were called up.
	Oct. 30	The Korean Military Academy was reopened with its academic system transformed into a four-year course.
1952	March 29	Shin Tae-young was inaugurated as the 4th Minister of National Defense.
	May 7	At an enemy prisoner war camp in Koje Island, a rebellion occurred, and its commander MG Dodd was captured.
1953	April 6	At the armistice talks, a treaty on the exchange of wounded POWs was signed.
	June 3	A major law on mobilizing workers was enacted.
	June 30	Son Won-il was inaugurated as the 5th Minister of National Defense.
	July 27	The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed.
	Aug. 5	ROK-US talks were held in Seoul. POWs were exchanged at the truce village of Panmunjom.
	Oct. 1	The ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was concluded.
	Oct. 12	A coastal guard for defense of the peace line was inaugurated.
	Oct. 26	A preliminary to political talks was held at Panmunjom.
	Dec. 15	The First Army Command was created.
1954	Jan. 14	Second recruit service personnel were called up.
	Jan. 18	The coast guard installed signs at Tok-do, saying, "This island belongs to the ROK."
	March 21	The army's first field army commander took over the operational command authority of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps from the US.
	May 1	The Tok-do defense team composed of 20 civilians was dispatched.
	July 9	Naval cadets first engaged in cruise training.
	Aug. 12	At ROK-US military talks, it was agreed to reinforce the armed forces and to replace the reserve forces' old equipment.
	Sept. 2	The ROK government decided to arm Tok-do.
	Sept. 27	ROK-US military talks were held to discuss issues including reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces.
	Oct. 3	The ROK government took over administrative authority over all recaptured areas from the UNF.
	Oct. 20	The ROK Armed Forces took over the operational command authority of the 6th ROK Corps.
	Oct. 31	The Second Army Command was created.
	Nov. 18	The ROK-US memorandum of agreement (MOA) was signed, in which CINC UNC continued to have operational control authority of the ROK military.
	Nov. 20	Eighth US Army (EUSA) Headquarters was moved to Japan from the ROK.
	Nov. 23	At ROK-US military talks, reinforcement of the ROK Armed Forces was discussed.
1955	Jan. 14	At ROK-US military talks, naval power reinforcement was discussed.
	Jan. 28	ROK-US military assistance talks were held.
	June 21	ROK-US military-economy talks were held in Washington.
	Oct. 5	The first four-year Korea Military Academy (KMA) graduates (11th class).
1956	Feb. 20	The ROK Army and Navy Headquarters announced their regulations on organizations of an office.
	April 13	The military announced its cemetery regulations.
	May 26	Kim Yong-wu was inaugurated as the 6th Minister of National Defense.
	Sept. 21	ROK Armed Forces Day was announced as October 1.
	Oct. 26	The ROK joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA).
	Dec. 3	ROK-US combined military talks were held in Tokyo.

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1957	March 24	ROK-US military talks were held in Washington.
	May 22	The Military Armistice Commission's UN representative informed the ROK military of the committee's decision to modernize ROK's military equipment (removed line D of Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement).
	July 1	The UNC was moved to South Korea from Japan.
	July 6	Kim Jung-ryel was inaugurated as the 7th Minister of National Defense.
1958	Jan. 17	The ROK Air Force took over the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) from the US Air Force.
	Feb. 16	A Korean Air Lines DC-13 was hijacked.
	Feb. 19	The US State Department announced that USFK would not leave South Korea.
	April 13	The Air Force procured the first RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft.
	July 16	The Air Force procured the first H-19B/D helicopters.
1959	May 5	The ROK-US combined amphibious operation, "Turtle Training" was carried out.
	May 22	The MND took over arsenal operational authority from the USFK.
	July 15	An air control and warning system (AC&WS) was taken over from the US.
	July 27	The ROK succeeded in launching a rocket for the first time.
1960	May 2	Lee Chong-chan was inaugurated as the 8th Minister of National Defense.
	Aug. 23	Hyon Suk-ho was inaugurated as the 9th Minister of National Defense.
	Sept. 12	Kwon Chung-don was inaugurated as the 10th Minister of National Defense.
	Dec. 29	The number of the ROK Armed Forces was fixed at 600,000 under an agreement between the ROK and the US.
1961	Jan. 30	Hyun Suk-ho was inaugurated as the 11th Minister of National Defense.
	May 16	The 5 · 16 Military Coup occurred.
	May 20	Chang Do-young was inaugurated as the 12th Minister of National Defense.
	May 26	The UNC took over operational command of the ROK units mobilized for the 5.16 Military Coup.
	June 12	Song Yo-chan was inaugurated as the 13th Minister of National Defense.
	July 10	Park Pyong-kwon was inaugurated as the 14th Minister of National Defense.
	Aug. 19	ROK-US high-level military talks were held in Chinhae.
	Oct. 13	A ROK-US combined commanders meeting was held at EUSA headquarters.
	Dec. 27	The Homeland Reserve Forces Act was enacted.
1962	Jan. 20	A new military penal code, military administration and criminal law, military court martial law, and the military personnel law were enacted.
	March 17	The ROK-US high-level military talks were held in Washington.
	April 13	At the ROK-US high-level military talks, some issues were agreed upon including a military aid project.
	April 27	The Military Personnel Clothing Decree was announced.
		The rank badges of the enlisted men (EM) in the three services were unified and standardized.
	May 1	At the ROK-US high-level military talks, the issue of financing additional defense expenditures was agreed upon.
	July 30	The first ceremony of entering the student military training course was held.
1963	Jan. 28	The Military Pension, Military Pension and Special Account Laws were enacted.
	March 16	Kim Sung-eun was inaugurated as the 15th Minister of National Defense.
	May 1	A law on confiscation, one on noncombatants and one on military personnel salary were enacted.
	May 17	The ROK Armed Forces first procured a destroyer.
	June 1	The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established.
	Dec. 14	The National Security Council Act was enacted.
1964	Jan. 4	High-level ROK-US economy- and military-related talks were held.
	July 15	The Vietnamese government publicly asked the ROK for military assistance.
	Aug. 7	MND established the war history compilation committee.
	Dec. 19	US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to ROK President Park Chung Hee requesting that the ROK government dispatch its troops to Vietnam.
1965	Jan. 26	The ROK National Assembly passed an act on dispatching troops to Vietnam.
	Feb. 24	The Civil Defense Improvement Committee was set up under the National Security Council (NSC).
	March 10	The ROK's Dove Troops were dispatched to Vietnam.
	June 1	The ROK Armed Forces first organized NIKE guided missile forces.
	June 22	The ROK-US Treaty on Basic Relations was signed.
	June 28	ROK-Japan high-level military talks were held to review the issue of dispatching troops to Vietnam.

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1965	Sept. 6	The ROK-US military executive agreement in Vietnam was concluded.
	Oct. 3	The Blue Dragon Unit was sent to Vietnam.
	Oct. 16	The Wild Tiger Unit was sent to Vietnam.
1966	March 4	The ROK and US governments signed the Brown Memorandum and an MOA on the conditions under which the ROK government decided to dispatch its troops to Vietnam.
	March 15	A code of conduct and regulations for behavior were established and announced.
	June 22	The ROK defense minister and US Secretary of Defense discussed the issue of modernizing the ROK Armed Forces.
	July 9	The ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded.
	Aug. 30	The White Horse Unit was dispatched to Vietnam.
	Nov. 7	The office of the Korean military attache was set up in Japan.
1967	Jan. 19	A PCE-56 patrol boat was sunk by North Korean shore guns near the truce line in the East Sea.
	Sept. 5	ROK-US high-level military talks were held to discuss the issue of military aid.
	Nov. 3	The ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and US Secretary of State discussed modernizing the ROK Armed Forces and other issues.
	Dec. 28	The first Defense White Paper was published.
1968	Jan. 21	Armed North Korean agents attacked the Blue House.
	Jan. 23	The USS Pueblo was hijacked by North Korea.
	Feb. 28	Choi Young Hee was inaugurated as the 16th Minister of National Defense.
	April 1	ROK Reserve Forces was created.
	April 18	President Park Chung Hee held talks with US President Lyndon B. Johnson in Honolulu to discuss military aid and dispatch of ROK forces to Vietnam.
	May 28	A ROK Defense Minister first met a US Secretary of Defense in Washington.
	July 9	The UNC changed its rules of engagement, taking over ROK countermeasures authority, in particular the counter infiltration operations when North Korea infiltrated the DMZ.
	Aug. 5	Lim Chung-Shik was inaugurated as the 17th Minister of National Defense.
	Oct. 13	The 1st Focus-Lens Exercise was held.
	Oct. 15	The ROK-US Staff Group for Operations Planning was organized.
	Oct. 30	North Korean armed agents infiltrated into Ulchin and Samchok.
	Dec. 4	At the talks between ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State, increases in US military aid to the ROK were discussed.
1969	March 16	ROK-US Focus Retina combined operations were conducted.
	April 11	The ROK-Britain combined operations, "Foam Report" were carried out in the Yellow Sea.
	April 15	The US Navy' s E-121 reconnaissance aircraft was shot over the East Sea, killing 31 persons.
	June 4	The 2nd ROK-US defense cabinet members' meeting was held.
	June 16	Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) were set up at 16 teachers' colleges around the country.
	July 22	The ROK Defense Minister and US Secretary of State met to discuss reduction of the ROK Armed Forces.
	Oct. 20	The military executive agreement was signed between the ROK forces stationed in Vietnamese and the Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of Staff.
	Dec. 11	A Korean Air Lines YS-11 was hijacked by North Korea.
1970	March 10	Chung Lay Hyuk was inaugurated as the 18th Minister of National Defense.
	May 26	US government offered the last batch of free military aid to the ROK. (Free military aid was given over 25 years.)
	July 11	ROK-US high-ranking military talks were held to discuss reducing USFK and modernizing the ROK Armed Forces.
	July 22	The 3rd ROK-US defense cabinet level meeting was held in Honolulu.
	Aug. 6	The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) was created.
	Aug. 20	The Military Manpower Administration replaced the Bureau of Military Manpower.
	Sept. 1	The MND HQ building was moved from Huam-dong to Samkakji, Yongsan.
	Oct. 14	At ROK-US military talks, the two sides agreed to modernize and cut down the number of troops.
1971	Feb. 6	The 4th talks between ROK National Defense Minister and US Secretary of Defense were held in Seoul.

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1971	March 4	Freedom Bolt ROK-US combined airborne transport training was carried out.
	March 27	The US 7th Division was withdrawn from the ROK.
	April 1	The US Military Advisory Group in South Korea was incorporated into the US Joint Military Support Group.
	April 22	The ROK and the US agreed to build a factory for M-16 rifles.
	July 1	The ROK-US 1st Corps was established. (The US Army I corps was removed.)
	July 13	The annual 4th ROK-US SCM (renamed), was held in Seoul.
	Aug. 25	Yu, Jae-hung was inaugurated as the 19th Minister of National Defense.
	Sept. 21	A hot-line between the South and North Korean Red Cross organizations was set up at Panmunjom.
	Dec. 27	A special act was enacted on safeguarding the nation.
1972	Feb. 11	ROK Minister of National Defense Yu, Jae-hung held talks with Vietnamese President Thieu.
	May 18	A ROK-US high-level military working group meeting was held.
	June 27	The 5th annual ROK-US SCM was held at the US Air Force Academy.
	July 4	The ROK government announced a South-North joint communique stating that the two Koreas would try to unify peacefully and independently.
	Aug. 11	A ROK-US military working-level meeting was held to discuss withdrawing the ROK troops from Vietnam.
	Aug. 30	The first plenary session of the South-North Korean Red Cross talks were held in Pyongyang.
	Sept. 15	SOFA was signed between the ROK and West Germany Ministers of Defense.
	Oct. 12	The co-chairmen of the South-North Coordination Committee first met at Panmunjom.
	Dec. 26	The Military Secret Protection Law and the Military Facilities Protection Law were both announced.
	Dec. 29	The first official defense objectives were set up.
1973	Jan. 13	The 1st National Security Council was established in 1973 to discuss basic national security policies for 1974.
	Feb. 17	A special action law on military procurement was announced.
	March 23	The withdrawal of the ROK forces from Vietnam was completed.
	July 1	The Third Army Command was created.
	Aug. 28	The Mukwunghwa Conference was first held.
	Sept. 13	The 6th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Oct. 10	The Marine Corps was incorporated into the navy.
	Dec. 3	Suh, Chong-chul was inaugurated as the 20th Minister of National Defense.
1974	Jan. 18	President Park, Chung-hee proposed signing an inter-Korean nonaggression treaty.
	Jan. 21	The ROK-US Logistical Cooperation Group was established.
	Aug. 15	North Korean armed agent Mun, Se-kwang attempted to shoot President Park, Chung-hee and the first lady was killed.
	Sept. 24	The 7th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Honolulu.
	Nov. 15	Tunnel No. 1 aimed at infiltrating into the ROK was discovered under the DMZ by North Korea.
	Nov. 22	At ROK-US summit talks, the US reaffirmed its commitment to help defend the ROK.
1975	March 17	A small array of exercises, which had been carried out since 1961 were incorporated into the Doksuri (Foal Eagle) Exercise.
	March 19	Tunnel No. 2 was discovered.
	April 23	The ROK signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
	May 5	The Ulchi Exercise (ROK) and the Focus-Lens Exercise (the ROK and the US) were combined to become the Ulchi Focus-Lens Exercise.
	June 30	The Combat Reserve Forces was created.
	Aug. 27	The 8th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Sept. 2	A ceremony was held to celebrate the creation of the Student Defense Corps.
	Sept. 22	The Civil Defense Corps was created.
1976	May 26	The 9th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Honolulu.
	June 7	The Team Spirit Exercise was first carried out.
	Aug. 18	Axe-wielding North Korean armed agents intruded the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom.
	Sept. 6	Patrol zones in the Joint Security Area were divided.
1977	Feb. 1	Anti-submarine helicopters (ALT-III) were first procured.
	May 11	The ROK-US started the talks on the reduction of the USFK.
	July 20	The 10th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Dec. 20	Roh, Jae-hyun was inaugurated as the 21st Minister of National Defense.

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1978	July 6	The ROK and the US concluded a basic memorandum of understanding on Korean-made tanks.
	July 27	The 11th annual ROK-US SCM was held in San Diego.
	July 28	The 1st ROK-US military committee was held in San Diego.
	Sept. 26	The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) succeeded in test-firing a Korean surface-to-surface guided missile (Paeckgom).
	Oct. 17	Tunnel No. 3 was discovered.
	Nov. 7	The ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created.
1979	July 20	US President James Carter announced that the US would consider withdrawal of USFK.
	Oct. 19	The 12th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Oct. 26	The 10 · 26 Incident occurred.
	Dec. 12	The 12¡ Á12 Incident occurred.
	Dec. 14	Ju, Young-pok was inaugurated as the 22nd Minister of National Defense.
1980	Jan. 30	The Kobukson was launched, made according to the ancient turtle-ship.
	March 14	The ROK-US 1st corps was reorganized into the Combined Field Army (CFA).
	April 8	The first domestically-built destroyer Ulsan was launched in Chinhae.
	Dec. 4	The draft age was reduced to 19 and the military service term was cut to 30 months.
	Dec. 19	The top limit age for reservists was reduced from 35 to 33.
1981	Jan. 3	At the ROK-US military summit, a 14-point communique was announced including the cancell-ation of planned withdrawal of the USFK.
	April 30	The 13th annual ROK-US SCM was held in San Francisco.
	June 19	ROK-US naval maneuvers exercise was carried out in the East China Sea.
1982	Jan. 1	The conscription age was reduced to 20 from 21.
	March 31	The 14th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	May 21	Yun, Sung-min was inaugurated as the 23rd Minister of National Defense.
	Sept. 9	The first domestically made fighter F-5F named Ceykong was issued.
	Nov. 18	Korea' s first domestic patrol vessel PCC was launched.
1983	April 2	The ADD launched Korea' s first midget submarine, the Dolgorae.
	April 15	The 15th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
	Sept. 1	A Soviet fighter shot down a Korean Air flight near Sakhalin, killing all 269 passengers on board.
	Oct. 9	The Aungsan Cemetery in Yangoon, Burma, was bombed by North Korean special agents. Eighteen senior government officials, who were scheduled to pay respects at the cemetery were killed.
	Dec. 8	A ROK-US memorandum of understanding was concluded on the joint production of the 155 mm self-propelled artillery.
1984	May 10	The 16th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul. ROK-US combined air-ground exercises were carried out.
	June 25	A ROK-US memorandum of agreement was concluded on the ROK-US WRSA and the sale of stockpiled US supplies to South Korea.
	Aug. 4	The Emergency Resource Management Law was enacted.
1985	Feb. 15	The ROK government held a ROK-US joint standing conference on the export of helicopters to North Korea.
	May 8	The 17th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
	July 1	The air force started its operation of the automatic defense system.
	Aug. 22	Working-level delegations met in their third round of the South-North Korean Red Cross meetings.
	Sept. 21	The ADD demonstrated Hyunmu surface-to-surface guided weapons.
	Dec. 3	The plenary session of the 10th South-North Korean Red Cross Meeting was held.
	Dec. 31	The ADD succeeded in developing Korean armored personnel carriers (K-200).
1986	Jan. 1	Standby reservists service term was extended from 14 months, to 18 months, and the enlistment system was improved.
	Jan. 8	Lee, Ki-baek was inaugurated as the 24th Minister on National Defense.
	April 3	The 18th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Aug. 30	The first launching ceremony of domestically-produced minesweepers.

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1987	March 1	The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) was established.
	May 7	The 19th annual ROK-US SCM held in Washington, DC.
	June 25	South Korea joined in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
	July 14	Chung, Ho-yong was inaugurated as the 25th Minister of National Defense.
	Sept. 18	The christening ceremony and fire power testing of the Korean tank K-1 ("88 tank").
	Nov. 1	The ROK Marine Corps Command was separated from the navy.
	Nov. 29	A Korean airliner, a Boeing 707, was bombed by a North Korean agent (Kim, Hyun-hee) and crashed over the Andaman Sea.
1988	Feb. 26	Oh, Ja-bok was inaugurated as the 26th Minister of National Defense.
	April 29	The US government began to ask the ROK government to share the cost of protecting the gulf oil supply.
	June 8	The ROK-US Mutual Logistical Support Treaty was concluded.
		The ROK-US Defense Technology Tie-up MOU was concluded.
	June 9	The 20th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Dec. 5	Lee, Sang-hoon was inaugurated as the 27th Minister of National Defense.
	Dec. 29	The Defense White Paper began to be published on an annual basis(It was first published in 1967, but only periodically.).
	Dec. 31	The Disaster and Suspension Compensation System for army reservists was established.
1989	May 24	The ROK and Spain exchanged memoranda regarding the concept of defense industry cooperation.
	July 18	The ROK and the US concluded a MOU on the use of technology to produce defense products.
	July 19	The 21st annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
	July 22	ROK Army and Air Force HQs moved to Kyeryongdae.
	Sept. 26	The ROK and Italy concluded an MOU about governmental quality assurances for defense equipment.
	Dec. 30	Integration and Abolition of the Special Supplementary System.
1990	Jan 1	The age limit of homeland reservists was reduced from 35 to 33.
	Feb. 15	Talks between the ROK Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense were conducted.
	March 3	Tunnel No. 4 was discovered.
	March 24	The ROK Navy first participated in RIMPAC exercises.
	June 25	The ROK and the US agreed in principle to transfer the USFK base at Yongsan to a provincial city.
	July 31	The ROK and France Ministers of National Defense concluded a treaty on mutual support for the Chonma missile project.
	Sept. 4	The first South-North high-level talks were held in Seoul.
	Oct. 1	Under a new joint force system, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created.
	Oct. 8	Lee, Chong-ku was inaugurated as the 28th Minister of National Defense.
	Nov. 15	The 22nd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
	Dec. 29	The working-level negotiation team and on-the-spot investigation team were dispatched to Saudi Arabia with a mission to prepare for dispatching a medical care support team to Gulf War.
1991	Jan. 23	The ROK Armed Forces Medical Care Support Group was dispatched to the Gulf.
	Jan. 25	The treaty on creating JUSMAG-K was concluded.
	March 25	US senior representative of the United States Forces to the Military Armistice Committee was replaced by a representative from the ROK.
	July 1	The army' s air defense artillery was transferred to the air force.
		The air force' s Air Defense Artillery Command was established.
	Aug. 30	An MOU on the Korean fighter project was concluded between the ROK and US.
	Sept. 12	Korea' s first submarine (the Changbogo) was first procured from abroad (Germany) and was launched.
	Sept. 19	The ROK Armed Forces took full responsibility for guarding the entire 155-mile truce line.
	Oct. 1	A Korean military attache office was set up in Russia.
	Nov. 4	The ROK and Thailand concluded an MOU on logistical cooperation.
	Nov. 8	President Ro, Tae-woo declared that South Korea entirely gave up nuclear weapons.
	Nov. 21	The 23rd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
		The ROK and the US concluded the Wartime Host Nation Support.

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1991	Dec. 13	The South-North Basic agreement was concluded.
	Dec. 18	President Ro, Tae-woo declared South Korea was a nuclear-free zone.
	Dec. 20	Choi, Se-chang was inaugurated as the 29th Minister of National Defense.
1992	Jan. 7	The MND announced that it would not carry out the Team Spirit Exercise.
	Jan. 20	The ROK-North Korea joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
	March 2	The ROK and Spain concluded an MOU on acquisition and logistical support cooperation.
	March 4	The ROK and France concluded an MOU on defense industry and logistical support cooperation.
	June 26	The ROK and US dissolved the ROK-US CFA.
	Aug. 20	The US Air Force, Korea (AFK) first deployed US Patriot missiles in the ROK.
	Oct. 8	The 24th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
	Oct. 12	The launching ceremony of the first domestic submarine, the Ichon, was held.
1993	Feb. 26	Kwon, Young-hae was inaugurated as the 30th Minister of National Defense.
	April 23	The "Sangroksu" PKO unit was created to be dispatched to Somalia.
	June 17	ROK Navy HQ was moved to Kyeryongdae.
	July 30	PKO (engineer battalion) was Dispatched to Somalia.
	Sept. 16	The ROK-Italy concluded an MOU on logistical support and defense system cooperation.
	Sept. 22	ROK Navy vessels made the first visit to Russia' s Vladivostok port.
	Sept. 27	The ROK and the United Kingdom concluded the MOU in the Sphere of Defense Industrial and Logistical Support.
	Oct. 8	The first Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) was held.
	Nov. 4	The 25th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Dec. 22	Lee, Byong-tae was inaugurated as the 31st Minister of National Defense.
	Dec. 31	A Korea military attache office was set up in China.
1994	Jan 1	The service system of reserve forces was revised from the age limit system to the period system: the mobilization training period and time were reduced; the standby replacement system was abolished; the recruitment of standby reserves and public service personnel were newly established.
	March 18	The withdrawal of the PKO engineer battalion was completed.
	April 16	A Chinese military attache office to South Korea was set up.
	April 28	North Korea called for a new peace regime to replace the armistice.
	May 4	The ROK and Germany concluded an agreement on enhancing defense and military exchanges.
	May 24	The ROK and the Philippines concluded an MOU on logistics and defense industry cooperation.
	July 25	The first Asian Regional Forum (ARF) was held.
	Aug. 18	The ROK and the US agreed that the US 7th Fleet would belong to the United Nations Command (UNC) in a state of war on the peninsula.
	Sept. 6	The ROK Medical Care Support Group was sent to the Western Sahara.
	Oct. 6	PKO troops were dispatched to Georgia as military observers.
	Oct. 7	The 26th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington. At the talks, the two sides agreed on an FDO deployment in emergencies on the Korean peninsula.
	Oct. 21	The Agreed Framework was signed between the US and North Korea.
	Oct. 23	Former 2LT Cho, Chang-ho, who had been a POW in North Korea since the Korean War, escaped from North Korea and returned to the ROK, via China.
	Nov. 10	The PKO military observers were sent to India and Pakistan.
	Dec 1	The ROK Armed Forces took over peacetime operational command authority from the United Nations Forces.
	Dec. 24	Lee, Yang-ho was inaugurated as the 32nd Minister of National Defense.
1995	Feb. 28	Poland withdrew from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom under the pressure of withdrawing from Pyongyang.
	March 9	The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was set up.
	May 1	The ROK and Canada concluded an MOU in order to increase military exchanges and cooperation.
	May 5	The ROK and Poland concluded an MOU to enhance military exchanges and cooperation.
	June 19	The Aprok River Exercise was first carried out.
	Aug. 27	South Korea and Israel concluded an MOU to increase military exchanges and cooperation.
	Oct. 5	PKO engineer battalion was dispatched to Angola.
	Oct. 9	The ROK and Indonesia concluded an MOU on defense logistics and defense industry cooperation.
	Oct. 13	The ROK entered the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG).

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1995	Nov. 3	The 27th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Nov. 28	The christening ceremony and the trial flight of the first domestically-made military aircraft, the KT-1, Ung-bi.
	Dec. 15	A LWR treaty was concluded between KEDO and North Korea.
	Dec. 29	Part of the law on the establishment of academies was revised to open the door for the admission of women.
1996	March 28	The first Hokuk Exercise was conducted.
	April 4	North Korea announced that it would abandon its responsibilities to take part in managing the Demilitarized Zone.
	April 16	The ROK and the US presidents proposed Four-Party Talks for peace on the Korean peninsula.
	April 17	The first RSOI exercise was conducted.
	Sept. 18	A North Korean midget submarine and armed agents intruded into Kangnung.
	Oct. 1	The ROK entered the Australia Group (AG).
	Oct. 18	Kim Dong-jin was inaugurated as the 33rd Minister of National Defense.
	Oct. 21	The 1996 Seoul International Air Show was held.
	Nov. 1	The Korean military attache office was set up in Vietnam.
		The 28th annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Dec. 23	PKO engineer battalion was withdrawn from Angola.
1997	Jan. 1	The service term for stand-by reserves was curtailed from 28 months to 26.
	Jan. 13	The Integrated Defense Law was enacted.
	March 3	Women cadets first entered the ROK Air Force Academy.
	April 28	The ROK joined the CWC.
	June 30	The first domestically-made KF-16 was delivered.
	Sep. 24	The ROK joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
	Oct. 27	The ADD successfully test-fired the Chonma, a domestically-made, ground-to-air missile.
	Nov. 17	The ROK and Germany concluded an MOU on defense industry cooperation.
	Nov. 20	The ROK and Russia concluded an agreement on defense industry and logistics cooperation.
	Nov. 27	The ROK and Romania concluded an MOU on defense industry and logistics cooperation.
	Dec. 9	The first plenary session of the Four-Party Talks was held; the 29th annual ROK-US annual SCM was held in Seoul.
1998	March 4	Chun Yong-Taek was inaugurated as the 34th Minister of National Defense.
	April 15	The Defense Reform Committee was inaugurated.
	June 22	North Korea dispatched a midget submarine to Sokcho.
	June 23	The 1st General Officer-Level Talks were held at Panmujom.
	June 30	ADD succeeds in developing torpedoes for submarines or submersibles.
	July 9	The ROK MND minister met with his US counterpart.
	July 15	The ADD finished developing the Chonma missile.
	Aug. 31	North Korea launched the Taepodong-1 missile.
	Sept. 30	The ADD succeeded in developing a new model 155 mm self-propelled artillery.
	Sept. 31	The ROK MND Minister met with his Japanese counterpart.
	Oct. 13	The International Naval Review was opened.
	Oct. 26	The 1998 Seoul International Air Show was held.
	Nov. 27	The ROK and New Zealand concluded an agreement on logistics cooperation.
	Dec. 18	A North Korean semi-submersible craft infiltrates into South Korean waters in the Korea Strait.
	Dec. 31	The ADD succeeded in developing a military aircraft KT-1 for the first time.
1999	Jan. 7	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Japanese counterpart.
	Jan. 17	The 30th ROK-US annual SCM was held in Seoul.
	Feb. 2	The ROK and Great Britain concluded an MOU on data and scientist exchange between the two countries' MNDs.
	May 24	Cho Seong-Tae was inaugurated as the 35th Minister on National Defense.
	May 26	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Australian counterpart.
	June 15	The ROK and North Korean navies were engaged in a battle in the Yellow Sea.
	July 29	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his US counterpart.
	Aug. 2	The first 'Reconnaissance & salvage exercise for peace' between the naval forces of Korea and Japan
	Aug. 23	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Chinese counterpart.

Date		Contents
1999	Sept. 3	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Russian counterpart.
	Oct. 4	The PKO was dispatched to East Timor.
	Nov. 3	The 31st annual ROK-US SCM was held in Washington.
2000	Jan. 6	National Defense University, National War College, and National Defense Leadership Institute were merged into National Defense University.
	Jan. 20	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Chinese counterpart.
	March 18	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his US counterpart.
	March 23	North Korea declares integrated order in the five islands in the Northwest.
	May 16	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Russian counterpart.
	May 22	The ROK Minister of National Defense met with his Japanese counterpart.
	June 13	President Kim Dae-Jung visited Pyongyang for South-North Summit (June 13-15).
	Sep. 21	The 32nd annual ROK-US SCM was held in Seoul.
	Sep. 25	The South-North Defense Ministerial Talks was held in Cheju Island during Sep. 25 to 26.

Appendix 52

Previous Defense White Papers

Year	Contents	Major Data	Remarks
1967	**Structured by 6 chapters.** Ch1. Introduction. Ch2. International Situation. Ch3. The overall situation of the ROK National Defense. Ch4. Defense policy and enforcement of a policy. Ch5. The three services. Ch6. The ROK armed forces in Vietnam.	· Main unit drill. · The present condition of defense budget. · National benefits from the Vietnam war. · Enforcement process of compensation for commandeered properties. · Military support project for the people.	· The first publication. · Utilized in military.
1968	**Structured by 7 chapters.** Ch1. Introduction. Ch2. International situation. Ch3. Rehabilitation of the Korean domestic defense concept. Ch4. An aspect of North Korean invasion, general condition of military power, and latest tendency. Ch5. 1968 basic defense policy. Ch6. Detailed enforcement of policy of the three services. Ch7. 1970' s trend of defense policy.	· Organized the ministry of national defense. · Relationship with the national defenses the main international an agreement synopsis. · The present condition of defense budget. · A fixed amount table of accident compensation payment for the ROK solders in Vietnam. · A military salary table and a table of pension criterion. · Installation rule of the homeland reserve forces.	· Utilized in military. · The publication have been disconnected between 1969~1987.
1988	**Structured by 6 parts.** Ch1. Introduction. Ch2. Security environment. Ch3. Military preparedness. Ch4. Defense management. Ch5. Services. Ch6. Citizens' lives and national defense.	· The present military power condition of the main countries. · Support expenses for the U.S. forces in Korea. · North Korean conscription system. · Acceptance of a donated defense fund and a details of expenditures. · Growing steps of the Korean defense industry.	· Republication. · Open to the public. · First publication by the character of document. · Began sale in the market.
1989	**Structured by 14 chapters.** Ch1. The basic defense policy condition. Ch2. The military environment around the Korean peninsula. Ch3. North Korean military threat against South Korea. Ch4. Truce agreement system of Korean peninsula. Ch5. Military preparedness. Ch6. ROK and U.S. combined forces in a posture of defense. Ch7. Comparison between North and South Korean military powers. Ch8. Build up the self-reliance power of national defense. Ch9. Defense budget. Ch10. Defense procurement. Ch11. Reserved forces.	· The present condition of the main countries' military powers. · A military truce committee council on related matters. · The present condition of improves various laws and regulations. · The 21st SCM joint statement. · The present condition of ROK-U.S. defense cost sharing. (1988). · The realities of the main provocations from North Korea. · Introduction of a business program to promote scientific defense research. · Introduction of a memorial business of the Korean war.	· Published English version of Defense White Papers (1989~present).

Year	Contents	Major Data	Remarks
1989	Ch12. Betterment of personnel management system. Ch13. Conscription administration. Ch14. National convenience defense administration.	· Activity of a war history compilation history. · Activity of a support project for the people.	
1990	**Structured by 5 parts** 1. Introduction. 2. Security environment. 3. Military preparedness. 4. Defence management. 5. The people and the army.	· The present conditions of military force in major nations. · Procedure of weapon system acquirement. · Improvement of female officer personnel. · Results of the civil appeal simplification. · Main activities of all armed forces. · The armed forces athletics activity.	· Thesis of the '88 and '89 White Papers' basic points.
1991	**Structured by 6 parts** 1. Introduction. 2. International security environment. 3. Korean peninsula security environment. 4. Defense posture. 5. Defense management. 6. The people and the army.	· The current state of each nations military index worldwide. · Current state of major nuclear powers. · START/CFE reduction agreement. · Current condition of the GULF war participating nations. · North Koreas provocation towards the south.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1991-1992.
1992	**Structured by 5 parts** 1. Introduction. 2. Security environment and the military threat. 3. Military preparedness. 4. Defence management. 5. The people and the army.	· Chronology of UN peacekeeping. · KOREA/RUSSIAN, KOREA/CHINA Joint declaration of friendship. · SOUTH/NORTH basic agreement. · Joint statement concerning the denuclearizing on the Korean peninsula.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1992-1993.
1993	**Structured by 5 parts** 1. Introduction. 2. Security situation and threat evaluation. 3. Military preparedness. 4. Defense management. 5. The people and the military.	· Current condition of North Korea's nuclear related facilities. · Current comparison of the north-south military capabilities. · Influence of civilian technology in the military.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1993-1994.
1994		· PKF' s activity and achievements. · START I/II, CFE, NPT, CWC, MTCR, WHNS · Construction of the war memorial hall · Agency for defense development. · Introduction of the military cadet education.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1994-1995.
1995		· US/NK nuclear basic written agreement. · Korea/Russia memorandum of agreement concerning military exchange. · Record of rice sent to North Korea for assistance.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1995-1996.
1996		· Journal of the 50 years of ROK/US military relations.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1996-1997.

Year	Contents	Major Data	Remarks
1996	〃	· Journal of foreign military relations and co-operations. · Current day to day press briefings. · Intro of the National Defense College, KIDA and ADD.	〃
1997	**Structured by 6 parts** 1. National goals and Defense objectives. 2. Security Environment. 3. National Defense Policy. 4. Defense Posture. 5. Defense Management. 6. People and the military.	· Defense Burden sharing and the Trend of ROK support for the USFK. · IAEA. · Counter infiltration Operation in the Kangrung Area. · The present condition of the Defense Budget. · Comparison of the key countries the Defense Budget. · National Memorial Board.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1997-1998.
1998	**Structured by 5 parts**	· Europe Security. · The Present Condition of Combined and Joint Training. · A Historical study on sources that establishes Korea's Territorial Rights to Island of Tok-do Historic Consideration of Dok-Do. · Current Peacekeeping Operations. · Composition of MND Budget. · Cooperation of the Defense industry agreements current condition. · Status of Defense Industrial Products Exports.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1998. · Cover design changed (The color of the cover was change from white to blue and the symbol was input).
1999	1. Changes and Challenges of Security Environment. 2. Defense Policy and Posture for Peacekeeping. 3. Status and Tasks of National Defense. 4. Defense Reform for the 21st Century. 5. National Defense with the People.	· The Battle of Yonpyoung in the Yellow Sea. · Status of Global conflict in 1998. · Military Capabilities of Major countries · TMD system. · The main countries of RMA. · Status of international weapon exports and imports. · Plan of force capability for the main weapon system. · Comparison of Economic and Military capabilities between North and South Korea. · North Korea's Missile Development and Production. · Chronology of the General officer level Talks at Panmunjom. · Status of investment of the Defense Research and Development. · Innovation of the administration of draft. · Introduce the National Assembly NDC. · 1998 Public Opinion Poll on Security Consciousness. · Chronology of ROK National Defense.	· Noted in Defense White Paper 1999. · Plan of Major Weaponry full force capability (Announcement of level of magnification information). · BOX(conflict in Kosovo, North Korea's CBR warfare capability , NLL, etc.) detailed description introduction.